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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
(Senate - May 25, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S5915-S5948] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill. Amendment No. 388 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 2 minutes equally divided on the Roth amendment. Who yields time? Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for 58 years, two distinguished commanders, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, have been unjustly scapegoated for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Numerous studies have made it unambiguously clear that Short and Kimmel were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington. Investigations by military boards found Kimmel and Short had properly disposed their forces in light of the intelligence and resources they had available. Investigations found the failure of their superiors to properly manage intelligence and to fulfill command responsibilities contributed significantly, if not predominantly, to the disaster. Yet, they alone remain singled out for responsibility. This amendment calls upon the President to correct this injustice by advancing them on the retired list, as was done for all their peers. This initiative has received support from veterans, including Bob Dole, countless military leaders, including Admirals Moorer, Crowe, Halloway, Zumwalt, and Trost, as well as the VFW. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the managers of this bill, we vigorously oppose this amendment. Right here on this desk is perhaps the most dramatic reason not to grant the request. This represents a hearing held by a joint committee of the Senate and House of the Congress of the United States in 1946. They had before them live witnesses, all of the documents, and it is clear from this and their findings that these two officers were then and remain today accused of serious errors in judgment which contributed to perhaps the greatest disaster in this century against the people of the United States of America. There are absolutely no new facts beyond those deduced in this record brought out by my distinguished good friend, the senior Senator from Delaware. For that reason, we oppose it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 388. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 47, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 142 Leg.] YEAS--52 Abraham Akaka Baucus Bayh Bennett Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bunning Campbell Cleland Cochran Collins Daschle [[Page S5916]] DeWine Domenici Durbin Edwards Enzi Feinstein Grassley Hagel Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerry Kyl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Lincoln Lott McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Rockefeller Roth Sarbanes Schumer Shelby Smith (NH) Thomas Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Wellstone Wyden NAYS--47 Allard Ashcroft Bond Brownback Bryan Burns Byrd Chafee Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Dodd Dorgan Feingold Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Gregg Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kerrey Kohl Levin Lieberman Lugar Mack Moynihan Murray Nickles Reed Reid Robb Roberts Santorum Sessions Smith (OR) Snowe Specter Stevens Thompson Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 388) was agreed to. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 377 Mr. WARNER. Is the Senator from Virginia correct that the next vote will be on the amendment by the Senator from Kansas? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, amendment No. 377 by the Senator from Kansas. Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Kansas and I understand, also, that our colleague, the ranking member of the committee, likewise supports the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, noting the presence of the Senator from Kansas, the amendment by the Senator from Kansas raises a very good point; that is, at the 50th anniversary of the NATO summit, those in attendance, the 19 nations, the heads of state and government, adopted a new Strategic Concept. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that Concept does not go beyond the confines of the 1949 Washington Treaty and such actions that took place in 1991 when a new Strategic Concept was drawn. A number of us are concerned, if we read through the language, that it opens up new vistas for NATO. If that be the case, then the Senate should have that treaty before it for consideration. This is a sense of the Senate, but despite that technicality, it is a very important amendment; it is one to which the President will respond. I understand from my distinguished colleague and ranking member, in all probability, we will receive the assurance from the President that it does not go beyond the foundations and objectives sought in the 1949 Washington Treaty. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. It says that the President should say to us whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes new commitments or obligations upon us. It does not find that there are such new obligations or commitments. The President has already written to us in a letter to Senator Warner that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. In 1991, the new Strategic Concept, which came with much new language and many new missions, was not submitted to the Senate. Indeed, much of the language is very similar in 1991 as in 1999. In my judgment, there are no new commitments or obligations imposed by the 1999 Strategic Concept. The President could very readily certify what is required that he certify by this amendment, and I support it. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote be limited to 10 minutes and the next vote following it to 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. All time has expired. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe that under the order 1 minute was reserved for anybody in opposition, is that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes equally divided. Mr. KYL. I don't think the Senator from Michigan spoke in opposition to the amendment, as I understand it. Therefore, would it not be in order for someone in opposition to take a minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. KYL. Might I inquire of the Senator from Delaware--I am prepared to speak for 30 seconds or a minute. Mr. BIDEN. If he can reserve 20 seconds for me, I would appreciate it. Mr. KYL. I will take 30 seconds. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both Senators be given 30 seconds. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues that, as Senator Levin just pointed out, this is a totally unnecessary amendment, because the administration has already expressed a view that it has not gone beyond the Concepts this Senate voted for 90 to 9 when the new states were added to NATO. Those are the Strategic Concepts. One might argue whether or not they are being applied correctly in the case of the war in Kosovo. That is another debate. But in terms of the Strategic Concepts themselves, this body voted on them, and I would hate for this body now to suggest to the other 18 countries in NATO that perhaps they should resubmit the Strategic Concepts to their legislative bodies as in the nature of a treaty so that the entire NATO agreement on Strategic Concepts would be subject to 19 separate votes of our parliamentary bodies. I don't think that would be a good idea given the fact that, as Senator Levin already noted, the President has already said the Strategic Concepts do not go beyond what the Senate voted for 90 to 9. This an unnecessary amendment. I suggest my colleagues vote no. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Strategic Concept does not rise to the level of a treaty amendment, and the Senator from Michigan has pointed that out. Therefore, it is a benign amendment, we are told, and in all probability it is. But it is unnecessary. It does mischief. It sends the wrong message. It is a bad idea, notwithstanding the fact that it has been cleaned up to the point that it is clear it does not rise to the level of a treaty requiring a treaty vote on the Strategic Concept. But I agree with the Senator from Arizona. He painstakingly on this floor laid out in the Kyl amendment during the expansion of NATO debate exactly what we asked the President to consider in the Strategic Concept that was being negotiated with our allies. They did that. We voted 90 to 9. This is a bad idea. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote? The result was announced--yeas 87, nays 12, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 143 Leg.] YEAS--87 Abraham Akaka Allard Ashcroft Baucus Bayh Bennett Bingaman Bond Breaux Brownback Bryan Bunning Burns Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Cochran Collins Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Daschle DeWine Dodd Domenici Dorgan Edwards Enzi Feingold Feinstein Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Murray Nickles Reed Reid Roberts Rockefeller Santorum Sarbanes Schumer Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Snowe Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Warner Wellstone Wyden [[Page S5917]] NAYS--12 Biden Boxer Durbin Hagel Inouye Kyl Lautenberg Moynihan Robb Roth Smith (OR) Specter NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 377), as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Amendment No. 382 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the next amendment is in the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. Therefore, I have consulted with Chairman Roth. Does Senator Roth have any comments on this? Mr. ROTH. No comments. Mr. WARNER. We yield back such time as we may have. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided on the amendment. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I have been trying to get this amendment on the floor. This is simple and straightforward. This requires the Department of Health and Human Services to provide us with a report on the status of women and children who are no longer on welfare. There are 4.5 million fewer recipients. We want to know what kinds of jobs, at what wages, do people have health care coverage. This is based on disturbing reports by Family U.S.A., Catholic Organization Network, Children's Defense Fund, Conference of Mayors and, in addition, National Conference of State Legislatures. Good public policy is good evaluation, and we ought to know what is going on in the country right now on this terribly important question that dramatically affects the lives of women and children, albeit low- income women and children. I hope to get a strong bipartisan vote. It will be a good message. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Wellstone's amendment to require states to collect data on the employment, jobs, earnings, health insurance, and child care arrangements of former welfare recipients. This information is essential. The most important indicator of welfare reform's success is not just declining welfare caseloads. It is the well-being of these low-income parents and their children after they leave the welfare system. We do not know enough about how they have fared, and states should be required to collect this information. Millions of families have left the welfare rolls, and we need to know how they are doing now. We need information on their earnings, their health care, and other vital data. The obvious question is whether former welfare recipients are doing well, or barely surviving, worse off than before. The data we do have about former welfare recipients is not encouraging. According to a study by the Children's Defense Fund and the National Coalition on the Homeless, most former welfare recipients earn below poverty wages after leaving the welfare system. Their financial hardship is compounded by the fact that many former welfare recipients do not receive the essential services that would enable them to hold jobs and care for their children. The cost of child care can be a crushing expense to low-income families, consuming over one-quarter of their income. Yet, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that only one in ten eligible low-income families gets the child care assistance they need. Health insurance trends are also troubling. As of 1997, 675,000 low- income people had lost Medicaid coverage due to welfare reform. Children comprise 62 percent of this figure, and many of them were still eligible for Medicaid. We need to improve outreach to get more eligible children enrolled in Medicaid. We also need to increase enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program, which offers states incentives to expand health coverage for children with family income up to 200 percent of poverty. it is estimated that 4 million uninsured children are eligible for this assistance. In addition to problems related to child care and health care, many low-income families are not receiving Food Stamp assistance. Over the last 4 years, participation in the Food Stamp Program has dropped by one-third, from serving nearly 28 million participants to serving fewer than 19 million. But this does not mean children and families are no longer hungry. Hunger and undernutrition continue to be urgent problems. According to a Department of Agriculture study, 1 in 8 Americans--or more than 34 million people--are at risk of hunger. The need for food assistance is underscored by he phenomenon of increasing reliance on food banks and emergency food services. Many food banks are now overwhelmed by the growing number of requests they receive for assistance. The Western Massachusetts Food Bank reports a dramatic increase in demand for emergency food services. In 1997, it assisted 75,000 people. In 1998, the number they served rose to 85,000. Massachusetts is not alone. According to a recent U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 78 percent of the 30 cities surveyed reported an increase in requests for emergency food in 1998. Sixty-one percent of the people seeking this assistance were children or their parents; 31 percent were employed. These statistics clearly demonstrate that hunger is a major problem. Yet fewer families are now receiving Food Stamps. One of the unintended consequences of welfare reform is that low-income, working families are dropping off the Food Stamps rolls. Often, these families are going hungry or turning to food banks because they don't have adequate information about Food Stamp eligibility. A Massachusetts study found that most people leaving welfare are not getting Food Stamp benefits, even though many are still eligible. Three months after leaving welfare, only 18 percent were receiving Food Stamps. After one year, the percentage drops to 6.5 percent. It is clear that too many eligible families are not getting the assistance they need and are entitled to. Every state should be required to collect this kind of data. We need better information about how low-income families are faring after they leave welfare. Adequate data will enable the states to build on their successes and address their weaknesses. Ultimately, the long-term success of welfare reform will be measured state by state, person by person with this data. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Ignorance is not bliss. We can't afford to ignore the need that may exist. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Is there any Senator who wishes to speak in opposition? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we yield back our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 382. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 49, nays 50, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 144 Leg.] YEAS--49 Akaka Baucus Bayh Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bryan Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Durbin Edwards Feingold Feinstein Graham Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Mikulski Moynihan Murray Reed Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Schumer Snowe Specter Torricelli Wellstone Wyden NAYS--50 Abraham Allard Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brownback Bunning Burns Cochran Collins Coverdell Craig Crapo DeWine Domenici Enzi Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hagel Hatch Helms Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Murkowski Nickles Roberts Roth Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Smith (OR) Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Voinovich Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 382) was rejected. [[Page S5918]] Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. GRAMM. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I have a colleague who is ready to go, Senator Specter, so I will not take much time. But I just want to make it clear to colleagues that on this vote I agreed to a time limit. I brought this amendment out to the floor. There could have been debate on the other side. Somebody could have come out here and debated me openly in public about this amendment. I am talking about exactly what is happening with this welfare bill. I am talking about good public policy evaluation. Shouldn't we at least have the information about where these women are? Where these children are? What kind of jobs? What kind of wages? Are there adequate child care arrangements? The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal once said: ``Ignorance is never random.'' Sometimes we don't know what we don't want to know. I say to colleagues, given this vote, I am going to bring this amendment out on the next bill I get a chance to bring it out on. I am not going to agree to a time limit. I am going to force people to come out here on the majority side and debate me on this question, and we will have a full-fledged, substantive debate. We are talking about the lives of women and children, albeit they are poor, albeit they don't have the lobbyists, albeit they are not well connected. I am telling you, I am outraged that there wasn't the willingness and the courage to debate me on this amendment. We will have the debate with no time limits next bill that comes out here. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I tried to accommodate the Senator early on on this matter. To be perfectly candid, it was a jurisdictional issue with this committee. It was not a subject with which this Senator had a great deal of familiarity. I did what I could to keep our bill moving and at the same time to accommodate my colleague. The various persons who have jurisdiction over it were notified, and that is as much as I can say. Now, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 90 minutes equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table with respect to amendment 383 and no amendments be in order prior to that vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I further ask that following that vote, provided it is tabled, that Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to make a motion to strike and there be 2 hours equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table and no amendments be in order to that language proposed to be stricken prior to that vote. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the only question I have is that on the second half here, which is the one that is before us, I suggest that it read ``prior to a motion to table or a motion on adoption'' so that there is an option as to whether there is a motion to table or a vote on the amendment itself. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find no objection to that. I so amend the request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request as amended? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Pennsylvania, and I yield the floor. Amendment No. 383 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment provides that: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The purpose of this amendment, obvious on its face, is to avoid having the United States drawn into a full-fledged war without authorization of the Congress. This authorization is required by the constitutional provision which states that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to declare war, and the implicit consequence from that constitutional provision that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United States in a war. The Founding Fathers entrusted that grave responsibility to the Congress because of the obvious factor that a war could not be successfully prosecuted unless it was backed by the American people. The first line of determination in a representative democracy, in a republic, is to have that determination made by the Congress of the United States. We have seen the bitter lesson of Vietnam where a war could not be successfully prosecuted by the United States, where the public was not behind the war. This amendment is being pressed today because there has been such a consistent erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Korea was a war without congressional declaration. Vietnam was a war without a congressional declaration. There was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which some said justified the involvement of the United States in Vietnam--military involvement, the waging of a war. But on its face, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not really sufficient. The Gulf War, authorized by a resolution of both Houses of Congress, broke that chain of the erosion of congressional authority. In January of 1991, the Senate and the House of Representatives took up the issue on the use of force. After a spirited debate on this floor, characterized by the media as historic, in a 52-47 vote, the Senate authorized the use of force. Similarly, the House of Representatives authorized the use of force so that we had the appropriate congressional declaration on that important matter. We have seen the erosion of congressional authority on many, many instances. I shall comment this afternoon on only a few. We have seen the missile strikes at Iraq really being acts of war. In February of 1998, I argued on the floor of the Senate that there ought not to be missile strikes without authorization by the Congress of the United States. There may be justification for the President to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, if there is an emergency situation, but where there is time for deliberation and debate and congressional action, that ought to be undertaken. As the circumstances worked out, missile strikes did not occur in early 1998, after the indication that the President might authorize or undertake those missile strikes. When that again became an apparent likelihood in November of 1998, I once more urged on the Senate floor that the President not undertake acts of war with missile strikes because there was ample time for consideration. There had been considerable talk about it, and that really should have been a congressional declaration. The President then did order missile strikes in December of 1998. As we have seen with the events in Kosovo, the President of the United States made it plain in mid-March, at a news conference which he held on March 19 and at a meeting earlier that day with Members of Congress, that he intended to proceed with airstrikes. At a meeting with Members of Congress on March 23, the President was asked by a number of Members to come to Congress, and he did. The President sent a letter to Senator Daschle asking for authorization by the Senate. In a context where it was apparent that the airstrikes were going to be pursued with or without congressional authorization, and with the prestige of NATO on the line and with the prestige of the United States on the line, the Senate did authorize airstrikes, specifically excluding any use of ground troops. That authorization was by a vote of 58 to 41. The House of Representatives had, on a prior vote, authorized U.S. forces as peacekeepers, but that was not really relevant to the issue of the airstrikes. Subsequently, the House of Representatives took up the issue of airstrikes, and by a tie vote of 213-213, the House of Representatives declined to authorize the airstrikes. That was at a time when the airstrikes were already underway. [[Page S5919]] I supported the Senate vote for the authorization of airstrikes. I talked to General Wesley Clark, the Supreme NATO Commander. One of the points which he made, which was telling on this Senator, was the morale of the troops. The airstrikes were an inevitability, as the President had determined, and it seemed to me that in that context we ought to give the authorization, again, as I say, expressly reserving the issue not to have ground forces used. So on this state of the record, with the vote by the Senate and with the tie vote by the House of Representatives, you have airstrikes which may well, under international law, be concluded to be at variance with the Constitution of the United States, to put it politely and not to articulate any doctrine of illegality, at a time when my country is involved in those airstrikes. But when we come to the issue of ground troops, which would be a major expansion and would constitute, beyond any question, the involvement of the United States in a war--although my own view is that the United States is conducting acts of war at the present time--the President ought to come to the Congress. When the President met with a large group of Members on Wednesday, April 28, the issue of ground forces came up and the President made a commitment to those in attendance--and I was present--that he would not order ground troops into Kosovo without prior congressional authorization. He said he would honor that congressional authorization, reserving his prerogative as President to say that he didn't feel it indispensable constitutionally that he do so. However, he said that he would make that commitment, and he did make that commitment to a large number of Members of the House and Senate on April 28 of this year. He said, as a matter of good faith, that he would come to the Congress before authorizing the use of ground troops. So, in a sense, it could be said that this amendment is duplicative. But I do believe, as a matter of adherence to the rule of law, that the commitment the President made ought to be memorialized in this defense authorization bill. I have, therefore, offered this amendment. It is a complicated question as to the use of ground forces, whether they will ever be requested, because unanimity has to be obtained under the rules that govern NATO. Germany has already said they are opposed to the use of ground forces. But this is a matter that really ought to come back to the Congress. I am prepared--speaking for myself--to consider a Presidential request for authorization for the use of ground forces. However, before I would vote on the matter, or give my consent or vote in the affirmative, there are a great many questions I will want to have answered--questions that go to intelligence, questions that go to the specialty of the military planners. I would want to know what the likely resistance would be from the army of the former Yugoslavia. How much have our airstrikes degraded the capability of the Serbian army to defend? How many U.S. troops would be involved? I would like to know, to the extent possible, what the assessment of risk is. When we talked about invading Japan before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we had estimates as to how many would be wounded and how many fatalities there would be. So while not easy to pass judgment on something that could be at least estimated or approximated, I would want to know, very importantly, how many ground troops would be supplied by others in NATO. I would want to know what the projection was for the duration of the military engagement, and what the projection was after the military engagement was over. These are only some of the questions that ought to be addressed. In 16 minutes, at 4 o'clock, members of the administration, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to give another congressional briefing. Before we have a vote on a matter of this importance and this magnitude, those are some of the questions I think ought to be answered. That, in a very brief statement, constitutes the essence of the reasons why I have offered this amendment. Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. SPECTER. Yes. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator. He and I are of the same mind in terms of the authority and responsibility of Congress when it comes to a declaration of war. It is interesting to note that last year when a similar amendment was called on the defense appropriation bill, offered by a gentleman in the House, David Skaggs, only 15 Members of the Senate voted in favor of it, including the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from Delaware, myself, and a handful of others. It will be interesting to see this debate now in the context of a real conflict. I have seen a copy of this amendment, and I want to understand the full clarity and intention of the Senator. As I understand it, there are two paragraphs offered as part of this amendment. They use different language in each paragraph. I wish the Senator would clarify. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond to the Senator, I would be glad to respond to the questions. I thank him for his leadership in offering a similar amendment in the past. When I undertook to send this amendment to the desk, I had called the Senator from Illinois and talked to him this morning and will consider this a joint venture if he is prepared to accept that characterization. Mr. DURBIN. Depending on the responses, I may very well be prepared to do so. Would the Senator be kind enough to enlighten me? The first paragraph refers to the introduction of ground troops. The second paragraph refers to the deployment of ground troops. Could the Senator tell me, is there a difference in his mind in the use of those two different terms? Mr. SPECTER. Responding directly to the question, I think there would be no difference. But I am not sure the Senator from Illinois has the precise amendment I have introduced, which has only one paragraph. I can read it quickly: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. Mr. DURBIN. The version I have---- Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, I am holding this draft amendment. You are referring to two paragraphs, and it appears to me that the first paragraph is the title; am I correct? I find that inconsistent with what I believe was paragraph 2. The first paragraph is the title, and there is really only one paragraph in the body of the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. If the Senator from Pennsylvania will yield, I will confine myself to the nature of the amendment. Could the Senator tell me why reference is only made to the deployment of grounds troops from U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo and not in Yugoslavia? Mr. SPECTER. The amendment was drafted in its narrowest form. Perhaps it would be appropriate to modify the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I think it might be. I ask the Senator a second question. Would he not want to make an exception, as well, for the rescue of the NATO forces in Yugoslavia if we would perhaps have a downed flier and ground troops could be sent in for rescue, and that would not require congressional authorization. I think that would be consistent with the Senator's earlier statements about the emergency authority of the President as Commander in Chief. Mr. SPECTER. I would be prepared to accept that exception. Mr. DURBIN. The final question is procedural. The Senator from Pennsylvania has been here---- Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to amend it for a downed flier--we just witnessed ground troops being caught, and they have now been released. I would be careful in the redrafting and not just to stick to a downed flier. That is just helpful advice. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator. Mr. DURBIN. A rescue of NATO forces in Yugoslavia was the question. Last, I will ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, if this requires a joint resolution, under the rules of the Senate, [[Page S5920]] Members in a filibuster, a minority, say, 41 Senators, could stop us from ever taking action on this measure. How would the Senator from Pennsylvania respond to that? Does that, in effect, give to a minority the authority to stop the debate and a vote by the Senate and thereby tie the President's hands when it comes to committing ground troops, should we ever reach the point where that is necessary? Mr. SPECTER. I respond to my colleague from Illinois by saying that with a declaration of war where the Senate has to join under the Constitution and there could be a filibuster requiring 60 votes, the same rule applies. To get that authorization, either by declaration of war or resolution for the use of force, we have to comply with the rules to get an affirmative vote out of the Senate. Under those rules, if somebody filibusters, it requires 60 votes. So be it. That is the rule of the Senate and that is the way you have to proceed to get the authorization from the Senate. Mr. DURBIN. I know I am speaking on the Senator's time. I thank him for responding to those questions. I have reservations, as he does, about committing ground troops. I certainly believe, as he does, that the Congress should make that decision and not the President unilaterally. He has promised to come to us for that decision to be made. I hope Mr. Milosevic and those who follow this debate don't take any comfort in this. We are speaking only to the question of the authority of Congress, not as to any actual decision of whether we will ever commit to ground troops. I think that is the sense of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I thank him for offering the amendment, and I support this important amendment. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will speak in opposition to the amendment. But I don't wish to interfere with the presentation of the Senator. At such time, perhaps, when I could start by propounding a few questions to my colleague and friend, would he indicate when he feels he has finished his presentation of the amendment? Mr. SPECTER. It would suit me to have the questions right now. Mr. WARNER. I remind the Senator of the parliamentary situation. While I have given him some suggestions, if he is going to amend it, it would take unanimous consent to amend the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. To modify the amendment? Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Mr. SPECTER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered. Mr. WARNER. The time agreement has been presented under the rules. I will address the question to the Chair. I think that would be best. The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would take unanimous consent to modify the amendment. Mr. WARNER. Just as a friendly gesture, I advise my colleague of that. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his friendly gesture. Mr. WARNER. As the Senator reads the title and then the text, I have trouble following the continuity of the two. For example, first it is directing the President of the United States pursuant to the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. I have been here 21 years. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is just a year or two shy of that. This War Powers Resolution has never been accepted by any President, Republican or Democrat or otherwise. Am I not correct in that respect? Mr. SPECTER. The Senator is correct. Mr. WARNER. Therefore, we would not be precipitating in another one of those endless debates which would consume hours and hours of the time of this body if we are acting on the predicate that this President is now going to acknowledge that he, as President of the United States, is bound by what is law? I readily admit it is the law. But we have witnessed, over these 20-plus years that I have been here and over the years the Senator from Pennsylvania has been here, that no President will acknowledge that he is subservient to this act of Congress because he feels that it is unconstitutional; that the Constitution has said he is Commander in Chief and he has the right to make decisions with respect to the Armed Forces of the United States on a minute's notice. Really, this is what concerns me about this amendment, among other things. Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to the question. Mr. WARNER. All right. Mr. SPECTER. If it took hours and hours, I think those hours and hours would be well spent, at least by comparison to what the Senate does on so many matters. And we might convene a little earlier. We might adjourn a little later. We might work on Mondays and Fridays and maybe even on Saturdays. I would not be concerned about the hours which we would spend. I think this Senator, after the 18 years and 5 months that I have been here, has given proper attention to the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare and/or involve the United States in war, or to the War Powers Act. This is a matter which first came to my attention in 1983 on the Lebanon matter when Senator Percy was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I had a debate, a colloquy, about whether Korea was a war, and Senator Percy said it was. Vietnam was a war. At that time, I undertook to draft a complex complaint trying to get the acquiescence of the President--President Reagan was in the White House at that time--which Senator Baker undertook to see if we could have a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. It is true, as the Senator from Virginia says, that Presidents have always denied it. They have denied it in complying with it. They send over the notice called for under the act, and then they put in a disclaimer. But I think the War Powers Act has had a profoundly beneficial effect, because Presidents have complied with it even while denying it. But I think it is high time that Congress stood up on its hind legs and said we are not going to be involved in wars unless Congress authorizes them. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, perhaps when I said hours and hours, it could be days and days. But we would come out with the same result. Presidents haven't complied with the act. They have ``complied with the spirit of the act.'' I believe that is how they have acknowledged it in the correspondence with the Congress. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I think ``complied with the act''--the act requires certain notification, certain statements of the President. They make the statements which the act calls for, and then they add an addendum, ``but we do not believe we are obligated to do so.'' Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me ask another question of my colleague. We will soon be receiving a briefing from the Secretaries of State, Defense and the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I will absent myself during that period, and the Senator from Pennsylvania will have the opportunity to control the floor. I hope there would be no unanimous consent requests in my absence. I hope that would be agreeable with my good friend, because I have asked for this meeting. Mr. SPECTER. The Senator may be assured there will be no unanimous consent requests for any effort to do anything but to play by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I asked for this meeting and have arranged it for the Senate. So I have to go upstairs. But I point out: Suppose we were to adopt this, and supposing that during the month of August when the Senate would be in recess the President had to make a decision with regard to ground troops. Then he would have to, practically speaking, bring the Congress back to town. Would that not be correct? Mr. SPECTER. That would be correct. That is exactly what he ought to do. Before we involve ground troops, the Congress of the United States could interrupt the recess and come back and decide this important issue. Mr. WARNER. But the reason for introducing ground troops, whatever it may be, might require a decision of less than an hour to make on behalf of the Chief Executive, the Commander in Chief, and he would be then shackled with the necessary time of, say, maybe 48 hours in which to bring the Members of Congress back from various places throughout the United States and throughout the world. To me, that imposes on the President something that was never envisioned by the Founding Fathers. And that is why he is given the power of Commander in Chief. Our power is the power of the purse, to [[Page S5921]] which I again direct the Senator's attention in the text of the amendment. But it seems to me I find the title in conflict with the text of the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. As I said during the course of my presentation, Mr. President, I think the Commander in Chief does have authority to act in an emergency. I made a clear-cut delineation as I presented the argument that when there is time for deliberation, as, for example, on the missile strikes in Iraq, or as, for example, on the gulf war resolution, it ought to be considered, debated and decided by the Congress. Mr. WARNER. How do we define ``emergency?'' Where the President can act without approval by the Congress, and in other situations where he must get the approval, who makes that decision? Mr. SPECTER. I think that our English language is capable of structuring a definition of what constitutes an emergency. Mr. WARNER. Where is it found in this amendment? Mr. SPECTER. I think the President has the authority to act as Commander in Chief without that kind of specification, and it is not now on the face of this amendment. However, it may be advisable to take the extra precaution, with modification offered and agreed to by unanimous consent in the presence of the Senator from Virginia, to spell that out as well, although I think unnecessarily so. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I must depart and go upstairs to this meeting. But I will return as quickly as I can. I thank the Senator for his courtesy of protecting the floor in the interests of the manager of the bill. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. The Senator is aware that the Senator from Virginia will at an appropriate time move to table, and in all probability I will reserve the right to object to this amendment until the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to amend the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Members of the Senate that under the previous order Senator Allard is to be recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. WARNER. Perhaps the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Colorado will work that out between them. I hope they can reach an accommodation. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may, I understand that the Senator from Virginia has articulated his views about a unanimous consent, and that is fine. Those are his rights. But it may be that there will be an additional amendment which I will file taking into account any modifications which I might want to make which might be objected to. So we can work it out in due course. Parliamentary inquiry: Does the Senator from Colorado have the floor? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is to have 20 minutes at 4 o'clock under the previous order. The 20 minutes is on the amendment, not on the bill. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might clarify the situation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Before the Senator from Pennsylvania specifically advised me he was going to assert his rights, which he has since his amendment was the pending business of the Senate following the three votes, I put in place a modest time slot for our colleague from Colorado, such that he could address the Senate on the general provisions of the underlying bill. But then we reached a subsequent time agreement to accommodate the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is my request, in the course of this debate, if the Senator could, within the parameters of the two unanimous consents, work out a situation where he could have about 15 minutes and then we could return to your debate? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do not understand that. If you are asking me to give time---- Mr. WARNER. Not from your time agreement. It would be totally separate. In other words, your 90 minutes, now the subject of the second unanimous consent agreement, would be preserved. That is as it was written. But can the Senator accommodate sliding that to some point in time to allow the Senator from Colorado to have 15 minutes? Mr. ALLARD. What is the regular order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. Mr. SPECTER. I would be delighted to accommodate the Senator from Colorado one way or the other. He can speak now and then we can go back to our time agreement on the pending amendment. Mr. ALLARD. I have been waiting. I was here most of the morning and then waiting this afternoon for 3 hours to have an opportunity to make some general comments on this bill. I do not anticipate taking much longer. My agreement is 20 minutes, if I remember correctly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. ALLARD. Maybe there would be an opportunity--I would like to get in on this meeting Senator Warner is attending at some point in time-- probably the last part of it. But I would like to have the opportunity to address this bill. What is it the Senator from Pennsylvania is seeking, as far as the privilege of the floor? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may respond, I am delighted to have the Senator from Colorado use his 20 minutes, which is ordered at this time. Mr. WARNER. With no subtraction whatsoever from the unanimous consent in place for the Senator. Mr. SPECTER. That is the understanding the Senator had spoken to earlier. Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this point in time, the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. The Senator is advised, with regard to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, 25 minutes remains for the Senator from Pennsylvania and 38\1/2\ minutes, approximately, remains for the opposition. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise in strong support of S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As the Personnel Subcommittee chairman, I take great pleasure in which Senator Cleland, the ranking member, and the other members of the subcommittee were able to provide for our men and women in uniform. Every leader in the military tells me the same thing, without the people the tools are useless. We must take care of our people and the personnel provisions in this bill were developed in a bipartisan manner. This bill is responsive to the manpower readiness needs of the military services; supports numerous quality of life improvements for our service men and women, their families, and the retiree community; and reflects the budget realities that we face today and will face in the future. First, military manpower strength levels. The bill adds 92 Marine personnel over the administration's request for an active duty end strength of 1,384,889. It also recommends a reserve end strength of 874,043--745 more than the administration requested. The bill also modifies but maintains the end-strength floors. While I do not believe that end-strength floors are a practical force management tool, I am personally concerned that the strength levels of the active and reserve forces are too low and that the Department of Defense is paying other bills by reducing personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to send a message to the administration that they cannot permit personnel levels to drop below the minimums established by the Congress. On military personnel policy, there are a number of provisions intended to support the recruiting and retention and personnel management of the services. Among the most noteworthy, are the several provisions that permit the services to offer 2-year enlistments with bonuses and other incentives. This is a pilot program in which students in college or vocational or technical schools could enlist and remain in school for 2 years before they actually go on active duty. Many Senators have expressed their concerns about the operational tempo of the military. That is why this bill attempts to address this problem by requiring the services to closely manage the Personnel and Deployment Tempo of military personnel. We would require a general or flag officer to approve deployments over 180 days in a [[Page S5922]] year; a four-star general or admiral to approve deployments over 200 days and would authorize a $100 per diem pay for each day a service member is deployed over 220 days. The briefings and hearings in the personnel subcommittee have found that the single most cited reason for separation is time away from home and families. At the same time, the services have not been effective in managing the Personnel and Deployment Tempo for their personnel. I am confident that the provision will focus the necessary attention on the management of this problem. Another important provision is the expansion of Junior ROTC or JROTC programs. A number of members and the service Chiefs and personnel Chiefs told me that they believed Junior ROTC is an important program and that an expansion was not only warranted but needed. Thus we have added $39 million to expand the JROTC programs. These funds will permit the Army to add 114 new schools; the Navy to add 63 new schools; the Air Force to add 63 new schools; and the Marine Corps to exhaust their waiting list to 32 schools. This is a total of 272 new JROTC programs in our school districts across the country. I am proud to be able to support these important programs that teach responsibility, leadership, ethics, and assist in military recruiting. In military compensation, our major recommendations are extracted from S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's and Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. First, this bill authorizes a 4.8-percent pay raise effective January 1, 2000 and a restructuring of the pay tables effective July 1, 2000. Another provision includes a Thrift Savings Plan for active forces and the ready reserves and a plan to offer service members who entered the service on or after August 1, 1986, the option to receive a $30,000 bonus and remain under the ``Redux'' retirement or to change to the ``High-three'' retirement system. In order to assist the active and reserve military forces in recruiting, there are a series of bonuses and new authorities to support the ability of our recruiters to attract qualified young men and women to serve in the armed forces. There are also several new bonuses and special pays to incentivize aviators, surface warfare officers, special warfare officers, air crewmen among others to remain on active duty. Two additional provisions from S. 4 are in this bill. A special retention initiative would permit a service secretary to match the thrift savings contribution of service members in critical specialties in return for an extended service commitment. Also, thanks to the hard work of Senator McCain and Senator Roberts, another provision authorizes a special subsistence allowance for junior enlisted personnel who qualify for food stamps. In health care, there are several key recommendations. There is a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to implement a number of initiatives to improve delivery of health care under TriCare. Another provision would require each Lead Agent to establish a patient advocate to assist beneficiaries in resolving problems they may encounter with TriCare. Finally there are a number of general provisions including one to enforce the reductions in management headquarters personnel Congress directed several years ago and several to assist the Department of Defense Dependents School System to provide quality education for the children of military personnel overseas. Before I close, as a first time Senator subcommittee chair, I express my appreciation to Senator Cleland for his leadership and assistance throughout this year as we worked in a bipartisan manner to develop programs which enhance personnel readiness and quality of life programs. I also thank the members of the subcommittee, Senator Thurmond, Senator McCain, Senator Snowe, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Reed, and their staffs. Their hard work made our work better and helped me focus on those issues which have the greatest impact on soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Mr. President, I finish by thanking Chairman Warner for the opportunity to point out some of the highlights in the bill which the Personnel Subcommittee has oversight and to congratulate him and Senator Levin on the bipartisan way this bill was accomplished and ask that all Senators strongly support S. 1059. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under control. If neither side yields time, time will simply run equally. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. The Senator from Delaware is here and I will be happy to yield--how much time do the opponents have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents of the amendment have 38 minutes and approximately 10 seconds. Mr. LEVIN. Is that divided in some way or under the control of Senator Warner and myself? How is that? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The manager of the bill is designated to be in charge of the opposition. Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be necessarily brief. It is not often I disagree with my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. I think he is right in the fundamental sense that if the President is going to send American ground forces into a war, it needs congressional authority. Very honestly, this amendment is, in my view, flawed. First of all, it is clear that the President has to come to Congress to use ground forces and that the President has already stated--I will ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a copy of his letter dated April 28, 1999, to the Speaker of the House in which he says in part: Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The White House, Washington, April 28, 1999. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo. The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so through use of air power. However, were I to change my policy with regard to the introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed to go home to a safe and secure environment. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, not only must the President, but he said he would. This amendment is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, I believe it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized or under his emergency powers. The Senate resolution we adopted only authorizes the use of airpower. If Congress adopts this amendment, it seems to me we will imply the President has carte blanche to take offensive action, and anywhere else unless the Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary in advance. In short, I think it will tender an invitation to Presidents in the future to use force whenever they want unless Congress provides a specific ban in advance. Putting that aside, however, the amendment is flawed because its exceptions are much too narrowly drawn. The amendment purports to bar the use of Armed Forces in response to an attack against Armed Forces. For example, we have thousands of soldiers now in Albania and Macedonia. [[Page S5923]] Let's suppose the Yugoslav forces launch an attack against U.S. forces in Albania or in Macedonia. This amendment would bar the use of ground forces to respond by going into Kosovo. The power to respond against such an attack is clearly within the power of the Commander in Chief. So, too, does the President have the power to launch a preemptive strike against an imminent attack. The U.S. forces do not have to wait until they take the first punch. The second point I will make in this brief amount of time I am taking is that the amendment does not appear to permit the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans. Most constitutional scholars concede the President has the power to use force in emergency circumstances to protect American citizens facin

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
(Senate - May 25, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S5915-S5948] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill. Amendment No. 388 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 2 minutes equally divided on the Roth amendment. Who yields time? Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for 58 years, two distinguished commanders, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, have been unjustly scapegoated for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Numerous studies have made it unambiguously clear that Short and Kimmel were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington. Investigations by military boards found Kimmel and Short had properly disposed their forces in light of the intelligence and resources they had available. Investigations found the failure of their superiors to properly manage intelligence and to fulfill command responsibilities contributed significantly, if not predominantly, to the disaster. Yet, they alone remain singled out for responsibility. This amendment calls upon the President to correct this injustice by advancing them on the retired list, as was done for all their peers. This initiative has received support from veterans, including Bob Dole, countless military leaders, including Admirals Moorer, Crowe, Halloway, Zumwalt, and Trost, as well as the VFW. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the managers of this bill, we vigorously oppose this amendment. Right here on this desk is perhaps the most dramatic reason not to grant the request. This represents a hearing held by a joint committee of the Senate and House of the Congress of the United States in 1946. They had before them live witnesses, all of the documents, and it is clear from this and their findings that these two officers were then and remain today accused of serious errors in judgment which contributed to perhaps the greatest disaster in this century against the people of the United States of America. There are absolutely no new facts beyond those deduced in this record brought out by my distinguished good friend, the senior Senator from Delaware. For that reason, we oppose it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 388. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 47, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 142 Leg.] YEAS--52 Abraham Akaka Baucus Bayh Bennett Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bunning Campbell Cleland Cochran Collins Daschle [[Page S5916]] DeWine Domenici Durbin Edwards Enzi Feinstein Grassley Hagel Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerry Kyl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Lincoln Lott McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Rockefeller Roth Sarbanes Schumer Shelby Smith (NH) Thomas Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Wellstone Wyden NAYS--47 Allard Ashcroft Bond Brownback Bryan Burns Byrd Chafee Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Dodd Dorgan Feingold Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Gregg Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kerrey Kohl Levin Lieberman Lugar Mack Moynihan Murray Nickles Reed Reid Robb Roberts Santorum Sessions Smith (OR) Snowe Specter Stevens Thompson Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 388) was agreed to. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 377 Mr. WARNER. Is the Senator from Virginia correct that the next vote will be on the amendment by the Senator from Kansas? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, amendment No. 377 by the Senator from Kansas. Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Kansas and I understand, also, that our colleague, the ranking member of the committee, likewise supports the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, noting the presence of the Senator from Kansas, the amendment by the Senator from Kansas raises a very good point; that is, at the 50th anniversary of the NATO summit, those in attendance, the 19 nations, the heads of state and government, adopted a new Strategic Concept. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that Concept does not go beyond the confines of the 1949 Washington Treaty and such actions that took place in 1991 when a new Strategic Concept was drawn. A number of us are concerned, if we read through the language, that it opens up new vistas for NATO. If that be the case, then the Senate should have that treaty before it for consideration. This is a sense of the Senate, but despite that technicality, it is a very important amendment; it is one to which the President will respond. I understand from my distinguished colleague and ranking member, in all probability, we will receive the assurance from the President that it does not go beyond the foundations and objectives sought in the 1949 Washington Treaty. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. It says that the President should say to us whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes new commitments or obligations upon us. It does not find that there are such new obligations or commitments. The President has already written to us in a letter to Senator Warner that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. In 1991, the new Strategic Concept, which came with much new language and many new missions, was not submitted to the Senate. Indeed, much of the language is very similar in 1991 as in 1999. In my judgment, there are no new commitments or obligations imposed by the 1999 Strategic Concept. The President could very readily certify what is required that he certify by this amendment, and I support it. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote be limited to 10 minutes and the next vote following it to 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. All time has expired. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe that under the order 1 minute was reserved for anybody in opposition, is that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes equally divided. Mr. KYL. I don't think the Senator from Michigan spoke in opposition to the amendment, as I understand it. Therefore, would it not be in order for someone in opposition to take a minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. KYL. Might I inquire of the Senator from Delaware--I am prepared to speak for 30 seconds or a minute. Mr. BIDEN. If he can reserve 20 seconds for me, I would appreciate it. Mr. KYL. I will take 30 seconds. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both Senators be given 30 seconds. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues that, as Senator Levin just pointed out, this is a totally unnecessary amendment, because the administration has already expressed a view that it has not gone beyond the Concepts this Senate voted for 90 to 9 when the new states were added to NATO. Those are the Strategic Concepts. One might argue whether or not they are being applied correctly in the case of the war in Kosovo. That is another debate. But in terms of the Strategic Concepts themselves, this body voted on them, and I would hate for this body now to suggest to the other 18 countries in NATO that perhaps they should resubmit the Strategic Concepts to their legislative bodies as in the nature of a treaty so that the entire NATO agreement on Strategic Concepts would be subject to 19 separate votes of our parliamentary bodies. I don't think that would be a good idea given the fact that, as Senator Levin already noted, the President has already said the Strategic Concepts do not go beyond what the Senate voted for 90 to 9. This an unnecessary amendment. I suggest my colleagues vote no. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Strategic Concept does not rise to the level of a treaty amendment, and the Senator from Michigan has pointed that out. Therefore, it is a benign amendment, we are told, and in all probability it is. But it is unnecessary. It does mischief. It sends the wrong message. It is a bad idea, notwithstanding the fact that it has been cleaned up to the point that it is clear it does not rise to the level of a treaty requiring a treaty vote on the Strategic Concept. But I agree with the Senator from Arizona. He painstakingly on this floor laid out in the Kyl amendment during the expansion of NATO debate exactly what we asked the President to consider in the Strategic Concept that was being negotiated with our allies. They did that. We voted 90 to 9. This is a bad idea. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote? The result was announced--yeas 87, nays 12, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 143 Leg.] YEAS--87 Abraham Akaka Allard Ashcroft Baucus Bayh Bennett Bingaman Bond Breaux Brownback Bryan Bunning Burns Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Cochran Collins Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Daschle DeWine Dodd Domenici Dorgan Edwards Enzi Feingold Feinstein Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Murray Nickles Reed Reid Roberts Rockefeller Santorum Sarbanes Schumer Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Snowe Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Warner Wellstone Wyden [[Page S5917]] NAYS--12 Biden Boxer Durbin Hagel Inouye Kyl Lautenberg Moynihan Robb Roth Smith (OR) Specter NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 377), as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Amendment No. 382 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the next amendment is in the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. Therefore, I have consulted with Chairman Roth. Does Senator Roth have any comments on this? Mr. ROTH. No comments. Mr. WARNER. We yield back such time as we may have. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided on the amendment. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I have been trying to get this amendment on the floor. This is simple and straightforward. This requires the Department of Health and Human Services to provide us with a report on the status of women and children who are no longer on welfare. There are 4.5 million fewer recipients. We want to know what kinds of jobs, at what wages, do people have health care coverage. This is based on disturbing reports by Family U.S.A., Catholic Organization Network, Children's Defense Fund, Conference of Mayors and, in addition, National Conference of State Legislatures. Good public policy is good evaluation, and we ought to know what is going on in the country right now on this terribly important question that dramatically affects the lives of women and children, albeit low- income women and children. I hope to get a strong bipartisan vote. It will be a good message. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Wellstone's amendment to require states to collect data on the employment, jobs, earnings, health insurance, and child care arrangements of former welfare recipients. This information is essential. The most important indicator of welfare reform's success is not just declining welfare caseloads. It is the well-being of these low-income parents and their children after they leave the welfare system. We do not know enough about how they have fared, and states should be required to collect this information. Millions of families have left the welfare rolls, and we need to know how they are doing now. We need information on their earnings, their health care, and other vital data. The obvious question is whether former welfare recipients are doing well, or barely surviving, worse off than before. The data we do have about former welfare recipients is not encouraging. According to a study by the Children's Defense Fund and the National Coalition on the Homeless, most former welfare recipients earn below poverty wages after leaving the welfare system. Their financial hardship is compounded by the fact that many former welfare recipients do not receive the essential services that would enable them to hold jobs and care for their children. The cost of child care can be a crushing expense to low-income families, consuming over one-quarter of their income. Yet, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that only one in ten eligible low-income families gets the child care assistance they need. Health insurance trends are also troubling. As of 1997, 675,000 low- income people had lost Medicaid coverage due to welfare reform. Children comprise 62 percent of this figure, and many of them were still eligible for Medicaid. We need to improve outreach to get more eligible children enrolled in Medicaid. We also need to increase enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program, which offers states incentives to expand health coverage for children with family income up to 200 percent of poverty. it is estimated that 4 million uninsured children are eligible for this assistance. In addition to problems related to child care and health care, many low-income families are not receiving Food Stamp assistance. Over the last 4 years, participation in the Food Stamp Program has dropped by one-third, from serving nearly 28 million participants to serving fewer than 19 million. But this does not mean children and families are no longer hungry. Hunger and undernutrition continue to be urgent problems. According to a Department of Agriculture study, 1 in 8 Americans--or more than 34 million people--are at risk of hunger. The need for food assistance is underscored by he phenomenon of increasing reliance on food banks and emergency food services. Many food banks are now overwhelmed by the growing number of requests they receive for assistance. The Western Massachusetts Food Bank reports a dramatic increase in demand for emergency food services. In 1997, it assisted 75,000 people. In 1998, the number they served rose to 85,000. Massachusetts is not alone. According to a recent U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 78 percent of the 30 cities surveyed reported an increase in requests for emergency food in 1998. Sixty-one percent of the people seeking this assistance were children or their parents; 31 percent were employed. These statistics clearly demonstrate that hunger is a major problem. Yet fewer families are now receiving Food Stamps. One of the unintended consequences of welfare reform is that low-income, working families are dropping off the Food Stamps rolls. Often, these families are going hungry or turning to food banks because they don't have adequate information about Food Stamp eligibility. A Massachusetts study found that most people leaving welfare are not getting Food Stamp benefits, even though many are still eligible. Three months after leaving welfare, only 18 percent were receiving Food Stamps. After one year, the percentage drops to 6.5 percent. It is clear that too many eligible families are not getting the assistance they need and are entitled to. Every state should be required to collect this kind of data. We need better information about how low-income families are faring after they leave welfare. Adequate data will enable the states to build on their successes and address their weaknesses. Ultimately, the long-term success of welfare reform will be measured state by state, person by person with this data. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Ignorance is not bliss. We can't afford to ignore the need that may exist. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Is there any Senator who wishes to speak in opposition? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we yield back our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 382. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 49, nays 50, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 144 Leg.] YEAS--49 Akaka Baucus Bayh Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bryan Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Durbin Edwards Feingold Feinstein Graham Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Mikulski Moynihan Murray Reed Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Schumer Snowe Specter Torricelli Wellstone Wyden NAYS--50 Abraham Allard Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brownback Bunning Burns Cochran Collins Coverdell Craig Crapo DeWine Domenici Enzi Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hagel Hatch Helms Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Murkowski Nickles Roberts Roth Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Smith (OR) Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Voinovich Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 382) was rejected. [[Page S5918]] Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. GRAMM. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I have a colleague who is ready to go, Senator Specter, so I will not take much time. But I just want to make it clear to colleagues that on this vote I agreed to a time limit. I brought this amendment out to the floor. There could have been debate on the other side. Somebody could have come out here and debated me openly in public about this amendment. I am talking about exactly what is happening with this welfare bill. I am talking about good public policy evaluation. Shouldn't we at least have the information about where these women are? Where these children are? What kind of jobs? What kind of wages? Are there adequate child care arrangements? The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal once said: ``Ignorance is never random.'' Sometimes we don't know what we don't want to know. I say to colleagues, given this vote, I am going to bring this amendment out on the next bill I get a chance to bring it out on. I am not going to agree to a time limit. I am going to force people to come out here on the majority side and debate me on this question, and we will have a full-fledged, substantive debate. We are talking about the lives of women and children, albeit they are poor, albeit they don't have the lobbyists, albeit they are not well connected. I am telling you, I am outraged that there wasn't the willingness and the courage to debate me on this amendment. We will have the debate with no time limits next bill that comes out here. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I tried to accommodate the Senator early on on this matter. To be perfectly candid, it was a jurisdictional issue with this committee. It was not a subject with which this Senator had a great deal of familiarity. I did what I could to keep our bill moving and at the same time to accommodate my colleague. The various persons who have jurisdiction over it were notified, and that is as much as I can say. Now, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 90 minutes equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table with respect to amendment 383 and no amendments be in order prior to that vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I further ask that following that vote, provided it is tabled, that Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to make a motion to strike and there be 2 hours equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table and no amendments be in order to that language proposed to be stricken prior to that vote. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the only question I have is that on the second half here, which is the one that is before us, I suggest that it read ``prior to a motion to table or a motion on adoption'' so that there is an option as to whether there is a motion to table or a vote on the amendment itself. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find no objection to that. I so amend the request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request as amended? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Pennsylvania, and I yield the floor. Amendment No. 383 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment provides that: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The purpose of this amendment, obvious on its face, is to avoid having the United States drawn into a full-fledged war without authorization of the Congress. This authorization is required by the constitutional provision which states that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to declare war, and the implicit consequence from that constitutional provision that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United States in a war. The Founding Fathers entrusted that grave responsibility to the Congress because of the obvious factor that a war could not be successfully prosecuted unless it was backed by the American people. The first line of determination in a representative democracy, in a republic, is to have that determination made by the Congress of the United States. We have seen the bitter lesson of Vietnam where a war could not be successfully prosecuted by the United States, where the public was not behind the war. This amendment is being pressed today because there has been such a consistent erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Korea was a war without congressional declaration. Vietnam was a war without a congressional declaration. There was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which some said justified the involvement of the United States in Vietnam--military involvement, the waging of a war. But on its face, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not really sufficient. The Gulf War, authorized by a resolution of both Houses of Congress, broke that chain of the erosion of congressional authority. In January of 1991, the Senate and the House of Representatives took up the issue on the use of force. After a spirited debate on this floor, characterized by the media as historic, in a 52-47 vote, the Senate authorized the use of force. Similarly, the House of Representatives authorized the use of force so that we had the appropriate congressional declaration on that important matter. We have seen the erosion of congressional authority on many, many instances. I shall comment this afternoon on only a few. We have seen the missile strikes at Iraq really being acts of war. In February of 1998, I argued on the floor of the Senate that there ought not to be missile strikes without authorization by the Congress of the United States. There may be justification for the President to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, if there is an emergency situation, but where there is time for deliberation and debate and congressional action, that ought to be undertaken. As the circumstances worked out, missile strikes did not occur in early 1998, after the indication that the President might authorize or undertake those missile strikes. When that again became an apparent likelihood in November of 1998, I once more urged on the Senate floor that the President not undertake acts of war with missile strikes because there was ample time for consideration. There had been considerable talk about it, and that really should have been a congressional declaration. The President then did order missile strikes in December of 1998. As we have seen with the events in Kosovo, the President of the United States made it plain in mid-March, at a news conference which he held on March 19 and at a meeting earlier that day with Members of Congress, that he intended to proceed with airstrikes. At a meeting with Members of Congress on March 23, the President was asked by a number of Members to come to Congress, and he did. The President sent a letter to Senator Daschle asking for authorization by the Senate. In a context where it was apparent that the airstrikes were going to be pursued with or without congressional authorization, and with the prestige of NATO on the line and with the prestige of the United States on the line, the Senate did authorize airstrikes, specifically excluding any use of ground troops. That authorization was by a vote of 58 to 41. The House of Representatives had, on a prior vote, authorized U.S. forces as peacekeepers, but that was not really relevant to the issue of the airstrikes. Subsequently, the House of Representatives took up the issue of airstrikes, and by a tie vote of 213-213, the House of Representatives declined to authorize the airstrikes. That was at a time when the airstrikes were already underway. [[Page S5919]] I supported the Senate vote for the authorization of airstrikes. I talked to General Wesley Clark, the Supreme NATO Commander. One of the points which he made, which was telling on this Senator, was the morale of the troops. The airstrikes were an inevitability, as the President had determined, and it seemed to me that in that context we ought to give the authorization, again, as I say, expressly reserving the issue not to have ground forces used. So on this state of the record, with the vote by the Senate and with the tie vote by the House of Representatives, you have airstrikes which may well, under international law, be concluded to be at variance with the Constitution of the United States, to put it politely and not to articulate any doctrine of illegality, at a time when my country is involved in those airstrikes. But when we come to the issue of ground troops, which would be a major expansion and would constitute, beyond any question, the involvement of the United States in a war--although my own view is that the United States is conducting acts of war at the present time--the President ought to come to the Congress. When the President met with a large group of Members on Wednesday, April 28, the issue of ground forces came up and the President made a commitment to those in attendance--and I was present--that he would not order ground troops into Kosovo without prior congressional authorization. He said he would honor that congressional authorization, reserving his prerogative as President to say that he didn't feel it indispensable constitutionally that he do so. However, he said that he would make that commitment, and he did make that commitment to a large number of Members of the House and Senate on April 28 of this year. He said, as a matter of good faith, that he would come to the Congress before authorizing the use of ground troops. So, in a sense, it could be said that this amendment is duplicative. But I do believe, as a matter of adherence to the rule of law, that the commitment the President made ought to be memorialized in this defense authorization bill. I have, therefore, offered this amendment. It is a complicated question as to the use of ground forces, whether they will ever be requested, because unanimity has to be obtained under the rules that govern NATO. Germany has already said they are opposed to the use of ground forces. But this is a matter that really ought to come back to the Congress. I am prepared--speaking for myself--to consider a Presidential request for authorization for the use of ground forces. However, before I would vote on the matter, or give my consent or vote in the affirmative, there are a great many questions I will want to have answered--questions that go to intelligence, questions that go to the specialty of the military planners. I would want to know what the likely resistance would be from the army of the former Yugoslavia. How much have our airstrikes degraded the capability of the Serbian army to defend? How many U.S. troops would be involved? I would like to know, to the extent possible, what the assessment of risk is. When we talked about invading Japan before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we had estimates as to how many would be wounded and how many fatalities there would be. So while not easy to pass judgment on something that could be at least estimated or approximated, I would want to know, very importantly, how many ground troops would be supplied by others in NATO. I would want to know what the projection was for the duration of the military engagement, and what the projection was after the military engagement was over. These are only some of the questions that ought to be addressed. In 16 minutes, at 4 o'clock, members of the administration, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to give another congressional briefing. Before we have a vote on a matter of this importance and this magnitude, those are some of the questions I think ought to be answered. That, in a very brief statement, constitutes the essence of the reasons why I have offered this amendment. Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. SPECTER. Yes. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator. He and I are of the same mind in terms of the authority and responsibility of Congress when it comes to a declaration of war. It is interesting to note that last year when a similar amendment was called on the defense appropriation bill, offered by a gentleman in the House, David Skaggs, only 15 Members of the Senate voted in favor of it, including the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from Delaware, myself, and a handful of others. It will be interesting to see this debate now in the context of a real conflict. I have seen a copy of this amendment, and I want to understand the full clarity and intention of the Senator. As I understand it, there are two paragraphs offered as part of this amendment. They use different language in each paragraph. I wish the Senator would clarify. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond to the Senator, I would be glad to respond to the questions. I thank him for his leadership in offering a similar amendment in the past. When I undertook to send this amendment to the desk, I had called the Senator from Illinois and talked to him this morning and will consider this a joint venture if he is prepared to accept that characterization. Mr. DURBIN. Depending on the responses, I may very well be prepared to do so. Would the Senator be kind enough to enlighten me? The first paragraph refers to the introduction of ground troops. The second paragraph refers to the deployment of ground troops. Could the Senator tell me, is there a difference in his mind in the use of those two different terms? Mr. SPECTER. Responding directly to the question, I think there would be no difference. But I am not sure the Senator from Illinois has the precise amendment I have introduced, which has only one paragraph. I can read it quickly: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. Mr. DURBIN. The version I have---- Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, I am holding this draft amendment. You are referring to two paragraphs, and it appears to me that the first paragraph is the title; am I correct? I find that inconsistent with what I believe was paragraph 2. The first paragraph is the title, and there is really only one paragraph in the body of the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. If the Senator from Pennsylvania will yield, I will confine myself to the nature of the amendment. Could the Senator tell me why reference is only made to the deployment of grounds troops from U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo and not in Yugoslavia? Mr. SPECTER. The amendment was drafted in its narrowest form. Perhaps it would be appropriate to modify the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I think it might be. I ask the Senator a second question. Would he not want to make an exception, as well, for the rescue of the NATO forces in Yugoslavia if we would perhaps have a downed flier and ground troops could be sent in for rescue, and that would not require congressional authorization. I think that would be consistent with the Senator's earlier statements about the emergency authority of the President as Commander in Chief. Mr. SPECTER. I would be prepared to accept that exception. Mr. DURBIN. The final question is procedural. The Senator from Pennsylvania has been here---- Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to amend it for a downed flier--we just witnessed ground troops being caught, and they have now been released. I would be careful in the redrafting and not just to stick to a downed flier. That is just helpful advice. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator. Mr. DURBIN. A rescue of NATO forces in Yugoslavia was the question. Last, I will ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, if this requires a joint resolution, under the rules of the Senate, [[Page S5920]] Members in a filibuster, a minority, say, 41 Senators, could stop us from ever taking action on this measure. How would the Senator from Pennsylvania respond to that? Does that, in effect, give to a minority the authority to stop the debate and a vote by the Senate and thereby tie the President's hands when it comes to committing ground troops, should we ever reach the point where that is necessary? Mr. SPECTER. I respond to my colleague from Illinois by saying that with a declaration of war where the Senate has to join under the Constitution and there could be a filibuster requiring 60 votes, the same rule applies. To get that authorization, either by declaration of war or resolution for the use of force, we have to comply with the rules to get an affirmative vote out of the Senate. Under those rules, if somebody filibusters, it requires 60 votes. So be it. That is the rule of the Senate and that is the way you have to proceed to get the authorization from the Senate. Mr. DURBIN. I know I am speaking on the Senator's time. I thank him for responding to those questions. I have reservations, as he does, about committing ground troops. I certainly believe, as he does, that the Congress should make that decision and not the President unilaterally. He has promised to come to us for that decision to be made. I hope Mr. Milosevic and those who follow this debate don't take any comfort in this. We are speaking only to the question of the authority of Congress, not as to any actual decision of whether we will ever commit to ground troops. I think that is the sense of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I thank him for offering the amendment, and I support this important amendment. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will speak in opposition to the amendment. But I don't wish to interfere with the presentation of the Senator. At such time, perhaps, when I could start by propounding a few questions to my colleague and friend, would he indicate when he feels he has finished his presentation of the amendment? Mr. SPECTER. It would suit me to have the questions right now. Mr. WARNER. I remind the Senator of the parliamentary situation. While I have given him some suggestions, if he is going to amend it, it would take unanimous consent to amend the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. To modify the amendment? Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Mr. SPECTER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered. Mr. WARNER. The time agreement has been presented under the rules. I will address the question to the Chair. I think that would be best. The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would take unanimous consent to modify the amendment. Mr. WARNER. Just as a friendly gesture, I advise my colleague of that. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his friendly gesture. Mr. WARNER. As the Senator reads the title and then the text, I have trouble following the continuity of the two. For example, first it is directing the President of the United States pursuant to the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. I have been here 21 years. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is just a year or two shy of that. This War Powers Resolution has never been accepted by any President, Republican or Democrat or otherwise. Am I not correct in that respect? Mr. SPECTER. The Senator is correct. Mr. WARNER. Therefore, we would not be precipitating in another one of those endless debates which would consume hours and hours of the time of this body if we are acting on the predicate that this President is now going to acknowledge that he, as President of the United States, is bound by what is law? I readily admit it is the law. But we have witnessed, over these 20-plus years that I have been here and over the years the Senator from Pennsylvania has been here, that no President will acknowledge that he is subservient to this act of Congress because he feels that it is unconstitutional; that the Constitution has said he is Commander in Chief and he has the right to make decisions with respect to the Armed Forces of the United States on a minute's notice. Really, this is what concerns me about this amendment, among other things. Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to the question. Mr. WARNER. All right. Mr. SPECTER. If it took hours and hours, I think those hours and hours would be well spent, at least by comparison to what the Senate does on so many matters. And we might convene a little earlier. We might adjourn a little later. We might work on Mondays and Fridays and maybe even on Saturdays. I would not be concerned about the hours which we would spend. I think this Senator, after the 18 years and 5 months that I have been here, has given proper attention to the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare and/or involve the United States in war, or to the War Powers Act. This is a matter which first came to my attention in 1983 on the Lebanon matter when Senator Percy was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I had a debate, a colloquy, about whether Korea was a war, and Senator Percy said it was. Vietnam was a war. At that time, I undertook to draft a complex complaint trying to get the acquiescence of the President--President Reagan was in the White House at that time--which Senator Baker undertook to see if we could have a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. It is true, as the Senator from Virginia says, that Presidents have always denied it. They have denied it in complying with it. They send over the notice called for under the act, and then they put in a disclaimer. But I think the War Powers Act has had a profoundly beneficial effect, because Presidents have complied with it even while denying it. But I think it is high time that Congress stood up on its hind legs and said we are not going to be involved in wars unless Congress authorizes them. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, perhaps when I said hours and hours, it could be days and days. But we would come out with the same result. Presidents haven't complied with the act. They have ``complied with the spirit of the act.'' I believe that is how they have acknowledged it in the correspondence with the Congress. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I think ``complied with the act''--the act requires certain notification, certain statements of the President. They make the statements which the act calls for, and then they add an addendum, ``but we do not believe we are obligated to do so.'' Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me ask another question of my colleague. We will soon be receiving a briefing from the Secretaries of State, Defense and the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I will absent myself during that period, and the Senator from Pennsylvania will have the opportunity to control the floor. I hope there would be no unanimous consent requests in my absence. I hope that would be agreeable with my good friend, because I have asked for this meeting. Mr. SPECTER. The Senator may be assured there will be no unanimous consent requests for any effort to do anything but to play by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I asked for this meeting and have arranged it for the Senate. So I have to go upstairs. But I point out: Suppose we were to adopt this, and supposing that during the month of August when the Senate would be in recess the President had to make a decision with regard to ground troops. Then he would have to, practically speaking, bring the Congress back to town. Would that not be correct? Mr. SPECTER. That would be correct. That is exactly what he ought to do. Before we involve ground troops, the Congress of the United States could interrupt the recess and come back and decide this important issue. Mr. WARNER. But the reason for introducing ground troops, whatever it may be, might require a decision of less than an hour to make on behalf of the Chief Executive, the Commander in Chief, and he would be then shackled with the necessary time of, say, maybe 48 hours in which to bring the Members of Congress back from various places throughout the United States and throughout the world. To me, that imposes on the President something that was never envisioned by the Founding Fathers. And that is why he is given the power of Commander in Chief. Our power is the power of the purse, to [[Page S5921]] which I again direct the Senator's attention in the text of the amendment. But it seems to me I find the title in conflict with the text of the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. As I said during the course of my presentation, Mr. President, I think the Commander in Chief does have authority to act in an emergency. I made a clear-cut delineation as I presented the argument that when there is time for deliberation, as, for example, on the missile strikes in Iraq, or as, for example, on the gulf war resolution, it ought to be considered, debated and decided by the Congress. Mr. WARNER. How do we define ``emergency?'' Where the President can act without approval by the Congress, and in other situations where he must get the approval, who makes that decision? Mr. SPECTER. I think that our English language is capable of structuring a definition of what constitutes an emergency. Mr. WARNER. Where is it found in this amendment? Mr. SPECTER. I think the President has the authority to act as Commander in Chief without that kind of specification, and it is not now on the face of this amendment. However, it may be advisable to take the extra precaution, with modification offered and agreed to by unanimous consent in the presence of the Senator from Virginia, to spell that out as well, although I think unnecessarily so. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I must depart and go upstairs to this meeting. But I will return as quickly as I can. I thank the Senator for his courtesy of protecting the floor in the interests of the manager of the bill. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. The Senator is aware that the Senator from Virginia will at an appropriate time move to table, and in all probability I will reserve the right to object to this amendment until the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to amend the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Members of the Senate that under the previous order Senator Allard is to be recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. WARNER. Perhaps the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Colorado will work that out between them. I hope they can reach an accommodation. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may, I understand that the Senator from Virginia has articulated his views about a unanimous consent, and that is fine. Those are his rights. But it may be that there will be an additional amendment which I will file taking into account any modifications which I might want to make which might be objected to. So we can work it out in due course. Parliamentary inquiry: Does the Senator from Colorado have the floor? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is to have 20 minutes at 4 o'clock under the previous order. The 20 minutes is on the amendment, not on the bill. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might clarify the situation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Before the Senator from Pennsylvania specifically advised me he was going to assert his rights, which he has since his amendment was the pending business of the Senate following the three votes, I put in place a modest time slot for our colleague from Colorado, such that he could address the Senate on the general provisions of the underlying bill. But then we reached a subsequent time agreement to accommodate the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is my request, in the course of this debate, if the Senator could, within the parameters of the two unanimous consents, work out a situation where he could have about 15 minutes and then we could return to your debate? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do not understand that. If you are asking me to give time---- Mr. WARNER. Not from your time agreement. It would be totally separate. In other words, your 90 minutes, now the subject of the second unanimous consent agreement, would be preserved. That is as it was written. But can the Senator accommodate sliding that to some point in time to allow the Senator from Colorado to have 15 minutes? Mr. ALLARD. What is the regular order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. Mr. SPECTER. I would be delighted to accommodate the Senator from Colorado one way or the other. He can speak now and then we can go back to our time agreement on the pending amendment. Mr. ALLARD. I have been waiting. I was here most of the morning and then waiting this afternoon for 3 hours to have an opportunity to make some general comments on this bill. I do not anticipate taking much longer. My agreement is 20 minutes, if I remember correctly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. ALLARD. Maybe there would be an opportunity--I would like to get in on this meeting Senator Warner is attending at some point in time-- probably the last part of it. But I would like to have the opportunity to address this bill. What is it the Senator from Pennsylvania is seeking, as far as the privilege of the floor? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may respond, I am delighted to have the Senator from Colorado use his 20 minutes, which is ordered at this time. Mr. WARNER. With no subtraction whatsoever from the unanimous consent in place for the Senator. Mr. SPECTER. That is the understanding the Senator had spoken to earlier. Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this point in time, the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. The Senator is advised, with regard to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, 25 minutes remains for the Senator from Pennsylvania and 38\1/2\ minutes, approximately, remains for the opposition. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise in strong support of S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As the Personnel Subcommittee chairman, I take great pleasure in which Senator Cleland, the ranking member, and the other members of the subcommittee were able to provide for our men and women in uniform. Every leader in the military tells me the same thing, without the people the tools are useless. We must take care of our people and the personnel provisions in this bill were developed in a bipartisan manner. This bill is responsive to the manpower readiness needs of the military services; supports numerous quality of life improvements for our service men and women, their families, and the retiree community; and reflects the budget realities that we face today and will face in the future. First, military manpower strength levels. The bill adds 92 Marine personnel over the administration's request for an active duty end strength of 1,384,889. It also recommends a reserve end strength of 874,043--745 more than the administration requested. The bill also modifies but maintains the end-strength floors. While I do not believe that end-strength floors are a practical force management tool, I am personally concerned that the strength levels of the active and reserve forces are too low and that the Department of Defense is paying other bills by reducing personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to send a message to the administration that they cannot permit personnel levels to drop below the minimums established by the Congress. On military personnel policy, there are a number of provisions intended to support the recruiting and retention and personnel management of the services. Among the most noteworthy, are the several provisions that permit the services to offer 2-year enlistments with bonuses and other incentives. This is a pilot program in which students in college or vocational or technical schools could enlist and remain in school for 2 years before they actually go on active duty. Many Senators have expressed their concerns about the operational tempo of the military. That is why this bill attempts to address this problem by requiring the services to closely manage the Personnel and Deployment Tempo of military personnel. We would require a general or flag officer to approve deployments over 180 days in a [[Page S5922]] year; a four-star general or admiral to approve deployments over 200 days and would authorize a $100 per diem pay for each day a service member is deployed over 220 days. The briefings and hearings in the personnel subcommittee have found that the single most cited reason for separation is time away from home and families. At the same time, the services have not been effective in managing the Personnel and Deployment Tempo for their personnel. I am confident that the provision will focus the necessary attention on the management of this problem. Another important provision is the expansion of Junior ROTC or JROTC programs. A number of members and the service Chiefs and personnel Chiefs told me that they believed Junior ROTC is an important program and that an expansion was not only warranted but needed. Thus we have added $39 million to expand the JROTC programs. These funds will permit the Army to add 114 new schools; the Navy to add 63 new schools; the Air Force to add 63 new schools; and the Marine Corps to exhaust their waiting list to 32 schools. This is a total of 272 new JROTC programs in our school districts across the country. I am proud to be able to support these important programs that teach responsibility, leadership, ethics, and assist in military recruiting. In military compensation, our major recommendations are extracted from S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's and Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. First, this bill authorizes a 4.8-percent pay raise effective January 1, 2000 and a restructuring of the pay tables effective July 1, 2000. Another provision includes a Thrift Savings Plan for active forces and the ready reserves and a plan to offer service members who entered the service on or after August 1, 1986, the option to receive a $30,000 bonus and remain under the ``Redux'' retirement or to change to the ``High-three'' retirement system. In order to assist the active and reserve military forces in recruiting, there are a series of bonuses and new authorities to support the ability of our recruiters to attract qualified young men and women to serve in the armed forces. There are also several new bonuses and special pays to incentivize aviators, surface warfare officers, special warfare officers, air crewmen among others to remain on active duty. Two additional provisions from S. 4 are in this bill. A special retention initiative would permit a service secretary to match the thrift savings contribution of service members in critical specialties in return for an extended service commitment. Also, thanks to the hard work of Senator McCain and Senator Roberts, another provision authorizes a special subsistence allowance for junior enlisted personnel who qualify for food stamps. In health care, there are several key recommendations. There is a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to implement a number of initiatives to improve delivery of health care under TriCare. Another provision would require each Lead Agent to establish a patient advocate to assist beneficiaries in resolving problems they may encounter with TriCare. Finally there are a number of general provisions including one to enforce the reductions in management headquarters personnel Congress directed several years ago and several to assist the Department of Defense Dependents School System to provide quality education for the children of military personnel overseas. Before I close, as a first time Senator subcommittee chair, I express my appreciation to Senator Cleland for his leadership and assistance throughout this year as we worked in a bipartisan manner to develop programs which enhance personnel readiness and quality of life programs. I also thank the members of the subcommittee, Senator Thurmond, Senator McCain, Senator Snowe, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Reed, and their staffs. Their hard work made our work better and helped me focus on those issues which have the greatest impact on soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Mr. President, I finish by thanking Chairman Warner for the opportunity to point out some of the highlights in the bill which the Personnel Subcommittee has oversight and to congratulate him and Senator Levin on the bipartisan way this bill was accomplished and ask that all Senators strongly support S. 1059. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under control. If neither side yields time, time will simply run equally. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. The Senator from Delaware is here and I will be happy to yield--how much time do the opponents have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents of the amendment have 38 minutes and approximately 10 seconds. Mr. LEVIN. Is that divided in some way or under the control of Senator Warner and myself? How is that? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The manager of the bill is designated to be in charge of the opposition. Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be necessarily brief. It is not often I disagree with my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. I think he is right in the fundamental sense that if the President is going to send American ground forces into a war, it needs congressional authority. Very honestly, this amendment is, in my view, flawed. First of all, it is clear that the President has to come to Congress to use ground forces and that the President has already stated--I will ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a copy of his letter dated April 28, 1999, to the Speaker of the House in which he says in part: Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The White House, Washington, April 28, 1999. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo. The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so through use of air power. However, were I to change my policy with regard to the introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed to go home to a safe and secure environment. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, not only must the President, but he said he would. This amendment is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, I believe it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized or under his emergency powers. The Senate resolution we adopted only authorizes the use of airpower. If Congress adopts this amendment, it seems to me we will imply the President has carte blanche to take offensive action, and anywhere else unless the Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary in advance. In short, I think it will tender an invitation to Presidents in the future to use force whenever they want unless Congress provides a specific ban in advance. Putting that aside, however, the amendment is flawed because its exceptions are much too narrowly drawn. The amendment purports to bar the use of Armed Forces in response to an attack against Armed Forces. For example, we have thousands of soldiers now in Albania and Macedonia. [[Page S5923]] Let's suppose the Yugoslav forces launch an attack against U.S. forces in Albania or in Macedonia. This amendment would bar the use of ground forces to respond by going into Kosovo. The power to respond against such an attack is clearly within the power of the Commander in Chief. So, too, does the President have the power to launch a preemptive strike against an imminent attack. The U.S. forces do not have to wait until they take the first punch. The second point I will make in this brief amount of time I am taking is that the amendment does not appear to permit the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans. Most constitutional scholars concede the President has the power to use force in emergency circumstances to protect American citi

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
(Senate - May 25, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S5915-S5948] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill. Amendment No. 388 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 2 minutes equally divided on the Roth amendment. Who yields time? Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for 58 years, two distinguished commanders, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, have been unjustly scapegoated for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Numerous studies have made it unambiguously clear that Short and Kimmel were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington. Investigations by military boards found Kimmel and Short had properly disposed their forces in light of the intelligence and resources they had available. Investigations found the failure of their superiors to properly manage intelligence and to fulfill command responsibilities contributed significantly, if not predominantly, to the disaster. Yet, they alone remain singled out for responsibility. This amendment calls upon the President to correct this injustice by advancing them on the retired list, as was done for all their peers. This initiative has received support from veterans, including Bob Dole, countless military leaders, including Admirals Moorer, Crowe, Halloway, Zumwalt, and Trost, as well as the VFW. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the managers of this bill, we vigorously oppose this amendment. Right here on this desk is perhaps the most dramatic reason not to grant the request. This represents a hearing held by a joint committee of the Senate and House of the Congress of the United States in 1946. They had before them live witnesses, all of the documents, and it is clear from this and their findings that these two officers were then and remain today accused of serious errors in judgment which contributed to perhaps the greatest disaster in this century against the people of the United States of America. There are absolutely no new facts beyond those deduced in this record brought out by my distinguished good friend, the senior Senator from Delaware. For that reason, we oppose it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 388. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 47, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 142 Leg.] YEAS--52 Abraham Akaka Baucus Bayh Bennett Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bunning Campbell Cleland Cochran Collins Daschle [[Page S5916]] DeWine Domenici Durbin Edwards Enzi Feinstein Grassley Hagel Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerry Kyl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Lincoln Lott McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Rockefeller Roth Sarbanes Schumer Shelby Smith (NH) Thomas Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Wellstone Wyden NAYS--47 Allard Ashcroft Bond Brownback Bryan Burns Byrd Chafee Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Dodd Dorgan Feingold Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Gregg Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kerrey Kohl Levin Lieberman Lugar Mack Moynihan Murray Nickles Reed Reid Robb Roberts Santorum Sessions Smith (OR) Snowe Specter Stevens Thompson Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 388) was agreed to. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 377 Mr. WARNER. Is the Senator from Virginia correct that the next vote will be on the amendment by the Senator from Kansas? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, amendment No. 377 by the Senator from Kansas. Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Kansas and I understand, also, that our colleague, the ranking member of the committee, likewise supports the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, noting the presence of the Senator from Kansas, the amendment by the Senator from Kansas raises a very good point; that is, at the 50th anniversary of the NATO summit, those in attendance, the 19 nations, the heads of state and government, adopted a new Strategic Concept. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that Concept does not go beyond the confines of the 1949 Washington Treaty and such actions that took place in 1991 when a new Strategic Concept was drawn. A number of us are concerned, if we read through the language, that it opens up new vistas for NATO. If that be the case, then the Senate should have that treaty before it for consideration. This is a sense of the Senate, but despite that technicality, it is a very important amendment; it is one to which the President will respond. I understand from my distinguished colleague and ranking member, in all probability, we will receive the assurance from the President that it does not go beyond the foundations and objectives sought in the 1949 Washington Treaty. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. It says that the President should say to us whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes new commitments or obligations upon us. It does not find that there are such new obligations or commitments. The President has already written to us in a letter to Senator Warner that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. In 1991, the new Strategic Concept, which came with much new language and many new missions, was not submitted to the Senate. Indeed, much of the language is very similar in 1991 as in 1999. In my judgment, there are no new commitments or obligations imposed by the 1999 Strategic Concept. The President could very readily certify what is required that he certify by this amendment, and I support it. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote be limited to 10 minutes and the next vote following it to 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. All time has expired. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe that under the order 1 minute was reserved for anybody in opposition, is that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes equally divided. Mr. KYL. I don't think the Senator from Michigan spoke in opposition to the amendment, as I understand it. Therefore, would it not be in order for someone in opposition to take a minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. KYL. Might I inquire of the Senator from Delaware--I am prepared to speak for 30 seconds or a minute. Mr. BIDEN. If he can reserve 20 seconds for me, I would appreciate it. Mr. KYL. I will take 30 seconds. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both Senators be given 30 seconds. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues that, as Senator Levin just pointed out, this is a totally unnecessary amendment, because the administration has already expressed a view that it has not gone beyond the Concepts this Senate voted for 90 to 9 when the new states were added to NATO. Those are the Strategic Concepts. One might argue whether or not they are being applied correctly in the case of the war in Kosovo. That is another debate. But in terms of the Strategic Concepts themselves, this body voted on them, and I would hate for this body now to suggest to the other 18 countries in NATO that perhaps they should resubmit the Strategic Concepts to their legislative bodies as in the nature of a treaty so that the entire NATO agreement on Strategic Concepts would be subject to 19 separate votes of our parliamentary bodies. I don't think that would be a good idea given the fact that, as Senator Levin already noted, the President has already said the Strategic Concepts do not go beyond what the Senate voted for 90 to 9. This an unnecessary amendment. I suggest my colleagues vote no. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Strategic Concept does not rise to the level of a treaty amendment, and the Senator from Michigan has pointed that out. Therefore, it is a benign amendment, we are told, and in all probability it is. But it is unnecessary. It does mischief. It sends the wrong message. It is a bad idea, notwithstanding the fact that it has been cleaned up to the point that it is clear it does not rise to the level of a treaty requiring a treaty vote on the Strategic Concept. But I agree with the Senator from Arizona. He painstakingly on this floor laid out in the Kyl amendment during the expansion of NATO debate exactly what we asked the President to consider in the Strategic Concept that was being negotiated with our allies. They did that. We voted 90 to 9. This is a bad idea. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote? The result was announced--yeas 87, nays 12, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 143 Leg.] YEAS--87 Abraham Akaka Allard Ashcroft Baucus Bayh Bennett Bingaman Bond Breaux Brownback Bryan Bunning Burns Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Cochran Collins Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Daschle DeWine Dodd Domenici Dorgan Edwards Enzi Feingold Feinstein Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Murray Nickles Reed Reid Roberts Rockefeller Santorum Sarbanes Schumer Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Snowe Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Warner Wellstone Wyden [[Page S5917]] NAYS--12 Biden Boxer Durbin Hagel Inouye Kyl Lautenberg Moynihan Robb Roth Smith (OR) Specter NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 377), as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Amendment No. 382 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the next amendment is in the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. Therefore, I have consulted with Chairman Roth. Does Senator Roth have any comments on this? Mr. ROTH. No comments. Mr. WARNER. We yield back such time as we may have. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided on the amendment. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I have been trying to get this amendment on the floor. This is simple and straightforward. This requires the Department of Health and Human Services to provide us with a report on the status of women and children who are no longer on welfare. There are 4.5 million fewer recipients. We want to know what kinds of jobs, at what wages, do people have health care coverage. This is based on disturbing reports by Family U.S.A., Catholic Organization Network, Children's Defense Fund, Conference of Mayors and, in addition, National Conference of State Legislatures. Good public policy is good evaluation, and we ought to know what is going on in the country right now on this terribly important question that dramatically affects the lives of women and children, albeit low- income women and children. I hope to get a strong bipartisan vote. It will be a good message. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Wellstone's amendment to require states to collect data on the employment, jobs, earnings, health insurance, and child care arrangements of former welfare recipients. This information is essential. The most important indicator of welfare reform's success is not just declining welfare caseloads. It is the well-being of these low-income parents and their children after they leave the welfare system. We do not know enough about how they have fared, and states should be required to collect this information. Millions of families have left the welfare rolls, and we need to know how they are doing now. We need information on their earnings, their health care, and other vital data. The obvious question is whether former welfare recipients are doing well, or barely surviving, worse off than before. The data we do have about former welfare recipients is not encouraging. According to a study by the Children's Defense Fund and the National Coalition on the Homeless, most former welfare recipients earn below poverty wages after leaving the welfare system. Their financial hardship is compounded by the fact that many former welfare recipients do not receive the essential services that would enable them to hold jobs and care for their children. The cost of child care can be a crushing expense to low-income families, consuming over one-quarter of their income. Yet, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that only one in ten eligible low-income families gets the child care assistance they need. Health insurance trends are also troubling. As of 1997, 675,000 low- income people had lost Medicaid coverage due to welfare reform. Children comprise 62 percent of this figure, and many of them were still eligible for Medicaid. We need to improve outreach to get more eligible children enrolled in Medicaid. We also need to increase enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program, which offers states incentives to expand health coverage for children with family income up to 200 percent of poverty. it is estimated that 4 million uninsured children are eligible for this assistance. In addition to problems related to child care and health care, many low-income families are not receiving Food Stamp assistance. Over the last 4 years, participation in the Food Stamp Program has dropped by one-third, from serving nearly 28 million participants to serving fewer than 19 million. But this does not mean children and families are no longer hungry. Hunger and undernutrition continue to be urgent problems. According to a Department of Agriculture study, 1 in 8 Americans--or more than 34 million people--are at risk of hunger. The need for food assistance is underscored by he phenomenon of increasing reliance on food banks and emergency food services. Many food banks are now overwhelmed by the growing number of requests they receive for assistance. The Western Massachusetts Food Bank reports a dramatic increase in demand for emergency food services. In 1997, it assisted 75,000 people. In 1998, the number they served rose to 85,000. Massachusetts is not alone. According to a recent U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 78 percent of the 30 cities surveyed reported an increase in requests for emergency food in 1998. Sixty-one percent of the people seeking this assistance were children or their parents; 31 percent were employed. These statistics clearly demonstrate that hunger is a major problem. Yet fewer families are now receiving Food Stamps. One of the unintended consequences of welfare reform is that low-income, working families are dropping off the Food Stamps rolls. Often, these families are going hungry or turning to food banks because they don't have adequate information about Food Stamp eligibility. A Massachusetts study found that most people leaving welfare are not getting Food Stamp benefits, even though many are still eligible. Three months after leaving welfare, only 18 percent were receiving Food Stamps. After one year, the percentage drops to 6.5 percent. It is clear that too many eligible families are not getting the assistance they need and are entitled to. Every state should be required to collect this kind of data. We need better information about how low-income families are faring after they leave welfare. Adequate data will enable the states to build on their successes and address their weaknesses. Ultimately, the long-term success of welfare reform will be measured state by state, person by person with this data. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Ignorance is not bliss. We can't afford to ignore the need that may exist. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Is there any Senator who wishes to speak in opposition? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we yield back our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 382. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 49, nays 50, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 144 Leg.] YEAS--49 Akaka Baucus Bayh Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bryan Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Durbin Edwards Feingold Feinstein Graham Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Mikulski Moynihan Murray Reed Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Schumer Snowe Specter Torricelli Wellstone Wyden NAYS--50 Abraham Allard Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brownback Bunning Burns Cochran Collins Coverdell Craig Crapo DeWine Domenici Enzi Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hagel Hatch Helms Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Murkowski Nickles Roberts Roth Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Smith (OR) Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Voinovich Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 382) was rejected. [[Page S5918]] Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. GRAMM. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I have a colleague who is ready to go, Senator Specter, so I will not take much time. But I just want to make it clear to colleagues that on this vote I agreed to a time limit. I brought this amendment out to the floor. There could have been debate on the other side. Somebody could have come out here and debated me openly in public about this amendment. I am talking about exactly what is happening with this welfare bill. I am talking about good public policy evaluation. Shouldn't we at least have the information about where these women are? Where these children are? What kind of jobs? What kind of wages? Are there adequate child care arrangements? The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal once said: ``Ignorance is never random.'' Sometimes we don't know what we don't want to know. I say to colleagues, given this vote, I am going to bring this amendment out on the next bill I get a chance to bring it out on. I am not going to agree to a time limit. I am going to force people to come out here on the majority side and debate me on this question, and we will have a full-fledged, substantive debate. We are talking about the lives of women and children, albeit they are poor, albeit they don't have the lobbyists, albeit they are not well connected. I am telling you, I am outraged that there wasn't the willingness and the courage to debate me on this amendment. We will have the debate with no time limits next bill that comes out here. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I tried to accommodate the Senator early on on this matter. To be perfectly candid, it was a jurisdictional issue with this committee. It was not a subject with which this Senator had a great deal of familiarity. I did what I could to keep our bill moving and at the same time to accommodate my colleague. The various persons who have jurisdiction over it were notified, and that is as much as I can say. Now, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 90 minutes equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table with respect to amendment 383 and no amendments be in order prior to that vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I further ask that following that vote, provided it is tabled, that Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to make a motion to strike and there be 2 hours equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table and no amendments be in order to that language proposed to be stricken prior to that vote. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the only question I have is that on the second half here, which is the one that is before us, I suggest that it read ``prior to a motion to table or a motion on adoption'' so that there is an option as to whether there is a motion to table or a vote on the amendment itself. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find no objection to that. I so amend the request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request as amended? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Pennsylvania, and I yield the floor. Amendment No. 383 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment provides that: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The purpose of this amendment, obvious on its face, is to avoid having the United States drawn into a full-fledged war without authorization of the Congress. This authorization is required by the constitutional provision which states that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to declare war, and the implicit consequence from that constitutional provision that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United States in a war. The Founding Fathers entrusted that grave responsibility to the Congress because of the obvious factor that a war could not be successfully prosecuted unless it was backed by the American people. The first line of determination in a representative democracy, in a republic, is to have that determination made by the Congress of the United States. We have seen the bitter lesson of Vietnam where a war could not be successfully prosecuted by the United States, where the public was not behind the war. This amendment is being pressed today because there has been such a consistent erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Korea was a war without congressional declaration. Vietnam was a war without a congressional declaration. There was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which some said justified the involvement of the United States in Vietnam--military involvement, the waging of a war. But on its face, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not really sufficient. The Gulf War, authorized by a resolution of both Houses of Congress, broke that chain of the erosion of congressional authority. In January of 1991, the Senate and the House of Representatives took up the issue on the use of force. After a spirited debate on this floor, characterized by the media as historic, in a 52-47 vote, the Senate authorized the use of force. Similarly, the House of Representatives authorized the use of force so that we had the appropriate congressional declaration on that important matter. We have seen the erosion of congressional authority on many, many instances. I shall comment this afternoon on only a few. We have seen the missile strikes at Iraq really being acts of war. In February of 1998, I argued on the floor of the Senate that there ought not to be missile strikes without authorization by the Congress of the United States. There may be justification for the President to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, if there is an emergency situation, but where there is time for deliberation and debate and congressional action, that ought to be undertaken. As the circumstances worked out, missile strikes did not occur in early 1998, after the indication that the President might authorize or undertake those missile strikes. When that again became an apparent likelihood in November of 1998, I once more urged on the Senate floor that the President not undertake acts of war with missile strikes because there was ample time for consideration. There had been considerable talk about it, and that really should have been a congressional declaration. The President then did order missile strikes in December of 1998. As we have seen with the events in Kosovo, the President of the United States made it plain in mid-March, at a news conference which he held on March 19 and at a meeting earlier that day with Members of Congress, that he intended to proceed with airstrikes. At a meeting with Members of Congress on March 23, the President was asked by a number of Members to come to Congress, and he did. The President sent a letter to Senator Daschle asking for authorization by the Senate. In a context where it was apparent that the airstrikes were going to be pursued with or without congressional authorization, and with the prestige of NATO on the line and with the prestige of the United States on the line, the Senate did authorize airstrikes, specifically excluding any use of ground troops. That authorization was by a vote of 58 to 41. The House of Representatives had, on a prior vote, authorized U.S. forces as peacekeepers, but that was not really relevant to the issue of the airstrikes. Subsequently, the House of Representatives took up the issue of airstrikes, and by a tie vote of 213-213, the House of Representatives declined to authorize the airstrikes. That was at a time when the airstrikes were already underway. [[Page S5919]] I supported the Senate vote for the authorization of airstrikes. I talked to General Wesley Clark, the Supreme NATO Commander. One of the points which he made, which was telling on this Senator, was the morale of the troops. The airstrikes were an inevitability, as the President had determined, and it seemed to me that in that context we ought to give the authorization, again, as I say, expressly reserving the issue not to have ground forces used. So on this state of the record, with the vote by the Senate and with the tie vote by the House of Representatives, you have airstrikes which may well, under international law, be concluded to be at variance with the Constitution of the United States, to put it politely and not to articulate any doctrine of illegality, at a time when my country is involved in those airstrikes. But when we come to the issue of ground troops, which would be a major expansion and would constitute, beyond any question, the involvement of the United States in a war--although my own view is that the United States is conducting acts of war at the present time--the President ought to come to the Congress. When the President met with a large group of Members on Wednesday, April 28, the issue of ground forces came up and the President made a commitment to those in attendance--and I was present--that he would not order ground troops into Kosovo without prior congressional authorization. He said he would honor that congressional authorization, reserving his prerogative as President to say that he didn't feel it indispensable constitutionally that he do so. However, he said that he would make that commitment, and he did make that commitment to a large number of Members of the House and Senate on April 28 of this year. He said, as a matter of good faith, that he would come to the Congress before authorizing the use of ground troops. So, in a sense, it could be said that this amendment is duplicative. But I do believe, as a matter of adherence to the rule of law, that the commitment the President made ought to be memorialized in this defense authorization bill. I have, therefore, offered this amendment. It is a complicated question as to the use of ground forces, whether they will ever be requested, because unanimity has to be obtained under the rules that govern NATO. Germany has already said they are opposed to the use of ground forces. But this is a matter that really ought to come back to the Congress. I am prepared--speaking for myself--to consider a Presidential request for authorization for the use of ground forces. However, before I would vote on the matter, or give my consent or vote in the affirmative, there are a great many questions I will want to have answered--questions that go to intelligence, questions that go to the specialty of the military planners. I would want to know what the likely resistance would be from the army of the former Yugoslavia. How much have our airstrikes degraded the capability of the Serbian army to defend? How many U.S. troops would be involved? I would like to know, to the extent possible, what the assessment of risk is. When we talked about invading Japan before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we had estimates as to how many would be wounded and how many fatalities there would be. So while not easy to pass judgment on something that could be at least estimated or approximated, I would want to know, very importantly, how many ground troops would be supplied by others in NATO. I would want to know what the projection was for the duration of the military engagement, and what the projection was after the military engagement was over. These are only some of the questions that ought to be addressed. In 16 minutes, at 4 o'clock, members of the administration, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to give another congressional briefing. Before we have a vote on a matter of this importance and this magnitude, those are some of the questions I think ought to be answered. That, in a very brief statement, constitutes the essence of the reasons why I have offered this amendment. Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. SPECTER. Yes. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator. He and I are of the same mind in terms of the authority and responsibility of Congress when it comes to a declaration of war. It is interesting to note that last year when a similar amendment was called on the defense appropriation bill, offered by a gentleman in the House, David Skaggs, only 15 Members of the Senate voted in favor of it, including the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from Delaware, myself, and a handful of others. It will be interesting to see this debate now in the context of a real conflict. I have seen a copy of this amendment, and I want to understand the full clarity and intention of the Senator. As I understand it, there are two paragraphs offered as part of this amendment. They use different language in each paragraph. I wish the Senator would clarify. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond to the Senator, I would be glad to respond to the questions. I thank him for his leadership in offering a similar amendment in the past. When I undertook to send this amendment to the desk, I had called the Senator from Illinois and talked to him this morning and will consider this a joint venture if he is prepared to accept that characterization. Mr. DURBIN. Depending on the responses, I may very well be prepared to do so. Would the Senator be kind enough to enlighten me? The first paragraph refers to the introduction of ground troops. The second paragraph refers to the deployment of ground troops. Could the Senator tell me, is there a difference in his mind in the use of those two different terms? Mr. SPECTER. Responding directly to the question, I think there would be no difference. But I am not sure the Senator from Illinois has the precise amendment I have introduced, which has only one paragraph. I can read it quickly: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. Mr. DURBIN. The version I have---- Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, I am holding this draft amendment. You are referring to two paragraphs, and it appears to me that the first paragraph is the title; am I correct? I find that inconsistent with what I believe was paragraph 2. The first paragraph is the title, and there is really only one paragraph in the body of the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. If the Senator from Pennsylvania will yield, I will confine myself to the nature of the amendment. Could the Senator tell me why reference is only made to the deployment of grounds troops from U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo and not in Yugoslavia? Mr. SPECTER. The amendment was drafted in its narrowest form. Perhaps it would be appropriate to modify the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I think it might be. I ask the Senator a second question. Would he not want to make an exception, as well, for the rescue of the NATO forces in Yugoslavia if we would perhaps have a downed flier and ground troops could be sent in for rescue, and that would not require congressional authorization. I think that would be consistent with the Senator's earlier statements about the emergency authority of the President as Commander in Chief. Mr. SPECTER. I would be prepared to accept that exception. Mr. DURBIN. The final question is procedural. The Senator from Pennsylvania has been here---- Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to amend it for a downed flier--we just witnessed ground troops being caught, and they have now been released. I would be careful in the redrafting and not just to stick to a downed flier. That is just helpful advice. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator. Mr. DURBIN. A rescue of NATO forces in Yugoslavia was the question. Last, I will ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, if this requires a joint resolution, under the rules of the Senate, [[Page S5920]] Members in a filibuster, a minority, say, 41 Senators, could stop us from ever taking action on this measure. How would the Senator from Pennsylvania respond to that? Does that, in effect, give to a minority the authority to stop the debate and a vote by the Senate and thereby tie the President's hands when it comes to committing ground troops, should we ever reach the point where that is necessary? Mr. SPECTER. I respond to my colleague from Illinois by saying that with a declaration of war where the Senate has to join under the Constitution and there could be a filibuster requiring 60 votes, the same rule applies. To get that authorization, either by declaration of war or resolution for the use of force, we have to comply with the rules to get an affirmative vote out of the Senate. Under those rules, if somebody filibusters, it requires 60 votes. So be it. That is the rule of the Senate and that is the way you have to proceed to get the authorization from the Senate. Mr. DURBIN. I know I am speaking on the Senator's time. I thank him for responding to those questions. I have reservations, as he does, about committing ground troops. I certainly believe, as he does, that the Congress should make that decision and not the President unilaterally. He has promised to come to us for that decision to be made. I hope Mr. Milosevic and those who follow this debate don't take any comfort in this. We are speaking only to the question of the authority of Congress, not as to any actual decision of whether we will ever commit to ground troops. I think that is the sense of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I thank him for offering the amendment, and I support this important amendment. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will speak in opposition to the amendment. But I don't wish to interfere with the presentation of the Senator. At such time, perhaps, when I could start by propounding a few questions to my colleague and friend, would he indicate when he feels he has finished his presentation of the amendment? Mr. SPECTER. It would suit me to have the questions right now. Mr. WARNER. I remind the Senator of the parliamentary situation. While I have given him some suggestions, if he is going to amend it, it would take unanimous consent to amend the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. To modify the amendment? Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Mr. SPECTER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered. Mr. WARNER. The time agreement has been presented under the rules. I will address the question to the Chair. I think that would be best. The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would take unanimous consent to modify the amendment. Mr. WARNER. Just as a friendly gesture, I advise my colleague of that. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his friendly gesture. Mr. WARNER. As the Senator reads the title and then the text, I have trouble following the continuity of the two. For example, first it is directing the President of the United States pursuant to the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. I have been here 21 years. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is just a year or two shy of that. This War Powers Resolution has never been accepted by any President, Republican or Democrat or otherwise. Am I not correct in that respect? Mr. SPECTER. The Senator is correct. Mr. WARNER. Therefore, we would not be precipitating in another one of those endless debates which would consume hours and hours of the time of this body if we are acting on the predicate that this President is now going to acknowledge that he, as President of the United States, is bound by what is law? I readily admit it is the law. But we have witnessed, over these 20-plus years that I have been here and over the years the Senator from Pennsylvania has been here, that no President will acknowledge that he is subservient to this act of Congress because he feels that it is unconstitutional; that the Constitution has said he is Commander in Chief and he has the right to make decisions with respect to the Armed Forces of the United States on a minute's notice. Really, this is what concerns me about this amendment, among other things. Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to the question. Mr. WARNER. All right. Mr. SPECTER. If it took hours and hours, I think those hours and hours would be well spent, at least by comparison to what the Senate does on so many matters. And we might convene a little earlier. We might adjourn a little later. We might work on Mondays and Fridays and maybe even on Saturdays. I would not be concerned about the hours which we would spend. I think this Senator, after the 18 years and 5 months that I have been here, has given proper attention to the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare and/or involve the United States in war, or to the War Powers Act. This is a matter which first came to my attention in 1983 on the Lebanon matter when Senator Percy was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I had a debate, a colloquy, about whether Korea was a war, and Senator Percy said it was. Vietnam was a war. At that time, I undertook to draft a complex complaint trying to get the acquiescence of the President--President Reagan was in the White House at that time--which Senator Baker undertook to see if we could have a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. It is true, as the Senator from Virginia says, that Presidents have always denied it. They have denied it in complying with it. They send over the notice called for under the act, and then they put in a disclaimer. But I think the War Powers Act has had a profoundly beneficial effect, because Presidents have complied with it even while denying it. But I think it is high time that Congress stood up on its hind legs and said we are not going to be involved in wars unless Congress authorizes them. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, perhaps when I said hours and hours, it could be days and days. But we would come out with the same result. Presidents haven't complied with the act. They have ``complied with the spirit of the act.'' I believe that is how they have acknowledged it in the correspondence with the Congress. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I think ``complied with the act''--the act requires certain notification, certain statements of the President. They make the statements which the act calls for, and then they add an addendum, ``but we do not believe we are obligated to do so.'' Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me ask another question of my colleague. We will soon be receiving a briefing from the Secretaries of State, Defense and the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I will absent myself during that period, and the Senator from Pennsylvania will have the opportunity to control the floor. I hope there would be no unanimous consent requests in my absence. I hope that would be agreeable with my good friend, because I have asked for this meeting. Mr. SPECTER. The Senator may be assured there will be no unanimous consent requests for any effort to do anything but to play by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I asked for this meeting and have arranged it for the Senate. So I have to go upstairs. But I point out: Suppose we were to adopt this, and supposing that during the month of August when the Senate would be in recess the President had to make a decision with regard to ground troops. Then he would have to, practically speaking, bring the Congress back to town. Would that not be correct? Mr. SPECTER. That would be correct. That is exactly what he ought to do. Before we involve ground troops, the Congress of the United States could interrupt the recess and come back and decide this important issue. Mr. WARNER. But the reason for introducing ground troops, whatever it may be, might require a decision of less than an hour to make on behalf of the Chief Executive, the Commander in Chief, and he would be then shackled with the necessary time of, say, maybe 48 hours in which to bring the Members of Congress back from various places throughout the United States and throughout the world. To me, that imposes on the President something that was never envisioned by the Founding Fathers. And that is why he is given the power of Commander in Chief. Our power is the power of the purse, to [[Page S5921]] which I again direct the Senator's attention in the text of the amendment. But it seems to me I find the title in conflict with the text of the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. As I said during the course of my presentation, Mr. President, I think the Commander in Chief does have authority to act in an emergency. I made a clear-cut delineation as I presented the argument that when there is time for deliberation, as, for example, on the missile strikes in Iraq, or as, for example, on the gulf war resolution, it ought to be considered, debated and decided by the Congress. Mr. WARNER. How do we define ``emergency?'' Where the President can act without approval by the Congress, and in other situations where he must get the approval, who makes that decision? Mr. SPECTER. I think that our English language is capable of structuring a definition of what constitutes an emergency. Mr. WARNER. Where is it found in this amendment? Mr. SPECTER. I think the President has the authority to act as Commander in Chief without that kind of specification, and it is not now on the face of this amendment. However, it may be advisable to take the extra precaution, with modification offered and agreed to by unanimous consent in the presence of the Senator from Virginia, to spell that out as well, although I think unnecessarily so. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I must depart and go upstairs to this meeting. But I will return as quickly as I can. I thank the Senator for his courtesy of protecting the floor in the interests of the manager of the bill. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. The Senator is aware that the Senator from Virginia will at an appropriate time move to table, and in all probability I will reserve the right to object to this amendment until the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to amend the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Members of the Senate that under the previous order Senator Allard is to be recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. WARNER. Perhaps the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Colorado will work that out between them. I hope they can reach an accommodation. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may, I understand that the Senator from Virginia has articulated his views about a unanimous consent, and that is fine. Those are his rights. But it may be that there will be an additional amendment which I will file taking into account any modifications which I might want to make which might be objected to. So we can work it out in due course. Parliamentary inquiry: Does the Senator from Colorado have the floor? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is to have 20 minutes at 4 o'clock under the previous order. The 20 minutes is on the amendment, not on the bill. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might clarify the situation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Before the Senator from Pennsylvania specifically advised me he was going to assert his rights, which he has since his amendment was the pending business of the Senate following the three votes, I put in place a modest time slot for our colleague from Colorado, such that he could address the Senate on the general provisions of the underlying bill. But then we reached a subsequent time agreement to accommodate the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is my request, in the course of this debate, if the Senator could, within the parameters of the two unanimous consents, work out a situation where he could have about 15 minutes and then we could return to your debate? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do not understand that. If you are asking me to give time---- Mr. WARNER. Not from your time agreement. It would be totally separate. In other words, your 90 minutes, now the subject of the second unanimous consent agreement, would be preserved. That is as it was written. But can the Senator accommodate sliding that to some point in time to allow the Senator from Colorado to have 15 minutes? Mr. ALLARD. What is the regular order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. Mr. SPECTER. I would be delighted to accommodate the Senator from Colorado one way or the other. He can speak now and then we can go back to our time agreement on the pending amendment. Mr. ALLARD. I have been waiting. I was here most of the morning and then waiting this afternoon for 3 hours to have an opportunity to make some general comments on this bill. I do not anticipate taking much longer. My agreement is 20 minutes, if I remember correctly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. ALLARD. Maybe there would be an opportunity--I would like to get in on this meeting Senator Warner is attending at some point in time-- probably the last part of it. But I would like to have the opportunity to address this bill. What is it the Senator from Pennsylvania is seeking, as far as the privilege of the floor? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may respond, I am delighted to have the Senator from Colorado use his 20 minutes, which is ordered at this time. Mr. WARNER. With no subtraction whatsoever from the unanimous consent in place for the Senator. Mr. SPECTER. That is the understanding the Senator had spoken to earlier. Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this point in time, the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. The Senator is advised, with regard to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, 25 minutes remains for the Senator from Pennsylvania and 38\1/2\ minutes, approximately, remains for the opposition. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise in strong support of S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As the Personnel Subcommittee chairman, I take great pleasure in which Senator Cleland, the ranking member, and the other members of the subcommittee were able to provide for our men and women in uniform. Every leader in the military tells me the same thing, without the people the tools are useless. We must take care of our people and the personnel provisions in this bill were developed in a bipartisan manner. This bill is responsive to the manpower readiness needs of the military services; supports numerous quality of life improvements for our service men and women, their families, and the retiree community; and reflects the budget realities that we face today and will face in the future. First, military manpower strength levels. The bill adds 92 Marine personnel over the administration's request for an active duty end strength of 1,384,889. It also recommends a reserve end strength of 874,043--745 more than the administration requested. The bill also modifies but maintains the end-strength floors. While I do not believe that end-strength floors are a practical force management tool, I am personally concerned that the strength levels of the active and reserve forces are too low and that the Department of Defense is paying other bills by reducing personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to send a message to the administration that they cannot permit personnel levels to drop below the minimums established by the Congress. On military personnel policy, there are a number of provisions intended to support the recruiting and retention and personnel management of the services. Among the most noteworthy, are the several provisions that permit the services to offer 2-year enlistments with bonuses and other incentives. This is a pilot program in which students in college or vocational or technical schools could enlist and remain in school for 2 years before they actually go on active duty. Many Senators have expressed their concerns about the operational tempo of the military. That is why this bill attempts to address this problem by requiring the services to closely manage the Personnel and Deployment Tempo of military personnel. We would require a general or flag officer to approve deployments over 180 days in a [[Page S5922]] year; a four-star general or admiral to approve deployments over 200 days and would authorize a $100 per diem pay for each day a service member is deployed over 220 days. The briefings and hearings in the personnel subcommittee have found that the single most cited reason for separation is time away from home and families. At the same time, the services have not been effective in managing the Personnel and Deployment Tempo for their personnel. I am confident that the provision will focus the necessary attention on the management of this problem. Another important provision is the expansion of Junior ROTC or JROTC programs. A number of members and the service Chiefs and personnel Chiefs told me that they believed Junior ROTC is an important program and that an expansion was not only warranted but needed. Thus we have added $39 million to expand the JROTC programs. These funds will permit the Army to add 114 new schools; the Navy to add 63 new schools; the Air Force to add 63 new schools; and the Marine Corps to exhaust their waiting list to 32 schools. This is a total of 272 new JROTC programs in our school districts across the country. I am proud to be able to support these important programs that teach responsibility, leadership, ethics, and assist in military recruiting. In military compensation, our major recommendations are extracted from S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's and Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. First, this bill authorizes a 4.8-percent pay raise effective January 1, 2000 and a restructuring of the pay tables effective July 1, 2000. Another provision includes a Thrift Savings Plan for active forces and the ready reserves and a plan to offer service members who entered the service on or after August 1, 1986, the option to receive a $30,000 bonus and remain under the ``Redux'' retirement or to change to the ``High-three'' retirement system. In order to assist the active and reserve military forces in recruiting, there are a series of bonuses and new authorities to support the ability of our recruiters to attract qualified young men and women to serve in the armed forces. There are also several new bonuses and special pays to incentivize aviators, surface warfare officers, special warfare officers, air crewmen among others to remain on active duty. Two additional provisions from S. 4 are in this bill. A special retention initiative would permit a service secretary to match the thrift savings contribution of service members in critical specialties in return for an extended service commitment. Also, thanks to the hard work of Senator McCain and Senator Roberts, another provision authorizes a special subsistence allowance for junior enlisted personnel who qualify for food stamps. In health care, there are several key recommendations. There is a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to implement a number of initiatives to improve delivery of health care under TriCare. Another provision would require each Lead Agent to establish a patient advocate to assist beneficiaries in resolving problems they may encounter with TriCare. Finally there are a number of general provisions including one to enforce the reductions in management headquarters personnel Congress directed several years ago and several to assist the Department of Defense Dependents School System to provide quality education for the children of military personnel overseas. Before I close, as a first time Senator subcommittee chair, I express my appreciation to Senator Cleland for his leadership and assistance throughout this year as we worked in a bipartisan manner to develop programs which enhance personnel readiness and quality of life programs. I also thank the members of the subcommittee, Senator Thurmond, Senator McCain, Senator Snowe, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Reed, and their staffs. Their hard work made our work better and helped me focus on those issues which have the greatest impact on soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Mr. President, I finish by thanking Chairman Warner for the opportunity to point out some of the highlights in the bill which the Personnel Subcommittee has oversight and to congratulate him and Senator Levin on the bipartisan way this bill was accomplished and ask that all Senators strongly support S. 1059. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under control. If neither side yields time, time will simply run equally. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. The Senator from Delaware is here and I will be happy to yield--how much time do the opponents have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents of the amendment have 38 minutes and approximately 10 seconds. Mr. LEVIN. Is that divided in some way or under the control of Senator Warner and myself? How is that? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The manager of the bill is designated to be in charge of the opposition. Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be necessarily brief. It is not often I disagree with my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. I think he is right in the fundamental sense that if the President is going to send American ground forces into a war, it needs congressional authority. Very honestly, this amendment is, in my view, flawed. First of all, it is clear that the President has to come to Congress to use ground forces and that the President has already stated--I will ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a copy of his letter dated April 28, 1999, to the Speaker of the House in which he says in part: Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The White House, Washington, April 28, 1999. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo. The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so through use of air power. However, were I to change my policy with regard to the introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed to go home to a safe and secure environment. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, not only must the President, but he said he would. This amendment is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, I believe it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized or under his emergency powers. The Senate resolution we adopted only authorizes the use of airpower. If Congress adopts this amendment, it seems to me we will imply the President has carte blanche to take offensive action, and anywhere else unless the Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary in advance. In short, I think it will tender an invitation to Presidents in the future to use force whenever they want unless Congress provides a specific ban in advance. Putting that aside, however, the amendment is flawed because its exceptions are much too narrowly drawn. The amendment purports to bar the use of Armed Forces in response to an attack against Armed Forces. For example, we have thousands of soldiers now in Albania and Macedonia. [[Page S5923]] Let's suppose the Yugoslav forces launch an attack against U.S. forces in Albania or in Macedonia. This amendment would bar the use of ground forces to respond by going into Kosovo. The power to respond against such an attack is clearly within the power of the Commander in Chief. So, too, does the President have the power to launch a preemptive strike against an imminent attack. The U.S. forces do not have to wait until they take the first punch. The second point I will make in this brief amount of time I am taking is that the amendment does not appear to permit the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans. Most constitutional scholars concede the President has the power to use force in emergency circumstances to protect American citizens facin

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
(Senate - May 25, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S5915-S5948] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill. Amendment No. 388 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 2 minutes equally divided on the Roth amendment. Who yields time? Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for 58 years, two distinguished commanders, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, have been unjustly scapegoated for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Numerous studies have made it unambiguously clear that Short and Kimmel were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington. Investigations by military boards found Kimmel and Short had properly disposed their forces in light of the intelligence and resources they had available. Investigations found the failure of their superiors to properly manage intelligence and to fulfill command responsibilities contributed significantly, if not predominantly, to the disaster. Yet, they alone remain singled out for responsibility. This amendment calls upon the President to correct this injustice by advancing them on the retired list, as was done for all their peers. This initiative has received support from veterans, including Bob Dole, countless military leaders, including Admirals Moorer, Crowe, Halloway, Zumwalt, and Trost, as well as the VFW. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the managers of this bill, we vigorously oppose this amendment. Right here on this desk is perhaps the most dramatic reason not to grant the request. This represents a hearing held by a joint committee of the Senate and House of the Congress of the United States in 1946. They had before them live witnesses, all of the documents, and it is clear from this and their findings that these two officers were then and remain today accused of serious errors in judgment which contributed to perhaps the greatest disaster in this century against the people of the United States of America. There are absolutely no new facts beyond those deduced in this record brought out by my distinguished good friend, the senior Senator from Delaware. For that reason, we oppose it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 388. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 47, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 142 Leg.] YEAS--52 Abraham Akaka Baucus Bayh Bennett Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bunning Campbell Cleland Cochran Collins Daschle [[Page S5916]] DeWine Domenici Durbin Edwards Enzi Feinstein Grassley Hagel Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerry Kyl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Lincoln Lott McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Rockefeller Roth Sarbanes Schumer Shelby Smith (NH) Thomas Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Wellstone Wyden NAYS--47 Allard Ashcroft Bond Brownback Bryan Burns Byrd Chafee Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Dodd Dorgan Feingold Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Gregg Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kerrey Kohl Levin Lieberman Lugar Mack Moynihan Murray Nickles Reed Reid Robb Roberts Santorum Sessions Smith (OR) Snowe Specter Stevens Thompson Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 388) was agreed to. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 377 Mr. WARNER. Is the Senator from Virginia correct that the next vote will be on the amendment by the Senator from Kansas? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, amendment No. 377 by the Senator from Kansas. Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Kansas and I understand, also, that our colleague, the ranking member of the committee, likewise supports the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, noting the presence of the Senator from Kansas, the amendment by the Senator from Kansas raises a very good point; that is, at the 50th anniversary of the NATO summit, those in attendance, the 19 nations, the heads of state and government, adopted a new Strategic Concept. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that Concept does not go beyond the confines of the 1949 Washington Treaty and such actions that took place in 1991 when a new Strategic Concept was drawn. A number of us are concerned, if we read through the language, that it opens up new vistas for NATO. If that be the case, then the Senate should have that treaty before it for consideration. This is a sense of the Senate, but despite that technicality, it is a very important amendment; it is one to which the President will respond. I understand from my distinguished colleague and ranking member, in all probability, we will receive the assurance from the President that it does not go beyond the foundations and objectives sought in the 1949 Washington Treaty. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. It says that the President should say to us whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes new commitments or obligations upon us. It does not find that there are such new obligations or commitments. The President has already written to us in a letter to Senator Warner that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. In 1991, the new Strategic Concept, which came with much new language and many new missions, was not submitted to the Senate. Indeed, much of the language is very similar in 1991 as in 1999. In my judgment, there are no new commitments or obligations imposed by the 1999 Strategic Concept. The President could very readily certify what is required that he certify by this amendment, and I support it. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote be limited to 10 minutes and the next vote following it to 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. All time has expired. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe that under the order 1 minute was reserved for anybody in opposition, is that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes equally divided. Mr. KYL. I don't think the Senator from Michigan spoke in opposition to the amendment, as I understand it. Therefore, would it not be in order for someone in opposition to take a minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. KYL. Might I inquire of the Senator from Delaware--I am prepared to speak for 30 seconds or a minute. Mr. BIDEN. If he can reserve 20 seconds for me, I would appreciate it. Mr. KYL. I will take 30 seconds. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both Senators be given 30 seconds. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues that, as Senator Levin just pointed out, this is a totally unnecessary amendment, because the administration has already expressed a view that it has not gone beyond the Concepts this Senate voted for 90 to 9 when the new states were added to NATO. Those are the Strategic Concepts. One might argue whether or not they are being applied correctly in the case of the war in Kosovo. That is another debate. But in terms of the Strategic Concepts themselves, this body voted on them, and I would hate for this body now to suggest to the other 18 countries in NATO that perhaps they should resubmit the Strategic Concepts to their legislative bodies as in the nature of a treaty so that the entire NATO agreement on Strategic Concepts would be subject to 19 separate votes of our parliamentary bodies. I don't think that would be a good idea given the fact that, as Senator Levin already noted, the President has already said the Strategic Concepts do not go beyond what the Senate voted for 90 to 9. This an unnecessary amendment. I suggest my colleagues vote no. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Strategic Concept does not rise to the level of a treaty amendment, and the Senator from Michigan has pointed that out. Therefore, it is a benign amendment, we are told, and in all probability it is. But it is unnecessary. It does mischief. It sends the wrong message. It is a bad idea, notwithstanding the fact that it has been cleaned up to the point that it is clear it does not rise to the level of a treaty requiring a treaty vote on the Strategic Concept. But I agree with the Senator from Arizona. He painstakingly on this floor laid out in the Kyl amendment during the expansion of NATO debate exactly what we asked the President to consider in the Strategic Concept that was being negotiated with our allies. They did that. We voted 90 to 9. This is a bad idea. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote? The result was announced--yeas 87, nays 12, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 143 Leg.] YEAS--87 Abraham Akaka Allard Ashcroft Baucus Bayh Bennett Bingaman Bond Breaux Brownback Bryan Bunning Burns Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Cochran Collins Conrad Coverdell Craig Crapo Daschle DeWine Dodd Domenici Dorgan Edwards Enzi Feingold Feinstein Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Graham Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Harkin Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Mikulski Murkowski Murray Nickles Reed Reid Roberts Rockefeller Santorum Sarbanes Schumer Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Snowe Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Torricelli Voinovich Warner Wellstone Wyden [[Page S5917]] NAYS--12 Biden Boxer Durbin Hagel Inouye Kyl Lautenberg Moynihan Robb Roth Smith (OR) Specter NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 377), as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Amendment No. 382 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the next amendment is in the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. Therefore, I have consulted with Chairman Roth. Does Senator Roth have any comments on this? Mr. ROTH. No comments. Mr. WARNER. We yield back such time as we may have. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided on the amendment. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I have been trying to get this amendment on the floor. This is simple and straightforward. This requires the Department of Health and Human Services to provide us with a report on the status of women and children who are no longer on welfare. There are 4.5 million fewer recipients. We want to know what kinds of jobs, at what wages, do people have health care coverage. This is based on disturbing reports by Family U.S.A., Catholic Organization Network, Children's Defense Fund, Conference of Mayors and, in addition, National Conference of State Legislatures. Good public policy is good evaluation, and we ought to know what is going on in the country right now on this terribly important question that dramatically affects the lives of women and children, albeit low- income women and children. I hope to get a strong bipartisan vote. It will be a good message. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Wellstone's amendment to require states to collect data on the employment, jobs, earnings, health insurance, and child care arrangements of former welfare recipients. This information is essential. The most important indicator of welfare reform's success is not just declining welfare caseloads. It is the well-being of these low-income parents and their children after they leave the welfare system. We do not know enough about how they have fared, and states should be required to collect this information. Millions of families have left the welfare rolls, and we need to know how they are doing now. We need information on their earnings, their health care, and other vital data. The obvious question is whether former welfare recipients are doing well, or barely surviving, worse off than before. The data we do have about former welfare recipients is not encouraging. According to a study by the Children's Defense Fund and the National Coalition on the Homeless, most former welfare recipients earn below poverty wages after leaving the welfare system. Their financial hardship is compounded by the fact that many former welfare recipients do not receive the essential services that would enable them to hold jobs and care for their children. The cost of child care can be a crushing expense to low-income families, consuming over one-quarter of their income. Yet, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that only one in ten eligible low-income families gets the child care assistance they need. Health insurance trends are also troubling. As of 1997, 675,000 low- income people had lost Medicaid coverage due to welfare reform. Children comprise 62 percent of this figure, and many of them were still eligible for Medicaid. We need to improve outreach to get more eligible children enrolled in Medicaid. We also need to increase enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program, which offers states incentives to expand health coverage for children with family income up to 200 percent of poverty. it is estimated that 4 million uninsured children are eligible for this assistance. In addition to problems related to child care and health care, many low-income families are not receiving Food Stamp assistance. Over the last 4 years, participation in the Food Stamp Program has dropped by one-third, from serving nearly 28 million participants to serving fewer than 19 million. But this does not mean children and families are no longer hungry. Hunger and undernutrition continue to be urgent problems. According to a Department of Agriculture study, 1 in 8 Americans--or more than 34 million people--are at risk of hunger. The need for food assistance is underscored by he phenomenon of increasing reliance on food banks and emergency food services. Many food banks are now overwhelmed by the growing number of requests they receive for assistance. The Western Massachusetts Food Bank reports a dramatic increase in demand for emergency food services. In 1997, it assisted 75,000 people. In 1998, the number they served rose to 85,000. Massachusetts is not alone. According to a recent U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 78 percent of the 30 cities surveyed reported an increase in requests for emergency food in 1998. Sixty-one percent of the people seeking this assistance were children or their parents; 31 percent were employed. These statistics clearly demonstrate that hunger is a major problem. Yet fewer families are now receiving Food Stamps. One of the unintended consequences of welfare reform is that low-income, working families are dropping off the Food Stamps rolls. Often, these families are going hungry or turning to food banks because they don't have adequate information about Food Stamp eligibility. A Massachusetts study found that most people leaving welfare are not getting Food Stamp benefits, even though many are still eligible. Three months after leaving welfare, only 18 percent were receiving Food Stamps. After one year, the percentage drops to 6.5 percent. It is clear that too many eligible families are not getting the assistance they need and are entitled to. Every state should be required to collect this kind of data. We need better information about how low-income families are faring after they leave welfare. Adequate data will enable the states to build on their successes and address their weaknesses. Ultimately, the long-term success of welfare reform will be measured state by state, person by person with this data. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Ignorance is not bliss. We can't afford to ignore the need that may exist. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Is there any Senator who wishes to speak in opposition? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we yield back our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 382. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The result was announced--yeas 49, nays 50, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 144 Leg.] YEAS--49 Akaka Baucus Bayh Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bryan Byrd Campbell Chafee Cleland Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Durbin Edwards Feingold Feinstein Graham Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Lincoln Mikulski Moynihan Murray Reed Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Schumer Snowe Specter Torricelli Wellstone Wyden NAYS--50 Abraham Allard Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brownback Bunning Burns Cochran Collins Coverdell Craig Crapo DeWine Domenici Enzi Fitzgerald Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hagel Hatch Helms Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McConnell Murkowski Nickles Roberts Roth Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith (NH) Smith (OR) Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Voinovich Warner NOT VOTING--1 McCain The amendment (No. 382) was rejected. [[Page S5918]] Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. GRAMM. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I have a colleague who is ready to go, Senator Specter, so I will not take much time. But I just want to make it clear to colleagues that on this vote I agreed to a time limit. I brought this amendment out to the floor. There could have been debate on the other side. Somebody could have come out here and debated me openly in public about this amendment. I am talking about exactly what is happening with this welfare bill. I am talking about good public policy evaluation. Shouldn't we at least have the information about where these women are? Where these children are? What kind of jobs? What kind of wages? Are there adequate child care arrangements? The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal once said: ``Ignorance is never random.'' Sometimes we don't know what we don't want to know. I say to colleagues, given this vote, I am going to bring this amendment out on the next bill I get a chance to bring it out on. I am not going to agree to a time limit. I am going to force people to come out here on the majority side and debate me on this question, and we will have a full-fledged, substantive debate. We are talking about the lives of women and children, albeit they are poor, albeit they don't have the lobbyists, albeit they are not well connected. I am telling you, I am outraged that there wasn't the willingness and the courage to debate me on this amendment. We will have the debate with no time limits next bill that comes out here. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I tried to accommodate the Senator early on on this matter. To be perfectly candid, it was a jurisdictional issue with this committee. It was not a subject with which this Senator had a great deal of familiarity. I did what I could to keep our bill moving and at the same time to accommodate my colleague. The various persons who have jurisdiction over it were notified, and that is as much as I can say. Now, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 90 minutes equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table with respect to amendment 383 and no amendments be in order prior to that vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I further ask that following that vote, provided it is tabled, that Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to make a motion to strike and there be 2 hours equally divided in the usual form prior to a motion to table and no amendments be in order to that language proposed to be stricken prior to that vote. Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the only question I have is that on the second half here, which is the one that is before us, I suggest that it read ``prior to a motion to table or a motion on adoption'' so that there is an option as to whether there is a motion to table or a vote on the amendment itself. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find no objection to that. I so amend the request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request as amended? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Pennsylvania, and I yield the floor. Amendment No. 383 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment provides that: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The purpose of this amendment, obvious on its face, is to avoid having the United States drawn into a full-fledged war without authorization of the Congress. This authorization is required by the constitutional provision which states that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to declare war, and the implicit consequence from that constitutional provision that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United States in a war. The Founding Fathers entrusted that grave responsibility to the Congress because of the obvious factor that a war could not be successfully prosecuted unless it was backed by the American people. The first line of determination in a representative democracy, in a republic, is to have that determination made by the Congress of the United States. We have seen the bitter lesson of Vietnam where a war could not be successfully prosecuted by the United States, where the public was not behind the war. This amendment is being pressed today because there has been such a consistent erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Korea was a war without congressional declaration. Vietnam was a war without a congressional declaration. There was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which some said justified the involvement of the United States in Vietnam--military involvement, the waging of a war. But on its face, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not really sufficient. The Gulf War, authorized by a resolution of both Houses of Congress, broke that chain of the erosion of congressional authority. In January of 1991, the Senate and the House of Representatives took up the issue on the use of force. After a spirited debate on this floor, characterized by the media as historic, in a 52-47 vote, the Senate authorized the use of force. Similarly, the House of Representatives authorized the use of force so that we had the appropriate congressional declaration on that important matter. We have seen the erosion of congressional authority on many, many instances. I shall comment this afternoon on only a few. We have seen the missile strikes at Iraq really being acts of war. In February of 1998, I argued on the floor of the Senate that there ought not to be missile strikes without authorization by the Congress of the United States. There may be justification for the President to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, if there is an emergency situation, but where there is time for deliberation and debate and congressional action, that ought to be undertaken. As the circumstances worked out, missile strikes did not occur in early 1998, after the indication that the President might authorize or undertake those missile strikes. When that again became an apparent likelihood in November of 1998, I once more urged on the Senate floor that the President not undertake acts of war with missile strikes because there was ample time for consideration. There had been considerable talk about it, and that really should have been a congressional declaration. The President then did order missile strikes in December of 1998. As we have seen with the events in Kosovo, the President of the United States made it plain in mid-March, at a news conference which he held on March 19 and at a meeting earlier that day with Members of Congress, that he intended to proceed with airstrikes. At a meeting with Members of Congress on March 23, the President was asked by a number of Members to come to Congress, and he did. The President sent a letter to Senator Daschle asking for authorization by the Senate. In a context where it was apparent that the airstrikes were going to be pursued with or without congressional authorization, and with the prestige of NATO on the line and with the prestige of the United States on the line, the Senate did authorize airstrikes, specifically excluding any use of ground troops. That authorization was by a vote of 58 to 41. The House of Representatives had, on a prior vote, authorized U.S. forces as peacekeepers, but that was not really relevant to the issue of the airstrikes. Subsequently, the House of Representatives took up the issue of airstrikes, and by a tie vote of 213-213, the House of Representatives declined to authorize the airstrikes. That was at a time when the airstrikes were already underway. [[Page S5919]] I supported the Senate vote for the authorization of airstrikes. I talked to General Wesley Clark, the Supreme NATO Commander. One of the points which he made, which was telling on this Senator, was the morale of the troops. The airstrikes were an inevitability, as the President had determined, and it seemed to me that in that context we ought to give the authorization, again, as I say, expressly reserving the issue not to have ground forces used. So on this state of the record, with the vote by the Senate and with the tie vote by the House of Representatives, you have airstrikes which may well, under international law, be concluded to be at variance with the Constitution of the United States, to put it politely and not to articulate any doctrine of illegality, at a time when my country is involved in those airstrikes. But when we come to the issue of ground troops, which would be a major expansion and would constitute, beyond any question, the involvement of the United States in a war--although my own view is that the United States is conducting acts of war at the present time--the President ought to come to the Congress. When the President met with a large group of Members on Wednesday, April 28, the issue of ground forces came up and the President made a commitment to those in attendance--and I was present--that he would not order ground troops into Kosovo without prior congressional authorization. He said he would honor that congressional authorization, reserving his prerogative as President to say that he didn't feel it indispensable constitutionally that he do so. However, he said that he would make that commitment, and he did make that commitment to a large number of Members of the House and Senate on April 28 of this year. He said, as a matter of good faith, that he would come to the Congress before authorizing the use of ground troops. So, in a sense, it could be said that this amendment is duplicative. But I do believe, as a matter of adherence to the rule of law, that the commitment the President made ought to be memorialized in this defense authorization bill. I have, therefore, offered this amendment. It is a complicated question as to the use of ground forces, whether they will ever be requested, because unanimity has to be obtained under the rules that govern NATO. Germany has already said they are opposed to the use of ground forces. But this is a matter that really ought to come back to the Congress. I am prepared--speaking for myself--to consider a Presidential request for authorization for the use of ground forces. However, before I would vote on the matter, or give my consent or vote in the affirmative, there are a great many questions I will want to have answered--questions that go to intelligence, questions that go to the specialty of the military planners. I would want to know what the likely resistance would be from the army of the former Yugoslavia. How much have our airstrikes degraded the capability of the Serbian army to defend? How many U.S. troops would be involved? I would like to know, to the extent possible, what the assessment of risk is. When we talked about invading Japan before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we had estimates as to how many would be wounded and how many fatalities there would be. So while not easy to pass judgment on something that could be at least estimated or approximated, I would want to know, very importantly, how many ground troops would be supplied by others in NATO. I would want to know what the projection was for the duration of the military engagement, and what the projection was after the military engagement was over. These are only some of the questions that ought to be addressed. In 16 minutes, at 4 o'clock, members of the administration, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to give another congressional briefing. Before we have a vote on a matter of this importance and this magnitude, those are some of the questions I think ought to be answered. That, in a very brief statement, constitutes the essence of the reasons why I have offered this amendment. Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. SPECTER. Yes. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator. He and I are of the same mind in terms of the authority and responsibility of Congress when it comes to a declaration of war. It is interesting to note that last year when a similar amendment was called on the defense appropriation bill, offered by a gentleman in the House, David Skaggs, only 15 Members of the Senate voted in favor of it, including the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from Delaware, myself, and a handful of others. It will be interesting to see this debate now in the context of a real conflict. I have seen a copy of this amendment, and I want to understand the full clarity and intention of the Senator. As I understand it, there are two paragraphs offered as part of this amendment. They use different language in each paragraph. I wish the Senator would clarify. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond to the Senator, I would be glad to respond to the questions. I thank him for his leadership in offering a similar amendment in the past. When I undertook to send this amendment to the desk, I had called the Senator from Illinois and talked to him this morning and will consider this a joint venture if he is prepared to accept that characterization. Mr. DURBIN. Depending on the responses, I may very well be prepared to do so. Would the Senator be kind enough to enlighten me? The first paragraph refers to the introduction of ground troops. The second paragraph refers to the deployment of ground troops. Could the Senator tell me, is there a difference in his mind in the use of those two different terms? Mr. SPECTER. Responding directly to the question, I think there would be no difference. But I am not sure the Senator from Illinois has the precise amendment I have introduced, which has only one paragraph. I can read it quickly: None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. Mr. DURBIN. The version I have---- Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, I am holding this draft amendment. You are referring to two paragraphs, and it appears to me that the first paragraph is the title; am I correct? I find that inconsistent with what I believe was paragraph 2. The first paragraph is the title, and there is really only one paragraph in the body of the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. If the Senator from Pennsylvania will yield, I will confine myself to the nature of the amendment. Could the Senator tell me why reference is only made to the deployment of grounds troops from U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo and not in Yugoslavia? Mr. SPECTER. The amendment was drafted in its narrowest form. Perhaps it would be appropriate to modify the amendment. Mr. DURBIN. I think it might be. I ask the Senator a second question. Would he not want to make an exception, as well, for the rescue of the NATO forces in Yugoslavia if we would perhaps have a downed flier and ground troops could be sent in for rescue, and that would not require congressional authorization. I think that would be consistent with the Senator's earlier statements about the emergency authority of the President as Commander in Chief. Mr. SPECTER. I would be prepared to accept that exception. Mr. DURBIN. The final question is procedural. The Senator from Pennsylvania has been here---- Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to amend it for a downed flier--we just witnessed ground troops being caught, and they have now been released. I would be careful in the redrafting and not just to stick to a downed flier. That is just helpful advice. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator. Mr. DURBIN. A rescue of NATO forces in Yugoslavia was the question. Last, I will ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, if this requires a joint resolution, under the rules of the Senate, [[Page S5920]] Members in a filibuster, a minority, say, 41 Senators, could stop us from ever taking action on this measure. How would the Senator from Pennsylvania respond to that? Does that, in effect, give to a minority the authority to stop the debate and a vote by the Senate and thereby tie the President's hands when it comes to committing ground troops, should we ever reach the point where that is necessary? Mr. SPECTER. I respond to my colleague from Illinois by saying that with a declaration of war where the Senate has to join under the Constitution and there could be a filibuster requiring 60 votes, the same rule applies. To get that authorization, either by declaration of war or resolution for the use of force, we have to comply with the rules to get an affirmative vote out of the Senate. Under those rules, if somebody filibusters, it requires 60 votes. So be it. That is the rule of the Senate and that is the way you have to proceed to get the authorization from the Senate. Mr. DURBIN. I know I am speaking on the Senator's time. I thank him for responding to those questions. I have reservations, as he does, about committing ground troops. I certainly believe, as he does, that the Congress should make that decision and not the President unilaterally. He has promised to come to us for that decision to be made. I hope Mr. Milosevic and those who follow this debate don't take any comfort in this. We are speaking only to the question of the authority of Congress, not as to any actual decision of whether we will ever commit to ground troops. I think that is the sense of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I thank him for offering the amendment, and I support this important amendment. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will speak in opposition to the amendment. But I don't wish to interfere with the presentation of the Senator. At such time, perhaps, when I could start by propounding a few questions to my colleague and friend, would he indicate when he feels he has finished his presentation of the amendment? Mr. SPECTER. It would suit me to have the questions right now. Mr. WARNER. I remind the Senator of the parliamentary situation. While I have given him some suggestions, if he is going to amend it, it would take unanimous consent to amend the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. To modify the amendment? Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Mr. SPECTER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered. Mr. WARNER. The time agreement has been presented under the rules. I will address the question to the Chair. I think that would be best. The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would take unanimous consent to modify the amendment. Mr. WARNER. Just as a friendly gesture, I advise my colleague of that. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his friendly gesture. Mr. WARNER. As the Senator reads the title and then the text, I have trouble following the continuity of the two. For example, first it is directing the President of the United States pursuant to the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. I have been here 21 years. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is just a year or two shy of that. This War Powers Resolution has never been accepted by any President, Republican or Democrat or otherwise. Am I not correct in that respect? Mr. SPECTER. The Senator is correct. Mr. WARNER. Therefore, we would not be precipitating in another one of those endless debates which would consume hours and hours of the time of this body if we are acting on the predicate that this President is now going to acknowledge that he, as President of the United States, is bound by what is law? I readily admit it is the law. But we have witnessed, over these 20-plus years that I have been here and over the years the Senator from Pennsylvania has been here, that no President will acknowledge that he is subservient to this act of Congress because he feels that it is unconstitutional; that the Constitution has said he is Commander in Chief and he has the right to make decisions with respect to the Armed Forces of the United States on a minute's notice. Really, this is what concerns me about this amendment, among other things. Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to the question. Mr. WARNER. All right. Mr. SPECTER. If it took hours and hours, I think those hours and hours would be well spent, at least by comparison to what the Senate does on so many matters. And we might convene a little earlier. We might adjourn a little later. We might work on Mondays and Fridays and maybe even on Saturdays. I would not be concerned about the hours which we would spend. I think this Senator, after the 18 years and 5 months that I have been here, has given proper attention to the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare and/or involve the United States in war, or to the War Powers Act. This is a matter which first came to my attention in 1983 on the Lebanon matter when Senator Percy was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I had a debate, a colloquy, about whether Korea was a war, and Senator Percy said it was. Vietnam was a war. At that time, I undertook to draft a complex complaint trying to get the acquiescence of the President--President Reagan was in the White House at that time--which Senator Baker undertook to see if we could have a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. It is true, as the Senator from Virginia says, that Presidents have always denied it. They have denied it in complying with it. They send over the notice called for under the act, and then they put in a disclaimer. But I think the War Powers Act has had a profoundly beneficial effect, because Presidents have complied with it even while denying it. But I think it is high time that Congress stood up on its hind legs and said we are not going to be involved in wars unless Congress authorizes them. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, perhaps when I said hours and hours, it could be days and days. But we would come out with the same result. Presidents haven't complied with the act. They have ``complied with the spirit of the act.'' I believe that is how they have acknowledged it in the correspondence with the Congress. Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I think ``complied with the act''--the act requires certain notification, certain statements of the President. They make the statements which the act calls for, and then they add an addendum, ``but we do not believe we are obligated to do so.'' Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me ask another question of my colleague. We will soon be receiving a briefing from the Secretaries of State, Defense and the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I will absent myself during that period, and the Senator from Pennsylvania will have the opportunity to control the floor. I hope there would be no unanimous consent requests in my absence. I hope that would be agreeable with my good friend, because I have asked for this meeting. Mr. SPECTER. The Senator may be assured there will be no unanimous consent requests for any effort to do anything but to play by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I asked for this meeting and have arranged it for the Senate. So I have to go upstairs. But I point out: Suppose we were to adopt this, and supposing that during the month of August when the Senate would be in recess the President had to make a decision with regard to ground troops. Then he would have to, practically speaking, bring the Congress back to town. Would that not be correct? Mr. SPECTER. That would be correct. That is exactly what he ought to do. Before we involve ground troops, the Congress of the United States could interrupt the recess and come back and decide this important issue. Mr. WARNER. But the reason for introducing ground troops, whatever it may be, might require a decision of less than an hour to make on behalf of the Chief Executive, the Commander in Chief, and he would be then shackled with the necessary time of, say, maybe 48 hours in which to bring the Members of Congress back from various places throughout the United States and throughout the world. To me, that imposes on the President something that was never envisioned by the Founding Fathers. And that is why he is given the power of Commander in Chief. Our power is the power of the purse, to [[Page S5921]] which I again direct the Senator's attention in the text of the amendment. But it seems to me I find the title in conflict with the text of the amendment. Mr. SPECTER. As I said during the course of my presentation, Mr. President, I think the Commander in Chief does have authority to act in an emergency. I made a clear-cut delineation as I presented the argument that when there is time for deliberation, as, for example, on the missile strikes in Iraq, or as, for example, on the gulf war resolution, it ought to be considered, debated and decided by the Congress. Mr. WARNER. How do we define ``emergency?'' Where the President can act without approval by the Congress, and in other situations where he must get the approval, who makes that decision? Mr. SPECTER. I think that our English language is capable of structuring a definition of what constitutes an emergency. Mr. WARNER. Where is it found in this amendment? Mr. SPECTER. I think the President has the authority to act as Commander in Chief without that kind of specification, and it is not now on the face of this amendment. However, it may be advisable to take the extra precaution, with modification offered and agreed to by unanimous consent in the presence of the Senator from Virginia, to spell that out as well, although I think unnecessarily so. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I must depart and go upstairs to this meeting. But I will return as quickly as I can. I thank the Senator for his courtesy of protecting the floor in the interests of the manager of the bill. Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. The Senator is aware that the Senator from Virginia will at an appropriate time move to table, and in all probability I will reserve the right to object to this amendment until the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to amend the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Members of the Senate that under the previous order Senator Allard is to be recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. WARNER. Perhaps the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Colorado will work that out between them. I hope they can reach an accommodation. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may, I understand that the Senator from Virginia has articulated his views about a unanimous consent, and that is fine. Those are his rights. But it may be that there will be an additional amendment which I will file taking into account any modifications which I might want to make which might be objected to. So we can work it out in due course. Parliamentary inquiry: Does the Senator from Colorado have the floor? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is to have 20 minutes at 4 o'clock under the previous order. The 20 minutes is on the amendment, not on the bill. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might clarify the situation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Before the Senator from Pennsylvania specifically advised me he was going to assert his rights, which he has since his amendment was the pending business of the Senate following the three votes, I put in place a modest time slot for our colleague from Colorado, such that he could address the Senate on the general provisions of the underlying bill. But then we reached a subsequent time agreement to accommodate the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is my request, in the course of this debate, if the Senator could, within the parameters of the two unanimous consents, work out a situation where he could have about 15 minutes and then we could return to your debate? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do not understand that. If you are asking me to give time---- Mr. WARNER. Not from your time agreement. It would be totally separate. In other words, your 90 minutes, now the subject of the second unanimous consent agreement, would be preserved. That is as it was written. But can the Senator accommodate sliding that to some point in time to allow the Senator from Colorado to have 15 minutes? Mr. ALLARD. What is the regular order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. Mr. SPECTER. I would be delighted to accommodate the Senator from Colorado one way or the other. He can speak now and then we can go back to our time agreement on the pending amendment. Mr. ALLARD. I have been waiting. I was here most of the morning and then waiting this afternoon for 3 hours to have an opportunity to make some general comments on this bill. I do not anticipate taking much longer. My agreement is 20 minutes, if I remember correctly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. ALLARD. Maybe there would be an opportunity--I would like to get in on this meeting Senator Warner is attending at some point in time-- probably the last part of it. But I would like to have the opportunity to address this bill. What is it the Senator from Pennsylvania is seeking, as far as the privilege of the floor? Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may respond, I am delighted to have the Senator from Colorado use his 20 minutes, which is ordered at this time. Mr. WARNER. With no subtraction whatsoever from the unanimous consent in place for the Senator. Mr. SPECTER. That is the understanding the Senator had spoken to earlier. Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this point in time, the Senator from Colorado has the floor for 20 minutes. The Senator is advised, with regard to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, 25 minutes remains for the Senator from Pennsylvania and 38\1/2\ minutes, approximately, remains for the opposition. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 20 minutes. Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise in strong support of S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As the Personnel Subcommittee chairman, I take great pleasure in which Senator Cleland, the ranking member, and the other members of the subcommittee were able to provide for our men and women in uniform. Every leader in the military tells me the same thing, without the people the tools are useless. We must take care of our people and the personnel provisions in this bill were developed in a bipartisan manner. This bill is responsive to the manpower readiness needs of the military services; supports numerous quality of life improvements for our service men and women, their families, and the retiree community; and reflects the budget realities that we face today and will face in the future. First, military manpower strength levels. The bill adds 92 Marine personnel over the administration's request for an active duty end strength of 1,384,889. It also recommends a reserve end strength of 874,043--745 more than the administration requested. The bill also modifies but maintains the end-strength floors. While I do not believe that end-strength floors are a practical force management tool, I am personally concerned that the strength levels of the active and reserve forces are too low and that the Department of Defense is paying other bills by reducing personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to send a message to the administration that they cannot permit personnel levels to drop below the minimums established by the Congress. On military personnel policy, there are a number of provisions intended to support the recruiting and retention and personnel management of the services. Among the most noteworthy, are the several provisions that permit the services to offer 2-year enlistments with bonuses and other incentives. This is a pilot program in which students in college or vocational or technical schools could enlist and remain in school for 2 years before they actually go on active duty. Many Senators have expressed their concerns about the operational tempo of the military. That is why this bill attempts to address this problem by requiring the services to closely manage the Personnel and Deployment Tempo of military personnel. We would require a general or flag officer to approve deployments over 180 days in a [[Page S5922]] year; a four-star general or admiral to approve deployments over 200 days and would authorize a $100 per diem pay for each day a service member is deployed over 220 days. The briefings and hearings in the personnel subcommittee have found that the single most cited reason for separation is time away from home and families. At the same time, the services have not been effective in managing the Personnel and Deployment Tempo for their personnel. I am confident that the provision will focus the necessary attention on the management of this problem. Another important provision is the expansion of Junior ROTC or JROTC programs. A number of members and the service Chiefs and personnel Chiefs told me that they believed Junior ROTC is an important program and that an expansion was not only warranted but needed. Thus we have added $39 million to expand the JROTC programs. These funds will permit the Army to add 114 new schools; the Navy to add 63 new schools; the Air Force to add 63 new schools; and the Marine Corps to exhaust their waiting list to 32 schools. This is a total of 272 new JROTC programs in our school districts across the country. I am proud to be able to support these important programs that teach responsibility, leadership, ethics, and assist in military recruiting. In military compensation, our major recommendations are extracted from S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's and Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. First, this bill authorizes a 4.8-percent pay raise effective January 1, 2000 and a restructuring of the pay tables effective July 1, 2000. Another provision includes a Thrift Savings Plan for active forces and the ready reserves and a plan to offer service members who entered the service on or after August 1, 1986, the option to receive a $30,000 bonus and remain under the ``Redux'' retirement or to change to the ``High-three'' retirement system. In order to assist the active and reserve military forces in recruiting, there are a series of bonuses and new authorities to support the ability of our recruiters to attract qualified young men and women to serve in the armed forces. There are also several new bonuses and special pays to incentivize aviators, surface warfare officers, special warfare officers, air crewmen among others to remain on active duty. Two additional provisions from S. 4 are in this bill. A special retention initiative would permit a service secretary to match the thrift savings contribution of service members in critical specialties in return for an extended service commitment. Also, thanks to the hard work of Senator McCain and Senator Roberts, another provision authorizes a special subsistence allowance for junior enlisted personnel who qualify for food stamps. In health care, there are several key recommendations. There is a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to implement a number of initiatives to improve delivery of health care under TriCare. Another provision would require each Lead Agent to establish a patient advocate to assist beneficiaries in resolving problems they may encounter with TriCare. Finally there are a number of general provisions including one to enforce the reductions in management headquarters personnel Congress directed several years ago and several to assist the Department of Defense Dependents School System to provide quality education for the children of military personnel overseas. Before I close, as a first time Senator subcommittee chair, I express my appreciation to Senator Cleland for his leadership and assistance throughout this year as we worked in a bipartisan manner to develop programs which enhance personnel readiness and quality of life programs. I also thank the members of the subcommittee, Senator Thurmond, Senator McCain, Senator Snowe, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Reed, and their staffs. Their hard work made our work better and helped me focus on those issues which have the greatest impact on soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Mr. President, I finish by thanking Chairman Warner for the opportunity to point out some of the highlights in the bill which the Personnel Subcommittee has oversight and to congratulate him and Senator Levin on the bipartisan way this bill was accomplished and ask that all Senators strongly support S. 1059. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under control. If neither side yields time, time will simply run equally. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. The Senator from Delaware is here and I will be happy to yield--how much time do the opponents have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents of the amendment have 38 minutes and approximately 10 seconds. Mr. LEVIN. Is that divided in some way or under the control of Senator Warner and myself? How is that? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The manager of the bill is designated to be in charge of the opposition. Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be necessarily brief. It is not often I disagree with my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. I think he is right in the fundamental sense that if the President is going to send American ground forces into a war, it needs congressional authority. Very honestly, this amendment is, in my view, flawed. First of all, it is clear that the President has to come to Congress to use ground forces and that the President has already stated--I will ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a copy of his letter dated April 28, 1999, to the Speaker of the House in which he says in part: Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The White House, Washington, April 28, 1999. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo. The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so through use of air power. However, were I to change my policy with regard to the introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed to go home to a safe and secure environment. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, not only must the President, but he said he would. This amendment is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, I believe it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized or under his emergency powers. The Senate resolution we adopted only authorizes the use of airpower. If Congress adopts this amendment, it seems to me we will imply the President has carte blanche to take offensive action, and anywhere else unless the Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary in advance. In short, I think it will tender an invitation to Presidents in the future to use force whenever they want unless Congress provides a specific ban in advance. Putting that aside, however, the amendment is flawed because its exceptions are much too narrowly drawn. The amendment purports to bar the use of Armed Forces in response to an attack against Armed Forces. For example, we have thousands of soldiers now in Albania and Macedonia. [[Page S5923]] Let's suppose the Yugoslav forces launch an attack against U.S. forces in Albania or in Macedonia. This amendment would bar the use of ground forces to respond by going into Kosovo. The power to respond against such an attack is clearly within the power of the Commander in Chief. So, too, does the President have the power to launch a preemptive strike against an imminent attack. The U.S. forces do not have to wait until they take the first punch. The second point I will make in this brief amount of time I am taking is that the amendment does not appear to permit the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans. Most constitutional scholars concede the President has the power to use force in emergency circumstances to protect American citi