STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - July 27, 2000)
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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BREAUX:
S. 2944. A bill to clarify that certain penalties provided for in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are the exclusive criminal penalties for any
action or activity that may arise or occur in connection with certain
discharges of oil or a hazardous substance; to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
Strict Criminal Liability Reform for Oil Spill Incidents
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation to
address a long-standing problem which adversely affects the safe and
reliable maritime transport of oil products. The legislation I am
introducing today will eliminate the application and use of strict
criminal liability statutes, statutes that do not require a showing of
criminal intent or even the slightest degree of negligence, for
maritime transportation-related oil spill incidents.
Through comprehensive Congressional action that led to the enactment
and implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, commonly referred
to as ``OPA90'', the United States has successfully reduced the number
of oil spills in the maritime environment and has established a
cooperative public/private partnership to respond effectively in the
diminishing number of situations when an oil spill occurs. Nonetheless,
over the past decade, the use of the unrelated strict criminal
liability statutes that I referred to above has undermined the spill
prevention and response objectives of OPA90, the very objectives that
were established by the Congress to preserve the environment, safeguard
the public welfare, and promote the safe transportation of oil. The
legislation I am introducing today will restore the delicate balance of
interests reached in OPA90, and will reaffirm OPA90's preeminent role
as the statute providing the exclusive criminal penalties for oil spill
incidents.
As stated in the Coast Guard's own environmental enforcement
directive, a company, its officers, employees, and mariners, in the
event of an oil spill ``could be convicted and sentenced to a criminal
fine even where [they] took all reasonable precautions to avoid the
discharge''. Accordingly, responsible operators in my home state of
Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States who transport oil are
unavoidably exposed to potentially immeasurable criminal fines and, in
the worst case scenario, jail time. Not only is this situation unfairly
targeting an industry that plays an extremely important role in our
national economy, but it also works contrary to the public welfare.
Most liquid cargo transportation companies on the coastal and inland
waterway system of the United States have embraced safe operation and
risk management as two of their most important and fundamental values.
For example, members of the American Waterways Operators (AWO) from
Louisiana and other states have implemented stronger safety programs
that have significantly reduced personal injuries to mariners. Tank
barge fleets have been upgraded through construction of new state-of-
the-art double hulled tank barges while obsolete single skin barges are
being retired far in advance of the OPA90 timetable. Additionally, AWO
members have dedicated significant time and financial resources to
provide continuous and comprehensive education and training for vessel
captains, crews and shoreside staff, not only in the operation of
vessels but also in preparation for all contingencies that could occur
in the transportation of oil products. This commitment to marine safety
and environmental protection by responsible members of the oil
transportation industry is real. The industry continues to work closely
with the Coast Guard to upgrade regulatory standards in such key areas
as towing vessel operator qualifications and navigation equipment on
towing vessels.
Through the efforts of AWO and other organizations, the maritime
transportation industry has achieved an outstanding compliance record
with the numerous laws and regulations enforced by the Coast Guard. Let
me be clear: responsible carriers, and frankly their customers, have a
``zero tolerance'' policy for oil spills. Additionally, the industry is
taking spill response preparedness seriously. Industry representatives
and operators routinely participate in Coast Guard oil spill crisis
management courses, PREP Drills, and regional spill response drills.
Yet despite all of the modernization, safety, and training efforts of
the marine transportation industry, their mariners and shoreside
employees cannot escape the threat of criminal liability in the event
of an oil spill, even where it is shown that they ``took all reasonable
precautions to avoid [a] discharge''.
As you know, in response to the tragic Exxon Valdez spill, Congress
enacted OPA90. OPA90 mandated new, comprehensive, and complex
regulatory and enforcement requirements for the transportation of oil
products and for oil spill response. Both the federal government and
maritime industry have worked hard to accomplish the legislation's
primary objective--to provide greater environmental safeguards in oil
transportation by creating a comprehensive prevention, response,
liability, and compensation regime to deal with vessel and facility oil
pollution. And OPA90 is working in a truly meaningful sense. To prevent
oil spill incidents from occurring in the first place, OPA90 provides
an enormously powerful deterrent, through both its criminal and civil
liability provisions. Moreover, OPA90 mandates prompt reporting of
spills, contingency planning, and both cooperation and coordination
with federal, state, and local authorities in connection with managing
the spill response. Failure to report and cooperate as required by
OPA90 may impose automatic civil penalties, criminal liability and
unlimited civil liability. As a result, the number of domestic oil
spills has been dramatically reduced over the past decade since OPA90
was enacted. In those limited situations in which oil spills
unfortunately occurred, intensive efforts commenced immediately with
federal, state and local officials working in a joint, unified manner
with the industry, as contemplated by OPA90, to clean up and report
spills as quickly as possible and to mitigate to the greatest extent
any impact on the environment. OPA90 has provided a comprehensive and
cohesive ``blueprint'' for proper planning, training, and resource
identification to respond to an oil spill incident, and to ensure that
such a response is properly and cooperatively managed.
OPA90 also provides a complete statutory framework for proceeding
against individuals for civil and/or criminal penalties arising out of
oil spills in the marine environment. When Congress crafted this Act,
it carefully balanced the imposition of stronger criminal and civil
penalties with the need to promote enhanced cooperation among all of
the parties involved in the spill prevention and response effort. In so
doing, the Congress clearly enumerated the circumstances in which
criminal penalties could be imposed for actions related to maritime oil
spills, and added and/or substantially increased criminal penalties
under the related laws which comprehensively govern the maritime
transportation of oil and other petroleum products.
The legislation we are introducing today will not change in any way
the tough criminal sanctions that were imposed in OPA90. However,
responsible, law-abiding members of the maritime industry in Louisiana
and elsewhere are concerned by the willingness of the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies in the post-OPA90 environment to use
strict criminal liability statutes in oil spill incidents. As you know,
strict liability imposes criminal sanctions without requiring a showing
of criminal knowledge, intent or even negligence. These federal actions
imposing strict liability have created an atmosphere of extreme
uncertainty for the maritime transportation industry about how to
respond to and cooperate with the Coast Guard and other federal
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agencies in cleaning up an oil spill. Criminal culpability in this
country, both historically and as reflected in the comprehensive OPA90
legislation itself, typically requires wrongful actions or omissions by
individuals through some degree of criminal intent or through the
failure to use the required standard of care. However, Federal
prosecutors have been employing other antiquated, seemingly unrelated
``strict liability'' statutes that do not require a showing of
``knowledge'' or ``intent'' as a basis for criminal prosecution for oil
spill incidents. Such strict criminal liability statutes as the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, statutes that were
enacted at the turn of the century to serve other purposes, have been
used to harass and intimidate the maritime industry, and, in effect,
have turned every oil spill into a potential crime scene without regard
to the fault or intent of companies, corporate officers and employees,
and mariners.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.) provides
that ``it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner,
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill, . . . any migratory bird . . .'', a violation of which is
punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the MBTA was primarily used to prosecute the illegal
activities of hunters and capturers of migratory birds, as the Congress
originally intended when it enacted the MBTA in 1918. In the Exxon
Valdez case itself, and prior to the enactment of OPA90, the MBTA was
first used to support a criminal prosecution against a vessel owner in
relation to a maritime oil spill, and this ``hunting statute'' has been
used ever since against the maritime industry. The ``Refuse Act'' (33
U.S.C. 407, 411) was enacted over 100 years ago at a time well before
subsequent federal legislation essentially replaced it with
comprehensive requirements and regulations specifically directed to the
maritime transportation of oil and other petroleum products. Such
strict liability statutes are unrelated to the regulation and
enforcement of oil transportation activities, and in fact were not
included within the comprehensive OPA90 legislation as statutes in
which criminal liability could be found. With the prosecutorial use of
strict liability statutes, owners and mariners engaged in the
transportation of oil cannot avoid exposure to criminal liability,
regardless of how diligently they adhere to prudent practice and safe
environmental standards. Although conscientious safety and training
programs, state-of-the-art equipment, proper operational procedures,
preventative maintenance programs, and the employment of qualified and
experienced personnel will collectively prevent most oil spills from
occurring, unfortunately spills will still occur on occasion.
To illustrate this point, please permit me to present a scenario that
highlights the dilemma faced by the maritime oil transportation
industry in Louisiana. Imagine, if you will, that a company is
operating a towing vessel in compliance with Coast Guard regulations on
the Mississippi River on a calm, clear day with several fully laden
tank barges in tow. Suddenly, in what was charted and previously
identified to be a clear portion of the waterway, one of the tank
barges strikes an unknown submerged object which shears through its
hull and causes a significant oil spill in the river. Unfortunately, in
addition to any other environmental damage that may occur, the oil
spill kills one or more migratory birds. As you know, under OPA90 the
operator must immediately undertake coordinated spill response actions
with the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies to
safeguard the vessel and its crew, clean up the oil spill, and
otherwise mitigate any damage to the surrounding environment. The
overriding objectives at this critical moment are to assure personnel
and public safety and to clean up the oil spill as quickly as possible
without constraint. However, in the current atmosphere the operator
must take into consideration the threat of strict criminal liability
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, together with
their attendant imprisonment and fines, despite the reasonable care and
precautions taken in the operation and navigation of the tow and in the
spill response effort. Indeed, in the Coast Guard's own environmental
enforcement directive, the statement is made that ``[t]he decision to
commit the necessary Coast Guard resources to obtain the evidence that
will support a criminal prosecution must often be made in the very
early stages of a pollution incident.'' Any prudent operator will
quickly recognize the dilemma in complying with the mandate to act
cooperatively with all appropriate public agencies in cleaning up the
oil spill, while at the same time those very agencies may be conducting
a criminal investigation of that operator. Vessel owners and their
employees who have complied with federal laws and regulations and have
exercised all reasonable care should not continue to face a substantial
risk of imprisonment and criminal fines under such strict liability
statutes. Criminal liability, when appropriately imposed under OPA90,
should be employed only where a discharge is caused by conduct which is
truly ``criminal'' in nature, i.e., where a discharge is caused by
reckless, intentional or other conduct deemed criminal by OPA90.
As this scenario demonstrates, the unjustified use of strict
liability statutes is plainly undermining the very objectives which
OPA90 sought to achieve, namely to enhance the prevention of and
response to oil spills in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States.
As we are well aware, tremendous time, effort, and resources have been
expended by both the federal government and the maritime industry to
eliminate oil spills to the maximum extent possible, and to plan for
and undertake an immediate and effective response to mitigate any
environmental damage from spills that do occur. Clearly unwarranted and
improper prosecutorial use of strict liability statutes is having a
``chilling'' effect on these cooperative spill prevention and response
efforts. Indeed, even if we were to believe that criminal prosecution
only follows intentional criminal conduct, the mere fact that strict
criminal liability statutes are available at the prosecutor's
discretion will intimidate even the most innocent and careful operator.
With strict liability criminal enforcement, responsible members of the
maritime transportation industry are faced with an extreme dilemma in
the event of an oil spill--provide less than full cooperation and
response as criminal defense attorneys will certainly direct, or
cooperate fully despite the risk of criminal prosecution that could
result from any additional actions or statements made during the course
of the spill response. Consequently, increased criminalization of oil
spill incidents introduces uncertainty into the response effort by
discouraging full and open communication and cooperation, and leaves
vessel owners and operators criminally vulnerable for response actions
taken in an effort to ``do the right thing''.
In the maritime industry's continuing effort to improve its risk
management process, it seeks to identify and address all foreseeable
risks associated with the operation of its business. Through fleet
modernization, personnel training, and all other reasonable steps to
address identified risks in its business, the industry still cannot
manage or avoid the increased risks of strict criminal liability
(again, a liability that has no regard to fault or intent). The only
method available to companies and their officers to avoid the risk of
criminal liability completely is to divest themselves from the maritime
business of transporting oil and other petroleum products, in effect to
get out of the business altogether. Furthermore, strict liability
criminal laws provide a strong disincentive for trained, highly
experienced mariners to continue the operation of tank vessels, and for
talented and capable individuals from even entering into that maritime
trade. An earlier editorial highlighted the fact that tugboat captains
``are reporting feelings of intense relief and lightening of their
spirits when they are ordered to push a cargo of grain or other dry
cargo, as compared to the apprehension they feel when they are staring
out of their wheelhouses at tank barges'', and ``that the reason for
this is very obvious in the way that they find themselves instantly
facing criminal charges . . . in the event of a collision or grounding
and oil or chemicals end up in the water''. Certainly, the federal
government does not want to create a situation where the least
experienced
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mariners are the only available crew to handle the most hazardous
cargoes, or the least responsible operators are the only available
carriers. Thus, the unavoidable risk of such criminal liability
directly and adversely affects the safe transportation of oil products,
an activity essential for the public, the economy, and the nation.
Therefore, despite the commitment and effort to provide trained and
experienced vessel operators and employees, to comply with all safety
and operational mandates of Coast Guard laws and regulations, and to
provide for the safe transportation of oil as required by OPA90,
maritime transportation companies in Louisiana, and elsewhere still
cannot avoid criminal liability in the event of an oil spill.
Responsible, law-abiding companies have unfortunately been forced to
undertake the only prudent action that they could under the
circumstances, namely the development of criminal liability action
plans and retention of criminal counsel in an attempt to prepare for
the unavoidable risks of such liability.
These are only preliminary steps and do not begin to address the many
implications of the increasing criminalization of oil spills. The
industry is now asking what responsibility does it have to educate its
mariners and shoreside staff about the potential personal exposure they
may face and wonder how to do this without creating many undesirable
consequences? How should the industry organize spill management teams
and educate them on how to cooperate openly and avoid unwitting
exposure to criminal liability? Mr. President, I have thought about
these issues a great deal and simply do not know how to resolve these
dilemmas under current, strict liability law. In the event of an oil
spill, a responsible party not only must manage the cleanup of the oil
and the civil liability resulting from the spill itself, but also must
protect itself from the criminal liability that now exists due to the
available and willing use of strict liability criminal laws by the
federal government. Managing the pervasive threat of strict criminal
liability, by its very nature, prevents a responsible party from
cooperating fully and completely in response to an oil spill situation.
The OPA90 ``blueprint'' is no longer clear. Is this serving the
objectives of OPA90? Does this really serve the public welfare of our
nation? Is this what Congress had in mind when it mandated its spill
response regime? Is this in the interest of the most immediate, most
effective oil spill cleanup in the unfortunate event of a spill? We
think not.
To restore the delicate balance of interests reached in the enactment
of OPA90 a decade ago, we intend to work with the Congress to reaffirm
the OPA90 framework for criminal prosecutions in oil spill incidents.
The enactment of the legislation we are introducing today will ensure
increased cooperation and responsiveness desired by all those
interested in oil spill response issues without diluting the deterrent
effect and stringent criminal penalties imposed by OPA90 itself.
I look forward to continuing the effort to upgrade the safety of
marine operations in the navigable waterways of the United States, and
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2944
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. AFFIRMATION OF PENALTIES UNDER OIL POLLUTION ACT
OF 1990.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law, section 4301(c) and 4302 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380; 104 Stat. 537) and the
amendments made by those sections provide the exclusive
criminal penalties for any action or activity that may arise
or occur in connection with a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance referred to in section 311(b)(3) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3)).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit, or otherwise exempt any person from,
liability for conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States, for fraud and false statements, or for the
obstruction of justice.
______
By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. Torricelli and Mr. Harkin):
S. 2946. A bill to amend title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not improperly
disqualified from benefits under pension plans and welfare plans based
on a miscategorization of their employee status; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
employee benefits eligibility fairness act of 2000
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, contingent workers in our society face
significant problems, and they deserve our help in meeting them. These
men and women--temporary and part-time workers, contract workers, and
independent contractors--continue to suffer unfairly, even in our
prosperous economy. A new report from the General Accounting Office
emphasizes that contingent workers often lack income security and
retirement security.
We know that for most workers today, a single lifetime job is a relic
of the past. The world is long gone in which workers stay with their
employer for many years, and then retire on a company pension. Since
1982 the number of temporary help jobs has grown 577 percent.
The GAO report shows that 30 percent of the workforce--39 million
working Americans--now get their paychecks from contingent jobs.
Contingent workers have lower incomes than traditional, full-time
workers and many are living in poverty. For example, 30 percent of
agency temporary workers have family incomes below $15,000. By
comparison, only 8 percent of standard full-time workers have family
incomes below $15,000.
Contingent workers are less likely to be covered by employer health
and retirement benefits than are standard, full-time workers. Even when
employers do sponsor a plan, contingent workers are less likely to
participate in the plan, either because they are excluded or because
the plan is too expensive. Only 21 percent of part-time workers are
included in an employer-sponsored pension plan. By comparison, 64
percent of standard full-time workers are included in their employer's
pension plan.
Non-standard or alternative work arrangements can meet the needs of
working families and employers alike, but these arrangements should not
be used to divide the workforce into ``haves'' and ``have-nots.''
Flexible work arrangements, for example, can give working parents more
time to care for their children, but many workers are not in their
contingent jobs by choice. More than half of temporary workers would
prefer a permanent job instead of their contingent job, but temporary
work is all they can find.
As the GAO report makes clear, employers have economic incentives to
cut costs by miscategorizing their workers as temporary or contract
workers. Too often, contingent arrangements are set-up by employers for
the purpose of excluding workers from their employee benefit programs
and evading their responsibilities to their workers. Millions of
employees have been miscategorized by their employers, and as a result
they have been denied the benefits and protections that they rightly
deserve and worked hard to earn.
All workers deserve a secure retirement at the end of their working
years. Social Security has been and will continue to be the best
foundation for that security. But the foundation is just that--the
beginning of our responsibility, not the end of it. We cannot expect
Americans to work hard all their lives, only to face poverty and hard
times when they retire.
That is why I am introducing, with Senators Torricelli and Harkin,
the Employee Benefits Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000 to help
contingent workers obtain the retirement benefits they deserve. This
legislation clarifies employers' responsibilities under the law so that
they cannot exclude contingent workers from employee benefit plans
based on artificial labels or payroll practices.
This is an issue of basic fairness for working men and women. It is
unfair for individuals who work full-time, on an indefinite long-term
basis for an employer to be excluded from the employer's pension plan,
merely because the employer classifies the workers as ``temporary''
when in fact they are not. The employer-employee relationship should be
determined on the facts of
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the working arrangement, not on artificial labels, not on artificial
accounting practices, not artificial payroll practices.
It is long past time for Congress to recognize the plight of
contingent workers and see that they get the employee benefits they
deserve. These important changes are critical to improving the security
of working families, and I look forward to their enactment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Employee Benefits
Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to protect the pension and welfare benefits of
workers is frustrated by the practice of mislabeling
employees to improperly exclude them from employee benefit
plans. Employees are wrongly denied benefits when they are
mislabeled as temporary employees, part-time employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
and contractors. If their true employment status were
recognized, mislabeled employees would be eligible to
participate in employee benefit plans because such plans are
offered to other employees performing the same or
substantially the same work and working for the same
employer.
(2) Mislabeled employees are often paid through staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms to give
the appearance that the employees do not work for their
worksite employer. Employment contracts and reports to
government agencies also are used to give the erroneous
impression that mislabeled employees work for staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms, when the
facts of the work arrangement do not meet the common law
standard for determining the employment relationship.
Employees are also mislabeled as contractors and paid from
non-payroll accounts to give the appearance that they are not
employees of their worksite employer. These practices violate
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(3) Employers are amending their benefit plans to add
provisions that exclude mislabeled employees from
participation in the plan even in the event that such
employees are determined to be common law employees and
otherwise eligible to participate in the plan. These plan
provisions violate the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
(4) As a condition of employment or continued employment,
mislabeled employees are often required to sign documents
that purport to waive their right to participate in employee
benefit plans. Such documents inaccurately claim to limit the
authority of the courts and applicable Federal agencies to
correct the mislabeling of employees and to enforce the terms
of plans providing for their participation. This practice
violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to clarify
applicable provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not
improperly excluded from participation in employee benefit
plans as a result of mislabeling of their employment status.
SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL STANDARDS RELATING TO MINIMUM
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Required Inclusion of Service.--Section 202(a)(3) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29
U.S.C. 1052(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(E) For purposes of this section, in determining `years
of service' and `hours of service', service shall include all
service for the employer as an employee under the common law,
irrespective of whether the worker--
``(i) is paid through a staffing firm, temporary help firm,
payroll agency, employment agency, or other such similar
arrangement,
``(ii) is paid directly by the employer under an
arrangement purporting to characterize an employee under the
common law as other than an employee, or
``(iii) is paid from an account not designated as a payroll
account.''
(b) Exclusion Precluded When Related to Certain Purported
Categorizations.--Section 202 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1052) is
amended further by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a pension plan shall be
treated as failing to meet the requirements of this section
if any individual who--
``(A) is an employee under the common law, and
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan,
is excluded from participation in the plan, irrespective of
the placement of such employee in any category of workers
(such as temporary employees, part-time employees, leased
employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) which may be specified
under the plan as ineligible for participation.
``(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to
preclude the exclusion from participation in a pension plan
of individuals who in fact do not meet a minimum service
period or minimum age which is required under the terms of
the plan and which is otherwise in conformity with the
requirements of this section.''
SEC. 4. WAIVERS OF PARTICIPATION INEFFECTIVE IF RELATED TO
MISCATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE.
Section 202 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1052) (as amended by section 3) is amended
further by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Any waiver or purported waiver by an employee of
participation in a pension plan or welfare plan shall be
ineffective if related, in whole or in part, to the a
miscategorization of the employee in 1 or more ineligible
plan categories.''
SEC. 5. OBJECTIVE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IN PLAN INSTRUMENTS.
Section 402 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1102) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(c)(1) The written instrument pursuant to which an
employee benefit plan is maintained shall set forth
eligibility criteria which--
``(A) include and exclude employees on a uniform basis;
``(B) are based on reasonable job classifications; and
``(C) are based on objective criteria stated in the
instrument itself for the inclusion or exclusion (other than
the mere listing of an employee as included or excluded).
``(2) No plan instrument may permit an employer or plan
sponsor to exclude an employee under the common law from
participation irrespective of the placement of such employee
in any category of workers (such as temporary employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) if the employee--
``(A) is an employee of the employer under the common law,
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan, and
``(C) meets a minimum service period or minimum age which
is required under the terms of the plan.''
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
Section 502(a)(3)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' in clause (i) and inserting a comma,
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) and
inserting ``, or'', and
(3) by adding at the end the following: ``(iii) to provide
relief to employees who have been miscategorized in violation
of sections 202 and 402;''.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to
plan years beginning on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2950. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
establish the Sand Creek Massacre Historic Site in the State of
Colorado; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
introduction of legislation to create the sand creek national historic
site
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce the Sand Creek
Massacre National Historic Site Establishment Act of 2000, legislation
which will finally recognize and memorialize the hallowed ground on
which hundreds of peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians were massacred
by members of the Colorado Militia.
The legislation I introduce today follows The Sand Creek Massacre
Historic Site Study Act of 1998, legislation I introduced and Congress
approved to study the suitability of creating an enduring memorial to
the slain innocents who were camped peacefully near Sand Creek, in
Kiowa County, in Colorado on November 28, 1868.
Much has been written about the horrors visited upon the plains
Indians in the territories of the Western United States in the latter
half of the 19th century. However, what has been lost for more than a
century is a comprehensive understanding of the events of that day in a
grove of cottonwood trees along Sand Creek now SE Colorado. In some
cases denial of the events of the day or a sense that ``the Indians had
it coming'' has prevailed.
This legislation finally recognizes a shameful event in our country's
history based on scientific studies, and
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makes it clear America has the strength and resolve to face its past
and learn the painful lessons that come with intolerance.
The indisputable facts are these: 700 members of the Colorado
Militia, commanded by Colonel John Chivington struck at dawn that
November day, attacking a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians settled
under the U.S. Flag and a white flag which the Indian Chiefs Black
Kettle and White Antelope were told by the U.S. would protect them from
military attack.
By day's end, almost 150 Indians, many of them women, children and
the elderly, lay dead. Chivington's men reportedly desecrated the
bodies of the dead after the massacre, and newspaper reports from
Denver at the time told of the troops displaying Indian body parts in a
gruesome display as they rode through the streets of Colorado's largest
city following the attack.
The perpetrators of this horrible attack which left Indian women and
even babies dead, were never brought to justice even after a
congressional investigation concerning this brutality.
The legislation I introduce today authorizes the National Park
Service to enter into negotiations with willing sellers only, in an
attempt to secure property inside a boundary which encompasses
approximately 12,470 acres as identified by the National Park Service,
for a lasting memorial to events of that fateful day.
This legislation has been developed over the course of the last 18
months. It represents a remarkable effort which brought divergent
points of view together to define the events of that day and to plan
for the future protection of this site. The National Park Service, with
the cooperation of the Kiowa County Commissioners, the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the
Northern Arapaho Tribe, the State of Colorado and many local landowners
and volunteers have completed extensive cultural, geomorphological and
physical studies of the area where the massacre occurred.
All of those involved in this project agree, not acting now is not a
option. This legislation does not compel any private property owner to
sell his or her property to the federal government. It allows the
National Park Service to negotiate with willing sellers to secure
property at fair market value, for a national memorial. This process
could take years. However, several willing sellers have come forward
and are willing to negotiate with the NPS. The property they own has
been identified by the NPS as suitable for a memorial. Additional
acquisitions of property from willing sellers could come in the future.
However, the Sand Creek National Historic Site could never extend
beyond the 12,470 acres identified by the site resource study already
completed.
This legislation has come to being because all of those involved have
exhibited an extraordinary ability to put aside their differences, look
with equal measure at the scientific evidence and the oral traditions
of the Tribes, and come up with a plan that equally honors the memory
of those killed and the rights of the private property owners who have
been faithful and responsible stewards of this site. We have a window
of opportunity here that will not always be available. I encourage my
colleagues to respect the memory of those so brutally killed and
support the creation of a National Historic Site on this hallowed
ground in Kiowa County, in Colorado.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill and other research material
associated with the studies of the Sand Creek site be printed in the
Record for my colleagues or the public to review.
______
By Mr. TORRICELLI:
S. 2953. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve
outreach programs carried out by the Department of Veterans Affairs to
provide for more fully informing veterans of benefits available to them
under laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; to the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
The Veterans' Right to Know Act
Mr. TORRICELLI: Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Veterans' Right to Know Act which will assist millions of brave
Americans who have served this nation in times of war. This legislation
would ensure that all veterans are fully informed of the various
benefits that they have earned through their brave and dedicated
service to their country.
Throughout the history of the United States, the interests of our
nation have been championed by ordinary citizens who willingly defend
our nation when called upon. During the times of crisis which
threatened the very existence of our Republic, we persevered because
young men and women from all walks of life took up arms to defend the
ideals by which this nation was founded. Whether it was winning our
freedom from an oppressive empire, preserving our Union, defeating
fascism or battling the spread of communism, the American people have
time and time again answered the call to defend liberty, justice and
democracy at home and throughout the world.
Our government owes a debt of gratitude to each and every one of our
veterans, and we must make a concerted effort to show our appreciation
for their valiant service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
provides the necessary health care services and benefits to our war
heroes; however, over half of the veterans in the United States are not
fully aware of the benefits or pensions to which they are entitled.
The bill I introduced today is straightforward and it does not call
for the creation of new benefits. Rather, it seeks to ensure that our
veterans are well informed of the benefits they are entitled to as a
result of their service or injuries sustained during their service to
their country.
This legislation would require the VA to inform veterans about their
eligibility for benefits and health care services whenever they first
apply for any benefit with the VA. Furthermore, many times, widows and
surviving family members of veterans are not aware of the special
benefits available to them when their family member passes. My bill
would help these individuals in their time of loss by instructing the
VA to inform them of the benefits for which they are eligible on the
passing of their loved one.
My legislation also seeks to reach out to those veterans who are not
currently enrolled in the VA system by calling upon the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to prepare an annual outreach plan that will encourage
eligible veterans to register with the VA as well as keeping current
enrollees aware of any changes to benefits or eligibility requirements.
This bill will help ensure that our government and its services for
veterans are there for the men and women who have served this nation in
the armed forces. I am hopeful that my colleagues in the Senate will
recognize the tremendous service that our veterans have given and
support this reasonable measure to ensure that our veterans receive the
benefits they deserve.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Stevens,
Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Cleland):
S. 2954. A bill to establish the Dr. Nancy Foster Marine Biology
Scholarship Program; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
The Nancy Foster Scholarship Act
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy
Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in
marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of
the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am
proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such
a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues
Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in
recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the
conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal
resources.
My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship
Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide
scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students
to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine
biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the
development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber.
[[Page
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Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and
during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a
career professional can achieve. She directed the complete
modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting
programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National
Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program
called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and
enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her
colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am
introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure
that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others.
Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to
come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small
way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.
______
By Mr. DeWINE (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Leahy);
S. 2955. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
relief for the payment of asbestos-related claims; to the Committee on
Finance.
asbestos-related claims relief legislation
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
the bill introduced today by my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator
DeWine, that would provide relief for payment of asbestos-related
claims.
I urge my colleagues on the Finance Committee to take a close look at
the serious problem this bill addresses. Certain manufacturers who were
required by government specification to use asbestos in their products
are facing a severe financial crisis arising from claims made by
individuals who are suffering health problems from asbestos-related
diseases. These claims have put several of these companies into
bankruptcy, and several more appear to be on the brink of insolvency.
Thousands of jobs may be at stake, as may be the proper compensation of
the victims of the illnesses.
A major part of the underlying justification for this measure is that
the federal government shares some culpability in the harm caused by
the asbestos-related products manufactured by these companies. For
example, from World War II through the Vietnam War, the government
required that private contractors and shipyard workers use asbestos to
insulate navy ships from so-called ``secondary fires.'' Because of
sovereign immunity, however, the government has not had to share in
paying the damages, leaving American companies to bear the full and
ongoing financial load of compensation.
The legislation we are introducing today is a step toward recognizing
that the federal government is partially responsible for payment of
these claims. It does so through two income tax provisions, both of
which directly benefit the victims of the illnesses.
The first provision exempts from income tax the income earned by a
designated or qualified settlement fund established for the principal
purpose of resolving and satisfying present and future claims relating
to asbestos illnesses. The effect of this provision, Mr. President, is
to increase the amount of money available for the payment of these
claims.
The second provision allows taxpayers with specified liability losses
attributable to asbestos to carry back those losses to the tax year in
which the taxpayer, or its predecessor company, was first involved in
producing or distributing products containing asbestos.
This provision is a matter of fairness, Mr. President. Because of the
long latency period related to asbestos-related diseases, which can be
as long as 40 years, many of these claims are just now arising. Current
law provides for the carryback of this kind of liability losses, but
only for a ten-year period.
Many of the companies involved earned profits and paid taxes on those
profits in the years the asbestos-related products were made or
distributed. However, it is now clear, many years after the taxes were
paid, that there were no profits earned at all, since millions of
dollars of health claims relating to those products must now be paid.
It is only fair, and it is sound tax policy, to allow relief for
situations like these. Again, it should be emphasized that the primary
beneficiaries of this tax change will not be the corporations, but the
victims of the illnesses, because the taxpayer would be required to
devote the entire amount of the tax reduction to paying the claims.
This is not the only time the federal government has been at least
partially responsible for health problems of citizens that arose many
years after the event that initially triggered the problem. During the
Cold War, America conducted above ground atomic tests during which the
wind blew the fallout into communities and ranches of Utah, New Mexico
and Arizona. The government also demanded quantities of uranium, which
is harmful to those who mined and milled it. The incidence of cancers
and other debilitating diseases caused by this activity among the
``downwinders,'' miners and millers has been acknowledged by the
federal government.
The least we can do for those manufacturers forced to use asbestos
instead of other materials is provide some tax relief for their
compensation funds.
This legislation has substantial bipartisan backing. It is sponsored
in the House by both the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Judiciary Committee. It is backed by the by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and by at least one related labor union. This bill addresses a
very serious problem and is the right thing to do. I hope we can pass
it expeditiously.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2955
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXEMPTION FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED SETTLEMENT FUNDS.
(a) Exemption for Asbestos-Related Settlement Funds.--
Subsection (b) of section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(6) Exemption from tax for asbestos-related designated
settlement funds.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), no tax
shall be imposed under this section or any other provision of
this subtitle on any designated settlement fund established
for the principal purpose of resolving and satisfying present
and future claims relating to asbestos.''
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Paragraph (1) of section 468B(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``There'' and
inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (6), there''.
(2) Subsection (g) of section 468B of such Code is amended
by inserting ``(other than subsection (b)(6))'' after
``Nothing in any provision of law''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 2. MODIFY TREATMENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED NET OPERATING
LOSSES.
(a) Asbestos-Related Net Operating Losses.--Subsection (f)
of section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively, and by inserting
after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
``(4) Special rules for asbestos liability losses.--
``(A) In general.--At the election of the taxpayer, the
portion of any specified liability loss that is attributable
to asbestos may, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), be
carried back to the taxable year in which the taxpayer,
including any predecessor corporation, was first involved in
the production or distribution of products containing
asbestos and each subsequent taxable year.
``(B) Coordination with credits.--If a deduction is
allowable for any taxable year by reason of a carryback
described in subparagraph (A)--
``(i) the credits allowable under part IV (other than
subpart C) of subchapter A shall be determined without regard
to such deduction, and
``(ii) the amount of taxable income taken into account with
respect to the carryback under subsection (b)(2) for such
taxable year shall be reduced by an amount equal to--
``(I) the increase in the amount of such credits allowable
for such taxable year solely by reason of clause (i), divided
by
``(II) the maximum rate of tax under section 1 or 11
(whichever is applicable) for such taxable year.
``(C) Carryforwards taken into account before asbestos-
related deductions.--For purposes of this section--
``(i) in determining whether a net operating loss
carryforward may be carried under subsection (b)(2) to a
taxable year, taxable income for such year shall be
determined
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without regard to the deductions referred to in paragraph
(1)(A) with respect to asbestos, and
``(ii) if there is a net operating loss for such year after
taking into account such carryforwards and deductions, the
portion of such loss attributable to such deductions shall be
treated as a specified liability loss that is attributable to
asbestos.
``(D) Limitation.--The amount of reduction in income tax
liability arising from the election described in subparagraph
(A) that exceeds the amount of reduction in income tax
liability that would have resulted if the taxpayer utilized
the 10-year carryback period under subsection (b)(1)(C) shall
be devoted by the taxpayer solely to asbestos claimant
compensation and related costs, through a designated
settlement fund or otherwise.
``(E) Consolidated groups.--For purposes of this paragraph,
all members of an affiliated group of corporations that join
in the filing of a consolidated return pursuant to section
1501 (or a predecessor section) shall be treated as 1
corporation.
``(F) Predecessor corporation.--For purposes of this
paragraph, a predecessor corporation shall include a
corporation that transferred or distributed assets to the
taxpayer in a transaction to which section 381(a) applies or
that distributed the stock of the taxpayer in a transaction
to which section 355 applies.''
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (7) of section 172(f)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as redesignated by this
section, is amended by striking ``10-year''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2956. A bill to establish the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
colorado canyons preservation act of 2000
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation which
would preserve over 130,000 acres of land in Western Colorado. This
legislation is supported locally by property owners, county
commissioners, environmentalists, and recreational groups. My bill is a
Senate companion to
H.R. 4275 which was introduced by my colleague and
fellow Coloradan Representative Scott McInnis.
The areas proposed for Wildernesss Protection are the Black Ridge and
Ruby Canyons of the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley near Grand Junction,
Colorado. They contain unique and valuable scenic, recreational,
multiple use, paleontological, natural, and wildlife components. This
historic rural western setting provides extensive opportunities for
recreational activities, and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and
grazing. This area is truly worthy of additional protection as a
national conservation area.
This legislation has the support of the administration and should
easily be signed into law. The only issue confronting us is the limited
amount of time left in the 106th Congress. I hope we will be able to
move this legislation quickly through the process and that it will not
get bogged down in partisan politics. It simply is the right thing to
do.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2956
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that certain areas located in
the Grand Valley in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, should be protected and enhanced for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. These areas
include the following:
(1) The areas making up the Black Ridge and Ruby Canyons of
the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley, which contain unique and
valuable scenic, recreational, multiple use opportunities
(including grazing), paleontological, natural, and wildlife
components enhanced by the rural western setting of the area,
provide extensive opportunities for recreational activities,
and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and grazing, and
are worthy of additional protection as a national
conservation area.
(2) The Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Study Area has
wilderness value and offers unique geological,
paleontological, scientific, and recreational resources.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to conserve,
protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations the unique and nationally important
values of the public lands described in section 4(b),
including geological, cultural, paleontological, natural,
scientific, recreational, environmental, biological,
wilderness, wildlife education, and scenic resources of such
public lands, by establishing the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness in
the State of Colorado and the State of Utah.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Conservation area.--The term ``Conservation Area''
means the Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area
established by section 4(a).
(2) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Colorado
Canyons National Conservation Area Advisory Council
established under section 8.
(3) Management plan.--The term ``management plan'' means
the management plan developed for the Conservation Area under
section 6(h).
(4) Map.--The term ``Map'' means the map entitled
``Proposed Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Area'' and dated July 18,
2000.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management.
(6) Wilderness.--The term ``Wilderness'' means the Black
Ridge Canyons Wilderness so designated in section 5.
SEC. 4. COLORADO CANYONS NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREA.
(a) In General.--There is established the Colorado Canyons
National Conservation Area in the State of Colorado and the
State of Utah.
(b) Areas Included.--The Conservation Area shall consist of
approximately 122,300 acres of public land as generally
depicted on the Map.
SEC. 5. BLACK RIDGE CANYONS WILDERNESS DESIGNATION.
Certain lands in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, which comprise approximately 75,550 acres as generally
depicted on the Map, are hereby designated as wilderness and
therefore as a component of the National Wilderness
Preservation System. Such component shall be known as the
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness.
SEC. 6. MANAGEMENT.
(a) Conservation Area.--The Secretary shall manage the
Conservation Area in a manner that--
(1) conserves, protects, and enhances the resources of the
Conservation Area specified in section 2(b); and
(2) is in accordance with--
(A) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
(B) other applicable law, including this Act.
(b) Uses.--The Secretary shall allow only such uses of the
Conservation Area as the Secretary determines will further
the purposes for which the Conservation Area is established.
(c) Withdrawals.--Subject to valid existing rights, all
Federal land within the Conservation Area and the Wilderness
and all land and interests in land acquired for the
Conservation Area or the Wilderness by the United States are
withdrawn from--
(1) all forms of entry, appropriation, or disposal under
the public land laws;
(2) location, entry, and patent
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - July 27, 2000)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
S7841-S7908]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BREAUX:
S. 2944. A bill to clarify that certain penalties provided for in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are the exclusive criminal penalties for any
action or activity that may arise or occur in connection with certain
discharges of oil or a hazardous substance; to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
Strict Criminal Liability Reform for Oil Spill Incidents
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation to
address a long-standing problem which adversely affects the safe and
reliable maritime transport of oil products. The legislation I am
introducing today will eliminate the application and use of strict
criminal liability statutes, statutes that do not require a showing of
criminal intent or even the slightest degree of negligence, for
maritime transportation-related oil spill incidents.
Through comprehensive Congressional action that led to the enactment
and implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, commonly referred
to as ``OPA90'', the United States has successfully reduced the number
of oil spills in the maritime environment and has established a
cooperative public/private partnership to respond effectively in the
diminishing number of situations when an oil spill occurs. Nonetheless,
over the past decade, the use of the unrelated strict criminal
liability statutes that I referred to above has undermined the spill
prevention and response objectives of OPA90, the very objectives that
were established by the Congress to preserve the environment, safeguard
the public welfare, and promote the safe transportation of oil. The
legislation I am introducing today will restore the delicate balance of
interests reached in OPA90, and will reaffirm OPA90's preeminent role
as the statute providing the exclusive criminal penalties for oil spill
incidents.
As stated in the Coast Guard's own environmental enforcement
directive, a company, its officers, employees, and mariners, in the
event of an oil spill ``could be convicted and sentenced to a criminal
fine even where [they] took all reasonable precautions to avoid the
discharge''. Accordingly, responsible operators in my home state of
Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States who transport oil are
unavoidably exposed to potentially immeasurable criminal fines and, in
the worst case scenario, jail time. Not only is this situation unfairly
targeting an industry that plays an extremely important role in our
national economy, but it also works contrary to the public welfare.
Most liquid cargo transportation companies on the coastal and inland
waterway system of the United States have embraced safe operation and
risk management as two of their most important and fundamental values.
For example, members of the American Waterways Operators (AWO) from
Louisiana and other states have implemented stronger safety programs
that have significantly reduced personal injuries to mariners. Tank
barge fleets have been upgraded through construction of new state-of-
the-art double hulled tank barges while obsolete single skin barges are
being retired far in advance of the OPA90 timetable. Additionally, AWO
members have dedicated significant time and financial resources to
provide continuous and comprehensive education and training for vessel
captains, crews and shoreside staff, not only in the operation of
vessels but also in preparation for all contingencies that could occur
in the transportation of oil products. This commitment to marine safety
and environmental protection by responsible members of the oil
transportation industry is real. The industry continues to work closely
with the Coast Guard to upgrade regulatory standards in such key areas
as towing vessel operator qualifications and navigation equipment on
towing vessels.
Through the efforts of AWO and other organizations, the maritime
transportation industry has achieved an outstanding compliance record
with the numerous laws and regulations enforced by the Coast Guard. Let
me be clear: responsible carriers, and frankly their customers, have a
``zero tolerance'' policy for oil spills. Additionally, the industry is
taking spill response preparedness seriously. Industry representatives
and operators routinely participate in Coast Guard oil spill crisis
management courses, PREP Drills, and regional spill response drills.
Yet despite all of the modernization, safety, and training efforts of
the marine transportation industry, their mariners and shoreside
employees cannot escape the threat of criminal liability in the event
of an oil spill, even where it is shown that they ``took all reasonable
precautions to avoid [a] discharge''.
As you know, in response to the tragic Exxon Valdez spill, Congress
enacted OPA90. OPA90 mandated new, comprehensive, and complex
regulatory and enforcement requirements for the transportation of oil
products and for oil spill response. Both the federal government and
maritime industry have worked hard to accomplish the legislation's
primary objective--to provide greater environmental safeguards in oil
transportation by creating a comprehensive prevention, response,
liability, and compensation regime to deal with vessel and facility oil
pollution. And OPA90 is working in a truly meaningful sense. To prevent
oil spill incidents from occurring in the first place, OPA90 provides
an enormously powerful deterrent, through both its criminal and civil
liability provisions. Moreover, OPA90 mandates prompt reporting of
spills, contingency planning, and both cooperation and coordination
with federal, state, and local authorities in connection with managing
the spill response. Failure to report and cooperate as required by
OPA90 may impose automatic civil penalties, criminal liability and
unlimited civil liability. As a result, the number of domestic oil
spills has been dramatically reduced over the past decade since OPA90
was enacted. In those limited situations in which oil spills
unfortunately occurred, intensive efforts commenced immediately with
federal, state and local officials working in a joint, unified manner
with the industry, as contemplated by OPA90, to clean up and report
spills as quickly as possible and to mitigate to the greatest extent
any impact on the environment. OPA90 has provided a comprehensive and
cohesive ``blueprint'' for proper planning, training, and resource
identification to respond to an oil spill incident, and to ensure that
such a response is properly and cooperatively managed.
OPA90 also provides a complete statutory framework for proceeding
against individuals for civil and/or criminal penalties arising out of
oil spills in the marine environment. When Congress crafted this Act,
it carefully balanced the imposition of stronger criminal and civil
penalties with the need to promote enhanced cooperation among all of
the parties involved in the spill prevention and response effort. In so
doing, the Congress clearly enumerated the circumstances in which
criminal penalties could be imposed for actions related to maritime oil
spills, and added and/or substantially increased criminal penalties
under the related laws which comprehensively govern the maritime
transportation of oil and other petroleum products.
The legislation we are introducing today will not change in any way
the tough criminal sanctions that were imposed in OPA90. However,
responsible, law-abiding members of the maritime industry in Louisiana
and elsewhere are concerned by the willingness of the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies in the post-OPA90 environment to use
strict criminal liability statutes in oil spill incidents. As you know,
strict liability imposes criminal sanctions without requiring a showing
of criminal knowledge, intent or even negligence. These federal actions
imposing strict liability have created an atmosphere of extreme
uncertainty for the maritime transportation industry about how to
respond to and cooperate with the Coast Guard and other federal
[[Page
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agencies in cleaning up an oil spill. Criminal culpability in this
country, both historically and as reflected in the comprehensive OPA90
legislation itself, typically requires wrongful actions or omissions by
individuals through some degree of criminal intent or through the
failure to use the required standard of care. However, Federal
prosecutors have been employing other antiquated, seemingly unrelated
``strict liability'' statutes that do not require a showing of
``knowledge'' or ``intent'' as a basis for criminal prosecution for oil
spill incidents. Such strict criminal liability statutes as the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, statutes that were
enacted at the turn of the century to serve other purposes, have been
used to harass and intimidate the maritime industry, and, in effect,
have turned every oil spill into a potential crime scene without regard
to the fault or intent of companies, corporate officers and employees,
and mariners.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.) provides
that ``it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner,
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill, . . . any migratory bird . . .'', a violation of which is
punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the MBTA was primarily used to prosecute the illegal
activities of hunters and capturers of migratory birds, as the Congress
originally intended when it enacted the MBTA in 1918. In the Exxon
Valdez case itself, and prior to the enactment of OPA90, the MBTA was
first used to support a criminal prosecution against a vessel owner in
relation to a maritime oil spill, and this ``hunting statute'' has been
used ever since against the maritime industry. The ``Refuse Act'' (33
U.S.C. 407, 411) was enacted over 100 years ago at a time well before
subsequent federal legislation essentially replaced it with
comprehensive requirements and regulations specifically directed to the
maritime transportation of oil and other petroleum products. Such
strict liability statutes are unrelated to the regulation and
enforcement of oil transportation activities, and in fact were not
included within the comprehensive OPA90 legislation as statutes in
which criminal liability could be found. With the prosecutorial use of
strict liability statutes, owners and mariners engaged in the
transportation of oil cannot avoid exposure to criminal liability,
regardless of how diligently they adhere to prudent practice and safe
environmental standards. Although conscientious safety and training
programs, state-of-the-art equipment, proper operational procedures,
preventative maintenance programs, and the employment of qualified and
experienced personnel will collectively prevent most oil spills from
occurring, unfortunately spills will still occur on occasion.
To illustrate this point, please permit me to present a scenario that
highlights the dilemma faced by the maritime oil transportation
industry in Louisiana. Imagine, if you will, that a company is
operating a towing vessel in compliance with Coast Guard regulations on
the Mississippi River on a calm, clear day with several fully laden
tank barges in tow. Suddenly, in what was charted and previously
identified to be a clear portion of the waterway, one of the tank
barges strikes an unknown submerged object which shears through its
hull and causes a significant oil spill in the river. Unfortunately, in
addition to any other environmental damage that may occur, the oil
spill kills one or more migratory birds. As you know, under OPA90 the
operator must immediately undertake coordinated spill response actions
with the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies to
safeguard the vessel and its crew, clean up the oil spill, and
otherwise mitigate any damage to the surrounding environment. The
overriding objectives at this critical moment are to assure personnel
and public safety and to clean up the oil spill as quickly as possible
without constraint. However, in the current atmosphere the operator
must take into consideration the threat of strict criminal liability
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, together with
their attendant imprisonment and fines, despite the reasonable care and
precautions taken in the operation and navigation of the tow and in the
spill response effort. Indeed, in the Coast Guard's own environmental
enforcement directive, the statement is made that ``[t]he decision to
commit the necessary Coast Guard resources to obtain the evidence that
will support a criminal prosecution must often be made in the very
early stages of a pollution incident.'' Any prudent operator will
quickly recognize the dilemma in complying with the mandate to act
cooperatively with all appropriate public agencies in cleaning up the
oil spill, while at the same time those very agencies may be conducting
a criminal investigation of that operator. Vessel owners and their
employees who have complied with federal laws and regulations and have
exercised all reasonable care should not continue to face a substantial
risk of imprisonment and criminal fines under such strict liability
statutes. Criminal liability, when appropriately imposed under OPA90,
should be employed only where a discharge is caused by conduct which is
truly ``criminal'' in nature, i.e., where a discharge is caused by
reckless, intentional or other conduct deemed criminal by OPA90.
As this scenario demonstrates, the unjustified use of strict
liability statutes is plainly undermining the very objectives which
OPA90 sought to achieve, namely to enhance the prevention of and
response to oil spills in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States.
As we are well aware, tremendous time, effort, and resources have been
expended by both the federal government and the maritime industry to
eliminate oil spills to the maximum extent possible, and to plan for
and undertake an immediate and effective response to mitigate any
environmental damage from spills that do occur. Clearly unwarranted and
improper prosecutorial use of strict liability statutes is having a
``chilling'' effect on these cooperative spill prevention and response
efforts. Indeed, even if we were to believe that criminal prosecution
only follows intentional criminal conduct, the mere fact that strict
criminal liability statutes are available at the prosecutor's
discretion will intimidate even the most innocent and careful operator.
With strict liability criminal enforcement, responsible members of the
maritime transportation industry are faced with an extreme dilemma in
the event of an oil spill--provide less than full cooperation and
response as criminal defense attorneys will certainly direct, or
cooperate fully despite the risk of criminal prosecution that could
result from any additional actions or statements made during the course
of the spill response. Consequently, increased criminalization of oil
spill incidents introduces uncertainty into the response effort by
discouraging full and open communication and cooperation, and leaves
vessel owners and operators criminally vulnerable for response actions
taken in an effort to ``do the right thing''.
In the maritime industry's continuing effort to improve its risk
management process, it seeks to identify and address all foreseeable
risks associated with the operation of its business. Through fleet
modernization, personnel training, and all other reasonable steps to
address identified risks in its business, the industry still cannot
manage or avoid the increased risks of strict criminal liability
(again, a liability that has no regard to fault or intent). The only
method available to companies and their officers to avoid the risk of
criminal liability completely is to divest themselves from the maritime
business of transporting oil and other petroleum products, in effect to
get out of the business altogether. Furthermore, strict liability
criminal laws provide a strong disincentive for trained, highly
experienced mariners to continue the operation of tank vessels, and for
talented and capable individuals from even entering into that maritime
trade. An earlier editorial highlighted the fact that tugboat captains
``are reporting feelings of intense relief and lightening of their
spirits when they are ordered to push a cargo of grain or other dry
cargo, as compared to the apprehension they feel when they are staring
out of their wheelhouses at tank barges'', and ``that the reason for
this is very obvious in the way that they find themselves instantly
facing criminal charges . . . in the event of a collision or grounding
and oil or chemicals end up in the water''. Certainly, the federal
government does not want to create a situation where the least
experienced
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mariners are the only available crew to handle the most hazardous
cargoes, or the least responsible operators are the only available
carriers. Thus, the unavoidable risk of such criminal liability
directly and adversely affects the safe transportation of oil products,
an activity essential for the public, the economy, and the nation.
Therefore, despite the commitment and effort to provide trained and
experienced vessel operators and employees, to comply with all safety
and operational mandates of Coast Guard laws and regulations, and to
provide for the safe transportation of oil as required by OPA90,
maritime transportation companies in Louisiana, and elsewhere still
cannot avoid criminal liability in the event of an oil spill.
Responsible, law-abiding companies have unfortunately been forced to
undertake the only prudent action that they could under the
circumstances, namely the development of criminal liability action
plans and retention of criminal counsel in an attempt to prepare for
the unavoidable risks of such liability.
These are only preliminary steps and do not begin to address the many
implications of the increasing criminalization of oil spills. The
industry is now asking what responsibility does it have to educate its
mariners and shoreside staff about the potential personal exposure they
may face and wonder how to do this without creating many undesirable
consequences? How should the industry organize spill management teams
and educate them on how to cooperate openly and avoid unwitting
exposure to criminal liability? Mr. President, I have thought about
these issues a great deal and simply do not know how to resolve these
dilemmas under current, strict liability law. In the event of an oil
spill, a responsible party not only must manage the cleanup of the oil
and the civil liability resulting from the spill itself, but also must
protect itself from the criminal liability that now exists due to the
available and willing use of strict liability criminal laws by the
federal government. Managing the pervasive threat of strict criminal
liability, by its very nature, prevents a responsible party from
cooperating fully and completely in response to an oil spill situation.
The OPA90 ``blueprint'' is no longer clear. Is this serving the
objectives of OPA90? Does this really serve the public welfare of our
nation? Is this what Congress had in mind when it mandated its spill
response regime? Is this in the interest of the most immediate, most
effective oil spill cleanup in the unfortunate event of a spill? We
think not.
To restore the delicate balance of interests reached in the enactment
of OPA90 a decade ago, we intend to work with the Congress to reaffirm
the OPA90 framework for criminal prosecutions in oil spill incidents.
The enactment of the legislation we are introducing today will ensure
increased cooperation and responsiveness desired by all those
interested in oil spill response issues without diluting the deterrent
effect and stringent criminal penalties imposed by OPA90 itself.
I look forward to continuing the effort to upgrade the safety of
marine operations in the navigable waterways of the United States, and
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2944
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. AFFIRMATION OF PENALTIES UNDER OIL POLLUTION ACT
OF 1990.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law, section 4301(c) and 4302 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380; 104 Stat. 537) and the
amendments made by those sections provide the exclusive
criminal penalties for any action or activity that may arise
or occur in connection with a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance referred to in section 311(b)(3) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3)).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit, or otherwise exempt any person from,
liability for conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States, for fraud and false statements, or for the
obstruction of justice.
______
By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. Torricelli and Mr. Harkin):
S. 2946. A bill to amend title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not improperly
disqualified from benefits under pension plans and welfare plans based
on a miscategorization of their employee status; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
employee benefits eligibility fairness act of 2000
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, contingent workers in our society face
significant problems, and they deserve our help in meeting them. These
men and women--temporary and part-time workers, contract workers, and
independent contractors--continue to suffer unfairly, even in our
prosperous economy. A new report from the General Accounting Office
emphasizes that contingent workers often lack income security and
retirement security.
We know that for most workers today, a single lifetime job is a relic
of the past. The world is long gone in which workers stay with their
employer for many years, and then retire on a company pension. Since
1982 the number of temporary help jobs has grown 577 percent.
The GAO report shows that 30 percent of the workforce--39 million
working Americans--now get their paychecks from contingent jobs.
Contingent workers have lower incomes than traditional, full-time
workers and many are living in poverty. For example, 30 percent of
agency temporary workers have family incomes below $15,000. By
comparison, only 8 percent of standard full-time workers have family
incomes below $15,000.
Contingent workers are less likely to be covered by employer health
and retirement benefits than are standard, full-time workers. Even when
employers do sponsor a plan, contingent workers are less likely to
participate in the plan, either because they are excluded or because
the plan is too expensive. Only 21 percent of part-time workers are
included in an employer-sponsored pension plan. By comparison, 64
percent of standard full-time workers are included in their employer's
pension plan.
Non-standard or alternative work arrangements can meet the needs of
working families and employers alike, but these arrangements should not
be used to divide the workforce into ``haves'' and ``have-nots.''
Flexible work arrangements, for example, can give working parents more
time to care for their children, but many workers are not in their
contingent jobs by choice. More than half of temporary workers would
prefer a permanent job instead of their contingent job, but temporary
work is all they can find.
As the GAO report makes clear, employers have economic incentives to
cut costs by miscategorizing their workers as temporary or contract
workers. Too often, contingent arrangements are set-up by employers for
the purpose of excluding workers from their employee benefit programs
and evading their responsibilities to their workers. Millions of
employees have been miscategorized by their employers, and as a result
they have been denied the benefits and protections that they rightly
deserve and worked hard to earn.
All workers deserve a secure retirement at the end of their working
years. Social Security has been and will continue to be the best
foundation for that security. But the foundation is just that--the
beginning of our responsibility, not the end of it. We cannot expect
Americans to work hard all their lives, only to face poverty and hard
times when they retire.
That is why I am introducing, with Senators Torricelli and Harkin,
the Employee Benefits Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000 to help
contingent workers obtain the retirement benefits they deserve. This
legislation clarifies employers' responsibilities under the law so that
they cannot exclude contingent workers from employee benefit plans
based on artificial labels or payroll practices.
This is an issue of basic fairness for working men and women. It is
unfair for individuals who work full-time, on an indefinite long-term
basis for an employer to be excluded from the employer's pension plan,
merely because the employer classifies the workers as ``temporary''
when in fact they are not. The employer-employee relationship should be
determined on the facts of
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the working arrangement, not on artificial labels, not on artificial
accounting practices, not artificial payroll practices.
It is long past time for Congress to recognize the plight of
contingent workers and see that they get the employee benefits they
deserve. These important changes are critical to improving the security
of working families, and I look forward to their enactment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Employee Benefits
Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to protect the pension and welfare benefits of
workers is frustrated by the practice of mislabeling
employees to improperly exclude them from employee benefit
plans. Employees are wrongly denied benefits when they are
mislabeled as temporary employees, part-time employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
and contractors. If their true employment status were
recognized, mislabeled employees would be eligible to
participate in employee benefit plans because such plans are
offered to other employees performing the same or
substantially the same work and working for the same
employer.
(2) Mislabeled employees are often paid through staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms to give
the appearance that the employees do not work for their
worksite employer. Employment contracts and reports to
government agencies also are used to give the erroneous
impression that mislabeled employees work for staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms, when the
facts of the work arrangement do not meet the common law
standard for determining the employment relationship.
Employees are also mislabeled as contractors and paid from
non-payroll accounts to give the appearance that they are not
employees of their worksite employer. These practices violate
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(3) Employers are amending their benefit plans to add
provisions that exclude mislabeled employees from
participation in the plan even in the event that such
employees are determined to be common law employees and
otherwise eligible to participate in the plan. These plan
provisions violate the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
(4) As a condition of employment or continued employment,
mislabeled employees are often required to sign documents
that purport to waive their right to participate in employee
benefit plans. Such documents inaccurately claim to limit the
authority of the courts and applicable Federal agencies to
correct the mislabeling of employees and to enforce the terms
of plans providing for their participation. This practice
violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to clarify
applicable provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not
improperly excluded from participation in employee benefit
plans as a result of mislabeling of their employment status.
SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL STANDARDS RELATING TO MINIMUM
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Required Inclusion of Service.--Section 202(a)(3) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29
U.S.C. 1052(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(E) For purposes of this section, in determining `years
of service' and `hours of service', service shall include all
service for the employer as an employee under the common law,
irrespective of whether the worker--
``(i) is paid through a staffing firm, temporary help firm,
payroll agency, employment agency, or other such similar
arrangement,
``(ii) is paid directly by the employer under an
arrangement purporting to characterize an employee under the
common law as other than an employee, or
``(iii) is paid from an account not designated as a payroll
account.''
(b) Exclusion Precluded When Related to Certain Purported
Categorizations.--Section 202 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1052) is
amended further by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a pension plan shall be
treated as failing to meet the requirements of this section
if any individual who--
``(A) is an employee under the common law, and
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan,
is excluded from participation in the plan, irrespective of
the placement of such employee in any category of workers
(such as temporary employees, part-time employees, leased
employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) which may be specified
under the plan as ineligible for participation.
``(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to
preclude the exclusion from participation in a pension plan
of individuals who in fact do not meet a minimum service
period or minimum age which is required under the terms of
the plan and which is otherwise in conformity with the
requirements of this section.''
SEC. 4. WAIVERS OF PARTICIPATION INEFFECTIVE IF RELATED TO
MISCATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE.
Section 202 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1052) (as amended by section 3) is amended
further by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Any waiver or purported waiver by an employee of
participation in a pension plan or welfare plan shall be
ineffective if related, in whole or in part, to the a
miscategorization of the employee in 1 or more ineligible
plan categories.''
SEC. 5. OBJECTIVE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IN PLAN INSTRUMENTS.
Section 402 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1102) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(c)(1) The written instrument pursuant to which an
employee benefit plan is maintained shall set forth
eligibility criteria which--
``(A) include and exclude employees on a uniform basis;
``(B) are based on reasonable job classifications; and
``(C) are based on objective criteria stated in the
instrument itself for the inclusion or exclusion (other than
the mere listing of an employee as included or excluded).
``(2) No plan instrument may permit an employer or plan
sponsor to exclude an employee under the common law from
participation irrespective of the placement of such employee
in any category of workers (such as temporary employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) if the employee--
``(A) is an employee of the employer under the common law,
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan, and
``(C) meets a minimum service period or minimum age which
is required under the terms of the plan.''
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
Section 502(a)(3)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' in clause (i) and inserting a comma,
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) and
inserting ``, or'', and
(3) by adding at the end the following: ``(iii) to provide
relief to employees who have been miscategorized in violation
of sections 202 and 402;''.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to
plan years beginning on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2950. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
establish the Sand Creek Massacre Historic Site in the State of
Colorado; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
introduction of legislation to create the sand creek national historic
site
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce the Sand Creek
Massacre National Historic Site Establishment Act of 2000, legislation
which will finally recognize and memorialize the hallowed ground on
which hundreds of peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians were massacred
by members of the Colorado Militia.
The legislation I introduce today follows The Sand Creek Massacre
Historic Site Study Act of 1998, legislation I introduced and Congress
approved to study the suitability of creating an enduring memorial to
the slain innocents who were camped peacefully near Sand Creek, in
Kiowa County, in Colorado on November 28, 1868.
Much has been written about the horrors visited upon the plains
Indians in the territories of the Western United States in the latter
half of the 19th century. However, what has been lost for more than a
century is a comprehensive understanding of the events of that day in a
grove of cottonwood trees along Sand Creek now SE Colorado. In some
cases denial of the events of the day or a sense that ``the Indians had
it coming'' has prevailed.
This legislation finally recognizes a shameful event in our country's
history based on scientific studies, and
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makes it clear America has the strength and resolve to face its past
and learn the painful lessons that come with intolerance.
The indisputable facts are these: 700 members of the Colorado
Militia, commanded by Colonel John Chivington struck at dawn that
November day, attacking a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians settled
under the U.S. Flag and a white flag which the Indian Chiefs Black
Kettle and White Antelope were told by the U.S. would protect them from
military attack.
By day's end, almost 150 Indians, many of them women, children and
the elderly, lay dead. Chivington's men reportedly desecrated the
bodies of the dead after the massacre, and newspaper reports from
Denver at the time told of the troops displaying Indian body parts in a
gruesome display as they rode through the streets of Colorado's largest
city following the attack.
The perpetrators of this horrible attack which left Indian women and
even babies dead, were never brought to justice even after a
congressional investigation concerning this brutality.
The legislation I introduce today authorizes the National Park
Service to enter into negotiations with willing sellers only, in an
attempt to secure property inside a boundary which encompasses
approximately 12,470 acres as identified by the National Park Service,
for a lasting memorial to events of that fateful day.
This legislation has been developed over the course of the last 18
months. It represents a remarkable effort which brought divergent
points of view together to define the events of that day and to plan
for the future protection of this site. The National Park Service, with
the cooperation of the Kiowa County Commissioners, the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the
Northern Arapaho Tribe, the State of Colorado and many local landowners
and volunteers have completed extensive cultural, geomorphological and
physical studies of the area where the massacre occurred.
All of those involved in this project agree, not acting now is not a
option. This legislation does not compel any private property owner to
sell his or her property to the federal government. It allows the
National Park Service to negotiate with willing sellers to secure
property at fair market value, for a national memorial. This process
could take years. However, several willing sellers have come forward
and are willing to negotiate with the NPS. The property they own has
been identified by the NPS as suitable for a memorial. Additional
acquisitions of property from willing sellers could come in the future.
However, the Sand Creek National Historic Site could never extend
beyond the 12,470 acres identified by the site resource study already
completed.
This legislation has come to being because all of those involved have
exhibited an extraordinary ability to put aside their differences, look
with equal measure at the scientific evidence and the oral traditions
of the Tribes, and come up with a plan that equally honors the memory
of those killed and the rights of the private property owners who have
been faithful and responsible stewards of this site. We have a window
of opportunity here that will not always be available. I encourage my
colleagues to respect the memory of those so brutally killed and
support the creation of a National Historic Site on this hallowed
ground in Kiowa County, in Colorado.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill and other research material
associated with the studies of the Sand Creek site be printed in the
Record for my colleagues or the public to review.
______
By Mr. TORRICELLI:
S. 2953. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve
outreach programs carried out by the Department of Veterans Affairs to
provide for more fully informing veterans of benefits available to them
under laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; to the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
The Veterans' Right to Know Act
Mr. TORRICELLI: Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Veterans' Right to Know Act which will assist millions of brave
Americans who have served this nation in times of war. This legislation
would ensure that all veterans are fully informed of the various
benefits that they have earned through their brave and dedicated
service to their country.
Throughout the history of the United States, the interests of our
nation have been championed by ordinary citizens who willingly defend
our nation when called upon. During the times of crisis which
threatened the very existence of our Republic, we persevered because
young men and women from all walks of life took up arms to defend the
ideals by which this nation was founded. Whether it was winning our
freedom from an oppressive empire, preserving our Union, defeating
fascism or battling the spread of communism, the American people have
time and time again answered the call to defend liberty, justice and
democracy at home and throughout the world.
Our government owes a debt of gratitude to each and every one of our
veterans, and we must make a concerted effort to show our appreciation
for their valiant service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
provides the necessary health care services and benefits to our war
heroes; however, over half of the veterans in the United States are not
fully aware of the benefits or pensions to which they are entitled.
The bill I introduced today is straightforward and it does not call
for the creation of new benefits. Rather, it seeks to ensure that our
veterans are well informed of the benefits they are entitled to as a
result of their service or injuries sustained during their service to
their country.
This legislation would require the VA to inform veterans about their
eligibility for benefits and health care services whenever they first
apply for any benefit with the VA. Furthermore, many times, widows and
surviving family members of veterans are not aware of the special
benefits available to them when their family member passes. My bill
would help these individuals in their time of loss by instructing the
VA to inform them of the benefits for which they are eligible on the
passing of their loved one.
My legislation also seeks to reach out to those veterans who are not
currently enrolled in the VA system by calling upon the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to prepare an annual outreach plan that will encourage
eligible veterans to register with the VA as well as keeping current
enrollees aware of any changes to benefits or eligibility requirements.
This bill will help ensure that our government and its services for
veterans are there for the men and women who have served this nation in
the armed forces. I am hopeful that my colleagues in the Senate will
recognize the tremendous service that our veterans have given and
support this reasonable measure to ensure that our veterans receive the
benefits they deserve.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Stevens,
Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Cleland):
S. 2954. A bill to establish the Dr. Nancy Foster Marine Biology
Scholarship Program; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
The Nancy Foster Scholarship Act
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy
Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in
marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of
the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am
proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such
a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues
Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in
recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the
conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal
resources.
My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship
Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide
scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students
to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine
biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the
development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber.
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Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and
during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a
career professional can achieve. She directed the complete
modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting
programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National
Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program
called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and
enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her
colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am
introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure
that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others.
Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to
come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small
way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.
______
By Mr. DeWINE (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Leahy);
S. 2955. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
relief for the payment of asbestos-related claims; to the Committee on
Finance.
asbestos-related claims relief legislation
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
the bill introduced today by my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator
DeWine, that would provide relief for payment of asbestos-related
claims.
I urge my colleagues on the Finance Committee to take a close look at
the serious problem this bill addresses. Certain manufacturers who were
required by government specification to use asbestos in their products
are facing a severe financial crisis arising from claims made by
individuals who are suffering health problems from asbestos-related
diseases. These claims have put several of these companies into
bankruptcy, and several more appear to be on the brink of insolvency.
Thousands of jobs may be at stake, as may be the proper compensation of
the victims of the illnesses.
A major part of the underlying justification for this measure is that
the federal government shares some culpability in the harm caused by
the asbestos-related products manufactured by these companies. For
example, from World War II through the Vietnam War, the government
required that private contractors and shipyard workers use asbestos to
insulate navy ships from so-called ``secondary fires.'' Because of
sovereign immunity, however, the government has not had to share in
paying the damages, leaving American companies to bear the full and
ongoing financial load of compensation.
The legislation we are introducing today is a step toward recognizing
that the federal government is partially responsible for payment of
these claims. It does so through two income tax provisions, both of
which directly benefit the victims of the illnesses.
The first provision exempts from income tax the income earned by a
designated or qualified settlement fund established for the principal
purpose of resolving and satisfying present and future claims relating
to asbestos illnesses. The effect of this provision, Mr. President, is
to increase the amount of money available for the payment of these
claims.
The second provision allows taxpayers with specified liability losses
attributable to asbestos to carry back those losses to the tax year in
which the taxpayer, or its predecessor company, was first involved in
producing or distributing products containing asbestos.
This provision is a matter of fairness, Mr. President. Because of the
long latency period related to asbestos-related diseases, which can be
as long as 40 years, many of these claims are just now arising. Current
law provides for the carryback of this kind of liability losses, but
only for a ten-year period.
Many of the companies involved earned profits and paid taxes on those
profits in the years the asbestos-related products were made or
distributed. However, it is now clear, many years after the taxes were
paid, that there were no profits earned at all, since millions of
dollars of health claims relating to those products must now be paid.
It is only fair, and it is sound tax policy, to allow relief for
situations like these. Again, it should be emphasized that the primary
beneficiaries of this tax change will not be the corporations, but the
victims of the illnesses, because the taxpayer would be required to
devote the entire amount of the tax reduction to paying the claims.
This is not the only time the federal government has been at least
partially responsible for health problems of citizens that arose many
years after the event that initially triggered the problem. During the
Cold War, America conducted above ground atomic tests during which the
wind blew the fallout into communities and ranches of Utah, New Mexico
and Arizona. The government also demanded quantities of uranium, which
is harmful to those who mined and milled it. The incidence of cancers
and other debilitating diseases caused by this activity among the
``downwinders,'' miners and millers has been acknowledged by the
federal government.
The least we can do for those manufacturers forced to use asbestos
instead of other materials is provide some tax relief for their
compensation funds.
This legislation has substantial bipartisan backing. It is sponsored
in the House by both the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Judiciary Committee. It is backed by the by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and by at least one related labor union. This bill addresses a
very serious problem and is the right thing to do. I hope we can pass
it expeditiously.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2955
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXEMPTION FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED SETTLEMENT FUNDS.
(a) Exemption for Asbestos-Related Settlement Funds.--
Subsection (b) of section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(6) Exemption from tax for asbestos-related designated
settlement funds.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), no tax
shall be imposed under this section or any other provision of
this subtitle on any designated settlement fund established
for the principal purpose of resolving and satisfying present
and future claims relating to asbestos.''
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Paragraph (1) of section 468B(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``There'' and
inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (6), there''.
(2) Subsection (g) of section 468B of such Code is amended
by inserting ``(other than subsection (b)(6))'' after
``Nothing in any provision of law''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 2. MODIFY TREATMENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED NET OPERATING
LOSSES.
(a) Asbestos-Related Net Operating Losses.--Subsection (f)
of section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively, and by inserting
after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
``(4) Special rules for asbestos liability losses.--
``(A) In general.--At the election of the taxpayer, the
portion of any specified liability loss that is attributable
to asbestos may, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), be
carried back to the taxable year in which the taxpayer,
including any predecessor corporation, was first involved in
the production or distribution of products containing
asbestos and each subsequent taxable year.
``(B) Coordination with credits.--If a deduction is
allowable for any taxable year by reason of a carryback
described in subparagraph (A)--
``(i) the credits allowable under part IV (other than
subpart C) of subchapter A shall be determined without regard
to such deduction, and
``(ii) the amount of taxable income taken into account with
respect to the carryback under subsection (b)(2) for such
taxable year shall be reduced by an amount equal to--
``(I) the increase in the amount of such credits allowable
for such taxable year solely by reason of clause (i), divided
by
``(II) the maximum rate of tax under section 1 or 11
(whichever is applicable) for such taxable year.
``(C) Carryforwards taken into account before asbestos-
related deductions.--For purposes of this section--
``(i) in determining whether a net operating loss
carryforward may be carried under subsection (b)(2) to a
taxable year, taxable income for such year shall be
determined
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without regard to the deductions referred to in paragraph
(1)(A) with respect to asbestos, and
``(ii) if there is a net operating loss for such year after
taking into account such carryforwards and deductions, the
portion of such loss attributable to such deductions shall be
treated as a specified liability loss that is attributable to
asbestos.
``(D) Limitation.--The amount of reduction in income tax
liability arising from the election described in subparagraph
(A) that exceeds the amount of reduction in income tax
liability that would have resulted if the taxpayer utilized
the 10-year carryback period under subsection (b)(1)(C) shall
be devoted by the taxpayer solely to asbestos claimant
compensation and related costs, through a designated
settlement fund or otherwise.
``(E) Consolidated groups.--For purposes of this paragraph,
all members of an affiliated group of corporations that join
in the filing of a consolidated return pursuant to section
1501 (or a predecessor section) shall be treated as 1
corporation.
``(F) Predecessor corporation.--For purposes of this
paragraph, a predecessor corporation shall include a
corporation that transferred or distributed assets to the
taxpayer in a transaction to which section 381(a) applies or
that distributed the stock of the taxpayer in a transaction
to which section 355 applies.''
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (7) of section 172(f)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as redesignated by this
section, is amended by striking ``10-year''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2956. A bill to establish the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
colorado canyons preservation act of 2000
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation which
would preserve over 130,000 acres of land in Western Colorado. This
legislation is supported locally by property owners, county
commissioners, environmentalists, and recreational groups. My bill is a
Senate companion to
H.R. 4275 which was introduced by my colleague and
fellow Coloradan Representative Scott McInnis.
The areas proposed for Wildernesss Protection are the Black Ridge and
Ruby Canyons of the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley near Grand Junction,
Colorado. They contain unique and valuable scenic, recreational,
multiple use, paleontological, natural, and wildlife components. This
historic rural western setting provides extensive opportunities for
recreational activities, and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and
grazing. This area is truly worthy of additional protection as a
national conservation area.
This legislation has the support of the administration and should
easily be signed into law. The only issue confronting us is the limited
amount of time left in the 106th Congress. I hope we will be able to
move this legislation quickly through the process and that it will not
get bogged down in partisan politics. It simply is the right thing to
do.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2956
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that certain areas located in
the Grand Valley in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, should be protected and enhanced for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. These areas
include the following:
(1) The areas making up the Black Ridge and Ruby Canyons of
the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley, which contain unique and
valuable scenic, recreational, multiple use opportunities
(including grazing), paleontological, natural, and wildlife
components enhanced by the rural western setting of the area,
provide extensive opportunities for recreational activities,
and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and grazing, and
are worthy of additional protection as a national
conservation area.
(2) The Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Study Area has
wilderness value and offers unique geological,
paleontological, scientific, and recreational resources.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to conserve,
protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations the unique and nationally important
values of the public lands described in section 4(b),
including geological, cultural, paleontological, natural,
scientific, recreational, environmental, biological,
wilderness, wildlife education, and scenic resources of such
public lands, by establishing the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness in
the State of Colorado and the State of Utah.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Conservation area.--The term ``Conservation Area''
means the Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area
established by section 4(a).
(2) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Colorado
Canyons National Conservation Area Advisory Council
established under section 8.
(3) Management plan.--The term ``management plan'' means
the management plan developed for the Conservation Area under
section 6(h).
(4) Map.--The term ``Map'' means the map entitled
``Proposed Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Area'' and dated July 18,
2000.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management.
(6) Wilderness.--The term ``Wilderness'' means the Black
Ridge Canyons Wilderness so designated in section 5.
SEC. 4. COLORADO CANYONS NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREA.
(a) In General.--There is established the Colorado Canyons
National Conservation Area in the State of Colorado and the
State of Utah.
(b) Areas Included.--The Conservation Area shall consist of
approximately 122,300 acres of public land as generally
depicted on the Map.
SEC. 5. BLACK RIDGE CANYONS WILDERNESS DESIGNATION.
Certain lands in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, which comprise approximately 75,550 acres as generally
depicted on the Map, are hereby designated as wilderness and
therefore as a component of the National Wilderness
Preservation System. Such component shall be known as the
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness.
SEC. 6. MANAGEMENT.
(a) Conservation Area.--The Secretary shall manage the
Conservation Area in a manner that--
(1) conserves, protects, and enhances the resources of the
Conservation Area specified in section 2(b); and
(2) is in accordance with--
(A) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
(B) other applicable law, including this Act.
(b) Uses.--The Secretary shall allow only such uses of the
Conservation Area as the Secretary determines will further
the purposes for which the Conservation Area is established.
(c) Withdrawals.--Subject to valid existing rights, all
Federal land within the Conservation Area and the Wilderness
and all land and interests in land acquired for the
Conservation Area or the Wilderness by the United States are
withdrawn from--
(1) all forms of entry, appropriation, or disposal under
the public land laws;
(2) location, entry, and patent under the mining laws; and
Amendments:
Cosponsors:
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
Sponsor:
Summary:
All articles in Senate section
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - July 27, 2000)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
S7841-S7908]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BREAUX:
S. 2944. A bill to clarify that certain penalties provided for in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are the exclusive criminal penalties for any
action or activity that may arise or occur in connection with certain
discharges of oil or a hazardous substance; to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
Strict Criminal Liability Reform for Oil Spill Incidents
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation to
address a long-standing problem which adversely affects the safe and
reliable maritime transport of oil products. The legislation I am
introducing today will eliminate the application and use of strict
criminal liability statutes, statutes that do not require a showing of
criminal intent or even the slightest degree of negligence, for
maritime transportation-related oil spill incidents.
Through comprehensive Congressional action that led to the enactment
and implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, commonly referred
to as ``OPA90'', the United States has successfully reduced the number
of oil spills in the maritime environment and has established a
cooperative public/private partnership to respond effectively in the
diminishing number of situations when an oil spill occurs. Nonetheless,
over the past decade, the use of the unrelated strict criminal
liability statutes that I referred to above has undermined the spill
prevention and response objectives of OPA90, the very objectives that
were established by the Congress to preserve the environment, safeguard
the public welfare, and promote the safe transportation of oil. The
legislation I am introducing today will restore the delicate balance of
interests reached in OPA90, and will reaffirm OPA90's preeminent role
as the statute providing the exclusive criminal penalties for oil spill
incidents.
As stated in the Coast Guard's own environmental enforcement
directive, a company, its officers, employees, and mariners, in the
event of an oil spill ``could be convicted and sentenced to a criminal
fine even where [they] took all reasonable precautions to avoid the
discharge''. Accordingly, responsible operators in my home state of
Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States who transport oil are
unavoidably exposed to potentially immeasurable criminal fines and, in
the worst case scenario, jail time. Not only is this situation unfairly
targeting an industry that plays an extremely important role in our
national economy, but it also works contrary to the public welfare.
Most liquid cargo transportation companies on the coastal and inland
waterway system of the United States have embraced safe operation and
risk management as two of their most important and fundamental values.
For example, members of the American Waterways Operators (AWO) from
Louisiana and other states have implemented stronger safety programs
that have significantly reduced personal injuries to mariners. Tank
barge fleets have been upgraded through construction of new state-of-
the-art double hulled tank barges while obsolete single skin barges are
being retired far in advance of the OPA90 timetable. Additionally, AWO
members have dedicated significant time and financial resources to
provide continuous and comprehensive education and training for vessel
captains, crews and shoreside staff, not only in the operation of
vessels but also in preparation for all contingencies that could occur
in the transportation of oil products. This commitment to marine safety
and environmental protection by responsible members of the oil
transportation industry is real. The industry continues to work closely
with the Coast Guard to upgrade regulatory standards in such key areas
as towing vessel operator qualifications and navigation equipment on
towing vessels.
Through the efforts of AWO and other organizations, the maritime
transportation industry has achieved an outstanding compliance record
with the numerous laws and regulations enforced by the Coast Guard. Let
me be clear: responsible carriers, and frankly their customers, have a
``zero tolerance'' policy for oil spills. Additionally, the industry is
taking spill response preparedness seriously. Industry representatives
and operators routinely participate in Coast Guard oil spill crisis
management courses, PREP Drills, and regional spill response drills.
Yet despite all of the modernization, safety, and training efforts of
the marine transportation industry, their mariners and shoreside
employees cannot escape the threat of criminal liability in the event
of an oil spill, even where it is shown that they ``took all reasonable
precautions to avoid [a] discharge''.
As you know, in response to the tragic Exxon Valdez spill, Congress
enacted OPA90. OPA90 mandated new, comprehensive, and complex
regulatory and enforcement requirements for the transportation of oil
products and for oil spill response. Both the federal government and
maritime industry have worked hard to accomplish the legislation's
primary objective--to provide greater environmental safeguards in oil
transportation by creating a comprehensive prevention, response,
liability, and compensation regime to deal with vessel and facility oil
pollution. And OPA90 is working in a truly meaningful sense. To prevent
oil spill incidents from occurring in the first place, OPA90 provides
an enormously powerful deterrent, through both its criminal and civil
liability provisions. Moreover, OPA90 mandates prompt reporting of
spills, contingency planning, and both cooperation and coordination
with federal, state, and local authorities in connection with managing
the spill response. Failure to report and cooperate as required by
OPA90 may impose automatic civil penalties, criminal liability and
unlimited civil liability. As a result, the number of domestic oil
spills has been dramatically reduced over the past decade since OPA90
was enacted. In those limited situations in which oil spills
unfortunately occurred, intensive efforts commenced immediately with
federal, state and local officials working in a joint, unified manner
with the industry, as contemplated by OPA90, to clean up and report
spills as quickly as possible and to mitigate to the greatest extent
any impact on the environment. OPA90 has provided a comprehensive and
cohesive ``blueprint'' for proper planning, training, and resource
identification to respond to an oil spill incident, and to ensure that
such a response is properly and cooperatively managed.
OPA90 also provides a complete statutory framework for proceeding
against individuals for civil and/or criminal penalties arising out of
oil spills in the marine environment. When Congress crafted this Act,
it carefully balanced the imposition of stronger criminal and civil
penalties with the need to promote enhanced cooperation among all of
the parties involved in the spill prevention and response effort. In so
doing, the Congress clearly enumerated the circumstances in which
criminal penalties could be imposed for actions related to maritime oil
spills, and added and/or substantially increased criminal penalties
under the related laws which comprehensively govern the maritime
transportation of oil and other petroleum products.
The legislation we are introducing today will not change in any way
the tough criminal sanctions that were imposed in OPA90. However,
responsible, law-abiding members of the maritime industry in Louisiana
and elsewhere are concerned by the willingness of the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies in the post-OPA90 environment to use
strict criminal liability statutes in oil spill incidents. As you know,
strict liability imposes criminal sanctions without requiring a showing
of criminal knowledge, intent or even negligence. These federal actions
imposing strict liability have created an atmosphere of extreme
uncertainty for the maritime transportation industry about how to
respond to and cooperate with the Coast Guard and other federal
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agencies in cleaning up an oil spill. Criminal culpability in this
country, both historically and as reflected in the comprehensive OPA90
legislation itself, typically requires wrongful actions or omissions by
individuals through some degree of criminal intent or through the
failure to use the required standard of care. However, Federal
prosecutors have been employing other antiquated, seemingly unrelated
``strict liability'' statutes that do not require a showing of
``knowledge'' or ``intent'' as a basis for criminal prosecution for oil
spill incidents. Such strict criminal liability statutes as the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, statutes that were
enacted at the turn of the century to serve other purposes, have been
used to harass and intimidate the maritime industry, and, in effect,
have turned every oil spill into a potential crime scene without regard
to the fault or intent of companies, corporate officers and employees,
and mariners.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.) provides
that ``it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner,
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill, . . . any migratory bird . . .'', a violation of which is
punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the MBTA was primarily used to prosecute the illegal
activities of hunters and capturers of migratory birds, as the Congress
originally intended when it enacted the MBTA in 1918. In the Exxon
Valdez case itself, and prior to the enactment of OPA90, the MBTA was
first used to support a criminal prosecution against a vessel owner in
relation to a maritime oil spill, and this ``hunting statute'' has been
used ever since against the maritime industry. The ``Refuse Act'' (33
U.S.C. 407, 411) was enacted over 100 years ago at a time well before
subsequent federal legislation essentially replaced it with
comprehensive requirements and regulations specifically directed to the
maritime transportation of oil and other petroleum products. Such
strict liability statutes are unrelated to the regulation and
enforcement of oil transportation activities, and in fact were not
included within the comprehensive OPA90 legislation as statutes in
which criminal liability could be found. With the prosecutorial use of
strict liability statutes, owners and mariners engaged in the
transportation of oil cannot avoid exposure to criminal liability,
regardless of how diligently they adhere to prudent practice and safe
environmental standards. Although conscientious safety and training
programs, state-of-the-art equipment, proper operational procedures,
preventative maintenance programs, and the employment of qualified and
experienced personnel will collectively prevent most oil spills from
occurring, unfortunately spills will still occur on occasion.
To illustrate this point, please permit me to present a scenario that
highlights the dilemma faced by the maritime oil transportation
industry in Louisiana. Imagine, if you will, that a company is
operating a towing vessel in compliance with Coast Guard regulations on
the Mississippi River on a calm, clear day with several fully laden
tank barges in tow. Suddenly, in what was charted and previously
identified to be a clear portion of the waterway, one of the tank
barges strikes an unknown submerged object which shears through its
hull and causes a significant oil spill in the river. Unfortunately, in
addition to any other environmental damage that may occur, the oil
spill kills one or more migratory birds. As you know, under OPA90 the
operator must immediately undertake coordinated spill response actions
with the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies to
safeguard the vessel and its crew, clean up the oil spill, and
otherwise mitigate any damage to the surrounding environment. The
overriding objectives at this critical moment are to assure personnel
and public safety and to clean up the oil spill as quickly as possible
without constraint. However, in the current atmosphere the operator
must take into consideration the threat of strict criminal liability
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, together with
their attendant imprisonment and fines, despite the reasonable care and
precautions taken in the operation and navigation of the tow and in the
spill response effort. Indeed, in the Coast Guard's own environmental
enforcement directive, the statement is made that ``[t]he decision to
commit the necessary Coast Guard resources to obtain the evidence that
will support a criminal prosecution must often be made in the very
early stages of a pollution incident.'' Any prudent operator will
quickly recognize the dilemma in complying with the mandate to act
cooperatively with all appropriate public agencies in cleaning up the
oil spill, while at the same time those very agencies may be conducting
a criminal investigation of that operator. Vessel owners and their
employees who have complied with federal laws and regulations and have
exercised all reasonable care should not continue to face a substantial
risk of imprisonment and criminal fines under such strict liability
statutes. Criminal liability, when appropriately imposed under OPA90,
should be employed only where a discharge is caused by conduct which is
truly ``criminal'' in nature, i.e., where a discharge is caused by
reckless, intentional or other conduct deemed criminal by OPA90.
As this scenario demonstrates, the unjustified use of strict
liability statutes is plainly undermining the very objectives which
OPA90 sought to achieve, namely to enhance the prevention of and
response to oil spills in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States.
As we are well aware, tremendous time, effort, and resources have been
expended by both the federal government and the maritime industry to
eliminate oil spills to the maximum extent possible, and to plan for
and undertake an immediate and effective response to mitigate any
environmental damage from spills that do occur. Clearly unwarranted and
improper prosecutorial use of strict liability statutes is having a
``chilling'' effect on these cooperative spill prevention and response
efforts. Indeed, even if we were to believe that criminal prosecution
only follows intentional criminal conduct, the mere fact that strict
criminal liability statutes are available at the prosecutor's
discretion will intimidate even the most innocent and careful operator.
With strict liability criminal enforcement, responsible members of the
maritime transportation industry are faced with an extreme dilemma in
the event of an oil spill--provide less than full cooperation and
response as criminal defense attorneys will certainly direct, or
cooperate fully despite the risk of criminal prosecution that could
result from any additional actions or statements made during the course
of the spill response. Consequently, increased criminalization of oil
spill incidents introduces uncertainty into the response effort by
discouraging full and open communication and cooperation, and leaves
vessel owners and operators criminally vulnerable for response actions
taken in an effort to ``do the right thing''.
In the maritime industry's continuing effort to improve its risk
management process, it seeks to identify and address all foreseeable
risks associated with the operation of its business. Through fleet
modernization, personnel training, and all other reasonable steps to
address identified risks in its business, the industry still cannot
manage or avoid the increased risks of strict criminal liability
(again, a liability that has no regard to fault or intent). The only
method available to companies and their officers to avoid the risk of
criminal liability completely is to divest themselves from the maritime
business of transporting oil and other petroleum products, in effect to
get out of the business altogether. Furthermore, strict liability
criminal laws provide a strong disincentive for trained, highly
experienced mariners to continue the operation of tank vessels, and for
talented and capable individuals from even entering into that maritime
trade. An earlier editorial highlighted the fact that tugboat captains
``are reporting feelings of intense relief and lightening of their
spirits when they are ordered to push a cargo of grain or other dry
cargo, as compared to the apprehension they feel when they are staring
out of their wheelhouses at tank barges'', and ``that the reason for
this is very obvious in the way that they find themselves instantly
facing criminal charges . . . in the event of a collision or grounding
and oil or chemicals end up in the water''. Certainly, the federal
government does not want to create a situation where the least
experienced
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mariners are the only available crew to handle the most hazardous
cargoes, or the least responsible operators are the only available
carriers. Thus, the unavoidable risk of such criminal liability
directly and adversely affects the safe transportation of oil products,
an activity essential for the public, the economy, and the nation.
Therefore, despite the commitment and effort to provide trained and
experienced vessel operators and employees, to comply with all safety
and operational mandates of Coast Guard laws and regulations, and to
provide for the safe transportation of oil as required by OPA90,
maritime transportation companies in Louisiana, and elsewhere still
cannot avoid criminal liability in the event of an oil spill.
Responsible, law-abiding companies have unfortunately been forced to
undertake the only prudent action that they could under the
circumstances, namely the development of criminal liability action
plans and retention of criminal counsel in an attempt to prepare for
the unavoidable risks of such liability.
These are only preliminary steps and do not begin to address the many
implications of the increasing criminalization of oil spills. The
industry is now asking what responsibility does it have to educate its
mariners and shoreside staff about the potential personal exposure they
may face and wonder how to do this without creating many undesirable
consequences? How should the industry organize spill management teams
and educate them on how to cooperate openly and avoid unwitting
exposure to criminal liability? Mr. President, I have thought about
these issues a great deal and simply do not know how to resolve these
dilemmas under current, strict liability law. In the event of an oil
spill, a responsible party not only must manage the cleanup of the oil
and the civil liability resulting from the spill itself, but also must
protect itself from the criminal liability that now exists due to the
available and willing use of strict liability criminal laws by the
federal government. Managing the pervasive threat of strict criminal
liability, by its very nature, prevents a responsible party from
cooperating fully and completely in response to an oil spill situation.
The OPA90 ``blueprint'' is no longer clear. Is this serving the
objectives of OPA90? Does this really serve the public welfare of our
nation? Is this what Congress had in mind when it mandated its spill
response regime? Is this in the interest of the most immediate, most
effective oil spill cleanup in the unfortunate event of a spill? We
think not.
To restore the delicate balance of interests reached in the enactment
of OPA90 a decade ago, we intend to work with the Congress to reaffirm
the OPA90 framework for criminal prosecutions in oil spill incidents.
The enactment of the legislation we are introducing today will ensure
increased cooperation and responsiveness desired by all those
interested in oil spill response issues without diluting the deterrent
effect and stringent criminal penalties imposed by OPA90 itself.
I look forward to continuing the effort to upgrade the safety of
marine operations in the navigable waterways of the United States, and
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2944
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. AFFIRMATION OF PENALTIES UNDER OIL POLLUTION ACT
OF 1990.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law, section 4301(c) and 4302 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380; 104 Stat. 537) and the
amendments made by those sections provide the exclusive
criminal penalties for any action or activity that may arise
or occur in connection with a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance referred to in section 311(b)(3) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3)).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit, or otherwise exempt any person from,
liability for conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States, for fraud and false statements, or for the
obstruction of justice.
______
By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. Torricelli and Mr. Harkin):
S. 2946. A bill to amend title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not improperly
disqualified from benefits under pension plans and welfare plans based
on a miscategorization of their employee status; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
employee benefits eligibility fairness act of 2000
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, contingent workers in our society face
significant problems, and they deserve our help in meeting them. These
men and women--temporary and part-time workers, contract workers, and
independent contractors--continue to suffer unfairly, even in our
prosperous economy. A new report from the General Accounting Office
emphasizes that contingent workers often lack income security and
retirement security.
We know that for most workers today, a single lifetime job is a relic
of the past. The world is long gone in which workers stay with their
employer for many years, and then retire on a company pension. Since
1982 the number of temporary help jobs has grown 577 percent.
The GAO report shows that 30 percent of the workforce--39 million
working Americans--now get their paychecks from contingent jobs.
Contingent workers have lower incomes than traditional, full-time
workers and many are living in poverty. For example, 30 percent of
agency temporary workers have family incomes below $15,000. By
comparison, only 8 percent of standard full-time workers have family
incomes below $15,000.
Contingent workers are less likely to be covered by employer health
and retirement benefits than are standard, full-time workers. Even when
employers do sponsor a plan, contingent workers are less likely to
participate in the plan, either because they are excluded or because
the plan is too expensive. Only 21 percent of part-time workers are
included in an employer-sponsored pension plan. By comparison, 64
percent of standard full-time workers are included in their employer's
pension plan.
Non-standard or alternative work arrangements can meet the needs of
working families and employers alike, but these arrangements should not
be used to divide the workforce into ``haves'' and ``have-nots.''
Flexible work arrangements, for example, can give working parents more
time to care for their children, but many workers are not in their
contingent jobs by choice. More than half of temporary workers would
prefer a permanent job instead of their contingent job, but temporary
work is all they can find.
As the GAO report makes clear, employers have economic incentives to
cut costs by miscategorizing their workers as temporary or contract
workers. Too often, contingent arrangements are set-up by employers for
the purpose of excluding workers from their employee benefit programs
and evading their responsibilities to their workers. Millions of
employees have been miscategorized by their employers, and as a result
they have been denied the benefits and protections that they rightly
deserve and worked hard to earn.
All workers deserve a secure retirement at the end of their working
years. Social Security has been and will continue to be the best
foundation for that security. But the foundation is just that--the
beginning of our responsibility, not the end of it. We cannot expect
Americans to work hard all their lives, only to face poverty and hard
times when they retire.
That is why I am introducing, with Senators Torricelli and Harkin,
the Employee Benefits Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000 to help
contingent workers obtain the retirement benefits they deserve. This
legislation clarifies employers' responsibilities under the law so that
they cannot exclude contingent workers from employee benefit plans
based on artificial labels or payroll practices.
This is an issue of basic fairness for working men and women. It is
unfair for individuals who work full-time, on an indefinite long-term
basis for an employer to be excluded from the employer's pension plan,
merely because the employer classifies the workers as ``temporary''
when in fact they are not. The employer-employee relationship should be
determined on the facts of
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the working arrangement, not on artificial labels, not on artificial
accounting practices, not artificial payroll practices.
It is long past time for Congress to recognize the plight of
contingent workers and see that they get the employee benefits they
deserve. These important changes are critical to improving the security
of working families, and I look forward to their enactment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Employee Benefits
Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to protect the pension and welfare benefits of
workers is frustrated by the practice of mislabeling
employees to improperly exclude them from employee benefit
plans. Employees are wrongly denied benefits when they are
mislabeled as temporary employees, part-time employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
and contractors. If their true employment status were
recognized, mislabeled employees would be eligible to
participate in employee benefit plans because such plans are
offered to other employees performing the same or
substantially the same work and working for the same
employer.
(2) Mislabeled employees are often paid through staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms to give
the appearance that the employees do not work for their
worksite employer. Employment contracts and reports to
government agencies also are used to give the erroneous
impression that mislabeled employees work for staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms, when the
facts of the work arrangement do not meet the common law
standard for determining the employment relationship.
Employees are also mislabeled as contractors and paid from
non-payroll accounts to give the appearance that they are not
employees of their worksite employer. These practices violate
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(3) Employers are amending their benefit plans to add
provisions that exclude mislabeled employees from
participation in the plan even in the event that such
employees are determined to be common law employees and
otherwise eligible to participate in the plan. These plan
provisions violate the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
(4) As a condition of employment or continued employment,
mislabeled employees are often required to sign documents
that purport to waive their right to participate in employee
benefit plans. Such documents inaccurately claim to limit the
authority of the courts and applicable Federal agencies to
correct the mislabeling of employees and to enforce the terms
of plans providing for their participation. This practice
violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to clarify
applicable provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not
improperly excluded from participation in employee benefit
plans as a result of mislabeling of their employment status.
SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL STANDARDS RELATING TO MINIMUM
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Required Inclusion of Service.--Section 202(a)(3) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29
U.S.C. 1052(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(E) For purposes of this section, in determining `years
of service' and `hours of service', service shall include all
service for the employer as an employee under the common law,
irrespective of whether the worker--
``(i) is paid through a staffing firm, temporary help firm,
payroll agency, employment agency, or other such similar
arrangement,
``(ii) is paid directly by the employer under an
arrangement purporting to characterize an employee under the
common law as other than an employee, or
``(iii) is paid from an account not designated as a payroll
account.''
(b) Exclusion Precluded When Related to Certain Purported
Categorizations.--Section 202 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1052) is
amended further by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a pension plan shall be
treated as failing to meet the requirements of this section
if any individual who--
``(A) is an employee under the common law, and
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan,
is excluded from participation in the plan, irrespective of
the placement of such employee in any category of workers
(such as temporary employees, part-time employees, leased
employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) which may be specified
under the plan as ineligible for participation.
``(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to
preclude the exclusion from participation in a pension plan
of individuals who in fact do not meet a minimum service
period or minimum age which is required under the terms of
the plan and which is otherwise in conformity with the
requirements of this section.''
SEC. 4. WAIVERS OF PARTICIPATION INEFFECTIVE IF RELATED TO
MISCATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE.
Section 202 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1052) (as amended by section 3) is amended
further by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Any waiver or purported waiver by an employee of
participation in a pension plan or welfare plan shall be
ineffective if related, in whole or in part, to the a
miscategorization of the employee in 1 or more ineligible
plan categories.''
SEC. 5. OBJECTIVE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IN PLAN INSTRUMENTS.
Section 402 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1102) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(c)(1) The written instrument pursuant to which an
employee benefit plan is maintained shall set forth
eligibility criteria which--
``(A) include and exclude employees on a uniform basis;
``(B) are based on reasonable job classifications; and
``(C) are based on objective criteria stated in the
instrument itself for the inclusion or exclusion (other than
the mere listing of an employee as included or excluded).
``(2) No plan instrument may permit an employer or plan
sponsor to exclude an employee under the common law from
participation irrespective of the placement of such employee
in any category of workers (such as temporary employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) if the employee--
``(A) is an employee of the employer under the common law,
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan, and
``(C) meets a minimum service period or minimum age which
is required under the terms of the plan.''
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
Section 502(a)(3)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' in clause (i) and inserting a comma,
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) and
inserting ``, or'', and
(3) by adding at the end the following: ``(iii) to provide
relief to employees who have been miscategorized in violation
of sections 202 and 402;''.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to
plan years beginning on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2950. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
establish the Sand Creek Massacre Historic Site in the State of
Colorado; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
introduction of legislation to create the sand creek national historic
site
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce the Sand Creek
Massacre National Historic Site Establishment Act of 2000, legislation
which will finally recognize and memorialize the hallowed ground on
which hundreds of peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians were massacred
by members of the Colorado Militia.
The legislation I introduce today follows The Sand Creek Massacre
Historic Site Study Act of 1998, legislation I introduced and Congress
approved to study the suitability of creating an enduring memorial to
the slain innocents who were camped peacefully near Sand Creek, in
Kiowa County, in Colorado on November 28, 1868.
Much has been written about the horrors visited upon the plains
Indians in the territories of the Western United States in the latter
half of the 19th century. However, what has been lost for more than a
century is a comprehensive understanding of the events of that day in a
grove of cottonwood trees along Sand Creek now SE Colorado. In some
cases denial of the events of the day or a sense that ``the Indians had
it coming'' has prevailed.
This legislation finally recognizes a shameful event in our country's
history based on scientific studies, and
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makes it clear America has the strength and resolve to face its past
and learn the painful lessons that come with intolerance.
The indisputable facts are these: 700 members of the Colorado
Militia, commanded by Colonel John Chivington struck at dawn that
November day, attacking a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians settled
under the U.S. Flag and a white flag which the Indian Chiefs Black
Kettle and White Antelope were told by the U.S. would protect them from
military attack.
By day's end, almost 150 Indians, many of them women, children and
the elderly, lay dead. Chivington's men reportedly desecrated the
bodies of the dead after the massacre, and newspaper reports from
Denver at the time told of the troops displaying Indian body parts in a
gruesome display as they rode through the streets of Colorado's largest
city following the attack.
The perpetrators of this horrible attack which left Indian women and
even babies dead, were never brought to justice even after a
congressional investigation concerning this brutality.
The legislation I introduce today authorizes the National Park
Service to enter into negotiations with willing sellers only, in an
attempt to secure property inside a boundary which encompasses
approximately 12,470 acres as identified by the National Park Service,
for a lasting memorial to events of that fateful day.
This legislation has been developed over the course of the last 18
months. It represents a remarkable effort which brought divergent
points of view together to define the events of that day and to plan
for the future protection of this site. The National Park Service, with
the cooperation of the Kiowa County Commissioners, the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the
Northern Arapaho Tribe, the State of Colorado and many local landowners
and volunteers have completed extensive cultural, geomorphological and
physical studies of the area where the massacre occurred.
All of those involved in this project agree, not acting now is not a
option. This legislation does not compel any private property owner to
sell his or her property to the federal government. It allows the
National Park Service to negotiate with willing sellers to secure
property at fair market value, for a national memorial. This process
could take years. However, several willing sellers have come forward
and are willing to negotiate with the NPS. The property they own has
been identified by the NPS as suitable for a memorial. Additional
acquisitions of property from willing sellers could come in the future.
However, the Sand Creek National Historic Site could never extend
beyond the 12,470 acres identified by the site resource study already
completed.
This legislation has come to being because all of those involved have
exhibited an extraordinary ability to put aside their differences, look
with equal measure at the scientific evidence and the oral traditions
of the Tribes, and come up with a plan that equally honors the memory
of those killed and the rights of the private property owners who have
been faithful and responsible stewards of this site. We have a window
of opportunity here that will not always be available. I encourage my
colleagues to respect the memory of those so brutally killed and
support the creation of a National Historic Site on this hallowed
ground in Kiowa County, in Colorado.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill and other research material
associated with the studies of the Sand Creek site be printed in the
Record for my colleagues or the public to review.
______
By Mr. TORRICELLI:
S. 2953. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve
outreach programs carried out by the Department of Veterans Affairs to
provide for more fully informing veterans of benefits available to them
under laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; to the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
The Veterans' Right to Know Act
Mr. TORRICELLI: Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Veterans' Right to Know Act which will assist millions of brave
Americans who have served this nation in times of war. This legislation
would ensure that all veterans are fully informed of the various
benefits that they have earned through their brave and dedicated
service to their country.
Throughout the history of the United States, the interests of our
nation have been championed by ordinary citizens who willingly defend
our nation when called upon. During the times of crisis which
threatened the very existence of our Republic, we persevered because
young men and women from all walks of life took up arms to defend the
ideals by which this nation was founded. Whether it was winning our
freedom from an oppressive empire, preserving our Union, defeating
fascism or battling the spread of communism, the American people have
time and time again answered the call to defend liberty, justice and
democracy at home and throughout the world.
Our government owes a debt of gratitude to each and every one of our
veterans, and we must make a concerted effort to show our appreciation
for their valiant service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
provides the necessary health care services and benefits to our war
heroes; however, over half of the veterans in the United States are not
fully aware of the benefits or pensions to which they are entitled.
The bill I introduced today is straightforward and it does not call
for the creation of new benefits. Rather, it seeks to ensure that our
veterans are well informed of the benefits they are entitled to as a
result of their service or injuries sustained during their service to
their country.
This legislation would require the VA to inform veterans about their
eligibility for benefits and health care services whenever they first
apply for any benefit with the VA. Furthermore, many times, widows and
surviving family members of veterans are not aware of the special
benefits available to them when their family member passes. My bill
would help these individuals in their time of loss by instructing the
VA to inform them of the benefits for which they are eligible on the
passing of their loved one.
My legislation also seeks to reach out to those veterans who are not
currently enrolled in the VA system by calling upon the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to prepare an annual outreach plan that will encourage
eligible veterans to register with the VA as well as keeping current
enrollees aware of any changes to benefits or eligibility requirements.
This bill will help ensure that our government and its services for
veterans are there for the men and women who have served this nation in
the armed forces. I am hopeful that my colleagues in the Senate will
recognize the tremendous service that our veterans have given and
support this reasonable measure to ensure that our veterans receive the
benefits they deserve.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Stevens,
Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Cleland):
S. 2954. A bill to establish the Dr. Nancy Foster Marine Biology
Scholarship Program; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
The Nancy Foster Scholarship Act
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy
Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in
marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of
the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am
proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such
a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues
Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in
recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the
conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal
resources.
My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship
Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide
scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students
to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine
biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the
development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber.
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Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and
during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a
career professional can achieve. She directed the complete
modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting
programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National
Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program
called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and
enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her
colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am
introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure
that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others.
Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to
come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small
way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.
______
By Mr. DeWINE (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Leahy);
S. 2955. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
relief for the payment of asbestos-related claims; to the Committee on
Finance.
asbestos-related claims relief legislation
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
the bill introduced today by my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator
DeWine, that would provide relief for payment of asbestos-related
claims.
I urge my colleagues on the Finance Committee to take a close look at
the serious problem this bill addresses. Certain manufacturers who were
required by government specification to use asbestos in their products
are facing a severe financial crisis arising from claims made by
individuals who are suffering health problems from asbestos-related
diseases. These claims have put several of these companies into
bankruptcy, and several more appear to be on the brink of insolvency.
Thousands of jobs may be at stake, as may be the proper compensation of
the victims of the illnesses.
A major part of the underlying justification for this measure is that
the federal government shares some culpability in the harm caused by
the asbestos-related products manufactured by these companies. For
example, from World War II through the Vietnam War, the government
required that private contractors and shipyard workers use asbestos to
insulate navy ships from so-called ``secondary fires.'' Because of
sovereign immunity, however, the government has not had to share in
paying the damages, leaving American companies to bear the full and
ongoing financial load of compensation.
The legislation we are introducing today is a step toward recognizing
that the federal government is partially responsible for payment of
these claims. It does so through two income tax provisions, both of
which directly benefit the victims of the illnesses.
The first provision exempts from income tax the income earned by a
designated or qualified settlement fund established for the principal
purpose of resolving and satisfying present and future claims relating
to asbestos illnesses. The effect of this provision, Mr. President, is
to increase the amount of money available for the payment of these
claims.
The second provision allows taxpayers with specified liability losses
attributable to asbestos to carry back those losses to the tax year in
which the taxpayer, or its predecessor company, was first involved in
producing or distributing products containing asbestos.
This provision is a matter of fairness, Mr. President. Because of the
long latency period related to asbestos-related diseases, which can be
as long as 40 years, many of these claims are just now arising. Current
law provides for the carryback of this kind of liability losses, but
only for a ten-year period.
Many of the companies involved earned profits and paid taxes on those
profits in the years the asbestos-related products were made or
distributed. However, it is now clear, many years after the taxes were
paid, that there were no profits earned at all, since millions of
dollars of health claims relating to those products must now be paid.
It is only fair, and it is sound tax policy, to allow relief for
situations like these. Again, it should be emphasized that the primary
beneficiaries of this tax change will not be the corporations, but the
victims of the illnesses, because the taxpayer would be required to
devote the entire amount of the tax reduction to paying the claims.
This is not the only time the federal government has been at least
partially responsible for health problems of citizens that arose many
years after the event that initially triggered the problem. During the
Cold War, America conducted above ground atomic tests during which the
wind blew the fallout into communities and ranches of Utah, New Mexico
and Arizona. The government also demanded quantities of uranium, which
is harmful to those who mined and milled it. The incidence of cancers
and other debilitating diseases caused by this activity among the
``downwinders,'' miners and millers has been acknowledged by the
federal government.
The least we can do for those manufacturers forced to use asbestos
instead of other materials is provide some tax relief for their
compensation funds.
This legislation has substantial bipartisan backing. It is sponsored
in the House by both the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Judiciary Committee. It is backed by the by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and by at least one related labor union. This bill addresses a
very serious problem and is the right thing to do. I hope we can pass
it expeditiously.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2955
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXEMPTION FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED SETTLEMENT FUNDS.
(a) Exemption for Asbestos-Related Settlement Funds.--
Subsection (b) of section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(6) Exemption from tax for asbestos-related designated
settlement funds.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), no tax
shall be imposed under this section or any other provision of
this subtitle on any designated settlement fund established
for the principal purpose of resolving and satisfying present
and future claims relating to asbestos.''
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Paragraph (1) of section 468B(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``There'' and
inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (6), there''.
(2) Subsection (g) of section 468B of such Code is amended
by inserting ``(other than subsection (b)(6))'' after
``Nothing in any provision of law''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 2. MODIFY TREATMENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED NET OPERATING
LOSSES.
(a) Asbestos-Related Net Operating Losses.--Subsection (f)
of section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively, and by inserting
after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
``(4) Special rules for asbestos liability losses.--
``(A) In general.--At the election of the taxpayer, the
portion of any specified liability loss that is attributable
to asbestos may, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), be
carried back to the taxable year in which the taxpayer,
including any predecessor corporation, was first involved in
the production or distribution of products containing
asbestos and each subsequent taxable year.
``(B) Coordination with credits.--If a deduction is
allowable for any taxable year by reason of a carryback
described in subparagraph (A)--
``(i) the credits allowable under part IV (other than
subpart C) of subchapter A shall be determined without regard
to such deduction, and
``(ii) the amount of taxable income taken into account with
respect to the carryback under subsection (b)(2) for such
taxable year shall be reduced by an amount equal to--
``(I) the increase in the amount of such credits allowable
for such taxable year solely by reason of clause (i), divided
by
``(II) the maximum rate of tax under section 1 or 11
(whichever is applicable) for such taxable year.
``(C) Carryforwards taken into account before asbestos-
related deductions.--For purposes of this section--
``(i) in determining whether a net operating loss
carryforward may be carried under subsection (b)(2) to a
taxable year, taxable income for such year shall be
determined
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without regard to the deductions referred to in paragraph
(1)(A) with respect to asbestos, and
``(ii) if there is a net operating loss for such year after
taking into account such carryforwards and deductions, the
portion of such loss attributable to such deductions shall be
treated as a specified liability loss that is attributable to
asbestos.
``(D) Limitation.--The amount of reduction in income tax
liability arising from the election described in subparagraph
(A) that exceeds the amount of reduction in income tax
liability that would have resulted if the taxpayer utilized
the 10-year carryback period under subsection (b)(1)(C) shall
be devoted by the taxpayer solely to asbestos claimant
compensation and related costs, through a designated
settlement fund or otherwise.
``(E) Consolidated groups.--For purposes of this paragraph,
all members of an affiliated group of corporations that join
in the filing of a consolidated return pursuant to section
1501 (or a predecessor section) shall be treated as 1
corporation.
``(F) Predecessor corporation.--For purposes of this
paragraph, a predecessor corporation shall include a
corporation that transferred or distributed assets to the
taxpayer in a transaction to which section 381(a) applies or
that distributed the stock of the taxpayer in a transaction
to which section 355 applies.''
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (7) of section 172(f)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as redesignated by this
section, is amended by striking ``10-year''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2956. A bill to establish the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
colorado canyons preservation act of 2000
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation which
would preserve over 130,000 acres of land in Western Colorado. This
legislation is supported locally by property owners, county
commissioners, environmentalists, and recreational groups. My bill is a
Senate companion to
H.R. 4275 which was introduced by my colleague and
fellow Coloradan Representative Scott McInnis.
The areas proposed for Wildernesss Protection are the Black Ridge and
Ruby Canyons of the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley near Grand Junction,
Colorado. They contain unique and valuable scenic, recreational,
multiple use, paleontological, natural, and wildlife components. This
historic rural western setting provides extensive opportunities for
recreational activities, and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and
grazing. This area is truly worthy of additional protection as a
national conservation area.
This legislation has the support of the administration and should
easily be signed into law. The only issue confronting us is the limited
amount of time left in the 106th Congress. I hope we will be able to
move this legislation quickly through the process and that it will not
get bogged down in partisan politics. It simply is the right thing to
do.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2956
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that certain areas located in
the Grand Valley in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, should be protected and enhanced for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. These areas
include the following:
(1) The areas making up the Black Ridge and Ruby Canyons of
the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley, which contain unique and
valuable scenic, recreational, multiple use opportunities
(including grazing), paleontological, natural, and wildlife
components enhanced by the rural western setting of the area,
provide extensive opportunities for recreational activities,
and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and grazing, and
are worthy of additional protection as a national
conservation area.
(2) The Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Study Area has
wilderness value and offers unique geological,
paleontological, scientific, and recreational resources.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to conserve,
protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations the unique and nationally important
values of the public lands described in section 4(b),
including geological, cultural, paleontological, natural,
scientific, recreational, environmental, biological,
wilderness, wildlife education, and scenic resources of such
public lands, by establishing the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness in
the State of Colorado and the State of Utah.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Conservation area.--The term ``Conservation Area''
means the Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area
established by section 4(a).
(2) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Colorado
Canyons National Conservation Area Advisory Council
established under section 8.
(3) Management plan.--The term ``management plan'' means
the management plan developed for the Conservation Area under
section 6(h).
(4) Map.--The term ``Map'' means the map entitled
``Proposed Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Area'' and dated July 18,
2000.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management.
(6) Wilderness.--The term ``Wilderness'' means the Black
Ridge Canyons Wilderness so designated in section 5.
SEC. 4. COLORADO CANYONS NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREA.
(a) In General.--There is established the Colorado Canyons
National Conservation Area in the State of Colorado and the
State of Utah.
(b) Areas Included.--The Conservation Area shall consist of
approximately 122,300 acres of public land as generally
depicted on the Map.
SEC. 5. BLACK RIDGE CANYONS WILDERNESS DESIGNATION.
Certain lands in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, which comprise approximately 75,550 acres as generally
depicted on the Map, are hereby designated as wilderness and
therefore as a component of the National Wilderness
Preservation System. Such component shall be known as the
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness.
SEC. 6. MANAGEMENT.
(a) Conservation Area.--The Secretary shall manage the
Conservation Area in a manner that--
(1) conserves, protects, and enhances the resources of the
Conservation Area specified in section 2(b); and
(2) is in accordance with--
(A) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
(B) other applicable law, including this Act.
(b) Uses.--The Secretary shall allow only such uses of the
Conservation Area as the Secretary determines will further
the purposes for which the Conservation Area is established.
(c) Withdrawals.--Subject to valid existing rights, all
Federal land within the Conservation Area and the Wilderness
and all land and interests in land acquired for the
Conservation Area or the Wilderness by the United States are
withdrawn from--
(1) all forms of entry, appropriation, or disposal under
the public land laws;
(2) location, entry, and patent
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - July 27, 2000)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
S7841-S7908]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BREAUX:
S. 2944. A bill to clarify that certain penalties provided for in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are the exclusive criminal penalties for any
action or activity that may arise or occur in connection with certain
discharges of oil or a hazardous substance; to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
Strict Criminal Liability Reform for Oil Spill Incidents
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation to
address a long-standing problem which adversely affects the safe and
reliable maritime transport of oil products. The legislation I am
introducing today will eliminate the application and use of strict
criminal liability statutes, statutes that do not require a showing of
criminal intent or even the slightest degree of negligence, for
maritime transportation-related oil spill incidents.
Through comprehensive Congressional action that led to the enactment
and implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, commonly referred
to as ``OPA90'', the United States has successfully reduced the number
of oil spills in the maritime environment and has established a
cooperative public/private partnership to respond effectively in the
diminishing number of situations when an oil spill occurs. Nonetheless,
over the past decade, the use of the unrelated strict criminal
liability statutes that I referred to above has undermined the spill
prevention and response objectives of OPA90, the very objectives that
were established by the Congress to preserve the environment, safeguard
the public welfare, and promote the safe transportation of oil. The
legislation I am introducing today will restore the delicate balance of
interests reached in OPA90, and will reaffirm OPA90's preeminent role
as the statute providing the exclusive criminal penalties for oil spill
incidents.
As stated in the Coast Guard's own environmental enforcement
directive, a company, its officers, employees, and mariners, in the
event of an oil spill ``could be convicted and sentenced to a criminal
fine even where [they] took all reasonable precautions to avoid the
discharge''. Accordingly, responsible operators in my home state of
Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States who transport oil are
unavoidably exposed to potentially immeasurable criminal fines and, in
the worst case scenario, jail time. Not only is this situation unfairly
targeting an industry that plays an extremely important role in our
national economy, but it also works contrary to the public welfare.
Most liquid cargo transportation companies on the coastal and inland
waterway system of the United States have embraced safe operation and
risk management as two of their most important and fundamental values.
For example, members of the American Waterways Operators (AWO) from
Louisiana and other states have implemented stronger safety programs
that have significantly reduced personal injuries to mariners. Tank
barge fleets have been upgraded through construction of new state-of-
the-art double hulled tank barges while obsolete single skin barges are
being retired far in advance of the OPA90 timetable. Additionally, AWO
members have dedicated significant time and financial resources to
provide continuous and comprehensive education and training for vessel
captains, crews and shoreside staff, not only in the operation of
vessels but also in preparation for all contingencies that could occur
in the transportation of oil products. This commitment to marine safety
and environmental protection by responsible members of the oil
transportation industry is real. The industry continues to work closely
with the Coast Guard to upgrade regulatory standards in such key areas
as towing vessel operator qualifications and navigation equipment on
towing vessels.
Through the efforts of AWO and other organizations, the maritime
transportation industry has achieved an outstanding compliance record
with the numerous laws and regulations enforced by the Coast Guard. Let
me be clear: responsible carriers, and frankly their customers, have a
``zero tolerance'' policy for oil spills. Additionally, the industry is
taking spill response preparedness seriously. Industry representatives
and operators routinely participate in Coast Guard oil spill crisis
management courses, PREP Drills, and regional spill response drills.
Yet despite all of the modernization, safety, and training efforts of
the marine transportation industry, their mariners and shoreside
employees cannot escape the threat of criminal liability in the event
of an oil spill, even where it is shown that they ``took all reasonable
precautions to avoid [a] discharge''.
As you know, in response to the tragic Exxon Valdez spill, Congress
enacted OPA90. OPA90 mandated new, comprehensive, and complex
regulatory and enforcement requirements for the transportation of oil
products and for oil spill response. Both the federal government and
maritime industry have worked hard to accomplish the legislation's
primary objective--to provide greater environmental safeguards in oil
transportation by creating a comprehensive prevention, response,
liability, and compensation regime to deal with vessel and facility oil
pollution. And OPA90 is working in a truly meaningful sense. To prevent
oil spill incidents from occurring in the first place, OPA90 provides
an enormously powerful deterrent, through both its criminal and civil
liability provisions. Moreover, OPA90 mandates prompt reporting of
spills, contingency planning, and both cooperation and coordination
with federal, state, and local authorities in connection with managing
the spill response. Failure to report and cooperate as required by
OPA90 may impose automatic civil penalties, criminal liability and
unlimited civil liability. As a result, the number of domestic oil
spills has been dramatically reduced over the past decade since OPA90
was enacted. In those limited situations in which oil spills
unfortunately occurred, intensive efforts commenced immediately with
federal, state and local officials working in a joint, unified manner
with the industry, as contemplated by OPA90, to clean up and report
spills as quickly as possible and to mitigate to the greatest extent
any impact on the environment. OPA90 has provided a comprehensive and
cohesive ``blueprint'' for proper planning, training, and resource
identification to respond to an oil spill incident, and to ensure that
such a response is properly and cooperatively managed.
OPA90 also provides a complete statutory framework for proceeding
against individuals for civil and/or criminal penalties arising out of
oil spills in the marine environment. When Congress crafted this Act,
it carefully balanced the imposition of stronger criminal and civil
penalties with the need to promote enhanced cooperation among all of
the parties involved in the spill prevention and response effort. In so
doing, the Congress clearly enumerated the circumstances in which
criminal penalties could be imposed for actions related to maritime oil
spills, and added and/or substantially increased criminal penalties
under the related laws which comprehensively govern the maritime
transportation of oil and other petroleum products.
The legislation we are introducing today will not change in any way
the tough criminal sanctions that were imposed in OPA90. However,
responsible, law-abiding members of the maritime industry in Louisiana
and elsewhere are concerned by the willingness of the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies in the post-OPA90 environment to use
strict criminal liability statutes in oil spill incidents. As you know,
strict liability imposes criminal sanctions without requiring a showing
of criminal knowledge, intent or even negligence. These federal actions
imposing strict liability have created an atmosphere of extreme
uncertainty for the maritime transportation industry about how to
respond to and cooperate with the Coast Guard and other federal
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agencies in cleaning up an oil spill. Criminal culpability in this
country, both historically and as reflected in the comprehensive OPA90
legislation itself, typically requires wrongful actions or omissions by
individuals through some degree of criminal intent or through the
failure to use the required standard of care. However, Federal
prosecutors have been employing other antiquated, seemingly unrelated
``strict liability'' statutes that do not require a showing of
``knowledge'' or ``intent'' as a basis for criminal prosecution for oil
spill incidents. Such strict criminal liability statutes as the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, statutes that were
enacted at the turn of the century to serve other purposes, have been
used to harass and intimidate the maritime industry, and, in effect,
have turned every oil spill into a potential crime scene without regard
to the fault or intent of companies, corporate officers and employees,
and mariners.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.) provides
that ``it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner,
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill, . . . any migratory bird . . .'', a violation of which is
punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the MBTA was primarily used to prosecute the illegal
activities of hunters and capturers of migratory birds, as the Congress
originally intended when it enacted the MBTA in 1918. In the Exxon
Valdez case itself, and prior to the enactment of OPA90, the MBTA was
first used to support a criminal prosecution against a vessel owner in
relation to a maritime oil spill, and this ``hunting statute'' has been
used ever since against the maritime industry. The ``Refuse Act'' (33
U.S.C. 407, 411) was enacted over 100 years ago at a time well before
subsequent federal legislation essentially replaced it with
comprehensive requirements and regulations specifically directed to the
maritime transportation of oil and other petroleum products. Such
strict liability statutes are unrelated to the regulation and
enforcement of oil transportation activities, and in fact were not
included within the comprehensive OPA90 legislation as statutes in
which criminal liability could be found. With the prosecutorial use of
strict liability statutes, owners and mariners engaged in the
transportation of oil cannot avoid exposure to criminal liability,
regardless of how diligently they adhere to prudent practice and safe
environmental standards. Although conscientious safety and training
programs, state-of-the-art equipment, proper operational procedures,
preventative maintenance programs, and the employment of qualified and
experienced personnel will collectively prevent most oil spills from
occurring, unfortunately spills will still occur on occasion.
To illustrate this point, please permit me to present a scenario that
highlights the dilemma faced by the maritime oil transportation
industry in Louisiana. Imagine, if you will, that a company is
operating a towing vessel in compliance with Coast Guard regulations on
the Mississippi River on a calm, clear day with several fully laden
tank barges in tow. Suddenly, in what was charted and previously
identified to be a clear portion of the waterway, one of the tank
barges strikes an unknown submerged object which shears through its
hull and causes a significant oil spill in the river. Unfortunately, in
addition to any other environmental damage that may occur, the oil
spill kills one or more migratory birds. As you know, under OPA90 the
operator must immediately undertake coordinated spill response actions
with the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies to
safeguard the vessel and its crew, clean up the oil spill, and
otherwise mitigate any damage to the surrounding environment. The
overriding objectives at this critical moment are to assure personnel
and public safety and to clean up the oil spill as quickly as possible
without constraint. However, in the current atmosphere the operator
must take into consideration the threat of strict criminal liability
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, together with
their attendant imprisonment and fines, despite the reasonable care and
precautions taken in the operation and navigation of the tow and in the
spill response effort. Indeed, in the Coast Guard's own environmental
enforcement directive, the statement is made that ``[t]he decision to
commit the necessary Coast Guard resources to obtain the evidence that
will support a criminal prosecution must often be made in the very
early stages of a pollution incident.'' Any prudent operator will
quickly recognize the dilemma in complying with the mandate to act
cooperatively with all appropriate public agencies in cleaning up the
oil spill, while at the same time those very agencies may be conducting
a criminal investigation of that operator. Vessel owners and their
employees who have complied with federal laws and regulations and have
exercised all reasonable care should not continue to face a substantial
risk of imprisonment and criminal fines under such strict liability
statutes. Criminal liability, when appropriately imposed under OPA90,
should be employed only where a discharge is caused by conduct which is
truly ``criminal'' in nature, i.e., where a discharge is caused by
reckless, intentional or other conduct deemed criminal by OPA90.
As this scenario demonstrates, the unjustified use of strict
liability statutes is plainly undermining the very objectives which
OPA90 sought to achieve, namely to enhance the prevention of and
response to oil spills in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States.
As we are well aware, tremendous time, effort, and resources have been
expended by both the federal government and the maritime industry to
eliminate oil spills to the maximum extent possible, and to plan for
and undertake an immediate and effective response to mitigate any
environmental damage from spills that do occur. Clearly unwarranted and
improper prosecutorial use of strict liability statutes is having a
``chilling'' effect on these cooperative spill prevention and response
efforts. Indeed, even if we were to believe that criminal prosecution
only follows intentional criminal conduct, the mere fact that strict
criminal liability statutes are available at the prosecutor's
discretion will intimidate even the most innocent and careful operator.
With strict liability criminal enforcement, responsible members of the
maritime transportation industry are faced with an extreme dilemma in
the event of an oil spill--provide less than full cooperation and
response as criminal defense attorneys will certainly direct, or
cooperate fully despite the risk of criminal prosecution that could
result from any additional actions or statements made during the course
of the spill response. Consequently, increased criminalization of oil
spill incidents introduces uncertainty into the response effort by
discouraging full and open communication and cooperation, and leaves
vessel owners and operators criminally vulnerable for response actions
taken in an effort to ``do the right thing''.
In the maritime industry's continuing effort to improve its risk
management process, it seeks to identify and address all foreseeable
risks associated with the operation of its business. Through fleet
modernization, personnel training, and all other reasonable steps to
address identified risks in its business, the industry still cannot
manage or avoid the increased risks of strict criminal liability
(again, a liability that has no regard to fault or intent). The only
method available to companies and their officers to avoid the risk of
criminal liability completely is to divest themselves from the maritime
business of transporting oil and other petroleum products, in effect to
get out of the business altogether. Furthermore, strict liability
criminal laws provide a strong disincentive for trained, highly
experienced mariners to continue the operation of tank vessels, and for
talented and capable individuals from even entering into that maritime
trade. An earlier editorial highlighted the fact that tugboat captains
``are reporting feelings of intense relief and lightening of their
spirits when they are ordered to push a cargo of grain or other dry
cargo, as compared to the apprehension they feel when they are staring
out of their wheelhouses at tank barges'', and ``that the reason for
this is very obvious in the way that they find themselves instantly
facing criminal charges . . . in the event of a collision or grounding
and oil or chemicals end up in the water''. Certainly, the federal
government does not want to create a situation where the least
experienced
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mariners are the only available crew to handle the most hazardous
cargoes, or the least responsible operators are the only available
carriers. Thus, the unavoidable risk of such criminal liability
directly and adversely affects the safe transportation of oil products,
an activity essential for the public, the economy, and the nation.
Therefore, despite the commitment and effort to provide trained and
experienced vessel operators and employees, to comply with all safety
and operational mandates of Coast Guard laws and regulations, and to
provide for the safe transportation of oil as required by OPA90,
maritime transportation companies in Louisiana, and elsewhere still
cannot avoid criminal liability in the event of an oil spill.
Responsible, law-abiding companies have unfortunately been forced to
undertake the only prudent action that they could under the
circumstances, namely the development of criminal liability action
plans and retention of criminal counsel in an attempt to prepare for
the unavoidable risks of such liability.
These are only preliminary steps and do not begin to address the many
implications of the increasing criminalization of oil spills. The
industry is now asking what responsibility does it have to educate its
mariners and shoreside staff about the potential personal exposure they
may face and wonder how to do this without creating many undesirable
consequences? How should the industry organize spill management teams
and educate them on how to cooperate openly and avoid unwitting
exposure to criminal liability? Mr. President, I have thought about
these issues a great deal and simply do not know how to resolve these
dilemmas under current, strict liability law. In the event of an oil
spill, a responsible party not only must manage the cleanup of the oil
and the civil liability resulting from the spill itself, but also must
protect itself from the criminal liability that now exists due to the
available and willing use of strict liability criminal laws by the
federal government. Managing the pervasive threat of strict criminal
liability, by its very nature, prevents a responsible party from
cooperating fully and completely in response to an oil spill situation.
The OPA90 ``blueprint'' is no longer clear. Is this serving the
objectives of OPA90? Does this really serve the public welfare of our
nation? Is this what Congress had in mind when it mandated its spill
response regime? Is this in the interest of the most immediate, most
effective oil spill cleanup in the unfortunate event of a spill? We
think not.
To restore the delicate balance of interests reached in the enactment
of OPA90 a decade ago, we intend to work with the Congress to reaffirm
the OPA90 framework for criminal prosecutions in oil spill incidents.
The enactment of the legislation we are introducing today will ensure
increased cooperation and responsiveness desired by all those
interested in oil spill response issues without diluting the deterrent
effect and stringent criminal penalties imposed by OPA90 itself.
I look forward to continuing the effort to upgrade the safety of
marine operations in the navigable waterways of the United States, and
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2944
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. AFFIRMATION OF PENALTIES UNDER OIL POLLUTION ACT
OF 1990.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law, section 4301(c) and 4302 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380; 104 Stat. 537) and the
amendments made by those sections provide the exclusive
criminal penalties for any action or activity that may arise
or occur in connection with a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance referred to in section 311(b)(3) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3)).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit, or otherwise exempt any person from,
liability for conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States, for fraud and false statements, or for the
obstruction of justice.
______
By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. Torricelli and Mr. Harkin):
S. 2946. A bill to amend title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not improperly
disqualified from benefits under pension plans and welfare plans based
on a miscategorization of their employee status; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
employee benefits eligibility fairness act of 2000
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, contingent workers in our society face
significant problems, and they deserve our help in meeting them. These
men and women--temporary and part-time workers, contract workers, and
independent contractors--continue to suffer unfairly, even in our
prosperous economy. A new report from the General Accounting Office
emphasizes that contingent workers often lack income security and
retirement security.
We know that for most workers today, a single lifetime job is a relic
of the past. The world is long gone in which workers stay with their
employer for many years, and then retire on a company pension. Since
1982 the number of temporary help jobs has grown 577 percent.
The GAO report shows that 30 percent of the workforce--39 million
working Americans--now get their paychecks from contingent jobs.
Contingent workers have lower incomes than traditional, full-time
workers and many are living in poverty. For example, 30 percent of
agency temporary workers have family incomes below $15,000. By
comparison, only 8 percent of standard full-time workers have family
incomes below $15,000.
Contingent workers are less likely to be covered by employer health
and retirement benefits than are standard, full-time workers. Even when
employers do sponsor a plan, contingent workers are less likely to
participate in the plan, either because they are excluded or because
the plan is too expensive. Only 21 percent of part-time workers are
included in an employer-sponsored pension plan. By comparison, 64
percent of standard full-time workers are included in their employer's
pension plan.
Non-standard or alternative work arrangements can meet the needs of
working families and employers alike, but these arrangements should not
be used to divide the workforce into ``haves'' and ``have-nots.''
Flexible work arrangements, for example, can give working parents more
time to care for their children, but many workers are not in their
contingent jobs by choice. More than half of temporary workers would
prefer a permanent job instead of their contingent job, but temporary
work is all they can find.
As the GAO report makes clear, employers have economic incentives to
cut costs by miscategorizing their workers as temporary or contract
workers. Too often, contingent arrangements are set-up by employers for
the purpose of excluding workers from their employee benefit programs
and evading their responsibilities to their workers. Millions of
employees have been miscategorized by their employers, and as a result
they have been denied the benefits and protections that they rightly
deserve and worked hard to earn.
All workers deserve a secure retirement at the end of their working
years. Social Security has been and will continue to be the best
foundation for that security. But the foundation is just that--the
beginning of our responsibility, not the end of it. We cannot expect
Americans to work hard all their lives, only to face poverty and hard
times when they retire.
That is why I am introducing, with Senators Torricelli and Harkin,
the Employee Benefits Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000 to help
contingent workers obtain the retirement benefits they deserve. This
legislation clarifies employers' responsibilities under the law so that
they cannot exclude contingent workers from employee benefit plans
based on artificial labels or payroll practices.
This is an issue of basic fairness for working men and women. It is
unfair for individuals who work full-time, on an indefinite long-term
basis for an employer to be excluded from the employer's pension plan,
merely because the employer classifies the workers as ``temporary''
when in fact they are not. The employer-employee relationship should be
determined on the facts of
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the working arrangement, not on artificial labels, not on artificial
accounting practices, not artificial payroll practices.
It is long past time for Congress to recognize the plight of
contingent workers and see that they get the employee benefits they
deserve. These important changes are critical to improving the security
of working families, and I look forward to their enactment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Employee Benefits
Eligibility Fairness Act of 2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to protect the pension and welfare benefits of
workers is frustrated by the practice of mislabeling
employees to improperly exclude them from employee benefit
plans. Employees are wrongly denied benefits when they are
mislabeled as temporary employees, part-time employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
and contractors. If their true employment status were
recognized, mislabeled employees would be eligible to
participate in employee benefit plans because such plans are
offered to other employees performing the same or
substantially the same work and working for the same
employer.
(2) Mislabeled employees are often paid through staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms to give
the appearance that the employees do not work for their
worksite employer. Employment contracts and reports to
government agencies also are used to give the erroneous
impression that mislabeled employees work for staffing,
temporary, employee leasing, or other similar firms, when the
facts of the work arrangement do not meet the common law
standard for determining the employment relationship.
Employees are also mislabeled as contractors and paid from
non-payroll accounts to give the appearance that they are not
employees of their worksite employer. These practices violate
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(3) Employers are amending their benefit plans to add
provisions that exclude mislabeled employees from
participation in the plan even in the event that such
employees are determined to be common law employees and
otherwise eligible to participate in the plan. These plan
provisions violate the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
(4) As a condition of employment or continued employment,
mislabeled employees are often required to sign documents
that purport to waive their right to participate in employee
benefit plans. Such documents inaccurately claim to limit the
authority of the courts and applicable Federal agencies to
correct the mislabeling of employees and to enforce the terms
of plans providing for their participation. This practice
violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to clarify
applicable provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 to ensure that employees are not
improperly excluded from participation in employee benefit
plans as a result of mislabeling of their employment status.
SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL STANDARDS RELATING TO MINIMUM
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Required Inclusion of Service.--Section 202(a)(3) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29
U.S.C. 1052(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(E) For purposes of this section, in determining `years
of service' and `hours of service', service shall include all
service for the employer as an employee under the common law,
irrespective of whether the worker--
``(i) is paid through a staffing firm, temporary help firm,
payroll agency, employment agency, or other such similar
arrangement,
``(ii) is paid directly by the employer under an
arrangement purporting to characterize an employee under the
common law as other than an employee, or
``(iii) is paid from an account not designated as a payroll
account.''
(b) Exclusion Precluded When Related to Certain Purported
Categorizations.--Section 202 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1052) is
amended further by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a pension plan shall be
treated as failing to meet the requirements of this section
if any individual who--
``(A) is an employee under the common law, and
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan,
is excluded from participation in the plan, irrespective of
the placement of such employee in any category of workers
(such as temporary employees, part-time employees, leased
employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) which may be specified
under the plan as ineligible for participation.
``(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to
preclude the exclusion from participation in a pension plan
of individuals who in fact do not meet a minimum service
period or minimum age which is required under the terms of
the plan and which is otherwise in conformity with the
requirements of this section.''
SEC. 4. WAIVERS OF PARTICIPATION INEFFECTIVE IF RELATED TO
MISCATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE.
Section 202 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1052) (as amended by section 3) is amended
further by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Any waiver or purported waiver by an employee of
participation in a pension plan or welfare plan shall be
ineffective if related, in whole or in part, to the a
miscategorization of the employee in 1 or more ineligible
plan categories.''
SEC. 5. OBJECTIVE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IN PLAN INSTRUMENTS.
Section 402 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1102) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(c)(1) The written instrument pursuant to which an
employee benefit plan is maintained shall set forth
eligibility criteria which--
``(A) include and exclude employees on a uniform basis;
``(B) are based on reasonable job classifications; and
``(C) are based on objective criteria stated in the
instrument itself for the inclusion or exclusion (other than
the mere listing of an employee as included or excluded).
``(2) No plan instrument may permit an employer or plan
sponsor to exclude an employee under the common law from
participation irrespective of the placement of such employee
in any category of workers (such as temporary employees,
leased employees, agency employees, staffing firm employees,
contractors, or any similar category) if the employee--
``(A) is an employee of the employer under the common law,
``(B) performs the same work (or substantially the same
work) for the employer as other employees who generally are
not excluded from participation in the plan, and
``(C) meets a minimum service period or minimum age which
is required under the terms of the plan.''
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
Section 502(a)(3)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' in clause (i) and inserting a comma,
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (ii) and
inserting ``, or'', and
(3) by adding at the end the following: ``(iii) to provide
relief to employees who have been miscategorized in violation
of sections 202 and 402;''.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to
plan years beginning on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2950. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
establish the Sand Creek Massacre Historic Site in the State of
Colorado; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
introduction of legislation to create the sand creek national historic
site
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce the Sand Creek
Massacre National Historic Site Establishment Act of 2000, legislation
which will finally recognize and memorialize the hallowed ground on
which hundreds of peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians were massacred
by members of the Colorado Militia.
The legislation I introduce today follows The Sand Creek Massacre
Historic Site Study Act of 1998, legislation I introduced and Congress
approved to study the suitability of creating an enduring memorial to
the slain innocents who were camped peacefully near Sand Creek, in
Kiowa County, in Colorado on November 28, 1868.
Much has been written about the horrors visited upon the plains
Indians in the territories of the Western United States in the latter
half of the 19th century. However, what has been lost for more than a
century is a comprehensive understanding of the events of that day in a
grove of cottonwood trees along Sand Creek now SE Colorado. In some
cases denial of the events of the day or a sense that ``the Indians had
it coming'' has prevailed.
This legislation finally recognizes a shameful event in our country's
history based on scientific studies, and
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makes it clear America has the strength and resolve to face its past
and learn the painful lessons that come with intolerance.
The indisputable facts are these: 700 members of the Colorado
Militia, commanded by Colonel John Chivington struck at dawn that
November day, attacking a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians settled
under the U.S. Flag and a white flag which the Indian Chiefs Black
Kettle and White Antelope were told by the U.S. would protect them from
military attack.
By day's end, almost 150 Indians, many of them women, children and
the elderly, lay dead. Chivington's men reportedly desecrated the
bodies of the dead after the massacre, and newspaper reports from
Denver at the time told of the troops displaying Indian body parts in a
gruesome display as they rode through the streets of Colorado's largest
city following the attack.
The perpetrators of this horrible attack which left Indian women and
even babies dead, were never brought to justice even after a
congressional investigation concerning this brutality.
The legislation I introduce today authorizes the National Park
Service to enter into negotiations with willing sellers only, in an
attempt to secure property inside a boundary which encompasses
approximately 12,470 acres as identified by the National Park Service,
for a lasting memorial to events of that fateful day.
This legislation has been developed over the course of the last 18
months. It represents a remarkable effort which brought divergent
points of view together to define the events of that day and to plan
for the future protection of this site. The National Park Service, with
the cooperation of the Kiowa County Commissioners, the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the
Northern Arapaho Tribe, the State of Colorado and many local landowners
and volunteers have completed extensive cultural, geomorphological and
physical studies of the area where the massacre occurred.
All of those involved in this project agree, not acting now is not a
option. This legislation does not compel any private property owner to
sell his or her property to the federal government. It allows the
National Park Service to negotiate with willing sellers to secure
property at fair market value, for a national memorial. This process
could take years. However, several willing sellers have come forward
and are willing to negotiate with the NPS. The property they own has
been identified by the NPS as suitable for a memorial. Additional
acquisitions of property from willing sellers could come in the future.
However, the Sand Creek National Historic Site could never extend
beyond the 12,470 acres identified by the site resource study already
completed.
This legislation has come to being because all of those involved have
exhibited an extraordinary ability to put aside their differences, look
with equal measure at the scientific evidence and the oral traditions
of the Tribes, and come up with a plan that equally honors the memory
of those killed and the rights of the private property owners who have
been faithful and responsible stewards of this site. We have a window
of opportunity here that will not always be available. I encourage my
colleagues to respect the memory of those so brutally killed and
support the creation of a National Historic Site on this hallowed
ground in Kiowa County, in Colorado.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill and other research material
associated with the studies of the Sand Creek site be printed in the
Record for my colleagues or the public to review.
______
By Mr. TORRICELLI:
S. 2953. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve
outreach programs carried out by the Department of Veterans Affairs to
provide for more fully informing veterans of benefits available to them
under laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; to the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
The Veterans' Right to Know Act
Mr. TORRICELLI: Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Veterans' Right to Know Act which will assist millions of brave
Americans who have served this nation in times of war. This legislation
would ensure that all veterans are fully informed of the various
benefits that they have earned through their brave and dedicated
service to their country.
Throughout the history of the United States, the interests of our
nation have been championed by ordinary citizens who willingly defend
our nation when called upon. During the times of crisis which
threatened the very existence of our Republic, we persevered because
young men and women from all walks of life took up arms to defend the
ideals by which this nation was founded. Whether it was winning our
freedom from an oppressive empire, preserving our Union, defeating
fascism or battling the spread of communism, the American people have
time and time again answered the call to defend liberty, justice and
democracy at home and throughout the world.
Our government owes a debt of gratitude to each and every one of our
veterans, and we must make a concerted effort to show our appreciation
for their valiant service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
provides the necessary health care services and benefits to our war
heroes; however, over half of the veterans in the United States are not
fully aware of the benefits or pensions to which they are entitled.
The bill I introduced today is straightforward and it does not call
for the creation of new benefits. Rather, it seeks to ensure that our
veterans are well informed of the benefits they are entitled to as a
result of their service or injuries sustained during their service to
their country.
This legislation would require the VA to inform veterans about their
eligibility for benefits and health care services whenever they first
apply for any benefit with the VA. Furthermore, many times, widows and
surviving family members of veterans are not aware of the special
benefits available to them when their family member passes. My bill
would help these individuals in their time of loss by instructing the
VA to inform them of the benefits for which they are eligible on the
passing of their loved one.
My legislation also seeks to reach out to those veterans who are not
currently enrolled in the VA system by calling upon the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to prepare an annual outreach plan that will encourage
eligible veterans to register with the VA as well as keeping current
enrollees aware of any changes to benefits or eligibility requirements.
This bill will help ensure that our government and its services for
veterans are there for the men and women who have served this nation in
the armed forces. I am hopeful that my colleagues in the Senate will
recognize the tremendous service that our veterans have given and
support this reasonable measure to ensure that our veterans receive the
benefits they deserve.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Stevens,
Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Cleland):
S. 2954. A bill to establish the Dr. Nancy Foster Marine Biology
Scholarship Program; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
The Nancy Foster Scholarship Act
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy
Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in
marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of
the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am
proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such
a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues
Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in
recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the
conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal
resources.
My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship
Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide
scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students
to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine
biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the
development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber.
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Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and
during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a
career professional can achieve. She directed the complete
modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting
programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National
Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program
called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and
enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her
colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am
introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure
that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others.
Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to
come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small
way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.
______
By Mr. DeWINE (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Leahy);
S. 2955. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
relief for the payment of asbestos-related claims; to the Committee on
Finance.
asbestos-related claims relief legislation
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
the bill introduced today by my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator
DeWine, that would provide relief for payment of asbestos-related
claims.
I urge my colleagues on the Finance Committee to take a close look at
the serious problem this bill addresses. Certain manufacturers who were
required by government specification to use asbestos in their products
are facing a severe financial crisis arising from claims made by
individuals who are suffering health problems from asbestos-related
diseases. These claims have put several of these companies into
bankruptcy, and several more appear to be on the brink of insolvency.
Thousands of jobs may be at stake, as may be the proper compensation of
the victims of the illnesses.
A major part of the underlying justification for this measure is that
the federal government shares some culpability in the harm caused by
the asbestos-related products manufactured by these companies. For
example, from World War II through the Vietnam War, the government
required that private contractors and shipyard workers use asbestos to
insulate navy ships from so-called ``secondary fires.'' Because of
sovereign immunity, however, the government has not had to share in
paying the damages, leaving American companies to bear the full and
ongoing financial load of compensation.
The legislation we are introducing today is a step toward recognizing
that the federal government is partially responsible for payment of
these claims. It does so through two income tax provisions, both of
which directly benefit the victims of the illnesses.
The first provision exempts from income tax the income earned by a
designated or qualified settlement fund established for the principal
purpose of resolving and satisfying present and future claims relating
to asbestos illnesses. The effect of this provision, Mr. President, is
to increase the amount of money available for the payment of these
claims.
The second provision allows taxpayers with specified liability losses
attributable to asbestos to carry back those losses to the tax year in
which the taxpayer, or its predecessor company, was first involved in
producing or distributing products containing asbestos.
This provision is a matter of fairness, Mr. President. Because of the
long latency period related to asbestos-related diseases, which can be
as long as 40 years, many of these claims are just now arising. Current
law provides for the carryback of this kind of liability losses, but
only for a ten-year period.
Many of the companies involved earned profits and paid taxes on those
profits in the years the asbestos-related products were made or
distributed. However, it is now clear, many years after the taxes were
paid, that there were no profits earned at all, since millions of
dollars of health claims relating to those products must now be paid.
It is only fair, and it is sound tax policy, to allow relief for
situations like these. Again, it should be emphasized that the primary
beneficiaries of this tax change will not be the corporations, but the
victims of the illnesses, because the taxpayer would be required to
devote the entire amount of the tax reduction to paying the claims.
This is not the only time the federal government has been at least
partially responsible for health problems of citizens that arose many
years after the event that initially triggered the problem. During the
Cold War, America conducted above ground atomic tests during which the
wind blew the fallout into communities and ranches of Utah, New Mexico
and Arizona. The government also demanded quantities of uranium, which
is harmful to those who mined and milled it. The incidence of cancers
and other debilitating diseases caused by this activity among the
``downwinders,'' miners and millers has been acknowledged by the
federal government.
The least we can do for those manufacturers forced to use asbestos
instead of other materials is provide some tax relief for their
compensation funds.
This legislation has substantial bipartisan backing. It is sponsored
in the House by both the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Judiciary Committee. It is backed by the by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and by at least one related labor union. This bill addresses a
very serious problem and is the right thing to do. I hope we can pass
it expeditiously.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2955
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXEMPTION FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED SETTLEMENT FUNDS.
(a) Exemption for Asbestos-Related Settlement Funds.--
Subsection (b) of section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(6) Exemption from tax for asbestos-related designated
settlement funds.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), no tax
shall be imposed under this section or any other provision of
this subtitle on any designated settlement fund established
for the principal purpose of resolving and satisfying present
and future claims relating to asbestos.''
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Paragraph (1) of section 468B(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``There'' and
inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (6), there''.
(2) Subsection (g) of section 468B of such Code is amended
by inserting ``(other than subsection (b)(6))'' after
``Nothing in any provision of law''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 2. MODIFY TREATMENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED NET OPERATING
LOSSES.
(a) Asbestos-Related Net Operating Losses.--Subsection (f)
of section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively, and by inserting
after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
``(4) Special rules for asbestos liability losses.--
``(A) In general.--At the election of the taxpayer, the
portion of any specified liability loss that is attributable
to asbestos may, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), be
carried back to the taxable year in which the taxpayer,
including any predecessor corporation, was first involved in
the production or distribution of products containing
asbestos and each subsequent taxable year.
``(B) Coordination with credits.--If a deduction is
allowable for any taxable year by reason of a carryback
described in subparagraph (A)--
``(i) the credits allowable under part IV (other than
subpart C) of subchapter A shall be determined without regard
to such deduction, and
``(ii) the amount of taxable income taken into account with
respect to the carryback under subsection (b)(2) for such
taxable year shall be reduced by an amount equal to--
``(I) the increase in the amount of such credits allowable
for such taxable year solely by reason of clause (i), divided
by
``(II) the maximum rate of tax under section 1 or 11
(whichever is applicable) for such taxable year.
``(C) Carryforwards taken into account before asbestos-
related deductions.--For purposes of this section--
``(i) in determining whether a net operating loss
carryforward may be carried under subsection (b)(2) to a
taxable year, taxable income for such year shall be
determined
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without regard to the deductions referred to in paragraph
(1)(A) with respect to asbestos, and
``(ii) if there is a net operating loss for such year after
taking into account such carryforwards and deductions, the
portion of such loss attributable to such deductions shall be
treated as a specified liability loss that is attributable to
asbestos.
``(D) Limitation.--The amount of reduction in income tax
liability arising from the election described in subparagraph
(A) that exceeds the amount of reduction in income tax
liability that would have resulted if the taxpayer utilized
the 10-year carryback period under subsection (b)(1)(C) shall
be devoted by the taxpayer solely to asbestos claimant
compensation and related costs, through a designated
settlement fund or otherwise.
``(E) Consolidated groups.--For purposes of this paragraph,
all members of an affiliated group of corporations that join
in the filing of a consolidated return pursuant to section
1501 (or a predecessor section) shall be treated as 1
corporation.
``(F) Predecessor corporation.--For purposes of this
paragraph, a predecessor corporation shall include a
corporation that transferred or distributed assets to the
taxpayer in a transaction to which section 381(a) applies or
that distributed the stock of the taxpayer in a transaction
to which section 355 applies.''
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (7) of section 172(f)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as redesignated by this
section, is amended by striking ``10-year''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 2956. A bill to establish the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
colorado canyons preservation act of 2000
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation which
would preserve over 130,000 acres of land in Western Colorado. This
legislation is supported locally by property owners, county
commissioners, environmentalists, and recreational groups. My bill is a
Senate companion to
H.R. 4275 which was introduced by my colleague and
fellow Coloradan Representative Scott McInnis.
The areas proposed for Wildernesss Protection are the Black Ridge and
Ruby Canyons of the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley near Grand Junction,
Colorado. They contain unique and valuable scenic, recreational,
multiple use, paleontological, natural, and wildlife components. This
historic rural western setting provides extensive opportunities for
recreational activities, and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and
grazing. This area is truly worthy of additional protection as a
national conservation area.
This legislation has the support of the administration and should
easily be signed into law. The only issue confronting us is the limited
amount of time left in the 106th Congress. I hope we will be able to
move this legislation quickly through the process and that it will not
get bogged down in partisan politics. It simply is the right thing to
do.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2956
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that certain areas located in
the Grand Valley in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, should be protected and enhanced for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. These areas
include the following:
(1) The areas making up the Black Ridge and Ruby Canyons of
the Grand Valley and Rabbit Valley, which contain unique and
valuable scenic, recreational, multiple use opportunities
(including grazing), paleontological, natural, and wildlife
components enhanced by the rural western setting of the area,
provide extensive opportunities for recreational activities,
and are publicly used for hiking, camping, and grazing, and
are worthy of additional protection as a national
conservation area.
(2) The Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Study Area has
wilderness value and offers unique geological,
paleontological, scientific, and recreational resources.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to conserve,
protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations the unique and nationally important
values of the public lands described in section 4(b),
including geological, cultural, paleontological, natural,
scientific, recreational, environmental, biological,
wilderness, wildlife education, and scenic resources of such
public lands, by establishing the Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area and the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness in
the State of Colorado and the State of Utah.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Conservation area.--The term ``Conservation Area''
means the Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area
established by section 4(a).
(2) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Colorado
Canyons National Conservation Area Advisory Council
established under section 8.
(3) Management plan.--The term ``management plan'' means
the management plan developed for the Conservation Area under
section 6(h).
(4) Map.--The term ``Map'' means the map entitled
``Proposed Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness Area'' and dated July 18,
2000.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management.
(6) Wilderness.--The term ``Wilderness'' means the Black
Ridge Canyons Wilderness so designated in section 5.
SEC. 4. COLORADO CANYONS NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREA.
(a) In General.--There is established the Colorado Canyons
National Conservation Area in the State of Colorado and the
State of Utah.
(b) Areas Included.--The Conservation Area shall consist of
approximately 122,300 acres of public land as generally
depicted on the Map.
SEC. 5. BLACK RIDGE CANYONS WILDERNESS DESIGNATION.
Certain lands in Mesa County, Colorado, and Grand County,
Utah, which comprise approximately 75,550 acres as generally
depicted on the Map, are hereby designated as wilderness and
therefore as a component of the National Wilderness
Preservation System. Such component shall be known as the
Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness.
SEC. 6. MANAGEMENT.
(a) Conservation Area.--The Secretary shall manage the
Conservation Area in a manner that--
(1) conserves, protects, and enhances the resources of the
Conservation Area specified in section 2(b); and
(2) is in accordance with--
(A) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
(B) other applicable law, including this Act.
(b) Uses.--The Secretary shall allow only such uses of the
Conservation Area as the Secretary determines will further
the purposes for which the Conservation Area is established.
(c) Withdrawals.--Subject to valid existing rights, all
Federal land within the Conservation Area and the Wilderness
and all land and interests in land acquired for the
Conservation Area or the Wilderness by the United States are
withdrawn from--
(1) all forms of entry, appropriation, or disposal under
the public land laws;
(2) location, entry, and patent under the mining laws; and
Amendments:
Cosponsors: