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TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(Senate - February 12, 1999)
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[Pages S1462-
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TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the statement that I am placing in the
record is the statement I would have given had I been permitted to
speak longer and in open session. During our closed deliberations, I
gave a similar, but abridged statement.
For almost two years, the President of the United States was engaged
in what he has come to describe as an ``inappropriate intimate''
relationship with a young woman who came to his attention as a White
House intern. He then lied about their relationship, publicly,
privately, formally, informally, to the press, to the country, and
under oath, for a period of about a year.
This course of conduct requires us to face four distinct questions.
First, we must determine if the material facts alleged in the
Articles of Impeachment have been established to our satisfaction.
Second, do the established facts constitute either obstruction of
justice or perjury, or both?
Third, are obstruction of justice and perjury high Crimes and
Misdemeanors under the Constitution?
And, fourth, even if the acts of the president are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors, are they of sufficient gravity to warrant his conviction
if it allows of no alternative other than his removal from office?
The first article of impeachment alleges that the President committed
perjury while testifying before the Starr grand jury. Although the
House Managers assert that his testimony is replete with false
statements, it is clear, at the least, that his representations about
the nature and details of his relationship with Miss Lewinsky are
literally beyond belief.
From November 1995, until March 1997, the President engaged in
repeated sexual activities with Monica Lewinsky, who was first a
volunteer at and then an employee of the White House and eventually the
Pentagon. Though he denies directly few of her descriptions of those
activities, he testified under oath that he did not have ``sexual
relations'' with her. His accommodation of this paradox is based on the
incredible claim that he did not touch Miss Lewinsky with any intent to
arouse or gratify anyone sexually, even though she performed oral sex
on him.
It seems to me strange that any rational person would conclude that
the President's description of his relationship with Miss Lewinsky did
not constitute perjury.
In addition, while we are not required to reach our decision on these
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, I have no reasonable doubt that the
President committed perjury on a second such charge when he told the
grand jury that the purpose of the five statements he made to Mrs.
Currie after his Jones deposition was to refresh his own memory.
The President knew that each statement was a lie. His goal was to get
Mrs. Currie to concur in those lies.
The other allegations of perjury are either unproven--particularly
those requiring a strict incorporation of the president's Jones
deposition testimony into his grand jury testimony--or are more
properly considered solely--with those already discussed--as elements
of the obstruction of justice charges in Article II.
To determine that the president perjured himself at least twice,
however, is not to decide the ultimate question of guilt on Article I.
That I will discuss later.
All the material allegations of Article II seem to me to be well
founded. Four of them, however, those regarding the president's
encouraging Miss Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and then to give
false testimony, those regarding the president's failure to correct his
attorney's false statements to the Jones court, and those bearing upon
the disposal of his gifts to her are not, in my mind, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Again, I do not believe this standard to be required
in impeachment trials, but because I believe that the other three
factual allegations of Article II do meet that standard, I adopt it for
the purposes of this discussion.
(1) From the time she was transferred to the Pentagon in April, 1996,
Miss Lewinsky had pestered the president about returning to work at the
White House, and, other than some vague referrals, until October 1,
1997, the President had done nothing to make this
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happen and little to help her find another job.
On the first of October, 1997, the president was served with
interrogatories in the Jones case asking about his sexual relationships
with women other than his wife, and during the rest of October the
President and his agents stepped up their efforts to find Miss Lewinsky
a job. Three weeks later, on October 21, the United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, called Miss Lewinsky personally
to schedule an interview in her apartment complex, though apparently he
interviewed no one else. Shortly after this unusual interview, the
Ambassador created a new position in New York and offered it to Miss
Lewinsky.
What is perhaps most striking about the U.N. job is not even how
promptly it materialized, nor that the United States Ambassador was so
personally involved in hiring a young woman with precious little job
experience, but that Ambassador Richardson held the specially crafted
sinecure open for two months while the former intern kept him waiting
on her decision.
When Miss Lewinsky decided that she preferred the private sector, the
president enlisted the help one of his closest personal friends, one of
the most influential men in the United States, Vernon Jordan. Miss
Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan in early November. Mr. Jordan, who was
acting at the President's behest, apparently did not fully appreciate
how important it was for him to cater to Miss Lewinsky, and took no
action for a month.
The President and Mr. Jordan realized, however, on December 5, 1997,
the importance of satisfying Miss Lewinsky 's fancy when her name
appeared on the Jones witness list. Before that date, the President
needed Miss Lewinsky only to commit a lie of omission--simply to
refrain from making their relationship public. Her appearance on the
witness list now meant that she would have to lie under oath.
Fully appreciative of the higher stakes, the President redoubled his
efforts and those of his agents to find Miss Lewinsky a job and keep
her in his camp. In the weeks after Miss Lewinsky's name appeared on
the witness list, Mr. Jordan kept the President apprised of his efforts
to find work for her in the private sector. He called his contacts at
American Express, Young & Rubicam, and MacAndrews & Forbes (Revlon's
parent corporation). When Miss Lewinsky was subpoenaed on December 19,
1997, to be deposed in the Jones case, Mr. Jordan oversaw the
preparation of the affidavit that the President had suggested she file
in lieu of testifying. On January 7, 1997, Miss Lewinsky signed the
affidavit, which she later admitted was false, denying that she had a
``sexual relationship'' with the President. On January 8, she
interviewed with MacAndrew & Forbes. When she told Mr. Jordan that she
had done poorly, he called the Chairman of the Board, Ronald Perelman,
to recommend Miss Lewinsky, whom he commended as ``this bright young
girl, who I think is terrific.'' As a result of this conversation, Miss
Lewinsky was called back for another interview with MacAndrews the
following day and given an informal offer. On January 9, she reported
this to Mr. Jordan, who called Mrs. Currie with the message, ``mission
accomplished'' and then called the President himself to share his
success.
The President's lawyers arranged for Miss Lewinsky's affidavit to be
filed on January 14, 1998. After this date, although Miss Lewinsky did
not end up with a job in the private sector, neither the President nor
Mr. Jordan, who so resolutely pursued their earlier mission, lifted a
finger to help the ``bright * * * terrific'' young woman. Why? Because
shortly thereafter the fiction of the president's platonic relationship
with Lewinsky had exploded. Monica Lewinsky was the same Monica
Lewinsky, but she now could no longer protect the President.
It is impossible to reconcile the President's course of conduct with
any purpose other than to preclude Miss Lewinsky's truthful testimony
in the Jones case, or, indeed, to prevent her testifying at all. The
case for obstruction of justice is clear. Obstruction was the
President's only motive.
(2) Next we have the Currie conversation--a set of statements by the
President in the nominal form of questions, addressed by the President
to Mrs. Currie on the Sunday evening following his Jones deposition
when she was called to the White House at an extraordinary time and for
apparently a single purpose. We are all familiar now with the questions
he posed:
``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
``You could see and hear everything, right?''
``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''
Those five statements have a single common thread: the President knew
each and every one of them to have been totally false.
Had Mrs. Currie been willing to confirm the President's suggestions,
she would have been a devastatingly effective witness for him.
There is no reasonable explanation of this incident other than it is
the President's clear attempt to obstruct justice, both in the Jones
case and in the subsequent grand jury investigation.
(3) The false self-serving statements by the President to senior
members of his staff, to his cabinet, and to the American people just
after his affair became public present a somewhat different face. It is
reasonably clear that, at the time at which they were made, the
President's goal, at least in part, was to save face with his staff and
put a less humiliating spin on the Lewinsky matter. At the same time,
coupled with his public statements, the President's assertions to his
staff were designed to influence their testimony at some future time
and place and to enlist them in disguising his conduct. In fact, they
did obstruct the grand jury investigation. The President's manipulation
of friendly witnesses to testify falsely, if unknowingly, extended for
months until the DNA evidence shattered both his public and private
positions.
The President's attempt to derail the Independent Counsel's inquiry--
an inquiry the very purpose of which was to discover whether the
President gave false testimony and tampered with witnesses--by lying to
his colleagues, his cabinet, his confidantes, the media, the American
people, and ultimately, the grand jury, is--beyond a reasonable doubt--
a wide-ranging and highly public obstruction of justice, deeply
damaging to the judicial fabric of the United States.
One final note: to the extent that there are unresolved questions of
fact, almost every one of them could be resolved by truthful and
complete testimony by the President himself. That is a course of action
he spectacularly avoided both in his Jones deposition and before the
Starr grand jury. Now, he refuses to answer interrogatories from
Senator Lott and refuses to appear at this trial to testify on his own
behalf.
Under the circumstances, is it not appropriate to infer that to tell
the truth would be to confirm all of the questionable charges against
him? I have not done so for the purposes of this argument, and have
considered only those charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
president's silence allows the inference that every one of the factual
charges by the House managers is true.
With sufficient material facts alleged in the two Articles of
Impeachment either essentially uncontested or established by
overwhelming evidence, and with those facts clearly constituting both
perjury and obstruction, we arrive at the third question before the
Senate. Are perjury and obstruction of justice high Crimes and
Misdemeanors under the impeachment clause of the Constitution?
This is the easiest of the four questions to answer. Perjury and
crimes less serious than obstruction of justice have always and
properly been considered high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
In 1986 Judge Claiborne was convicted by the Senate and removed from
office for filing a false income tax return under penalties of perjury.
By a vote of 90 to 7, the Senate rejected his argument that he should
not be convicted because filing a false return was irrelevant to his
performance as a judge. In 1989, Judge Nixon was convicted by the
Senate and removed from office for perjury: in fact, for lying under
oath to a grand jury. And in that same year, Judge Hastings was
convicted of lying under oath and removed
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by the Senate even though he had already been acquitted in a criminal
trial. (It is generally recognized that an act need not be criminal in
order to be impeachable.) As these examples illustrate, perjury is and
historically has been a sufficient cause for conviction and removal.
Although no person has been convicted and removed for obstruction of
justice, the nature and gravity of this crime, punished more harshly
under our laws than bribery, clearly is also a sufficient cause for
conviction and removal.
Most of the Senate's precedents, of course, are based on the
impeachment trials of judges. President Clinton argues that those
precedents should not apply; that presidents, who hold the highest
office in the land, should benefit from a lower standard for removal
than the judges they appoint and the military officers they command.
This President would have presidents remain in office for acts that
have resulted in the dismissal of military officers under his command,
in the removal of judges, and for acts that would have resulted in the
removal of Senators like Bob Packwood, who, like the President, are
popularly elected for a fixed term. As House Manager Canady has pointed
out, the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry
concluded that the constitutional provision stating that judges would
hold office during ``good Behaviour,'' does not limit the relevance of
judges' impeachments with respect to standards for presidential
impeachments. The President's argument that he should be held to a
lower standard than judges, military officers and Senators has no basis
in the Constitution, in precedent, in equity, or in common sense.
The fourth and ultimate question, nevertheless, is considerably more
difficult to answer. For me, the proof of material facts supporting
some of the allegations is overwhelming, the proposition that the
established facts of the President's conduct constitute perjury and
obstruction of justice almost impossible to deny, and the conclusion
that perjury and obstruction of justice are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors a given.
But the inevitable result of a guilty verdict in this trial is the
President's removal from office, and I believe that reasonable minds
can differ on whether or not that consequence is appropriate. So does
at least one of the House Managers. In answering the question of
whether removal is too drastic a remedy for these alleged acts of
perjury and obstruction of justice, Lindsey Graham, one of the most
thoughtful Managers, stated that great minds may not necessarily agree
on the question of whether, for the good of the nation, one should or
should not remove this President for these high crimes. Removal, he
said, is the equivalent of the political death penalty, and the death
penalty is not imposed for every felony. Considerations such as
repentance and the impact of removal on society should also be
considered. (Mr. Graham's view was not , incidentally, that reasonable
minds could differ on any of the first three questions that I have
outlined, but only on the ultimate question of removal.)
While removal upon conviction has not always been considered
inevitable, I agree that Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
requires a mandatory sentence of removal upon conviction of high Crimes
and Misdemeanors. Nevertheless, a number of thoughtful commentators,
and at least a few members of this Senate, have already decided that
removal is too drastic a sanction. These commentators and members--who
are convinced, perhaps, that the President committed perjury and
obstruction of justice, which, as classes of crime, are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors--may nevertheless vote not to convict because they believe
that removal from office is unwarranted for this perjury and this
obstruction of justice.
I share that conclusion with respect to Article I, but not Article
II.
On Article I I have decided, with some regret, that the instances of
perjury I believe were established beyond a reasonable doubt are
offenses insufficient for removing the President from office--based on
the gravity of the offenses as against the drastic nature of removal.
Equally important is the fact that these instances of perjury are also
elements of the obstruction of justice charges in Article II. One
conviction for the same acts of perjury is enough.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that one other reflection must precede a
decision based on the belief that removal is disproportionate to the
gravity of the offenses established here, and that is: what are the
consequences of a not guilty finding by the Senate? The consequences
are, of course, no sanction whatsoever.
It is precisely because the absence of any sanction is so
objectionable to those who choke over removal that there has been such
a spirited search for a third way. But, fellow Senators, there is no
third way. There is no third way.
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution states: ``Judgment in Cases
of Impeachment shall extend no further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States * * *.''
The drafters did not intend to allow Congress to choose among a range
of punishments analogous to those available to the judiciary, and for
this reason they specified that the impeached party was to remain
subject to judicial process and specifically limited to two--removal
and disqualification--the sanctions that Congress could apply.
We must, I believe, by reason of this harsh choice consciously forced
on us at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, weigh seriously the
effect on the Republic of either of our two possible courses of action.
Will the Republic be strengthened, or will it be weakened, by
determining that a president shall remain in its most exalted office
after perjuring himself and obstructing the pursuit of justice both of
a private citizen and of a federal grand jury, in a case occasioned by
the president's sexual activities? Will the Republic be strengthened or
weakened by removing the President from office by an impeachment
conviction for this perjury and this obstruction?
Early in our history an incident involving one of the authors of the
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, shows clearly the bright line
between, on the one hand, a private sexual scandal, and on the other, a
public obligation--a line the president has intentionally crossed.
In No. 65 of the Federalist Papers, Mr. Hamilton described
impeachable offenses as ``those offences which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to
injuries done immediately to the society itself.'' The president's
defenders place great reliance on this explanation.
Within four years of the composition of this essay, Mr. Hamilton had
an opportunity to reflect on his own words. In the summer of 1791,
Hamilton, then the Secretary of the Treasury, had an adulterous affair
with a Maria Reynolds. Her husband discovered the affair and demanded a
job in the Treasury Department. Though Secretary Hamilton turned him
down, he did pay blackmail from his personal funds.
A year later, three Congressmen, all politically opposed to Hamilton,
learned of the payments, suspected that they might involve Treasury
funds, and confronted Hamilton. Despite the tremendous political
advantage the story, which eventually leaked, offered them, he
immediately and without hesitation told them the truth and nothing but
the truth.
The author of Federalist No. 65 knew very well the distinction
between a private scandal and the profound embarrassment arising out of
its publication--and the violation of a public duty in an attempt to
avoid that embarrassment. He chose not to use his Treasury position in
a way that would justify an impeachment. The personal cost was immense
and he assumed it without blinking.
President Clinton could hardly have chosen a more different course of
action. He chose to violate both his oath of office and his oath as a
witness, using his office, his staff and his position to try to avoid
personal embarrassment. In any event even the personal consequences for
him have been far worse than those visited upon Alexander Hamilton. But
it is our duty to determine whether he merits a drastic public
sanction--or none at all.
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Some will say that the President can be charged with crimes related
to this affair after his term of office is over.
First, such charges lie outside our jurisdiction or duty.
Second, such charges seem to me to be unlikely if we acquit the
President, or in any event.
But third, and most important, let us assume that President Clinton
is charged, convicted, and sentenced in 2001. What a devastating
judgment on the Senate of the United States that would be! We ourselves
would be convicted, by history and forever, of having permitted a felon
who abused his office in committing his felonies to remain in office as
President of the United States for two long years.
I simply cannot imagine any Senator willing to carry that burden of
conscience.
No, we must choose between the sanction of removal and no sanction at
all. We know how Alexander Hamilton would vote today on our question.
We know how James Madison, one of Hamilton's interrogators and the
careful author of the impeachment provision, would have voted. And
merely to call up the name of George Washington is to answer the
question of how he would vote.
The Republic will not be weakened if we convict. The policies of the
presidency will not change. The Administration will not change.
But if we acquit; if we say that some perjuries, some obstructions of
justice, some clear and conscious violations of a formal oath are free
from our sanction, the Republic and its institutions will be weakened.
One exception or excuse will lead to another, the right of the most
powerful of our leaders to act outside the law--or in violation of the
law--will be established. Our republican institutions will be seriously
undermined. They have been undermined already, and the damage accrues
to all equally--Republicans, Democrats, liberals, and conservatives.
If there is one thing this President can be relied on to do, it is to
put his interests before those of his office and of the Republic.
President Clinton has debased the presidency now and, if he is allowed
to remain in office, the low level to which he has brought the
presidency will continue, and that is not tolerable.
I cannot will to my children and grandchildren the proposition that a
president stands above the law and can systematically obstruct justice
simply because both his polls and the Dow Jones index are high.
Our duty in this case is as unpleasant as it was unsought. But our
duty is clear. It was imposed on us, by history, without equivocation,
212 years ago. It requires us to convict the President of Article II of
these Articles of Impeachment. And that is how I vote, with clear
conscience and saddened heart.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, like many others, the
day the President wagged his finger at the American people and
indicated he had not been involved with Ms. Lewinsky, I had the sense
that he wasn't telling the truth and I felt some genuine regret. The
President and I began here in Washington in the same month, in 1993. I
had high hopes and actually felt very close to what he was trying to
accomplish. So all along in this process, I have had to fight an urge
to personalize that regret in a way that would affect my ability to do
my job in this impeachment trial. And I will tell you that taking that
separate oath helped me get into the mindset necessary to do that task.
But let me say that I do regret that the President's public conduct--
not his private conduct--has brought us to this day.
But we are here, and I want to take a minute to praise my colleagues
on the process. I think it would have been unfortunate had we not had
any witness testimony--at least in the form of deposition testimony. I
think it would have been an unfortunate historical precedent. I found
the video testimony helpful. I didn't enjoy it, but I found it helpful
in clarifying some of the things that I was thinking about. So I am
glad, on balance, that we did not dismiss the case at the time it was
first suggested.
But as we get to the final stage and get immersed in the law and
facts of this case, it is too easy to forget the most salient fact
about this entire matter, and that is one simple fact that many others
have mentioned: In November 1996, 47 million Americans voted to reelect
President Clinton. The people hired him. They are the hiring authority.
An impeachment is a radical undoing of that authority. The people hire
and somehow, under this process, the Congress can fire. So, I caution
against, with all due respect to the excellent arguments made, the
attempt to analogize this to an employee-employer relationship, or a
military situation, or even the situation of judges--those situations
are all clearly different. Along with the choice of the Vice President,
in no other case, do the American people choose one person, and in no
other case can a completely different authority undo that choice.
Having said that, the Presidential conduct in this case, in my view,
does come perilously close to justifying that extreme remedy. There
really have been three Presidential impeachments in our Nation's
history. I see this one as being in the middle. The Andrew Johnson case
is usually considered by historians to have been a relatively weak
case. President Johnson had a different interpretation of the
constitutionality of the statute that he believed allowed him to remove
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton. He was not convicted, and
subsequently the U.S. Supreme Court, I believe, ruled that in fact that
was constitutional. I see that as having been a relatively weak case.
The case of Richard Nixon, in my view, was a pretty strong case,
involving a 1972 Presidential election and attempts to get involved
with the aspects of that election--frankly--an attempt to cover up what
happened during that 1972 election. I think that had more to do with
core meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
This is a closer case; this is a close case. In that sense, it may be
the most important of the three Presidential impeachments, in terms of
the law of impeachment, as we go into the future. I agree neither with
the House managers who say their evidence is ``overwhelming,'' nor with
the President's counsel who says the evidence against the President is
``nonexistent.'' The fact is, this is a hard case, and sometimes they
say that hard cases make bad law. But we cannot afford to have this be
bad law for the Nation's sake.
So how do we decide? There have been a lot of helpful suggestions,
but one thing that has been important to me is the way the House
presented their case. That doesn't bind us, but they did suggest that
two Federal statutes had been violated. Mr. Manager McCollum said that,
``You must first determine if a Federal crime has occurred.'' Many
others have said that. I will reiterate a point. If that is the
approach you want to take, then it is clear, in my view as one Senator,
that you must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, you are
using the power and the opprobrium of the Federal criminal law as a
sword but refusing to let the President and the defense counsel have
the shield of the burden of proof that is required in the criminal law.
I do not have time to discuss the perjury count this afternoon, but
will do so in a longer presentation for the Record. Suffice it to say I
do not believe the managers have met their burden of proving perjury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to obstruction of justice, the President did come perilously
close. Three quick observations make me conclude that, in fact, he did
not commit obstruction of justice beyond a reasonable doubt. First, I
am very concerned about the conversations between the President and
Betty Currie concerning the specifics of his relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky. But the critical question there is intent. Was his intent
about avoiding discovery by his family and the political problems
involved? Or was the core issue trying to avoid the Jones proceeding
and the consequences of that?
I don't think it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Jones proceeding was the President's concern. Perhaps Ms. Currie could
have shed some light on this. That is why I was extremely puzzled when
the House managers didn't call Betty Currie. Let me be the first to say
that I don't think in this instance the House managers ``wanted to win
too badly.'' I don't think they wanted to win badly enough to take the
chance of calling Betty Currie, a crucial witness.
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I was very concerned about the false affidavit until I saw Ms.
Lewinsky's Senate deposition testimony. I am persuaded that you cannot
say beyond a reasonable doubt that she was urged by the President to
make a false statement in that affidavit.
Finally, I was very concerned about the hiding of the gifts. And
maybe every one will disagree with me on this. But when I watched her
testimony, I thought Ms. Lewinsky was the most indefinite about whether
or not she had gotten that call from Ms. Currie than any other part of
her testimony. I happen to believe that Ms. Lewinsky was the one who
was the most concerned about the gifts. And I believe a showing beyond
a reasonable doubt has not been made that the President masterminded
the hiding of the gifts.
So I cannot deny what Representative Graham said: If you call
somebody up at 2:30 in the morning you are probably up to no good. But
if you call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning you have not necessarily
accomplished the crime of obstruction of justice.
I realize there is a separate question of whether these same acts by
the President, apart from the Federal criminal law, constitute high
crimes and misdemeanors. I do not. I will discuss that in more detail
in a future statement in the Record.
But I would like to conclude by just talking a little bit about this
impeachment issue in the modern context. When I say that the vote in
1996 is the primary issue, I don't just mean that in terms of the
rights of people. I mean it in terms of the goal of the Founding
Fathers, and our goal today; that is, political stability in this
country. We don't want a parliamentary system. And we don't want an
overly partisan system.
I see the 4-year term as a unifying force of our Nation. Yet, this is
the second time in my adult lifetime that we have had serious
impeachment proceedings, and I am only 45 years old. This only occurred
once in the entire 200 years prior to this time. Is this a fluke? Is it
that we just happened to have had two ``bad men'' as Presidents? I
doubt it. How will we feel if sometime in the next 10 years a third
impeachment proceeding occurs in this country so we will have had three
within 40 years?
I see a danger in this in an increasingly diverse country. I see a
danger in this in an increasingly divided country. And I see a danger
in this when the final argument of the House manager is that this is a
chapter in an ongoing ``culture war'' in this Nation. That troubles me.
I hope that is not where we are and hope that is not where we are
heading.
It is best not to err at all in this case. But if we must err, let us
err on the side of avoiding these divisions, and let us err on the side
of respecting the will of the people.
Let me conclude by quoting James W. Grimes, one of the seven
Republican Senators who voted not to acquit Andrew Johnson. I
discovered this speech, and found out that the Chief Justice had
already discovered and quoted him, and said he was one of the three of
the ablest of the seven. Grimes said this in his opinion about why he
wouldn't convict President Johnson:
I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the
Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable
President. Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I
cannot consent to trifle with the high office he holds. I can
do nothing which, by implication, may be construed as an
approval of impeachment as a part of future political
machinery.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. If a university president, a minister or priest,
general or admiral, or a corporate chief executive had engaged in a
sexual relationship with an intern under his charge, he would lose his
position, with scant attention paid to whether or not such a
relationship were ``consensual.'' We place in certain individuals so
great a measure of trust that they are seen as acting essentially in
loco parentis.
The question before us today is: Should the President of the United
States be held to a lower standard?
The answer is: No. To the contrary; we can bestow no higher honor
than to select one individual to represent us all as President. In one
person we endow the character of our nation, as the head of state and
the head of government.
It's with great disappointment, but firm resolve, that I have
concluded the President has not lived up to this high standard and that
he should be removed from office. The House managers have demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt that, in addition to indefensible behavior with
an intern, which was not illegal, the President engaged in the
obstruction of justice and, as an element of that obstruction,
committed perjury before a federal grand jury, which is.
This case began as an alleged civil rights violation of a young woman
who came to the bar seeking justice. The Supreme Court unanimously
decided to permit her case against the President to go forward. It was
that case which led to the revelations regarding the President's
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the White House intern.
Incredibly, an element of the President's defense is that we should
take the long view. We are told by the President's defenders that we
should not judge his actions toward one individual, in which he schemed
to impede her ability to seek redress, because his overall actions on
civil rights are so positive. We are asked not to judge his treatment
of one woman, or two women, but to evaluate his policies that affect
all women.
Would the President's defenders forgive a school teacher who molests
a student, simply because the teacher's classes are popular and his
students all go on to college? Should we ignore the police officer who
personally enriches himself by accepting graft, so long as his arrest
record is high? Would we look away from the corporate executive who
illegally profits from insider information, as long as his shareholders
are happy with the return on their investment? We would not sustain
civil society for long with such moral relativism as our guide.
The President had it solely within his power to keep the country from
the course on which it has been for the past year. First, of course, he
could have chosen not to engage in the behavior in question. Having
behaved as he did, though, and having been discovered, the President
could have acknowledged his own actions and accepted the consequences.
This could have been an honorable resignation, or an admission,
contrition, and a firm resolve to take responsibility; with a request
for resolution in a manner short of impeachment and trial.
Instead, the President chose to deny the allegations, and fight them
with a coordinated scheme of manipulation and obstruction. He lied
outright to the American people, to his close associates, and to his
cabinet. An enduring image of this whole tale will be his finger-
pointing lie to the American people, even after admonishing us to
listen closely, because he didn't want to have to say it again.
Even in view of these actions, the President missed numerous
opportunities to right this matter and get it behind him and the
country. At virtually every opportunity, though, he chose an action
that further prolonged the matter and led directly to his impeachment.
The President chose to impede the pursuit of justice by the
Independent Counsel, who was given the authority to investigate this
matter by the President's own Attorney General.
The President chose to construct a cover story with Ms. Lewinsky,
should their relationship become public.
The President chose to direct his personal staff to retrieve items
from Ms. Lewinsky that he knew were under subpoena in a federal
investigation.
The President chose to seek the assistance of friends to find a job
for Ms. Lewinsky, and to intensify that job search when it became clear
that Ms. Lewinsky had become a target of the civil suit against him.
The President chose to lie to his staff about the nature of his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky herself, with the expectation that these
lies would become part of the public perception.
And, the President chose to lie before a federal grand jury about his
actions with regard to some of the elements of obstruction of justice,
including the concealment of the gifts that were likely to become
evidence in the civil case against him.
As a result of these choices by the President of the United States,
the Senate was left with no choice other than to confront the charges
and hear the case pursuant to the President's impeachment in the House
of Representatives.
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In so doing, the Senate conducted a fair and expeditious trial. We
rejected the idea of an early test vote that would have truncated the
process. We rejected the motion for an early dismissal. The Senate is
fulfilling its Constitutional responsibility to hold a trial with a
complete evidentiary record and a final vote on each article of
impeachment sent to the Senate by the House of Representatives.
Through skillful use of the written record compiled by the
Independent Counsel, videotaped depositions, and hard evidence, the
House managers presented a compelling case. The case for perjury was
difficult. The President's testimony before the Grand Jury was guarded.
He was fully aware of the evidence the prosecutors had with respect to
this case. He chose his words carefully. He admitted his relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky before the Grand Jury, but did so only after
confronted with clinical evidence of its existence.
But he lied to the Grand Jury to deny other key facts. He perjured
himself as an element of a broader attempt to obstruct justice. There
are two false statements that are the most persuasive. First, when
asked if he directed Betty Currie to retrieve gifts from Ms. Lewinsky,
he stated unequivocally, ``No sir, I did not do that.''
The facts are contrary to that allegation. Ms. Lewinsky testified
that Betty Currie called her to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky give her the
gifts. We have cellular telephone records that indicate a call from Ms.
Currie to Ms. Lewinsky at about the time the gifts were picked up. It
was clear that Ms. Currie initiated a retrieval of the gifts at the
direction of the President, for this was the only source of information
she had that there were gifts. The evidence is overwhelming that the
President directed Betty Currie to retrieve these gifts. Thus, his
statement is false. Not only is this perjury, it is obstruction of
justice.
The President also lied before the Grand Jury about his conversations
with White House aides regarding Ms. Lewinsky. He testified that ``I
said to them things that were true about this relationship.'' We know
this to be completely false from the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal,
who stated directly and unequivocally that the President had lied to
him about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
The legal standard for perjury is high. Under Section 18 U.S.C.
1623(a), a person is guilty of perjury if he or she knowingly makes a
false, material statement under oath in a federal court or Grand Jury.
I believe these statements were false, intentional and material in that
they attempt to put a false impression on key events in a series of
attempts to obstruct justice. In effect, the President knew his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was shameful, but not necessarily
illegal. But he knew his obstruction of justice was illegal--so he lied
about it to a Grand Jury.
In many ways, obstruction of justice is even more corrosive than
perjury to the machinery of our legal system. As the target of a grand
jury and an independent prosecutor, the President has defended himself
against charges of perjury by claiming he was caught off guard, was
misinterpreted, was attempting to mislead but not lie.
Obstruction of justice, though, is a quite different matter. It is an
affirmative act that occurs at the person's own initiative; in this
case, the President. It involves actions taken that were not instigated
by anyone else.
It has been said in his defense that the President did not initiate
his perjury in that he was led to it by the prosecutor. But there is no
similar argument regarding Article II, the Obstruction of Justice.
Without the affirmative actions of the President, there would have been
no Article II.
The President sought out Mr. Blumenthal to tell his misleading story
about the nature of his relationship and the character of Ms. Lewinsky.
Separately, the President enlisted his personal secretary to further
his obstruction of justice. He asked Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts.
He summoned her to coach her testimony under the guise of ``trying to
figure out what the facts were.'' He did so within hours after coming
back to the White House on January 17th from his deposition in the
civil sexual harassment lawsuit. He required a face-to-face meeting
with her the next day, a Sunday. It couldn't be done over the phone,
and it couldn't wait until Monday. It was clear he needed her to
reaffirm his false testimony. This is obstruction of justice.
The edifice of American jurisprudence rests on the foundation of the
due process of law. The mortar in that foundation is the oath. Those
who seek to obstruct justice weaken that foundation, and those who
violate the oath would tear the whole structure down.
Every day, thousands of citizens in thousands of courtrooms across
America are sworn in as jurors, as grand jurors, as witnesses, as
defendants. On those oaths rest the due process of law upon which all
of our other rights are based.
The oath is how we defend ourselves against those who would subvert
our system by breaking our laws. There are Americans in jail today
because they violated that oath. Others have prevailed at the bar of
justice because of that oath.
What would we be telling Americans--and those worldwide who see in
America what they can only hope for in their own countries--if the
Senate of the United States were to conclude: The President lied under
oath as an element of a scheme to obstruct the due process of law, but
we chose to look the other way?
I cannot make that choice. I cannot look away. I vote ``Guilty'' on
Article I, Perjury. I vote ``Guilty'' on Article II, Obstruction of
Justice.
I ask unanimous consent an analysis of the Articles of Impeachment be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Analysis of the Articles of Impeachment
(By Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison)
``Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to
the trial of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton,
president of the United States, now pending, you will do
impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws: So
help you God?''
When the Chief Justice of the United States administered
this oath and I signed my name to it on January 7, 1999, as
one of one hundred triers of fact and law in the Court of
Impeachment of the President of the United States, I did so
with a heavy heart, but with a clear mind.
That solemn occasion in the well of this Senate, and the
weight of the burden imposed on us as ``jurors'' in only the
second such proceeding in the history of our Nation, reminded
me with vivid clarity that our Constitution belongs to all of
us.
I was reminded as well, however, that the laws of our
Country are applicable to us all, including the President,
and they must be obeyed. The concept of equal justice under
law and the importance of absolute truth in legal proceedings
is the foundation of our justice system in the courts.
In this proceeding, I have drawn conclusions about the
facts as I see them, and I have applied the law to those
facts as I understand that law to be.
underlying facts leading to this proceeding
The details of an intimate personal relationship that
occurred during the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 between the
President of the United States and a 22 year-old female White
House Intern who was directly under his command and control
have been chronicled throughout the world and are described
in thousands of pages of evidence and materials filed with
both the House and the Senate in this case and in bookstores
across America. They involved intimate sexual relations
within the White House, personal gifts, jobs within and
outside of government, and ``missions accomplished.'' The
underlying details will not be repeated by me here.
While some facts about that relationship and the timing of
some events were disputed at the trial in the Senate, their
essence has been publicly admitted by the President, by his
Counsel, and by the Intern in written or verbal form,
including sworn testimony in various forms.
However inappropriate the behavior of the President was,
the legal issues in the impeachment trial do not deal with
this relationship. All accusations against the President here
relate instead to alleged attempts to prevent the disclosure
of this relationship in a pending civil rights lawsuit
against the President in an Arkansas Federal court and to the
public. That is the critical factor that has brought us to
this extraordinary moment in our Nation's history when we are
considering whether or not to remove from office the
President of the United States.
core facts leading to the articles of impeachment
In May, 1994, a female citizen and employee of the State of
Arkansas filed a lawsuit in an Arkansas Federal District
Court, alleging, in summary, that, in 1991 while President
Clinton was Governor of Arkansas, the Governor committed the
civil offense of sexual harassment against her by insisting
that she perform sexual acts identical or similar to those
later performed by the Intern.
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In the course of preparing for the trial of the Arkansas
case, the plaintiff, with the consent of the presiding
Federal Judge, attempted to develop evidence that defendant
Clinton had, before and afterward, engaged in patterns of
conduct that were similar to the allegations of the plaintiff
in the case.
In December, 1997, the Arkansas Judge ordered defendant
Clinton to answer a written interrogatory naming every state
and federal employee with whom he had had sexual relations
since 1986. President Clinton answered: ``none.''
In an alleged attempt to avoid giving a personal deposition
in the case pursuant to a December, 1997, subpoena, the White
House Intern, who had since become employed at the Pentagon,
on January 7, 1998, signed an affidavit denying any sexual
relationship with President Clinton. Six days later, on
January 13, the Intern accepted a job offer at a major
corporation in New York City. A friend called the President
shortly thereafter with the message: ``Mission
accomplished.''
While the President was giving his own deposition in the
Arkansas case, his counsel tendered this affidavit to the
Arkansas Federal Court, referred to it, and vouched for its
accuracy in the presence of the President. The President,
knowing the affidavit to be false, sat by and said nothing.
The President's counsel subsequently advised the Court that
this affidavit was not reliable and should be ignored.
Defendant Clinton was subpoenaed to give the above-
mentioned deposition in the case and did so on January 17,
1998. In a rare event, the Arkansas Judge attended for the
purpose of supervising the deposition of the President in a
Washington lawyer's offices. While there, the Judge and
participating counsel for the parties, either knowingly or
unknowingly, formulated a definition of the meaning of the
words ``sexual relations'' to exclude certain forms of human
contact that in their commonly accepted meaning would be
included. But, allegedly upon the basis of this definition,
President Clinton denied, under oath, among other things,
that he had sexual relations with the Intern.
On January 21, 1998, the existence of an alleged
inappropriate relationship between the President and the
White House Intern blazed across the Nation from a story
first published in the Washington Post carrying the headline:
``Clinton Accused of Urging Aid to Lie; Starr Probes Whether
President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to (plaintiff's)
Lawyers.''
Evidence introduced and debated by the House Managers and
the President's Counsel in the Senate painted a picture of
frantic activities within and without the White House
throughout the month before and during the week following
this public disclosure, by the President, by his friends, by
White House staff and employees, and others. It was alleged,
among other things, that the President coached, manipulated,
and influenced false testimony of witnesses, including the
Intern, engineered the hiding of gifts and evidence that was
subject to subpoena, lied to his staff and friends about the
facts in order to assure that they would give false testimony
in public and legal proceedings, manipulated the Intern into
signing the false affidavit in the Arkansas Federal Court,
and, after failures to obtain employment for her elsewhere,
rewarded the Intern by obtaining for her an out-of-town job
in return for her cooperative falsehoods or silence. The
sequence and importance of such activities, much of which is
not disputed in the evidence, were debated aggressively by
the House Mangers and the President's Counsel in the Senate,
but the essence of those activities was not seriously denied.
After numerous public denials immediately after the public
disclosure, and after several days of alleged ``damage
control'' designed to synchronize false stories to be
provided by various parties in response to all inquiries, and
event of major, historic, and future national importance
occurred.
On January 26, 1998, the President addressed the Nation
about this issue at a press conference in Washington, since
replayed in television broadcasts thousands of times. On that
occasion, the President looked sternly into the camera and
pointed his finger directly at the American people and
stated:
``I want to say one thing to the American people. I want
you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again: I did not
have sexual relations with that woman, (naming the Intern). I
never told anybody to lie, not a single time. Never. These
allegations are false.''
During the following months, the gist of this
representation filled the news media around the World and in
every conceivable form, provided by every conceivable
spokesman for the President, including government employees,
Cabinet officials, lawyers, public relations specialists,
political advisors, friends, Members of Congress, and others.
After an immunity agreement was reached between the
Independent Counsel (discussed below) and the Intern on July
28, 1998, the Intern delivered a dress to the Independent
Counsel that, according to her testimony, had been worn by
her on February 28, 1997, during a sexual encounter with the
President in the White House. The dress was tested for the
President's DNA. The test was positive.
The President of the United States had lied directly to the
American people.
The President's Appearance Before the Grand Jury
After months of negotiation for an appearance by the
President, on July 17, 1998, the President was subpoenaed to
appear before a Federal grand jury in Washington by the
Independent Counsel assigned to investigate multiple issues
concerning the President, including issues involving
potential perjury by both the President and the Intern in the
Arkansas sexual harassment case, issues relating to the
President's relationship with the Intern, and issues relating
to alleged actions taken to influence the testimony of
witnesses in the Arkansas case and before the grand jury,
attempts to discredit the Intern by describing her as a
``stalker,'' as ``ignorant,'' and as ``stupid,'' all done in
an alleged effort to cover up and conceal the underlying
relationship between the President and the Intern, to
obstruct the right of the Arkansas plaintiff to pursue her
sexual harassment claims in the Arkansas Federal Court, and
to obstruct the proceedings of the grand jury itself.
After various losing motions and court proceedings
asserting various executive privileges against a Presidential
appearance before the grand jury, the President, on August
17, 1998, gave testimony voluntarily to the grand jury by
deposition given in the White House and piped live to the
grand jury. The prior subpoena was withdrawn by the
Independent Counsel.
During and since this appearance, the president has
repeatedly acknowledged publicly that he had an inappropriate
relationship with the White House Intern but has insisted
that he was misleading but truthful in his depositions in the
Arkansas case and before the Federal grand jury and did not
commit any act that would constitute an obstruction of any
legal proceeding or the rights of any party associated with
any portion of this historic tale.
Impeachment of the President
The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. Section
Sec. 595(c), directs any Independent Counsel appointed under
that law to advise the House of Representatives of any
substantial and credible information received during the
course of an investigation that may constitute grounds for
the impeachment of the President of the United States.
On September 9, 1998, the Office of Independent Counsel
submitted its referral to the House of Representatives
consisting of thousands of pages of sworn testimony from
many parties, recorded telephone conversations, video
tapes, interviews, reports, legal briefs, and arguments,
including the following partial introduction:
``This Referral presents substantial and credible
information that President Clinton criminally obstructed the
judicial process, first in a sexual harassment lawsuit in
which he was a defendant and then in a grand jury
investigation.''
The Judiciary Committee of the House, in its report to the
full House of Representatives, recommended four Articles of
Impeachment of the President. On December 19, 1998, the House
of Representatives declined to approve two of the proposed
Articles, but did approve the following two Articles, and
delivered
H. Res. 611 to the Senate for trial in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3 of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States:
Impeachment Article I, the ``perjury'' article, accuses the
President of violating his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed, of willfully
corrupting and manipulating the judicial process, and of
impeding the administration of justice for personal gain and
exoneration, in that:
While under oath before the Federal grand jury, the
President gave perjurious testimony before the grand jury
concerning one or more of the following: (i) the nature and
details of his relationship with the Intern; (ii) prior
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony he gave in the
Arkansas case; (iii) prior false and misleading statements he
allowed his attorney to make about the Intern's affidavit in
the Arkansas case; and (iv) his corrupt efforts to influence
the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
evidence in the Arkansas case.
Impleachment Article II, the ``obstruction of justice'' and
``witness tampering'' article, accuses the President of
violating his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, of preventing, obstructing, and
impeding the administration of justice, and, to that end, of
engaging personally and through his subordinates and agents
in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede,
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony
related to the Arkansas Federal sexual harassment case.
In support of the accusation, Article II accuses the
President of seven specific acts of obstruction: (i)
corruptly encouraging the Intern to execute false affidavit
in the Arkansas case, (ii) corruptly encouraging the Intern
to give false testimony in the Arkansas case if and when she
was called to testify personally in that case, (iii)
corruptly engaging in, encouraging, or supporting a scheme to
conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in the Arkansas
case, (iv) obtaining a job for the Intern in order to
corruptly prevent her truthful testimony in the Arkansas
case, (v) corruptly allowing his attorney in the Arkansas
case to make false statements to the Federal Judge
characterizing the Intern's affidavit in order to prevent
questioning deemed relevant by the Judge, (vi) corruptly
influencing his personal secretary to give false testimony in
the Arkansas case, and (vii) making false and misleading
statements to witnesses in the Federal grand jury
proceeding, confirmed by the witnesses, in order to
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses.
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the trial in the senate
H. Res. 611 was received in the Senate on December 19,
1998. The trial commenced on January 7, 1999. During the
trial, we have listened to hours of arguments from the House
Managers and Counsel for the President, and have engaged in
hours of internal Senate debate, both public and private. We
have been provided with access to thousands of pages and
other forms of evidence relating to the accusations contained
in the two Articles of Impeachment.
Under the Constitution, the power to impeach (or
``accuse'') a President of an impeachable offense is vested
solely in the House of Representatives. As Senators and
triers of both the facts and the law, we cannot ``accuse,''
``venture outside the record,'' or ``create and assert new
allegations.'' We are bound to cast our votes of ``guilty''
or ``not guilty'' solely on the two Article of Impeachment as
presented by the House.
I do not hold to the view of our Constitution that there
must be an actual, indictable crime in order for an act of a
public officer to be impeachable. It is clear to this Senator
that there are, indeed, circumstances, short of a felony
criminal offense that would justify the removal of a public
officer from office, including the President of the United
States. Manifest injury to the Office of the President, to
our Nation, and to the American people, and gross abuses of
trust and of public office clearly can reach the level of
intensity that would justify the impeachment and removal of a
leader. One of the Articles of Impeachment presented by the
House Judiciary Committee to the full House of
Representatives in this case charged the President with
precisely such an offense. The House of Representatives did
not approve that Article, and such a charge is, therefore,
not before us in this proceeding.
The two Articles of Impeachment before the Senate in this
proceeding do in fact accuse the President of committing
three actual crimes, ``perjury before the grand jury,''
`'obstruction of justice,'' and ``witness tampering,'' that
meet the requirements for conviction of an indicted defendant
in a criminal case brought under Federal law. The House
Managers and Counsel for the President reviewed those laws
extensively. Thus, in order to find the President ``guilty''
under either Article, this Senator must conclude that all of
the statutory prerequisites to conviction are present that
would be required to convict the President of one or more of
those crimes, if this proceeding were, instead, the
prosecution of felony criminal indictments in a United States
District Court under Federal law.
The President's Counsel did not significantly challenge the
underlying facts in the case, but insisted throughout (i)
that no crimes have been committed, and (ii) that, e
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(Senate - February 12, 1999)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages S1462-
S1637]
TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the statement that I am placing in the
record is the statement I would have given had I been permitted to
speak longer and in open session. During our closed deliberations, I
gave a similar, but abridged statement.
For almost two years, the President of the United States was engaged
in what he has come to describe as an ``inappropriate intimate''
relationship with a young woman who came to his attention as a White
House intern. He then lied about their relationship, publicly,
privately, formally, informally, to the press, to the country, and
under oath, for a period of about a year.
This course of conduct requires us to face four distinct questions.
First, we must determine if the material facts alleged in the
Articles of Impeachment have been established to our satisfaction.
Second, do the established facts constitute either obstruction of
justice or perjury, or both?
Third, are obstruction of justice and perjury high Crimes and
Misdemeanors under the Constitution?
And, fourth, even if the acts of the president are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors, are they of sufficient gravity to warrant his conviction
if it allows of no alternative other than his removal from office?
The first article of impeachment alleges that the President committed
perjury while testifying before the Starr grand jury. Although the
House Managers assert that his testimony is replete with false
statements, it is clear, at the least, that his representations about
the nature and details of his relationship with Miss Lewinsky are
literally beyond belief.
From November 1995, until March 1997, the President engaged in
repeated sexual activities with Monica Lewinsky, who was first a
volunteer at and then an employee of the White House and eventually the
Pentagon. Though he denies directly few of her descriptions of those
activities, he testified under oath that he did not have ``sexual
relations'' with her. His accommodation of this paradox is based on the
incredible claim that he did not touch Miss Lewinsky with any intent to
arouse or gratify anyone sexually, even though she performed oral sex
on him.
It seems to me strange that any rational person would conclude that
the President's description of his relationship with Miss Lewinsky did
not constitute perjury.
In addition, while we are not required to reach our decision on these
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, I have no reasonable doubt that the
President committed perjury on a second such charge when he told the
grand jury that the purpose of the five statements he made to Mrs.
Currie after his Jones deposition was to refresh his own memory.
The President knew that each statement was a lie. His goal was to get
Mrs. Currie to concur in those lies.
The other allegations of perjury are either unproven--particularly
those requiring a strict incorporation of the president's Jones
deposition testimony into his grand jury testimony--or are more
properly considered solely--with those already discussed--as elements
of the obstruction of justice charges in Article II.
To determine that the president perjured himself at least twice,
however, is not to decide the ultimate question of guilt on Article I.
That I will discuss later.
All the material allegations of Article II seem to me to be well
founded. Four of them, however, those regarding the president's
encouraging Miss Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and then to give
false testimony, those regarding the president's failure to correct his
attorney's false statements to the Jones court, and those bearing upon
the disposal of his gifts to her are not, in my mind, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Again, I do not believe this standard to be required
in impeachment trials, but because I believe that the other three
factual allegations of Article II do meet that standard, I adopt it for
the purposes of this discussion.
(1) From the time she was transferred to the Pentagon in April, 1996,
Miss Lewinsky had pestered the president about returning to work at the
White House, and, other than some vague referrals, until October 1,
1997, the President had done nothing to make this
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happen and little to help her find another job.
On the first of October, 1997, the president was served with
interrogatories in the Jones case asking about his sexual relationships
with women other than his wife, and during the rest of October the
President and his agents stepped up their efforts to find Miss Lewinsky
a job. Three weeks later, on October 21, the United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, called Miss Lewinsky personally
to schedule an interview in her apartment complex, though apparently he
interviewed no one else. Shortly after this unusual interview, the
Ambassador created a new position in New York and offered it to Miss
Lewinsky.
What is perhaps most striking about the U.N. job is not even how
promptly it materialized, nor that the United States Ambassador was so
personally involved in hiring a young woman with precious little job
experience, but that Ambassador Richardson held the specially crafted
sinecure open for two months while the former intern kept him waiting
on her decision.
When Miss Lewinsky decided that she preferred the private sector, the
president enlisted the help one of his closest personal friends, one of
the most influential men in the United States, Vernon Jordan. Miss
Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan in early November. Mr. Jordan, who was
acting at the President's behest, apparently did not fully appreciate
how important it was for him to cater to Miss Lewinsky, and took no
action for a month.
The President and Mr. Jordan realized, however, on December 5, 1997,
the importance of satisfying Miss Lewinsky 's fancy when her name
appeared on the Jones witness list. Before that date, the President
needed Miss Lewinsky only to commit a lie of omission--simply to
refrain from making their relationship public. Her appearance on the
witness list now meant that she would have to lie under oath.
Fully appreciative of the higher stakes, the President redoubled his
efforts and those of his agents to find Miss Lewinsky a job and keep
her in his camp. In the weeks after Miss Lewinsky's name appeared on
the witness list, Mr. Jordan kept the President apprised of his efforts
to find work for her in the private sector. He called his contacts at
American Express, Young & Rubicam, and MacAndrews & Forbes (Revlon's
parent corporation). When Miss Lewinsky was subpoenaed on December 19,
1997, to be deposed in the Jones case, Mr. Jordan oversaw the
preparation of the affidavit that the President had suggested she file
in lieu of testifying. On January 7, 1997, Miss Lewinsky signed the
affidavit, which she later admitted was false, denying that she had a
``sexual relationship'' with the President. On January 8, she
interviewed with MacAndrew & Forbes. When she told Mr. Jordan that she
had done poorly, he called the Chairman of the Board, Ronald Perelman,
to recommend Miss Lewinsky, whom he commended as ``this bright young
girl, who I think is terrific.'' As a result of this conversation, Miss
Lewinsky was called back for another interview with MacAndrews the
following day and given an informal offer. On January 9, she reported
this to Mr. Jordan, who called Mrs. Currie with the message, ``mission
accomplished'' and then called the President himself to share his
success.
The President's lawyers arranged for Miss Lewinsky's affidavit to be
filed on January 14, 1998. After this date, although Miss Lewinsky did
not end up with a job in the private sector, neither the President nor
Mr. Jordan, who so resolutely pursued their earlier mission, lifted a
finger to help the ``bright * * * terrific'' young woman. Why? Because
shortly thereafter the fiction of the president's platonic relationship
with Lewinsky had exploded. Monica Lewinsky was the same Monica
Lewinsky, but she now could no longer protect the President.
It is impossible to reconcile the President's course of conduct with
any purpose other than to preclude Miss Lewinsky's truthful testimony
in the Jones case, or, indeed, to prevent her testifying at all. The
case for obstruction of justice is clear. Obstruction was the
President's only motive.
(2) Next we have the Currie conversation--a set of statements by the
President in the nominal form of questions, addressed by the President
to Mrs. Currie on the Sunday evening following his Jones deposition
when she was called to the White House at an extraordinary time and for
apparently a single purpose. We are all familiar now with the questions
he posed:
``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
``You could see and hear everything, right?''
``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''
Those five statements have a single common thread: the President knew
each and every one of them to have been totally false.
Had Mrs. Currie been willing to confirm the President's suggestions,
she would have been a devastatingly effective witness for him.
There is no reasonable explanation of this incident other than it is
the President's clear attempt to obstruct justice, both in the Jones
case and in the subsequent grand jury investigation.
(3) The false self-serving statements by the President to senior
members of his staff, to his cabinet, and to the American people just
after his affair became public present a somewhat different face. It is
reasonably clear that, at the time at which they were made, the
President's goal, at least in part, was to save face with his staff and
put a less humiliating spin on the Lewinsky matter. At the same time,
coupled with his public statements, the President's assertions to his
staff were designed to influence their testimony at some future time
and place and to enlist them in disguising his conduct. In fact, they
did obstruct the grand jury investigation. The President's manipulation
of friendly witnesses to testify falsely, if unknowingly, extended for
months until the DNA evidence shattered both his public and private
positions.
The President's attempt to derail the Independent Counsel's inquiry--
an inquiry the very purpose of which was to discover whether the
President gave false testimony and tampered with witnesses--by lying to
his colleagues, his cabinet, his confidantes, the media, the American
people, and ultimately, the grand jury, is--beyond a reasonable doubt--
a wide-ranging and highly public obstruction of justice, deeply
damaging to the judicial fabric of the United States.
One final note: to the extent that there are unresolved questions of
fact, almost every one of them could be resolved by truthful and
complete testimony by the President himself. That is a course of action
he spectacularly avoided both in his Jones deposition and before the
Starr grand jury. Now, he refuses to answer interrogatories from
Senator Lott and refuses to appear at this trial to testify on his own
behalf.
Under the circumstances, is it not appropriate to infer that to tell
the truth would be to confirm all of the questionable charges against
him? I have not done so for the purposes of this argument, and have
considered only those charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
president's silence allows the inference that every one of the factual
charges by the House managers is true.
With sufficient material facts alleged in the two Articles of
Impeachment either essentially uncontested or established by
overwhelming evidence, and with those facts clearly constituting both
perjury and obstruction, we arrive at the third question before the
Senate. Are perjury and obstruction of justice high Crimes and
Misdemeanors under the impeachment clause of the Constitution?
This is the easiest of the four questions to answer. Perjury and
crimes less serious than obstruction of justice have always and
properly been considered high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
In 1986 Judge Claiborne was convicted by the Senate and removed from
office for filing a false income tax return under penalties of perjury.
By a vote of 90 to 7, the Senate rejected his argument that he should
not be convicted because filing a false return was irrelevant to his
performance as a judge. In 1989, Judge Nixon was convicted by the
Senate and removed from office for perjury: in fact, for lying under
oath to a grand jury. And in that same year, Judge Hastings was
convicted of lying under oath and removed
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by the Senate even though he had already been acquitted in a criminal
trial. (It is generally recognized that an act need not be criminal in
order to be impeachable.) As these examples illustrate, perjury is and
historically has been a sufficient cause for conviction and removal.
Although no person has been convicted and removed for obstruction of
justice, the nature and gravity of this crime, punished more harshly
under our laws than bribery, clearly is also a sufficient cause for
conviction and removal.
Most of the Senate's precedents, of course, are based on the
impeachment trials of judges. President Clinton argues that those
precedents should not apply; that presidents, who hold the highest
office in the land, should benefit from a lower standard for removal
than the judges they appoint and the military officers they command.
This President would have presidents remain in office for acts that
have resulted in the dismissal of military officers under his command,
in the removal of judges, and for acts that would have resulted in the
removal of Senators like Bob Packwood, who, like the President, are
popularly elected for a fixed term. As House Manager Canady has pointed
out, the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry
concluded that the constitutional provision stating that judges would
hold office during ``good Behaviour,'' does not limit the relevance of
judges' impeachments with respect to standards for presidential
impeachments. The President's argument that he should be held to a
lower standard than judges, military officers and Senators has no basis
in the Constitution, in precedent, in equity, or in common sense.
The fourth and ultimate question, nevertheless, is considerably more
difficult to answer. For me, the proof of material facts supporting
some of the allegations is overwhelming, the proposition that the
established facts of the President's conduct constitute perjury and
obstruction of justice almost impossible to deny, and the conclusion
that perjury and obstruction of justice are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors a given.
But the inevitable result of a guilty verdict in this trial is the
President's removal from office, and I believe that reasonable minds
can differ on whether or not that consequence is appropriate. So does
at least one of the House Managers. In answering the question of
whether removal is too drastic a remedy for these alleged acts of
perjury and obstruction of justice, Lindsey Graham, one of the most
thoughtful Managers, stated that great minds may not necessarily agree
on the question of whether, for the good of the nation, one should or
should not remove this President for these high crimes. Removal, he
said, is the equivalent of the political death penalty, and the death
penalty is not imposed for every felony. Considerations such as
repentance and the impact of removal on society should also be
considered. (Mr. Graham's view was not , incidentally, that reasonable
minds could differ on any of the first three questions that I have
outlined, but only on the ultimate question of removal.)
While removal upon conviction has not always been considered
inevitable, I agree that Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
requires a mandatory sentence of removal upon conviction of high Crimes
and Misdemeanors. Nevertheless, a number of thoughtful commentators,
and at least a few members of this Senate, have already decided that
removal is too drastic a sanction. These commentators and members--who
are convinced, perhaps, that the President committed perjury and
obstruction of justice, which, as classes of crime, are high Crimes and
Misdemeanors--may nevertheless vote not to convict because they believe
that removal from office is unwarranted for this perjury and this
obstruction of justice.
I share that conclusion with respect to Article I, but not Article
II.
On Article I I have decided, with some regret, that the instances of
perjury I believe were established beyond a reasonable doubt are
offenses insufficient for removing the President from office--based on
the gravity of the offenses as against the drastic nature of removal.
Equally important is the fact that these instances of perjury are also
elements of the obstruction of justice charges in Article II. One
conviction for the same acts of perjury is enough.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that one other reflection must precede a
decision based on the belief that removal is disproportionate to the
gravity of the offenses established here, and that is: what are the
consequences of a not guilty finding by the Senate? The consequences
are, of course, no sanction whatsoever.
It is precisely because the absence of any sanction is so
objectionable to those who choke over removal that there has been such
a spirited search for a third way. But, fellow Senators, there is no
third way. There is no third way.
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution states: ``Judgment in Cases
of Impeachment shall extend no further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States * * *.''
The drafters did not intend to allow Congress to choose among a range
of punishments analogous to those available to the judiciary, and for
this reason they specified that the impeached party was to remain
subject to judicial process and specifically limited to two--removal
and disqualification--the sanctions that Congress could apply.
We must, I believe, by reason of this harsh choice consciously forced
on us at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, weigh seriously the
effect on the Republic of either of our two possible courses of action.
Will the Republic be strengthened, or will it be weakened, by
determining that a president shall remain in its most exalted office
after perjuring himself and obstructing the pursuit of justice both of
a private citizen and of a federal grand jury, in a case occasioned by
the president's sexual activities? Will the Republic be strengthened or
weakened by removing the President from office by an impeachment
conviction for this perjury and this obstruction?
Early in our history an incident involving one of the authors of the
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, shows clearly the bright line
between, on the one hand, a private sexual scandal, and on the other, a
public obligation--a line the president has intentionally crossed.
In No. 65 of the Federalist Papers, Mr. Hamilton described
impeachable offenses as ``those offences which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to
injuries done immediately to the society itself.'' The president's
defenders place great reliance on this explanation.
Within four years of the composition of this essay, Mr. Hamilton had
an opportunity to reflect on his own words. In the summer of 1791,
Hamilton, then the Secretary of the Treasury, had an adulterous affair
with a Maria Reynolds. Her husband discovered the affair and demanded a
job in the Treasury Department. Though Secretary Hamilton turned him
down, he did pay blackmail from his personal funds.
A year later, three Congressmen, all politically opposed to Hamilton,
learned of the payments, suspected that they might involve Treasury
funds, and confronted Hamilton. Despite the tremendous political
advantage the story, which eventually leaked, offered them, he
immediately and without hesitation told them the truth and nothing but
the truth.
The author of Federalist No. 65 knew very well the distinction
between a private scandal and the profound embarrassment arising out of
its publication--and the violation of a public duty in an attempt to
avoid that embarrassment. He chose not to use his Treasury position in
a way that would justify an impeachment. The personal cost was immense
and he assumed it without blinking.
President Clinton could hardly have chosen a more different course of
action. He chose to violate both his oath of office and his oath as a
witness, using his office, his staff and his position to try to avoid
personal embarrassment. In any event even the personal consequences for
him have been far worse than those visited upon Alexander Hamilton. But
it is our duty to determine whether he merits a drastic public
sanction--or none at all.
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Some will say that the President can be charged with crimes related
to this affair after his term of office is over.
First, such charges lie outside our jurisdiction or duty.
Second, such charges seem to me to be unlikely if we acquit the
President, or in any event.
But third, and most important, let us assume that President Clinton
is charged, convicted, and sentenced in 2001. What a devastating
judgment on the Senate of the United States that would be! We ourselves
would be convicted, by history and forever, of having permitted a felon
who abused his office in committing his felonies to remain in office as
President of the United States for two long years.
I simply cannot imagine any Senator willing to carry that burden of
conscience.
No, we must choose between the sanction of removal and no sanction at
all. We know how Alexander Hamilton would vote today on our question.
We know how James Madison, one of Hamilton's interrogators and the
careful author of the impeachment provision, would have voted. And
merely to call up the name of George Washington is to answer the
question of how he would vote.
The Republic will not be weakened if we convict. The policies of the
presidency will not change. The Administration will not change.
But if we acquit; if we say that some perjuries, some obstructions of
justice, some clear and conscious violations of a formal oath are free
from our sanction, the Republic and its institutions will be weakened.
One exception or excuse will lead to another, the right of the most
powerful of our leaders to act outside the law--or in violation of the
law--will be established. Our republican institutions will be seriously
undermined. They have been undermined already, and the damage accrues
to all equally--Republicans, Democrats, liberals, and conservatives.
If there is one thing this President can be relied on to do, it is to
put his interests before those of his office and of the Republic.
President Clinton has debased the presidency now and, if he is allowed
to remain in office, the low level to which he has brought the
presidency will continue, and that is not tolerable.
I cannot will to my children and grandchildren the proposition that a
president stands above the law and can systematically obstruct justice
simply because both his polls and the Dow Jones index are high.
Our duty in this case is as unpleasant as it was unsought. But our
duty is clear. It was imposed on us, by history, without equivocation,
212 years ago. It requires us to convict the President of Article II of
these Articles of Impeachment. And that is how I vote, with clear
conscience and saddened heart.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, like many others, the
day the President wagged his finger at the American people and
indicated he had not been involved with Ms. Lewinsky, I had the sense
that he wasn't telling the truth and I felt some genuine regret. The
President and I began here in Washington in the same month, in 1993. I
had high hopes and actually felt very close to what he was trying to
accomplish. So all along in this process, I have had to fight an urge
to personalize that regret in a way that would affect my ability to do
my job in this impeachment trial. And I will tell you that taking that
separate oath helped me get into the mindset necessary to do that task.
But let me say that I do regret that the President's public conduct--
not his private conduct--has brought us to this day.
But we are here, and I want to take a minute to praise my colleagues
on the process. I think it would have been unfortunate had we not had
any witness testimony--at least in the form of deposition testimony. I
think it would have been an unfortunate historical precedent. I found
the video testimony helpful. I didn't enjoy it, but I found it helpful
in clarifying some of the things that I was thinking about. So I am
glad, on balance, that we did not dismiss the case at the time it was
first suggested.
But as we get to the final stage and get immersed in the law and
facts of this case, it is too easy to forget the most salient fact
about this entire matter, and that is one simple fact that many others
have mentioned: In November 1996, 47 million Americans voted to reelect
President Clinton. The people hired him. They are the hiring authority.
An impeachment is a radical undoing of that authority. The people hire
and somehow, under this process, the Congress can fire. So, I caution
against, with all due respect to the excellent arguments made, the
attempt to analogize this to an employee-employer relationship, or a
military situation, or even the situation of judges--those situations
are all clearly different. Along with the choice of the Vice President,
in no other case, do the American people choose one person, and in no
other case can a completely different authority undo that choice.
Having said that, the Presidential conduct in this case, in my view,
does come perilously close to justifying that extreme remedy. There
really have been three Presidential impeachments in our Nation's
history. I see this one as being in the middle. The Andrew Johnson case
is usually considered by historians to have been a relatively weak
case. President Johnson had a different interpretation of the
constitutionality of the statute that he believed allowed him to remove
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton. He was not convicted, and
subsequently the U.S. Supreme Court, I believe, ruled that in fact that
was constitutional. I see that as having been a relatively weak case.
The case of Richard Nixon, in my view, was a pretty strong case,
involving a 1972 Presidential election and attempts to get involved
with the aspects of that election--frankly--an attempt to cover up what
happened during that 1972 election. I think that had more to do with
core meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
This is a closer case; this is a close case. In that sense, it may be
the most important of the three Presidential impeachments, in terms of
the law of impeachment, as we go into the future. I agree neither with
the House managers who say their evidence is ``overwhelming,'' nor with
the President's counsel who says the evidence against the President is
``nonexistent.'' The fact is, this is a hard case, and sometimes they
say that hard cases make bad law. But we cannot afford to have this be
bad law for the Nation's sake.
So how do we decide? There have been a lot of helpful suggestions,
but one thing that has been important to me is the way the House
presented their case. That doesn't bind us, but they did suggest that
two Federal statutes had been violated. Mr. Manager McCollum said that,
``You must first determine if a Federal crime has occurred.'' Many
others have said that. I will reiterate a point. If that is the
approach you want to take, then it is clear, in my view as one Senator,
that you must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, you are
using the power and the opprobrium of the Federal criminal law as a
sword but refusing to let the President and the defense counsel have
the shield of the burden of proof that is required in the criminal law.
I do not have time to discuss the perjury count this afternoon, but
will do so in a longer presentation for the Record. Suffice it to say I
do not believe the managers have met their burden of proving perjury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to obstruction of justice, the President did come perilously
close. Three quick observations make me conclude that, in fact, he did
not commit obstruction of justice beyond a reasonable doubt. First, I
am very concerned about the conversations between the President and
Betty Currie concerning the specifics of his relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky. But the critical question there is intent. Was his intent
about avoiding discovery by his family and the political problems
involved? Or was the core issue trying to avoid the Jones proceeding
and the consequences of that?
I don't think it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Jones proceeding was the President's concern. Perhaps Ms. Currie could
have shed some light on this. That is why I was extremely puzzled when
the House managers didn't call Betty Currie. Let me be the first to say
that I don't think in this instance the House managers ``wanted to win
too badly.'' I don't think they wanted to win badly enough to take the
chance of calling Betty Currie, a crucial witness.
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I was very concerned about the false affidavit until I saw Ms.
Lewinsky's Senate deposition testimony. I am persuaded that you cannot
say beyond a reasonable doubt that she was urged by the President to
make a false statement in that affidavit.
Finally, I was very concerned about the hiding of the gifts. And
maybe every one will disagree with me on this. But when I watched her
testimony, I thought Ms. Lewinsky was the most indefinite about whether
or not she had gotten that call from Ms. Currie than any other part of
her testimony. I happen to believe that Ms. Lewinsky was the one who
was the most concerned about the gifts. And I believe a showing beyond
a reasonable doubt has not been made that the President masterminded
the hiding of the gifts.
So I cannot deny what Representative Graham said: If you call
somebody up at 2:30 in the morning you are probably up to no good. But
if you call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning you have not necessarily
accomplished the crime of obstruction of justice.
I realize there is a separate question of whether these same acts by
the President, apart from the Federal criminal law, constitute high
crimes and misdemeanors. I do not. I will discuss that in more detail
in a future statement in the Record.
But I would like to conclude by just talking a little bit about this
impeachment issue in the modern context. When I say that the vote in
1996 is the primary issue, I don't just mean that in terms of the
rights of people. I mean it in terms of the goal of the Founding
Fathers, and our goal today; that is, political stability in this
country. We don't want a parliamentary system. And we don't want an
overly partisan system.
I see the 4-year term as a unifying force of our Nation. Yet, this is
the second time in my adult lifetime that we have had serious
impeachment proceedings, and I am only 45 years old. This only occurred
once in the entire 200 years prior to this time. Is this a fluke? Is it
that we just happened to have had two ``bad men'' as Presidents? I
doubt it. How will we feel if sometime in the next 10 years a third
impeachment proceeding occurs in this country so we will have had three
within 40 years?
I see a danger in this in an increasingly diverse country. I see a
danger in this in an increasingly divided country. And I see a danger
in this when the final argument of the House manager is that this is a
chapter in an ongoing ``culture war'' in this Nation. That troubles me.
I hope that is not where we are and hope that is not where we are
heading.
It is best not to err at all in this case. But if we must err, let us
err on the side of avoiding these divisions, and let us err on the side
of respecting the will of the people.
Let me conclude by quoting James W. Grimes, one of the seven
Republican Senators who voted not to acquit Andrew Johnson. I
discovered this speech, and found out that the Chief Justice had
already discovered and quoted him, and said he was one of the three of
the ablest of the seven. Grimes said this in his opinion about why he
wouldn't convict President Johnson:
I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the
Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable
President. Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I
cannot consent to trifle with the high office he holds. I can
do nothing which, by implication, may be construed as an
approval of impeachment as a part of future political
machinery.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. If a university president, a minister or priest,
general or admiral, or a corporate chief executive had engaged in a
sexual relationship with an intern under his charge, he would lose his
position, with scant attention paid to whether or not such a
relationship were ``consensual.'' We place in certain individuals so
great a measure of trust that they are seen as acting essentially in
loco parentis.
The question before us today is: Should the President of the United
States be held to a lower standard?
The answer is: No. To the contrary; we can bestow no higher honor
than to select one individual to represent us all as President. In one
person we endow the character of our nation, as the head of state and
the head of government.
It's with great disappointment, but firm resolve, that I have
concluded the President has not lived up to this high standard and that
he should be removed from office. The House managers have demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt that, in addition to indefensible behavior with
an intern, which was not illegal, the President engaged in the
obstruction of justice and, as an element of that obstruction,
committed perjury before a federal grand jury, which is.
This case began as an alleged civil rights violation of a young woman
who came to the bar seeking justice. The Supreme Court unanimously
decided to permit her case against the President to go forward. It was
that case which led to the revelations regarding the President's
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the White House intern.
Incredibly, an element of the President's defense is that we should
take the long view. We are told by the President's defenders that we
should not judge his actions toward one individual, in which he schemed
to impede her ability to seek redress, because his overall actions on
civil rights are so positive. We are asked not to judge his treatment
of one woman, or two women, but to evaluate his policies that affect
all women.
Would the President's defenders forgive a school teacher who molests
a student, simply because the teacher's classes are popular and his
students all go on to college? Should we ignore the police officer who
personally enriches himself by accepting graft, so long as his arrest
record is high? Would we look away from the corporate executive who
illegally profits from insider information, as long as his shareholders
are happy with the return on their investment? We would not sustain
civil society for long with such moral relativism as our guide.
The President had it solely within his power to keep the country from
the course on which it has been for the past year. First, of course, he
could have chosen not to engage in the behavior in question. Having
behaved as he did, though, and having been discovered, the President
could have acknowledged his own actions and accepted the consequences.
This could have been an honorable resignation, or an admission,
contrition, and a firm resolve to take responsibility; with a request
for resolution in a manner short of impeachment and trial.
Instead, the President chose to deny the allegations, and fight them
with a coordinated scheme of manipulation and obstruction. He lied
outright to the American people, to his close associates, and to his
cabinet. An enduring image of this whole tale will be his finger-
pointing lie to the American people, even after admonishing us to
listen closely, because he didn't want to have to say it again.
Even in view of these actions, the President missed numerous
opportunities to right this matter and get it behind him and the
country. At virtually every opportunity, though, he chose an action
that further prolonged the matter and led directly to his impeachment.
The President chose to impede the pursuit of justice by the
Independent Counsel, who was given the authority to investigate this
matter by the President's own Attorney General.
The President chose to construct a cover story with Ms. Lewinsky,
should their relationship become public.
The President chose to direct his personal staff to retrieve items
from Ms. Lewinsky that he knew were under subpoena in a federal
investigation.
The President chose to seek the assistance of friends to find a job
for Ms. Lewinsky, and to intensify that job search when it became clear
that Ms. Lewinsky had become a target of the civil suit against him.
The President chose to lie to his staff about the nature of his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky herself, with the expectation that these
lies would become part of the public perception.
And, the President chose to lie before a federal grand jury about his
actions with regard to some of the elements of obstruction of justice,
including the concealment of the gifts that were likely to become
evidence in the civil case against him.
As a result of these choices by the President of the United States,
the Senate was left with no choice other than to confront the charges
and hear the case pursuant to the President's impeachment in the House
of Representatives.
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In so doing, the Senate conducted a fair and expeditious trial. We
rejected the idea of an early test vote that would have truncated the
process. We rejected the motion for an early dismissal. The Senate is
fulfilling its Constitutional responsibility to hold a trial with a
complete evidentiary record and a final vote on each article of
impeachment sent to the Senate by the House of Representatives.
Through skillful use of the written record compiled by the
Independent Counsel, videotaped depositions, and hard evidence, the
House managers presented a compelling case. The case for perjury was
difficult. The President's testimony before the Grand Jury was guarded.
He was fully aware of the evidence the prosecutors had with respect to
this case. He chose his words carefully. He admitted his relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky before the Grand Jury, but did so only after
confronted with clinical evidence of its existence.
But he lied to the Grand Jury to deny other key facts. He perjured
himself as an element of a broader attempt to obstruct justice. There
are two false statements that are the most persuasive. First, when
asked if he directed Betty Currie to retrieve gifts from Ms. Lewinsky,
he stated unequivocally, ``No sir, I did not do that.''
The facts are contrary to that allegation. Ms. Lewinsky testified
that Betty Currie called her to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky give her the
gifts. We have cellular telephone records that indicate a call from Ms.
Currie to Ms. Lewinsky at about the time the gifts were picked up. It
was clear that Ms. Currie initiated a retrieval of the gifts at the
direction of the President, for this was the only source of information
she had that there were gifts. The evidence is overwhelming that the
President directed Betty Currie to retrieve these gifts. Thus, his
statement is false. Not only is this perjury, it is obstruction of
justice.
The President also lied before the Grand Jury about his conversations
with White House aides regarding Ms. Lewinsky. He testified that ``I
said to them things that were true about this relationship.'' We know
this to be completely false from the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal,
who stated directly and unequivocally that the President had lied to
him about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
The legal standard for perjury is high. Under Section 18 U.S.C.
1623(a), a person is guilty of perjury if he or she knowingly makes a
false, material statement under oath in a federal court or Grand Jury.
I believe these statements were false, intentional and material in that
they attempt to put a false impression on key events in a series of
attempts to obstruct justice. In effect, the President knew his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was shameful, but not necessarily
illegal. But he knew his obstruction of justice was illegal--so he lied
about it to a Grand Jury.
In many ways, obstruction of justice is even more corrosive than
perjury to the machinery of our legal system. As the target of a grand
jury and an independent prosecutor, the President has defended himself
against charges of perjury by claiming he was caught off guard, was
misinterpreted, was attempting to mislead but not lie.
Obstruction of justice, though, is a quite different matter. It is an
affirmative act that occurs at the person's own initiative; in this
case, the President. It involves actions taken that were not instigated
by anyone else.
It has been said in his defense that the President did not initiate
his perjury in that he was led to it by the prosecutor. But there is no
similar argument regarding Article II, the Obstruction of Justice.
Without the affirmative actions of the President, there would have been
no Article II.
The President sought out Mr. Blumenthal to tell his misleading story
about the nature of his relationship and the character of Ms. Lewinsky.
Separately, the President enlisted his personal secretary to further
his obstruction of justice. He asked Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts.
He summoned her to coach her testimony under the guise of ``trying to
figure out what the facts were.'' He did so within hours after coming
back to the White House on January 17th from his deposition in the
civil sexual harassment lawsuit. He required a face-to-face meeting
with her the next day, a Sunday. It couldn't be done over the phone,
and it couldn't wait until Monday. It was clear he needed her to
reaffirm his false testimony. This is obstruction of justice.
The edifice of American jurisprudence rests on the foundation of the
due process of law. The mortar in that foundation is the oath. Those
who seek to obstruct justice weaken that foundation, and those who
violate the oath would tear the whole structure down.
Every day, thousands of citizens in thousands of courtrooms across
America are sworn in as jurors, as grand jurors, as witnesses, as
defendants. On those oaths rest the due process of law upon which all
of our other rights are based.
The oath is how we defend ourselves against those who would subvert
our system by breaking our laws. There are Americans in jail today
because they violated that oath. Others have prevailed at the bar of
justice because of that oath.
What would we be telling Americans--and those worldwide who see in
America what they can only hope for in their own countries--if the
Senate of the United States were to conclude: The President lied under
oath as an element of a scheme to obstruct the due process of law, but
we chose to look the other way?
I cannot make that choice. I cannot look away. I vote ``Guilty'' on
Article I, Perjury. I vote ``Guilty'' on Article II, Obstruction of
Justice.
I ask unanimous consent an analysis of the Articles of Impeachment be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Analysis of the Articles of Impeachment
(By Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison)
``Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to
the trial of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton,
president of the United States, now pending, you will do
impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws: So
help you God?''
When the Chief Justice of the United States administered
this oath and I signed my name to it on January 7, 1999, as
one of one hundred triers of fact and law in the Court of
Impeachment of the President of the United States, I did so
with a heavy heart, but with a clear mind.
That solemn occasion in the well of this Senate, and the
weight of the burden imposed on us as ``jurors'' in only the
second such proceeding in the history of our Nation, reminded
me with vivid clarity that our Constitution belongs to all of
us.
I was reminded as well, however, that the laws of our
Country are applicable to us all, including the President,
and they must be obeyed. The concept of equal justice under
law and the importance of absolute truth in legal proceedings
is the foundation of our justice system in the courts.
In this proceeding, I have drawn conclusions about the
facts as I see them, and I have applied the law to those
facts as I understand that law to be.
underlying facts leading to this proceeding
The details of an intimate personal relationship that
occurred during the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 between the
President of the United States and a 22 year-old female White
House Intern who was directly under his command and control
have been chronicled throughout the world and are described
in thousands of pages of evidence and materials filed with
both the House and the Senate in this case and in bookstores
across America. They involved intimate sexual relations
within the White House, personal gifts, jobs within and
outside of government, and ``missions accomplished.'' The
underlying details will not be repeated by me here.
While some facts about that relationship and the timing of
some events were disputed at the trial in the Senate, their
essence has been publicly admitted by the President, by his
Counsel, and by the Intern in written or verbal form,
including sworn testimony in various forms.
However inappropriate the behavior of the President was,
the legal issues in the impeachment trial do not deal with
this relationship. All accusations against the President here
relate instead to alleged attempts to prevent the disclosure
of this relationship in a pending civil rights lawsuit
against the President in an Arkansas Federal court and to the
public. That is the critical factor that has brought us to
this extraordinary moment in our Nation's history when we are
considering whether or not to remove from office the
President of the United States.
core facts leading to the articles of impeachment
In May, 1994, a female citizen and employee of the State of
Arkansas filed a lawsuit in an Arkansas Federal District
Court, alleging, in summary, that, in 1991 while President
Clinton was Governor of Arkansas, the Governor committed the
civil offense of sexual harassment against her by insisting
that she perform sexual acts identical or similar to those
later performed by the Intern.
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In the course of preparing for the trial of the Arkansas
case, the plaintiff, with the consent of the presiding
Federal Judge, attempted to develop evidence that defendant
Clinton had, before and afterward, engaged in patterns of
conduct that were similar to the allegations of the plaintiff
in the case.
In December, 1997, the Arkansas Judge ordered defendant
Clinton to answer a written interrogatory naming every state
and federal employee with whom he had had sexual relations
since 1986. President Clinton answered: ``none.''
In an alleged attempt to avoid giving a personal deposition
in the case pursuant to a December, 1997, subpoena, the White
House Intern, who had since become employed at the Pentagon,
on January 7, 1998, signed an affidavit denying any sexual
relationship with President Clinton. Six days later, on
January 13, the Intern accepted a job offer at a major
corporation in New York City. A friend called the President
shortly thereafter with the message: ``Mission
accomplished.''
While the President was giving his own deposition in the
Arkansas case, his counsel tendered this affidavit to the
Arkansas Federal Court, referred to it, and vouched for its
accuracy in the presence of the President. The President,
knowing the affidavit to be false, sat by and said nothing.
The President's counsel subsequently advised the Court that
this affidavit was not reliable and should be ignored.
Defendant Clinton was subpoenaed to give the above-
mentioned deposition in the case and did so on January 17,
1998. In a rare event, the Arkansas Judge attended for the
purpose of supervising the deposition of the President in a
Washington lawyer's offices. While there, the Judge and
participating counsel for the parties, either knowingly or
unknowingly, formulated a definition of the meaning of the
words ``sexual relations'' to exclude certain forms of human
contact that in their commonly accepted meaning would be
included. But, allegedly upon the basis of this definition,
President Clinton denied, under oath, among other things,
that he had sexual relations with the Intern.
On January 21, 1998, the existence of an alleged
inappropriate relationship between the President and the
White House Intern blazed across the Nation from a story
first published in the Washington Post carrying the headline:
``Clinton Accused of Urging Aid to Lie; Starr Probes Whether
President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to (plaintiff's)
Lawyers.''
Evidence introduced and debated by the House Managers and
the President's Counsel in the Senate painted a picture of
frantic activities within and without the White House
throughout the month before and during the week following
this public disclosure, by the President, by his friends, by
White House staff and employees, and others. It was alleged,
among other things, that the President coached, manipulated,
and influenced false testimony of witnesses, including the
Intern, engineered the hiding of gifts and evidence that was
subject to subpoena, lied to his staff and friends about the
facts in order to assure that they would give false testimony
in public and legal proceedings, manipulated the Intern into
signing the false affidavit in the Arkansas Federal Court,
and, after failures to obtain employment for her elsewhere,
rewarded the Intern by obtaining for her an out-of-town job
in return for her cooperative falsehoods or silence. The
sequence and importance of such activities, much of which is
not disputed in the evidence, were debated aggressively by
the House Mangers and the President's Counsel in the Senate,
but the essence of those activities was not seriously denied.
After numerous public denials immediately after the public
disclosure, and after several days of alleged ``damage
control'' designed to synchronize false stories to be
provided by various parties in response to all inquiries, and
event of major, historic, and future national importance
occurred.
On January 26, 1998, the President addressed the Nation
about this issue at a press conference in Washington, since
replayed in television broadcasts thousands of times. On that
occasion, the President looked sternly into the camera and
pointed his finger directly at the American people and
stated:
``I want to say one thing to the American people. I want
you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again: I did not
have sexual relations with that woman, (naming the Intern). I
never told anybody to lie, not a single time. Never. These
allegations are false.''
During the following months, the gist of this
representation filled the news media around the World and in
every conceivable form, provided by every conceivable
spokesman for the President, including government employees,
Cabinet officials, lawyers, public relations specialists,
political advisors, friends, Members of Congress, and others.
After an immunity agreement was reached between the
Independent Counsel (discussed below) and the Intern on July
28, 1998, the Intern delivered a dress to the Independent
Counsel that, according to her testimony, had been worn by
her on February 28, 1997, during a sexual encounter with the
President in the White House. The dress was tested for the
President's DNA. The test was positive.
The President of the United States had lied directly to the
American people.
The President's Appearance Before the Grand Jury
After months of negotiation for an appearance by the
President, on July 17, 1998, the President was subpoenaed to
appear before a Federal grand jury in Washington by the
Independent Counsel assigned to investigate multiple issues
concerning the President, including issues involving
potential perjury by both the President and the Intern in the
Arkansas sexual harassment case, issues relating to the
President's relationship with the Intern, and issues relating
to alleged actions taken to influence the testimony of
witnesses in the Arkansas case and before the grand jury,
attempts to discredit the Intern by describing her as a
``stalker,'' as ``ignorant,'' and as ``stupid,'' all done in
an alleged effort to cover up and conceal the underlying
relationship between the President and the Intern, to
obstruct the right of the Arkansas plaintiff to pursue her
sexual harassment claims in the Arkansas Federal Court, and
to obstruct the proceedings of the grand jury itself.
After various losing motions and court proceedings
asserting various executive privileges against a Presidential
appearance before the grand jury, the President, on August
17, 1998, gave testimony voluntarily to the grand jury by
deposition given in the White House and piped live to the
grand jury. The prior subpoena was withdrawn by the
Independent Counsel.
During and since this appearance, the president has
repeatedly acknowledged publicly that he had an inappropriate
relationship with the White House Intern but has insisted
that he was misleading but truthful in his depositions in the
Arkansas case and before the Federal grand jury and did not
commit any act that would constitute an obstruction of any
legal proceeding or the rights of any party associated with
any portion of this historic tale.
Impeachment of the President
The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. Section
Sec. 595(c), directs any Independent Counsel appointed under
that law to advise the House of Representatives of any
substantial and credible information received during the
course of an investigation that may constitute grounds for
the impeachment of the President of the United States.
On September 9, 1998, the Office of Independent Counsel
submitted its referral to the House of Representatives
consisting of thousands of pages of sworn testimony from
many parties, recorded telephone conversations, video
tapes, interviews, reports, legal briefs, and arguments,
including the following partial introduction:
``This Referral presents substantial and credible
information that President Clinton criminally obstructed the
judicial process, first in a sexual harassment lawsuit in
which he was a defendant and then in a grand jury
investigation.''
The Judiciary Committee of the House, in its report to the
full House of Representatives, recommended four Articles of
Impeachment of the President. On December 19, 1998, the House
of Representatives declined to approve two of the proposed
Articles, but did approve the following two Articles, and
delivered
H. Res. 611 to the Senate for trial in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3 of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States:
Impeachment Article I, the ``perjury'' article, accuses the
President of violating his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed, of willfully
corrupting and manipulating the judicial process, and of
impeding the administration of justice for personal gain and
exoneration, in that:
While under oath before the Federal grand jury, the
President gave perjurious testimony before the grand jury
concerning one or more of the following: (i) the nature and
details of his relationship with the Intern; (ii) prior
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony he gave in the
Arkansas case; (iii) prior false and misleading statements he
allowed his attorney to make about the Intern's affidavit in
the Arkansas case; and (iv) his corrupt efforts to influence
the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
evidence in the Arkansas case.
Impleachment Article II, the ``obstruction of justice'' and
``witness tampering'' article, accuses the President of
violating his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, of preventing, obstructing, and
impeding the administration of justice, and, to that end, of
engaging personally and through his subordinates and agents
in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede,
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony
related to the Arkansas Federal sexual harassment case.
In support of the accusation, Article II accuses the
President of seven specific acts of obstruction: (i)
corruptly encouraging the Intern to execute false affidavit
in the Arkansas case, (ii) corruptly encouraging the Intern
to give false testimony in the Arkansas case if and when she
was called to testify personally in that case, (iii)
corruptly engaging in, encouraging, or supporting a scheme to
conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in the Arkansas
case, (iv) obtaining a job for the Intern in order to
corruptly prevent her truthful testimony in the Arkansas
case, (v) corruptly allowing his attorney in the Arkansas
case to make false statements to the Federal Judge
characterizing the Intern's affidavit in order to prevent
questioning deemed relevant by the Judge, (vi) corruptly
influencing his personal secretary to give false testimony in
the Arkansas case, and (vii) making false and misleading
statements to witnesses in the Federal grand jury
proceeding, confirmed by the witnesses, in order to
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses.
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the trial in the senate
H. Res. 611 was received in the Senate on December 19,
1998. The trial commenced on January 7, 1999. During the
trial, we have listened to hours of arguments from the House
Managers and Counsel for the President, and have engaged in
hours of internal Senate debate, both public and private. We
have been provided with access to thousands of pages and
other forms of evidence relating to the accusations contained
in the two Articles of Impeachment.
Under the Constitution, the power to impeach (or
``accuse'') a President of an impeachable offense is vested
solely in the House of Representatives. As Senators and
triers of both the facts and the law, we cannot ``accuse,''
``venture outside the record,'' or ``create and assert new
allegations.'' We are bound to cast our votes of ``guilty''
or ``not guilty'' solely on the two Article of Impeachment as
presented by the House.
I do not hold to the view of our Constitution that there
must be an actual, indictable crime in order for an act of a
public officer to be impeachable. It is clear to this Senator
that there are, indeed, circumstances, short of a felony
criminal offense that would justify the removal of a public
officer from office, including the President of the United
States. Manifest injury to the Office of the President, to
our Nation, and to the American people, and gross abuses of
trust and of public office clearly can reach the level of
intensity that would justify the impeachment and removal of a
leader. One of the Articles of Impeachment presented by the
House Judiciary Committee to the full House of
Representatives in this case charged the President with
precisely such an offense. The House of Representatives did
not approve that Article, and such a charge is, therefore,
not before us in this proceeding.
The two Articles of Impeachment before the Senate in this
proceeding do in fact accuse the President of committing
three actual crimes, ``perjury before the grand jury,''
`'obstruction of justice,'' and ``witness tampering,'' that
meet the requirements for conviction of an indicted defendant
in a criminal case brought under Federal law. The House
Managers and Counsel for the President reviewed those laws
extensively. Thus, in order to find the President ``guilty''
under either Article, this Senator must conclude that all of
the statutory prerequisites to conviction are present that
would be required to convict the President of one or more of
those crimes, if this proceeding were, instead, the
prosecution of felony criminal indictments in a United States
District Court under Federal law.
The President's Counsel did not significantly challenge the
underlying facts in the case, but insisted throughout (i)
that no crimes have been committed, and (i
