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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Senate - May 03, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S4514-S4547] DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 20, which the clerk will report. The legislative assistant read as follows: A resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCAIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator. Mr. WELLSTONE. I know Senator Byrd wants to speak. I wonder whether I could ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from West Virginia speak, I be allowed to speak. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Today, Mr. President, the Senate should begin a constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership, both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the President of the United States, has determined that we will limit debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead this nation can be avoided indefinitely. I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now is not the time for this debate. When is the right time, Mr. President? After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the outcome is known? Shall those who oppose NATO's attack on Serbia wait until NATO's defeat is certain before voting their conscience? Shall those of us who believe American interests and values are now so at risk in the Balkans that they must be protected by all necessary force wait until victory is certain before voting our conscience? I would hope not, Mr. President. For that would mean that we have allowed American pilots and, possibly, American soldiers to risk their lives for a cause that we will not risk our careers for. I think we are better people than that. I think we are a better institution than that. And I think we should use this debate to prove it. All Senators should, for a start, use the opportunity provided by debate on this resolution to declare unequivocally their support or opposition for the war. Having declared their support or opposition, Senators should then endorse that course of action allowed Congress that logically and ethically corresponds to their views on the war. If Senators believe this war is worth fighting, then recognize that the President should exercise the authority vested in his office to use the power of the United States effectively to achieve victory as quickly as possible. If Senators believe that this war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure necessary to win it, then take the only course open to you to prevent further bloodshed. Vote to refuse the funds necessary to prosecute it. Senators cannot say that they oppose the war, but support our pilots, and then allow our pilots to continue fighting a war that they believe cannot justify their loss. If the war is not worth fighting for, then it is not worth letting Americans die for it. Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such a message to our servicemen and women, to the American public and to the world. They voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces. Such a contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the Senate not see our duty a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to our words? Should we meet our responsibilities honorably, we will not only have acted more forthrightly than the other body, we will have acted more forthrightly than has the President. The supporters of this resolution find ourselves defending the authority of the Presidency without the support of the President, a curious, but sadly, not unexpected position. Opponents have observed that the resolution gives the President authority he has not asked for. They are correct. The President has not asked for this resolution. Indeed, it is quite evident that he shares the leadership's preference that the Senate not address this matter. But, in truth, he need not ask for this authority. He possesses it already, whether he wants it or not. I cannot join my Republican friends in the other body by supporting the unconstitutional presumptions of the War Powers Act. Every Congress and every President since the act's inception has ignored it with good reason until now. We should have repealed the Act long ago, but that would have required us to surrender a little of the ambiguity that we find so useful in this city. Only Congress can declare war. But Congress cannot deny the President the ability to use force unless we refuse him the funds to do so. By taking neither aciton, Congress leaves the President free to prosecute this war to whatever extent he deems necessary. Although I can speak only for myself, I believe the sponsors of this resolution offered it to encourage the President to do what almost every experienced statesmen has said he should do--prepare for the use of ground troops in Kosovo if they are necessary to achieve victory. Regrettably, the President owuld rather not be encouraged. But his irresponsibility does not excuse Congress'. I beleive it is now imperative that we pass this resolution to distinguish the powers of the Presidency from the muddled claim made upon them by the House of Representatives. During the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this resolution, my friend, the Senator from Missouri, Senator Ashcroft, criticized the wording as too broad a grant of authority to the President, and an infringement of congressional authority. How, Mr. President, can Congress claim authority that it neither possesses constitutionally nor, as we see, cares to exercise even if we did possess it? No, Mr. President, the authority belongs to the President unless we deny it to him by means expressly identified in the Constitution. In short, and I welcome arguments to the contrary, only Congress can declare war but the President can wage one unless we deprive him of the means to do so. Therefore, I feel it is urgent that the Senate contradict the actions of the other body and clarify to the public, and to America's allies and our enemies that the President may, indeed, wage this war. And, with our encouragement, he might wage this war more effectively than he has done thus far. If he does not, the shame is on him and not on us. I regret to say that I have on more than one occasion suspected, as I suspect today, that the President and some of us among the loyal opposition suffer from the same failing. It seems to me that the President, in his poll driven approach to his every responsibility, fails to distinguish the office he holds from himself. And some of us in Congress are so distrustful of the President that we feel obliged to damage the office in order to restrain the current occupant. Both sides have lost the ability to tell the office from the man. Publicly and repeatedly ruling out ground troops may be smart politics according to the President's pollster, but it is inexcusably irresponsible leadership. In this determination to put politics over national security, the President even acquiesced to the other body's attempt to deprive him of his office's authority. He sent a letter promising that he would seek Congress' permission to introduce ground troops in the unlikely event he ever discovers the will to use them. My Republican colleagues in the House, who sought to uphold a law that [[Page S4515]] I doubt any of them believed in before last week, should take greater care with an office that will prove vital to our security in the years ahead. President Clinton will not stand for re-election again. Twenty months from now we will have a new President. And whoever he or she is will need all the powers of the office to begin to repair the terrible damage that this President has done to the national security interests of the United States. It is to avoid further damage to those interests and to the office of the President that I ask my colleagues to consider voting for this resolution. The irony that this resolution is being considered only because of a statute I oppose is not lost on me. But bad laws often produce unexpected irony along with their other, more damaging effects. So we have made what good use of it we can. We are here beginning a debate that many did not want, and few will mind seeing disposed of quickly. In my opening comments, I know I have spoken provocatively. Although I believe my points are correct, I could have been a little more restrained in offering them. I was not because I hope it will encourage, perhaps incite is a better word, greater debate today than is contemplated by our leaders. I meant to offend no one, but if any took offense, I hope they will come to the floor to make their case. Let us have the kind of debate today that the matter we are considering surely deserves. Mr. President, we are debating war. Not Bill Clinton's war. Not Madeleine Albright's war. America's war. It became America's war the moment the first American flew into harm's way to fight it. Nothing anyone can do will change that. If we lose this war, the entire country, and the world will suffer the consequences. Yes, the President would leave office with yet another mark against him. But he will not suffer this indignity alone. We will all be less secure. We will all be dishonored. This is America's war, and we are America's elected leaders. As we speak, tens of thousands of Americans are ready to die if they must to win it. They risk their lives for us, and for the values that define our good Nation. Can we not risk our political fortunes for them? Don't they deserve more than a few hours of perfunctory and sparsely attended debate? They do, Mr. President, they deserve much better than that. We might lose those vote and we might lose it badly. That would be a tragedy. But I would rather fight and lose, than not fight at all. I hope that an extended debate might persuade more Members to support the resolution. The resolution does not instruct the President to begin a ground war in Yugoslavia. Nor does it grant the President authority he does not already possess. Nor does it require the President to pursue additional objectives in the Balkans. But if Members would be more comfortable if those objectives and realities were expressed in the resolution than I am sure the sponsors would welcome amendments to that effect. But even if a majority of Members can never be persuaded to support this resolution, let us all agree that a debate--an honest, extensive, responsible debate--is appropriate in these circumstances. Surely, our consciences are agreed on that. Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how is the time controlled? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is equally divided between the proponents and the opponents. Mr. BYRD. Who has control of the time in opposition to the resolution? The PRESIDING OFFICER. No individual Senator has control. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, there is no division of time here. This is a unanimous consent agreement, that time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised that the time control is written in the War Powers Act. Mr. McCAIN. Thank you. I stand corrected. I appreciate the outstanding work of the Parliamentarian. On behalf of the other side, I ask unanimous consent to allow Senator Byrd to speak for as long as he may deem necessary. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I thank him for his courtesy. I thank him for his leadership on this resolution and for his leadership on many of the great issues that we have debated in this Senate from time to time. There are occasions when I vote with Mr. McCain. There are occasions when I feel that we do not see eye to eye. That is not to say that I do not have the greatest respect for his position, for his viewpoint. I do have. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain, and I commend the other Senators, Senator Biden and the others, who have cosponsored this resolution, for having the courage of their convictions and for standing up for that in which they believe. I am sorry that I cannot agree on this occasion, but there may be a time down the road when we will be working together and I can agree and they can agree with me. I shall not use more than 5 minutes, Mr. President. The course of action that they are advocating--giving the President blanket authority to use whatever force he deems necessary to resolve the Kosovo conflict--is a bold and possibly risky stroke. But whatever the outcome, they are forcing the Senate to confront the Kosovo crisis head-on, and that in itself is noteworthy. Unfortunately, this resolution troubles me for a number of reasons. First, in my judgment, it is premature. In response to a request from the President, the Senate authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia in March. To date, the President has not requested any expansion of that authority. In fact, he has specifically stated on numerous occasions that the use of ground troops is not being contemplated. I think that has been a mistake from the very beginning, virtually saying to the Yugoslavian leader that we have no intention whatsoever of confronting you with ground troops. That loosens whatever bonds or chains Mr. Milosevic may otherwise feel constrain him. But the President has not announced that. Now it is deep into our spring, and by the time we put ground troops on the ground, I assume it will be nearing winter in the Balkans. I think that the President has made a mistake from the very beginning in saying we have no intent. I would prefer to let Mr. Milosevic guess as to our intent than tell him we have no intent of doing thus and so. If the intent of this resolution is to send a message to Slobodan Milosevic that the United States is serious about its commitment to the NATO operation in Kosovo, there are better ways to accomplish that objective. Swift action on the emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the Kosovo operation would be a good first step. Second, this resolution has the practical effect of releasing the President from any obligation to consult with Congress over future action in Kosovo. With this language, the Senate is effectively bowing out of the Kosovo debate and ceding all authority to the executive branch. My friends may say that the Senate is not entertaining any debate anyhow, but at least it might do so. I do not think this is in the best interest of the Nation. The President needs to consult Congress, but nobody can seem to agree on just exactly what ``consultation'' means. The President has had a few of us down to the White House upon several occasions. I have gone upon three occasions, and I have declined to go upon one, I believe, but those consultations, while they are probably beneficial and should be had, are really not enough. But the President does need to consult with Congress, and if he determines ground troops are needed in Kosovo, he needs to make that case to the American people. He has to make the case. Nobody can make that case for him. The Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, cannot make the case. The Vice President cannot make the case. Who is going to listen to Sandy Berger? I am not going to listen very much. So who can make the case? Nobody but the President can really make the case. We in the Senate will do the President no favor by giving him the means to short circuit the process. Third, this resolution goes beyond policy and infringes on the power of [[Page S4516]] Congress to control the purse. If the Senate gives the President blanket authorization to ``use all necessary force and other means'' to accomplish the goals and objectives set by NATO for the Kosovo operation, the Senate has no choice but to back that up with a blank check to pay for it. I think I have to agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona in most of what he said. Practically speaking, he is exactly right. He is precisely correct when he says that the only real check that the Congress has upon the President is the power over the purse. Money talks. That is the raw power. Congress alone has that power. If we were to adopt this resolution, we would be essentially committing the United States to pay an undetermined amount of money for an unknown period of time to finance an uncertain and open-ended military offensive. Mr. President, that, by any standard, is not sound policy. I believe there are better ways for the Senate to address the conflict in Kosovo, ways in which we can encourage the administration to work with Congress and to listen to the views of the American people as expressed through their representatives in Congress. I have repeatedly urged the President to provide Congress--and the American people--with more details on the Kosovo strategy, including the projected level of U.S. involvement in terms of personnel and equipment, the estimated cost and source of funding, the expected duration and exit strategy, and the anticipated impact on military readiness and morale. Of course, we heard the promises made in connection with Bosnia: We were only going to be there a year. Repeatedly, we put that question to the administration people and they assured us, ``It will only take about a year.'' We have heard those promises before. We do not pay much attention to them anymore. Those assurances do not mean anything. The President has certainly made a good faith effort to date to consult on this matter, with Members of Congress, but we are only in the opening stages of this operation, and the path ahead is very unclear. The President would be well served to continue consulting closely with Congress and to seek Congressional support for any decision that he contemplates involving ground forces. For its part, the Senate should not take any action that would jeopardize this dialog, as I believe this resolution would do. Mr. President, again I commend Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and the other Senators who are cosponsors, for seeking a straightforward determination of the role that Congress will play in the Kosovo conflict. There is no question where the Senator from Arizona stands. He steps up to the plate, takes hold of the bat, says, here is how I stand, this is what I believe in. He is willing to have the Senate vote. I admire him for that. I admire his patriotism. I admire his determination to have the Senate speak. But I do not believe that this resolution is the appropriate action to take at this time. I urge my colleagues to table it. I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Minnesota is to be recognized. Mr. McCAIN. May I ask, for planning purposes, how long the Senator from Minnesota plans to speak? Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to keep this under 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I believe silence equals betrayal, and I think we should be debating this question. Besides having a great deal of respect for him, I appreciate his efforts. We may be in disagreement, but I thank the Senator from Arizona for his important efforts. It was with this deep belief in my soul that I voted 6 weeks ago to authorize the participation of the United States in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart and not without foreboding, because I knew once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence would likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence, and yet there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that it is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was about to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a rollcall vote on the subject, I sought to make sure that the Record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision, and today I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of the initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: the significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever the importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one: Inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence is absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has been, indeed, unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped: over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes; hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, and their homes and villages burned; women raped, thousands of the residents killed, and children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. Just last week, the Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horror goes on and on and on. I met a woman from Kosovo in my office on Friday with a businessman. They told me of four little children they had met in a refugee camp. The children had bandages over their eyes. They thought perhaps they had been near an explosion. That was not the case. The Serbs had raped their mother. They had witnessed the rape, and the Serbs cut their eyes out--they cut their eyes out. I do not understand this level of hatred. I do not understand this frame of reference. I have no way of knowing how people can do this. We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands are homeless, without shelter and food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators. And we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway by our own Government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations, and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of the unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain. There will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now. So long as our military forces are engaged in this mission, they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts [[Page S4517]] to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week, I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pushing and pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets. I would like to see an equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott, and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's view on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political, and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb security forces--or at least to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for nongovernmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. We need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including the key issue of the composition of an international military presence--and it must be a military presence--to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be responsible and flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the United States, and that United States-Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We really need to put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. I think, as I have said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the U.S. Government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million dollars to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and other NATO allies who will share this burden will be called upon to do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development, and relocation aid all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of millions of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo and deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and a very high human cost. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear that we made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied, and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying antimissile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward with these airstrikes against these paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks on civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. Mr. President, it is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on and on and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly nonmilitary targets appear to be selected--including the radio and TV network, Milosevic party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual-use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb war effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not the least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target list in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion of civilian, industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. What are the future military plans being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? Mr. President, this resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me in some ways of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam war. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops. The President of the United States has not asked Congress to authorize them. We should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And we should have the debate. Once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it is time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable timeout. Yes, a timeout before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it is too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counterproposals being discussed. [[Page S4518]] Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends in and out of NATO are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing on the floor of the Senate for consideration, if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops and would not risk Serb resupply of the war machine, is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be the slide toward the bombing of a broader array of nonmilitary targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort; but a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. .I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. Such a pause may well be worthwhile, if it works to prompt the cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons. .It may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's larger term goals, which I support, can be met. .A brief cessation might also enable nongovernmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in and then distribute relief supplies to the internally displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. .These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. .I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea and other similar proposals in their discussion today. .I intend to explore and refine these ideas further with administration officials in the coming days to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive. .I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. .But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. .One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. I am not just talking about a geographical or geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. .I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. .For 50 years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. .I believe we must again work with the Europeans, and now with the Russians and others, who have historic ties to the Serbs to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. .Stepped up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Silence equals betrayal. It was with that belief deep in my soul that I voted, six weeks ago, to authorize the United States participation in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart, and not without foreboding, because I knew that, once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence will likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence. And yet, there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that that is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility, and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was beginning to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a roll call vote on this subject, I sought to make sure that the record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision. And today, I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of that initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: The significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one--inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence was absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has indeed been unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped. Over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes. Hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, their homes and villages burned. Women raped, thousands of the residents killed, children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. From Acareva to Zim, villages in Kosovo have been burned by Serb forces. In Cirez, as many as 20,000 Albanian refugees were reportedly recently used as human shields against NATO bombings. In Djakovica, over 100 ethnic Albanians were reportedly summarily executed by Serb forces. In Goden, the Serbs reportedly executed over 20 men, including schoolteachers, before burning the village to the ground. In Kuraz, 21 schoolteachers were reported by refugees to have been executed in this village near Srbica, with hundreds more being held there by Serb paramilitary forces. In Pastasel, the bodies of over 70 ethnic Albanians, ranging in age from 14 to 50, were discovered by refugees on April 1. In Podujevo, Serb forces may have executed over 200 military- age Kosovar men, removing some from their cars and shooting them on the spot, at point-blank range. In Pristina, the Serbs appear to have completed their military operations in the city and have been ethnically cleansing the entire city. Approximately 25,000 Kosovars were forcibly expelled from the city last month, shipped to Macedonia by rail cars in scenes eerily reminiscent of the holocaust trains, and approximately 200,000 more may be detained there, awaiting their forced expulsion. In Prizren, Serb forces reportedly executed between 20 and 30 civilians. In Srbica, after emptying the town of its Kosovar inhabitants, Serb forces are believed to have executed 115 ethnic Albanian males over the age of 18. Over twenty thousand prisoners are reportedly still being housed in an ammunition factory near the town, under Serbian guard. Just last week, Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horrors goes on and on. [[Page S4519]] We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands homeless, without shelter and without food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators and we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway, by our own government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless non- governmental humanitarian relief organizations and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of this unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain, and there will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now, and so long as our military forces are engaged in this mission they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' And I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are, and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets--I would like to see equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's views on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb Security forces--or at least, to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for non-governmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. And we need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including on the key issue of the composition of an international military presence to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the U.S., and that US- Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We need to really put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. And I think, as I've said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The situation is so tense that it is being reported there have been near-riots in some camps over the desperate conditions there, and the situation in camps near Blace in Macedonia and at Kukes in northern Albania are especially grim. Shortly, we will consider an emergency supplemental package to fund the military and humanitarian costs for the Kosovo crisis. I am deeply concerned that the amount requested for refugee assistance may not be enough to meet the overwhelming needs of this emergency--the largest refugee crisis since World War II. We are meeting the military challenge by spending millions a day to assist NATO in its war against Serb aggression. The humanitarian challenge we face is just as great. If we have learned anything in recent weeks, it is that we must prepare for the worst of the worst- case scenarios. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still trapped inside Kosovo, waiting for an opportunity to escape. A further massive exodus seems likely. We must be prepared to meet their needs. Extensive medical supplies and possibly another field hospital will also be needed, since more and more new arrivals are requiring medical attention. Our experience in Bosnia has taught us that these refugees will not be going home anytime soon. Long-term assistance is required. Further, we must support Albania and Macedonia who are struggling to meet basic needs of their own people, let alone those of the Kosovar refugees. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo, and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the US government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and our other NATO allies who share this burden will be called upon do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development and relocation aid--all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo, and to deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and very high human costs. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying that the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear we have made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, and other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying anti-missile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward our air strikes against those paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks against civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. There will be time to determine whether our bombing accelerated, or whether it increased, the slaughter. In any case, it now seems clear, from detailed and credible reports in the media and elsewhere, that the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, labeled the other day by the Washington Post as ``one of the most ambitiously ruthless military campaigns in Europe in half a century,'' was carefully and meticulously planned for months before the bombing. The attacks have reportedly seriously damaged over 250 villages, with well over 50 being completely burned to the ground. Systematically integrating Interior Ministry (MUP) forces, regular Yugoslav army forces, police units and paramilitary gangs for the first time, [[Page S4520]] this effort was clearly coldly calculated to terrorize the populace, and ultimately to rid the entire province of its ethnic Albanian majority. It is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on, and on, and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly non-military targets appear to be selected--including the radio and tv network, the Milosevic Party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb War effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target lists in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion to civilian industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. I am also very concerned about reports from the NATO summit that future targeting decisions will likely be placed in the hands of NATO military officials, without careful review of elected civilian representatives--a policy that I think is at odds with our constitutional insistence upon civilian control. And what other future military plans are being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? While I recognize the legitimate concern of NATO military officials that we must not put pilots' lives at risk to hit oil production and distribution facilities servicing the Serb armies, while allowing oil to pour in to them through ports in Montenegro or through other means, we must be very careful as we proceed here. And then there is the question of the introduction of ground troops. After the NATO summit last weekend, plans are being ``taken off the shelf and updated.'' Propositioning of ground troops is being advocated by some within our own government. It doesn't take clairvoyance to see where some seem to be headed. This resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me, in some ways, of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam War. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops, the President of the U.S. has not asked Congress to authorize them; we should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now, under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And so, once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it's time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable time-out. Yes, a time-out, before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it's too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counter proposals being discussed. Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends, in and out of NATO, are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing for consideration--if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops, and would not risk Serb resupply of their war machine--is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be a slide toward the bombing of a broader array of non-military targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort. But a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses, and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. I know there are risks and costs associated with such an even temporary halt in the airstrikes. I am not yet sure, for example, that we could develop a verifiable time-out plan which would prevent Serb forces from quickly repairing their air defense systems such that they would pose new risks to NATO pilots; that cannot be allowed. I know there would be real problems in verifying that Serb attacks on the ground in Kosovo had stopped, and military and paramilitary units were actually pulling back, during any bombing pause. I am no military expert, but I am posing those and other questions to US military officials and others, to see if there is not room for such an initiative. Such a pause may well be worthwhile; if it works to prompt a cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons, it may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's longer-term goals, which I support, can be met. A brief cessation might also enable non-governmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in, and then distribute, relief supplies to the internally-displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea, and other similar proposals, in their discussion today. I intend to explore and refine this idea further with Administration officials in the coming days, to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive, and I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. It has been argued by the Administration and others that an intense and sustained conflict in Kosovo, which has sent hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders and could potentially draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into a wider war would be disastrous. That is true. We may not be able to contain a wider Balkan war [[Page S4521]] without far greater risk and cost than has been contemplated. And we could well face an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than we face now in the weeks and months to come. I am not just talking about a geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. For fifty years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. I believe we must again work with the Europeans--and now with the Russians and others who have historic ties to the Serbs--to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and of the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. Stepped-up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Arkansas as he may consume. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I especially thank him for his strong leadership on this issue and for pushing this issue to the point that we are having this debate on the floor of the Senate. I have believed for some time that this debate has been sorely needed and greatly lacking. Senator McCain is truly an American hero. He is one that I respect immensely, along with Senator Hagel and the other cosponsors of this resolution. Though I disagree with them and though I rise in opposition to the resolution, I believe they have taken a principled position, a principled stand that is justifiable and behind which there are rational arguments. I believe they reciprocate that respect for the principled position and belief that we do not have a vital national interest in the Balkans and that we have made a policy mistake and that given where we are, the placement of ground troops is not the next step that we should be taking. I regret the silence that has characterized Congress to this point, particularly the Senate. I applaud those who have pushed that we might have this time today. As I read the resolution, I read that it authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means. That, I do believe, is a blank check. I believe it grants blanket authority, and it does take us out of what is a very, very important role for the Congress. I read also that all necessary force and other means is granted to accomplish NATO's objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. One of the questions I have is, what are our objectives? I do not believe those objectives have been clearly outlined. Does the resolution refer to military objectives, which we have been told means to degrade the military capability of Milosevic--whatever that term ``degrade'' may mean, subjective as it is--or does this reference to the objectives of NATO refer to political objectives, which have been defined in a much broader sense in reference to the withdrawal of Milosevic, the incorporation of an international peacekeeping force, humanitarian aid and a number of things? So I am not certain what objectives are in mind in the resolution or how one would determine whether or not they have been achieved. When I made reference to the silence that I think has been embarrassing for the Senate, I think Members of the Senate have been reluctant to speak on this for a couple of reasons. We have been reticent to speak out because nobody wants to be portrayed as not being in support of American troops. I went to Aviano. We have the bravest young men and women imaginable involved in this. They are willing and have been risking their lives daily in pursuit of this policy and the orders they have been given. I support them and I believe in them. I believe in their effectiveness and I believe in their courage. But I think that is one reason people have been hesitant to get into this debate, because they are afraid of being portrayed as not being supportive of the military, and also because of the horrible atrocities that have been committed by the Serbs and the Milosevic

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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Senate - May 03, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S4514-S4547] DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 20, which the clerk will report. The legislative assistant read as follows: A resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCAIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator. Mr. WELLSTONE. I know Senator Byrd wants to speak. I wonder whether I could ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from West Virginia speak, I be allowed to speak. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Today, Mr. President, the Senate should begin a constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership, both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the President of the United States, has determined that we will limit debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead this nation can be avoided indefinitely. I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now is not the time for this debate. When is the right time, Mr. President? After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the outcome is known? Shall those who oppose NATO's attack on Serbia wait until NATO's defeat is certain before voting their conscience? Shall those of us who believe American interests and values are now so at risk in the Balkans that they must be protected by all necessary force wait until victory is certain before voting our conscience? I would hope not, Mr. President. For that would mean that we have allowed American pilots and, possibly, American soldiers to risk their lives for a cause that we will not risk our careers for. I think we are better people than that. I think we are a better institution than that. And I think we should use this debate to prove it. All Senators should, for a start, use the opportunity provided by debate on this resolution to declare unequivocally their support or opposition for the war. Having declared their support or opposition, Senators should then endorse that course of action allowed Congress that logically and ethically corresponds to their views on the war. If Senators believe this war is worth fighting, then recognize that the President should exercise the authority vested in his office to use the power of the United States effectively to achieve victory as quickly as possible. If Senators believe that this war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure necessary to win it, then take the only course open to you to prevent further bloodshed. Vote to refuse the funds necessary to prosecute it. Senators cannot say that they oppose the war, but support our pilots, and then allow our pilots to continue fighting a war that they believe cannot justify their loss. If the war is not worth fighting for, then it is not worth letting Americans die for it. Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such a message to our servicemen and women, to the American public and to the world. They voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces. Such a contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the Senate not see our duty a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to our words? Should we meet our responsibilities honorably, we will not only have acted more forthrightly than the other body, we will have acted more forthrightly than has the President. The supporters of this resolution find ourselves defending the authority of the Presidency without the support of the President, a curious, but sadly, not unexpected position. Opponents have observed that the resolution gives the President authority he has not asked for. They are correct. The President has not asked for this resolution. Indeed, it is quite evident that he shares the leadership's preference that the Senate not address this matter. But, in truth, he need not ask for this authority. He possesses it already, whether he wants it or not. I cannot join my Republican friends in the other body by supporting the unconstitutional presumptions of the War Powers Act. Every Congress and every President since the act's inception has ignored it with good reason until now. We should have repealed the Act long ago, but that would have required us to surrender a little of the ambiguity that we find so useful in this city. Only Congress can declare war. But Congress cannot deny the President the ability to use force unless we refuse him the funds to do so. By taking neither aciton, Congress leaves the President free to prosecute this war to whatever extent he deems necessary. Although I can speak only for myself, I believe the sponsors of this resolution offered it to encourage the President to do what almost every experienced statesmen has said he should do--prepare for the use of ground troops in Kosovo if they are necessary to achieve victory. Regrettably, the President owuld rather not be encouraged. But his irresponsibility does not excuse Congress'. I beleive it is now imperative that we pass this resolution to distinguish the powers of the Presidency from the muddled claim made upon them by the House of Representatives. During the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this resolution, my friend, the Senator from Missouri, Senator Ashcroft, criticized the wording as too broad a grant of authority to the President, and an infringement of congressional authority. How, Mr. President, can Congress claim authority that it neither possesses constitutionally nor, as we see, cares to exercise even if we did possess it? No, Mr. President, the authority belongs to the President unless we deny it to him by means expressly identified in the Constitution. In short, and I welcome arguments to the contrary, only Congress can declare war but the President can wage one unless we deprive him of the means to do so. Therefore, I feel it is urgent that the Senate contradict the actions of the other body and clarify to the public, and to America's allies and our enemies that the President may, indeed, wage this war. And, with our encouragement, he might wage this war more effectively than he has done thus far. If he does not, the shame is on him and not on us. I regret to say that I have on more than one occasion suspected, as I suspect today, that the President and some of us among the loyal opposition suffer from the same failing. It seems to me that the President, in his poll driven approach to his every responsibility, fails to distinguish the office he holds from himself. And some of us in Congress are so distrustful of the President that we feel obliged to damage the office in order to restrain the current occupant. Both sides have lost the ability to tell the office from the man. Publicly and repeatedly ruling out ground troops may be smart politics according to the President's pollster, but it is inexcusably irresponsible leadership. In this determination to put politics over national security, the President even acquiesced to the other body's attempt to deprive him of his office's authority. He sent a letter promising that he would seek Congress' permission to introduce ground troops in the unlikely event he ever discovers the will to use them. My Republican colleagues in the House, who sought to uphold a law that [[Page S4515]] I doubt any of them believed in before last week, should take greater care with an office that will prove vital to our security in the years ahead. President Clinton will not stand for re-election again. Twenty months from now we will have a new President. And whoever he or she is will need all the powers of the office to begin to repair the terrible damage that this President has done to the national security interests of the United States. It is to avoid further damage to those interests and to the office of the President that I ask my colleagues to consider voting for this resolution. The irony that this resolution is being considered only because of a statute I oppose is not lost on me. But bad laws often produce unexpected irony along with their other, more damaging effects. So we have made what good use of it we can. We are here beginning a debate that many did not want, and few will mind seeing disposed of quickly. In my opening comments, I know I have spoken provocatively. Although I believe my points are correct, I could have been a little more restrained in offering them. I was not because I hope it will encourage, perhaps incite is a better word, greater debate today than is contemplated by our leaders. I meant to offend no one, but if any took offense, I hope they will come to the floor to make their case. Let us have the kind of debate today that the matter we are considering surely deserves. Mr. President, we are debating war. Not Bill Clinton's war. Not Madeleine Albright's war. America's war. It became America's war the moment the first American flew into harm's way to fight it. Nothing anyone can do will change that. If we lose this war, the entire country, and the world will suffer the consequences. Yes, the President would leave office with yet another mark against him. But he will not suffer this indignity alone. We will all be less secure. We will all be dishonored. This is America's war, and we are America's elected leaders. As we speak, tens of thousands of Americans are ready to die if they must to win it. They risk their lives for us, and for the values that define our good Nation. Can we not risk our political fortunes for them? Don't they deserve more than a few hours of perfunctory and sparsely attended debate? They do, Mr. President, they deserve much better than that. We might lose those vote and we might lose it badly. That would be a tragedy. But I would rather fight and lose, than not fight at all. I hope that an extended debate might persuade more Members to support the resolution. The resolution does not instruct the President to begin a ground war in Yugoslavia. Nor does it grant the President authority he does not already possess. Nor does it require the President to pursue additional objectives in the Balkans. But if Members would be more comfortable if those objectives and realities were expressed in the resolution than I am sure the sponsors would welcome amendments to that effect. But even if a majority of Members can never be persuaded to support this resolution, let us all agree that a debate--an honest, extensive, responsible debate--is appropriate in these circumstances. Surely, our consciences are agreed on that. Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how is the time controlled? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is equally divided between the proponents and the opponents. Mr. BYRD. Who has control of the time in opposition to the resolution? The PRESIDING OFFICER. No individual Senator has control. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, there is no division of time here. This is a unanimous consent agreement, that time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised that the time control is written in the War Powers Act. Mr. McCAIN. Thank you. I stand corrected. I appreciate the outstanding work of the Parliamentarian. On behalf of the other side, I ask unanimous consent to allow Senator Byrd to speak for as long as he may deem necessary. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I thank him for his courtesy. I thank him for his leadership on this resolution and for his leadership on many of the great issues that we have debated in this Senate from time to time. There are occasions when I vote with Mr. McCain. There are occasions when I feel that we do not see eye to eye. That is not to say that I do not have the greatest respect for his position, for his viewpoint. I do have. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain, and I commend the other Senators, Senator Biden and the others, who have cosponsored this resolution, for having the courage of their convictions and for standing up for that in which they believe. I am sorry that I cannot agree on this occasion, but there may be a time down the road when we will be working together and I can agree and they can agree with me. I shall not use more than 5 minutes, Mr. President. The course of action that they are advocating--giving the President blanket authority to use whatever force he deems necessary to resolve the Kosovo conflict--is a bold and possibly risky stroke. But whatever the outcome, they are forcing the Senate to confront the Kosovo crisis head-on, and that in itself is noteworthy. Unfortunately, this resolution troubles me for a number of reasons. First, in my judgment, it is premature. In response to a request from the President, the Senate authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia in March. To date, the President has not requested any expansion of that authority. In fact, he has specifically stated on numerous occasions that the use of ground troops is not being contemplated. I think that has been a mistake from the very beginning, virtually saying to the Yugoslavian leader that we have no intention whatsoever of confronting you with ground troops. That loosens whatever bonds or chains Mr. Milosevic may otherwise feel constrain him. But the President has not announced that. Now it is deep into our spring, and by the time we put ground troops on the ground, I assume it will be nearing winter in the Balkans. I think that the President has made a mistake from the very beginning in saying we have no intent. I would prefer to let Mr. Milosevic guess as to our intent than tell him we have no intent of doing thus and so. If the intent of this resolution is to send a message to Slobodan Milosevic that the United States is serious about its commitment to the NATO operation in Kosovo, there are better ways to accomplish that objective. Swift action on the emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the Kosovo operation would be a good first step. Second, this resolution has the practical effect of releasing the President from any obligation to consult with Congress over future action in Kosovo. With this language, the Senate is effectively bowing out of the Kosovo debate and ceding all authority to the executive branch. My friends may say that the Senate is not entertaining any debate anyhow, but at least it might do so. I do not think this is in the best interest of the Nation. The President needs to consult Congress, but nobody can seem to agree on just exactly what ``consultation'' means. The President has had a few of us down to the White House upon several occasions. I have gone upon three occasions, and I have declined to go upon one, I believe, but those consultations, while they are probably beneficial and should be had, are really not enough. But the President does need to consult with Congress, and if he determines ground troops are needed in Kosovo, he needs to make that case to the American people. He has to make the case. Nobody can make that case for him. The Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, cannot make the case. The Vice President cannot make the case. Who is going to listen to Sandy Berger? I am not going to listen very much. So who can make the case? Nobody but the President can really make the case. We in the Senate will do the President no favor by giving him the means to short circuit the process. Third, this resolution goes beyond policy and infringes on the power of [[Page S4516]] Congress to control the purse. If the Senate gives the President blanket authorization to ``use all necessary force and other means'' to accomplish the goals and objectives set by NATO for the Kosovo operation, the Senate has no choice but to back that up with a blank check to pay for it. I think I have to agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona in most of what he said. Practically speaking, he is exactly right. He is precisely correct when he says that the only real check that the Congress has upon the President is the power over the purse. Money talks. That is the raw power. Congress alone has that power. If we were to adopt this resolution, we would be essentially committing the United States to pay an undetermined amount of money for an unknown period of time to finance an uncertain and open-ended military offensive. Mr. President, that, by any standard, is not sound policy. I believe there are better ways for the Senate to address the conflict in Kosovo, ways in which we can encourage the administration to work with Congress and to listen to the views of the American people as expressed through their representatives in Congress. I have repeatedly urged the President to provide Congress--and the American people--with more details on the Kosovo strategy, including the projected level of U.S. involvement in terms of personnel and equipment, the estimated cost and source of funding, the expected duration and exit strategy, and the anticipated impact on military readiness and morale. Of course, we heard the promises made in connection with Bosnia: We were only going to be there a year. Repeatedly, we put that question to the administration people and they assured us, ``It will only take about a year.'' We have heard those promises before. We do not pay much attention to them anymore. Those assurances do not mean anything. The President has certainly made a good faith effort to date to consult on this matter, with Members of Congress, but we are only in the opening stages of this operation, and the path ahead is very unclear. The President would be well served to continue consulting closely with Congress and to seek Congressional support for any decision that he contemplates involving ground forces. For its part, the Senate should not take any action that would jeopardize this dialog, as I believe this resolution would do. Mr. President, again I commend Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and the other Senators who are cosponsors, for seeking a straightforward determination of the role that Congress will play in the Kosovo conflict. There is no question where the Senator from Arizona stands. He steps up to the plate, takes hold of the bat, says, here is how I stand, this is what I believe in. He is willing to have the Senate vote. I admire him for that. I admire his patriotism. I admire his determination to have the Senate speak. But I do not believe that this resolution is the appropriate action to take at this time. I urge my colleagues to table it. I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Minnesota is to be recognized. Mr. McCAIN. May I ask, for planning purposes, how long the Senator from Minnesota plans to speak? Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to keep this under 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I believe silence equals betrayal, and I think we should be debating this question. Besides having a great deal of respect for him, I appreciate his efforts. We may be in disagreement, but I thank the Senator from Arizona for his important efforts. It was with this deep belief in my soul that I voted 6 weeks ago to authorize the participation of the United States in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart and not without foreboding, because I knew once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence would likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence, and yet there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that it is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was about to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a rollcall vote on the subject, I sought to make sure that the Record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision, and today I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of the initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: the significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever the importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one: Inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence is absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has been, indeed, unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped: over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes; hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, and their homes and villages burned; women raped, thousands of the residents killed, and children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. Just last week, the Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horror goes on and on and on. I met a woman from Kosovo in my office on Friday with a businessman. They told me of four little children they had met in a refugee camp. The children had bandages over their eyes. They thought perhaps they had been near an explosion. That was not the case. The Serbs had raped their mother. They had witnessed the rape, and the Serbs cut their eyes out--they cut their eyes out. I do not understand this level of hatred. I do not understand this frame of reference. I have no way of knowing how people can do this. We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands are homeless, without shelter and food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators. And we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway by our own Government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations, and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of the unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain. There will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now. So long as our military forces are engaged in this mission, they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts [[Page S4517]] to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week, I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pushing and pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets. I would like to see an equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott, and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's view on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political, and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb security forces--or at least to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for nongovernmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. We need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including the key issue of the composition of an international military presence--and it must be a military presence--to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be responsible and flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the United States, and that United States-Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We really need to put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. I think, as I have said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the U.S. Government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million dollars to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and other NATO allies who will share this burden will be called upon to do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development, and relocation aid all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of millions of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo and deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and a very high human cost. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear that we made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied, and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying antimissile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward with these airstrikes against these paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks on civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. Mr. President, it is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on and on and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly nonmilitary targets appear to be selected--including the radio and TV network, Milosevic party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual-use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb war effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not the least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target list in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion of civilian, industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. What are the future military plans being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? Mr. President, this resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me in some ways of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam war. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops. The President of the United States has not asked Congress to authorize them. We should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And we should have the debate. Once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it is time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable timeout. Yes, a timeout before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it is too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counterproposals being discussed. [[Page S4518]] Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends in and out of NATO are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing on the floor of the Senate for consideration, if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops and would not risk Serb resupply of the war machine, is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be the slide toward the bombing of a broader array of nonmilitary targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort; but a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. .I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. Such a pause may well be worthwhile, if it works to prompt the cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons. .It may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's larger term goals, which I support, can be met. .A brief cessation might also enable nongovernmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in and then distribute relief supplies to the internally displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. .These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. .I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea and other similar proposals in their discussion today. .I intend to explore and refine these ideas further with administration officials in the coming days to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive. .I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. .But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. .One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. I am not just talking about a geographical or geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. .I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. .For 50 years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. .I believe we must again work with the Europeans, and now with the Russians and others, who have historic ties to the Serbs to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. .Stepped up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Silence equals betrayal. It was with that belief deep in my soul that I voted, six weeks ago, to authorize the United States participation in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart, and not without foreboding, because I knew that, once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence will likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence. And yet, there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that that is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility, and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was beginning to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a roll call vote on this subject, I sought to make sure that the record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision. And today, I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of that initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: The significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one--inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence was absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has indeed been unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped. Over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes. Hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, their homes and villages burned. Women raped, thousands of the residents killed, children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. From Acareva to Zim, villages in Kosovo have been burned by Serb forces. In Cirez, as many as 20,000 Albanian refugees were reportedly recently used as human shields against NATO bombings. In Djakovica, over 100 ethnic Albanians were reportedly summarily executed by Serb forces. In Goden, the Serbs reportedly executed over 20 men, including schoolteachers, before burning the village to the ground. In Kuraz, 21 schoolteachers were reported by refugees to have been executed in this village near Srbica, with hundreds more being held there by Serb paramilitary forces. In Pastasel, the bodies of over 70 ethnic Albanians, ranging in age from 14 to 50, were discovered by refugees on April 1. In Podujevo, Serb forces may have executed over 200 military- age Kosovar men, removing some from their cars and shooting them on the spot, at point-blank range. In Pristina, the Serbs appear to have completed their military operations in the city and have been ethnically cleansing the entire city. Approximately 25,000 Kosovars were forcibly expelled from the city last month, shipped to Macedonia by rail cars in scenes eerily reminiscent of the holocaust trains, and approximately 200,000 more may be detained there, awaiting their forced expulsion. In Prizren, Serb forces reportedly executed between 20 and 30 civilians. In Srbica, after emptying the town of its Kosovar inhabitants, Serb forces are believed to have executed 115 ethnic Albanian males over the age of 18. Over twenty thousand prisoners are reportedly still being housed in an ammunition factory near the town, under Serbian guard. Just last week, Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horrors goes on and on. [[Page S4519]] We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands homeless, without shelter and without food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators and we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway, by our own government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless non- governmental humanitarian relief organizations and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of this unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain, and there will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now, and so long as our military forces are engaged in this mission they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' And I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are, and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets--I would like to see equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's views on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb Security forces--or at least, to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for non-governmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. And we need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including on the key issue of the composition of an international military presence to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the U.S., and that US- Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We need to really put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. And I think, as I've said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The situation is so tense that it is being reported there have been near-riots in some camps over the desperate conditions there, and the situation in camps near Blace in Macedonia and at Kukes in northern Albania are especially grim. Shortly, we will consider an emergency supplemental package to fund the military and humanitarian costs for the Kosovo crisis. I am deeply concerned that the amount requested for refugee assistance may not be enough to meet the overwhelming needs of this emergency--the largest refugee crisis since World War II. We are meeting the military challenge by spending millions a day to assist NATO in its war against Serb aggression. The humanitarian challenge we face is just as great. If we have learned anything in recent weeks, it is that we must prepare for the worst of the worst- case scenarios. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still trapped inside Kosovo, waiting for an opportunity to escape. A further massive exodus seems likely. We must be prepared to meet their needs. Extensive medical supplies and possibly another field hospital will also be needed, since more and more new arrivals are requiring medical attention. Our experience in Bosnia has taught us that these refugees will not be going home anytime soon. Long-term assistance is required. Further, we must support Albania and Macedonia who are struggling to meet basic needs of their own people, let alone those of the Kosovar refugees. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo, and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the US government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and our other NATO allies who share this burden will be called upon do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development and relocation aid--all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo, and to deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and very high human costs. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying that the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear we have made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, and other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying anti-missile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward our air strikes against those paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks against civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. There will be time to determine whether our bombing accelerated, or whether it increased, the slaughter. In any case, it now seems clear, from detailed and credible reports in the media and elsewhere, that the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, labeled the other day by the Washington Post as ``one of the most ambitiously ruthless military campaigns in Europe in half a century,'' was carefully and meticulously planned for months before the bombing. The attacks have reportedly seriously damaged over 250 villages, with well over 50 being completely burned to the ground. Systematically integrating Interior Ministry (MUP) forces, regular Yugoslav army forces, police units and paramilitary gangs for the first time, [[Page S4520]] this effort was clearly coldly calculated to terrorize the populace, and ultimately to rid the entire province of its ethnic Albanian majority. It is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on, and on, and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly non-military targets appear to be selected--including the radio and tv network, the Milosevic Party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb War effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target lists in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion to civilian industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. I am also very concerned about reports from the NATO summit that future targeting decisions will likely be placed in the hands of NATO military officials, without careful review of elected civilian representatives--a policy that I think is at odds with our constitutional insistence upon civilian control. And what other future military plans are being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? While I recognize the legitimate concern of NATO military officials that we must not put pilots' lives at risk to hit oil production and distribution facilities servicing the Serb armies, while allowing oil to pour in to them through ports in Montenegro or through other means, we must be very careful as we proceed here. And then there is the question of the introduction of ground troops. After the NATO summit last weekend, plans are being ``taken off the shelf and updated.'' Propositioning of ground troops is being advocated by some within our own government. It doesn't take clairvoyance to see where some seem to be headed. This resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me, in some ways, of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam War. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops, the President of the U.S. has not asked Congress to authorize them; we should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now, under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And so, once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it's time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable time-out. Yes, a time-out, before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it's too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counter proposals being discussed. Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends, in and out of NATO, are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing for consideration--if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops, and would not risk Serb resupply of their war machine--is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be a slide toward the bombing of a broader array of non-military targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort. But a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses, and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. I know there are risks and costs associated with such an even temporary halt in the airstrikes. I am not yet sure, for example, that we could develop a verifiable time-out plan which would prevent Serb forces from quickly repairing their air defense systems such that they would pose new risks to NATO pilots; that cannot be allowed. I know there would be real problems in verifying that Serb attacks on the ground in Kosovo had stopped, and military and paramilitary units were actually pulling back, during any bombing pause. I am no military expert, but I am posing those and other questions to US military officials and others, to see if there is not room for such an initiative. Such a pause may well be worthwhile; if it works to prompt a cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons, it may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's longer-term goals, which I support, can be met. A brief cessation might also enable non-governmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in, and then distribute, relief supplies to the internally-displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea, and other similar proposals, in their discussion today. I intend to explore and refine this idea further with Administration officials in the coming days, to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive, and I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. It has been argued by the Administration and others that an intense and sustained conflict in Kosovo, which has sent hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders and could potentially draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into a wider war would be disastrous. That is true. We may not be able to contain a wider Balkan war [[Page S4521]] without far greater risk and cost than has been contemplated. And we could well face an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than we face now in the weeks and months to come. I am not just talking about a geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. For fifty years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. I believe we must again work with the Europeans--and now with the Russians and others who have historic ties to the Serbs--to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and of the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. Stepped-up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Arkansas as he may consume. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I especially thank him for his strong leadership on this issue and for pushing this issue to the point that we are having this debate on the floor of the Senate. I have believed for some time that this debate has been sorely needed and greatly lacking. Senator McCain is truly an American hero. He is one that I respect immensely, along with Senator Hagel and the other cosponsors of this resolution. Though I disagree with them and though I rise in opposition to the resolution, I believe they have taken a principled position, a principled stand that is justifiable and behind which there are rational arguments. I believe they reciprocate that respect for the principled position and belief that we do not have a vital national interest in the Balkans and that we have made a policy mistake and that given where we are, the placement of ground troops is not the next step that we should be taking. I regret the silence that has characterized Congress to this point, particularly the Senate. I applaud those who have pushed that we might have this time today. As I read the resolution, I read that it authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means. That, I do believe, is a blank check. I believe it grants blanket authority, and it does take us out of what is a very, very important role for the Congress. I read also that all necessary force and other means is granted to accomplish NATO's objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. One of the questions I have is, what are our objectives? I do not believe those objectives have been clearly outlined. Does the resolution refer to military objectives, which we have been told means to degrade the military capability of Milosevic--whatever that term ``degrade'' may mean, subjective as it is--or does this reference to the objectives of NATO refer to political objectives, which have been defined in a much broader sense in reference to the withdrawal of Milosevic, the incorporation of an international peacekeeping force, humanitarian aid and a number of things? So I am not certain what objectives are in mind in the resolution or how one would determine whether or not they have been achieved. When I made reference to the silence that I think has been embarrassing for the Senate, I think Members of the Senate have been reluctant to speak on this for a couple of reasons. We have been reticent to speak out because nobody wants to be portrayed as not being in support of American troops. I went to Aviano. We have the bravest young men and women imaginable involved in this. They are willing and have been risking their lives daily in pursuit of this policy and the orders they have been given. I support them and I believe in them. I believe in their effectiveness and I believe in their courage. But I think that is one reason people have been hesitant to get into this debate, because they are afraid of being portrayed as not being supportive of the military, and also because of the horrible atrocities that have been committed by the Serbs and the

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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Senate - May 03, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S4514-S4547] DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 20, which the clerk will report. The legislative assistant read as follows: A resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCAIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator. Mr. WELLSTONE. I know Senator Byrd wants to speak. I wonder whether I could ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from West Virginia speak, I be allowed to speak. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Today, Mr. President, the Senate should begin a constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership, both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the President of the United States, has determined that we will limit debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead this nation can be avoided indefinitely. I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now is not the time for this debate. When is the right time, Mr. President? After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the outcome is known? Shall those who oppose NATO's attack on Serbia wait until NATO's defeat is certain before voting their conscience? Shall those of us who believe American interests and values are now so at risk in the Balkans that they must be protected by all necessary force wait until victory is certain before voting our conscience? I would hope not, Mr. President. For that would mean that we have allowed American pilots and, possibly, American soldiers to risk their lives for a cause that we will not risk our careers for. I think we are better people than that. I think we are a better institution than that. And I think we should use this debate to prove it. All Senators should, for a start, use the opportunity provided by debate on this resolution to declare unequivocally their support or opposition for the war. Having declared their support or opposition, Senators should then endorse that course of action allowed Congress that logically and ethically corresponds to their views on the war. If Senators believe this war is worth fighting, then recognize that the President should exercise the authority vested in his office to use the power of the United States effectively to achieve victory as quickly as possible. If Senators believe that this war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure necessary to win it, then take the only course open to you to prevent further bloodshed. Vote to refuse the funds necessary to prosecute it. Senators cannot say that they oppose the war, but support our pilots, and then allow our pilots to continue fighting a war that they believe cannot justify their loss. If the war is not worth fighting for, then it is not worth letting Americans die for it. Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such a message to our servicemen and women, to the American public and to the world. They voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces. Such a contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the Senate not see our duty a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to our words? Should we meet our responsibilities honorably, we will not only have acted more forthrightly than the other body, we will have acted more forthrightly than has the President. The supporters of this resolution find ourselves defending the authority of the Presidency without the support of the President, a curious, but sadly, not unexpected position. Opponents have observed that the resolution gives the President authority he has not asked for. They are correct. The President has not asked for this resolution. Indeed, it is quite evident that he shares the leadership's preference that the Senate not address this matter. But, in truth, he need not ask for this authority. He possesses it already, whether he wants it or not. I cannot join my Republican friends in the other body by supporting the unconstitutional presumptions of the War Powers Act. Every Congress and every President since the act's inception has ignored it with good reason until now. We should have repealed the Act long ago, but that would have required us to surrender a little of the ambiguity that we find so useful in this city. Only Congress can declare war. But Congress cannot deny the President the ability to use force unless we refuse him the funds to do so. By taking neither aciton, Congress leaves the President free to prosecute this war to whatever extent he deems necessary. Although I can speak only for myself, I believe the sponsors of this resolution offered it to encourage the President to do what almost every experienced statesmen has said he should do--prepare for the use of ground troops in Kosovo if they are necessary to achieve victory. Regrettably, the President owuld rather not be encouraged. But his irresponsibility does not excuse Congress'. I beleive it is now imperative that we pass this resolution to distinguish the powers of the Presidency from the muddled claim made upon them by the House of Representatives. During the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this resolution, my friend, the Senator from Missouri, Senator Ashcroft, criticized the wording as too broad a grant of authority to the President, and an infringement of congressional authority. How, Mr. President, can Congress claim authority that it neither possesses constitutionally nor, as we see, cares to exercise even if we did possess it? No, Mr. President, the authority belongs to the President unless we deny it to him by means expressly identified in the Constitution. In short, and I welcome arguments to the contrary, only Congress can declare war but the President can wage one unless we deprive him of the means to do so. Therefore, I feel it is urgent that the Senate contradict the actions of the other body and clarify to the public, and to America's allies and our enemies that the President may, indeed, wage this war. And, with our encouragement, he might wage this war more effectively than he has done thus far. If he does not, the shame is on him and not on us. I regret to say that I have on more than one occasion suspected, as I suspect today, that the President and some of us among the loyal opposition suffer from the same failing. It seems to me that the President, in his poll driven approach to his every responsibility, fails to distinguish the office he holds from himself. And some of us in Congress are so distrustful of the President that we feel obliged to damage the office in order to restrain the current occupant. Both sides have lost the ability to tell the office from the man. Publicly and repeatedly ruling out ground troops may be smart politics according to the President's pollster, but it is inexcusably irresponsible leadership. In this determination to put politics over national security, the President even acquiesced to the other body's attempt to deprive him of his office's authority. He sent a letter promising that he would seek Congress' permission to introduce ground troops in the unlikely event he ever discovers the will to use them. My Republican colleagues in the House, who sought to uphold a law that [[Page S4515]] I doubt any of them believed in before last week, should take greater care with an office that will prove vital to our security in the years ahead. President Clinton will not stand for re-election again. Twenty months from now we will have a new President. And whoever he or she is will need all the powers of the office to begin to repair the terrible damage that this President has done to the national security interests of the United States. It is to avoid further damage to those interests and to the office of the President that I ask my colleagues to consider voting for this resolution. The irony that this resolution is being considered only because of a statute I oppose is not lost on me. But bad laws often produce unexpected irony along with their other, more damaging effects. So we have made what good use of it we can. We are here beginning a debate that many did not want, and few will mind seeing disposed of quickly. In my opening comments, I know I have spoken provocatively. Although I believe my points are correct, I could have been a little more restrained in offering them. I was not because I hope it will encourage, perhaps incite is a better word, greater debate today than is contemplated by our leaders. I meant to offend no one, but if any took offense, I hope they will come to the floor to make their case. Let us have the kind of debate today that the matter we are considering surely deserves. Mr. President, we are debating war. Not Bill Clinton's war. Not Madeleine Albright's war. America's war. It became America's war the moment the first American flew into harm's way to fight it. Nothing anyone can do will change that. If we lose this war, the entire country, and the world will suffer the consequences. Yes, the President would leave office with yet another mark against him. But he will not suffer this indignity alone. We will all be less secure. We will all be dishonored. This is America's war, and we are America's elected leaders. As we speak, tens of thousands of Americans are ready to die if they must to win it. They risk their lives for us, and for the values that define our good Nation. Can we not risk our political fortunes for them? Don't they deserve more than a few hours of perfunctory and sparsely attended debate? They do, Mr. President, they deserve much better than that. We might lose those vote and we might lose it badly. That would be a tragedy. But I would rather fight and lose, than not fight at all. I hope that an extended debate might persuade more Members to support the resolution. The resolution does not instruct the President to begin a ground war in Yugoslavia. Nor does it grant the President authority he does not already possess. Nor does it require the President to pursue additional objectives in the Balkans. But if Members would be more comfortable if those objectives and realities were expressed in the resolution than I am sure the sponsors would welcome amendments to that effect. But even if a majority of Members can never be persuaded to support this resolution, let us all agree that a debate--an honest, extensive, responsible debate--is appropriate in these circumstances. Surely, our consciences are agreed on that. Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how is the time controlled? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is equally divided between the proponents and the opponents. Mr. BYRD. Who has control of the time in opposition to the resolution? The PRESIDING OFFICER. No individual Senator has control. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, there is no division of time here. This is a unanimous consent agreement, that time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised that the time control is written in the War Powers Act. Mr. McCAIN. Thank you. I stand corrected. I appreciate the outstanding work of the Parliamentarian. On behalf of the other side, I ask unanimous consent to allow Senator Byrd to speak for as long as he may deem necessary. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I thank him for his courtesy. I thank him for his leadership on this resolution and for his leadership on many of the great issues that we have debated in this Senate from time to time. There are occasions when I vote with Mr. McCain. There are occasions when I feel that we do not see eye to eye. That is not to say that I do not have the greatest respect for his position, for his viewpoint. I do have. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain, and I commend the other Senators, Senator Biden and the others, who have cosponsored this resolution, for having the courage of their convictions and for standing up for that in which they believe. I am sorry that I cannot agree on this occasion, but there may be a time down the road when we will be working together and I can agree and they can agree with me. I shall not use more than 5 minutes, Mr. President. The course of action that they are advocating--giving the President blanket authority to use whatever force he deems necessary to resolve the Kosovo conflict--is a bold and possibly risky stroke. But whatever the outcome, they are forcing the Senate to confront the Kosovo crisis head-on, and that in itself is noteworthy. Unfortunately, this resolution troubles me for a number of reasons. First, in my judgment, it is premature. In response to a request from the President, the Senate authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia in March. To date, the President has not requested any expansion of that authority. In fact, he has specifically stated on numerous occasions that the use of ground troops is not being contemplated. I think that has been a mistake from the very beginning, virtually saying to the Yugoslavian leader that we have no intention whatsoever of confronting you with ground troops. That loosens whatever bonds or chains Mr. Milosevic may otherwise feel constrain him. But the President has not announced that. Now it is deep into our spring, and by the time we put ground troops on the ground, I assume it will be nearing winter in the Balkans. I think that the President has made a mistake from the very beginning in saying we have no intent. I would prefer to let Mr. Milosevic guess as to our intent than tell him we have no intent of doing thus and so. If the intent of this resolution is to send a message to Slobodan Milosevic that the United States is serious about its commitment to the NATO operation in Kosovo, there are better ways to accomplish that objective. Swift action on the emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the Kosovo operation would be a good first step. Second, this resolution has the practical effect of releasing the President from any obligation to consult with Congress over future action in Kosovo. With this language, the Senate is effectively bowing out of the Kosovo debate and ceding all authority to the executive branch. My friends may say that the Senate is not entertaining any debate anyhow, but at least it might do so. I do not think this is in the best interest of the Nation. The President needs to consult Congress, but nobody can seem to agree on just exactly what ``consultation'' means. The President has had a few of us down to the White House upon several occasions. I have gone upon three occasions, and I have declined to go upon one, I believe, but those consultations, while they are probably beneficial and should be had, are really not enough. But the President does need to consult with Congress, and if he determines ground troops are needed in Kosovo, he needs to make that case to the American people. He has to make the case. Nobody can make that case for him. The Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, cannot make the case. The Vice President cannot make the case. Who is going to listen to Sandy Berger? I am not going to listen very much. So who can make the case? Nobody but the President can really make the case. We in the Senate will do the President no favor by giving him the means to short circuit the process. Third, this resolution goes beyond policy and infringes on the power of [[Page S4516]] Congress to control the purse. If the Senate gives the President blanket authorization to ``use all necessary force and other means'' to accomplish the goals and objectives set by NATO for the Kosovo operation, the Senate has no choice but to back that up with a blank check to pay for it. I think I have to agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona in most of what he said. Practically speaking, he is exactly right. He is precisely correct when he says that the only real check that the Congress has upon the President is the power over the purse. Money talks. That is the raw power. Congress alone has that power. If we were to adopt this resolution, we would be essentially committing the United States to pay an undetermined amount of money for an unknown period of time to finance an uncertain and open-ended military offensive. Mr. President, that, by any standard, is not sound policy. I believe there are better ways for the Senate to address the conflict in Kosovo, ways in which we can encourage the administration to work with Congress and to listen to the views of the American people as expressed through their representatives in Congress. I have repeatedly urged the President to provide Congress--and the American people--with more details on the Kosovo strategy, including the projected level of U.S. involvement in terms of personnel and equipment, the estimated cost and source of funding, the expected duration and exit strategy, and the anticipated impact on military readiness and morale. Of course, we heard the promises made in connection with Bosnia: We were only going to be there a year. Repeatedly, we put that question to the administration people and they assured us, ``It will only take about a year.'' We have heard those promises before. We do not pay much attention to them anymore. Those assurances do not mean anything. The President has certainly made a good faith effort to date to consult on this matter, with Members of Congress, but we are only in the opening stages of this operation, and the path ahead is very unclear. The President would be well served to continue consulting closely with Congress and to seek Congressional support for any decision that he contemplates involving ground forces. For its part, the Senate should not take any action that would jeopardize this dialog, as I believe this resolution would do. Mr. President, again I commend Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and the other Senators who are cosponsors, for seeking a straightforward determination of the role that Congress will play in the Kosovo conflict. There is no question where the Senator from Arizona stands. He steps up to the plate, takes hold of the bat, says, here is how I stand, this is what I believe in. He is willing to have the Senate vote. I admire him for that. I admire his patriotism. I admire his determination to have the Senate speak. But I do not believe that this resolution is the appropriate action to take at this time. I urge my colleagues to table it. I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Minnesota is to be recognized. Mr. McCAIN. May I ask, for planning purposes, how long the Senator from Minnesota plans to speak? Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to keep this under 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I believe silence equals betrayal, and I think we should be debating this question. Besides having a great deal of respect for him, I appreciate his efforts. We may be in disagreement, but I thank the Senator from Arizona for his important efforts. It was with this deep belief in my soul that I voted 6 weeks ago to authorize the participation of the United States in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart and not without foreboding, because I knew once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence would likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence, and yet there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that it is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was about to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a rollcall vote on the subject, I sought to make sure that the Record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision, and today I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of the initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: the significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever the importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one: Inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence is absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has been, indeed, unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped: over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes; hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, and their homes and villages burned; women raped, thousands of the residents killed, and children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. Just last week, the Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horror goes on and on and on. I met a woman from Kosovo in my office on Friday with a businessman. They told me of four little children they had met in a refugee camp. The children had bandages over their eyes. They thought perhaps they had been near an explosion. That was not the case. The Serbs had raped their mother. They had witnessed the rape, and the Serbs cut their eyes out--they cut their eyes out. I do not understand this level of hatred. I do not understand this frame of reference. I have no way of knowing how people can do this. We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands are homeless, without shelter and food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators. And we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway by our own Government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations, and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of the unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain. There will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now. So long as our military forces are engaged in this mission, they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts [[Page S4517]] to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week, I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pushing and pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets. I would like to see an equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott, and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's view on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political, and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb security forces--or at least to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for nongovernmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. We need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including the key issue of the composition of an international military presence--and it must be a military presence--to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be responsible and flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the United States, and that United States-Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We really need to put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. I think, as I have said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the U.S. Government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million dollars to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and other NATO allies who will share this burden will be called upon to do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development, and relocation aid all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of millions of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo and deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and a very high human cost. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear that we made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied, and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying antimissile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward with these airstrikes against these paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks on civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. Mr. President, it is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on and on and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly nonmilitary targets appear to be selected--including the radio and TV network, Milosevic party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual-use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb war effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not the least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target list in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion of civilian, industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. What are the future military plans being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? Mr. President, this resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me in some ways of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam war. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops. The President of the United States has not asked Congress to authorize them. We should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And we should have the debate. Once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it is time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable timeout. Yes, a timeout before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it is too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counterproposals being discussed. [[Page S4518]] Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends in and out of NATO are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing on the floor of the Senate for consideration, if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops and would not risk Serb resupply of the war machine, is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be the slide toward the bombing of a broader array of nonmilitary targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort; but a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. .I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. Such a pause may well be worthwhile, if it works to prompt the cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons. .It may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's larger term goals, which I support, can be met. .A brief cessation might also enable nongovernmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in and then distribute relief supplies to the internally displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. .These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. .I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea and other similar proposals in their discussion today. .I intend to explore and refine these ideas further with administration officials in the coming days to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive. .I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. .But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. .One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. I am not just talking about a geographical or geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. .I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. .For 50 years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. .I believe we must again work with the Europeans, and now with the Russians and others, who have historic ties to the Serbs to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. .Stepped up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Silence equals betrayal. It was with that belief deep in my soul that I voted, six weeks ago, to authorize the United States participation in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart, and not without foreboding, because I knew that, once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence will likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence. And yet, there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that that is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility, and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was beginning to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a roll call vote on this subject, I sought to make sure that the record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision. And today, I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of that initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: The significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one--inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence was absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has indeed been unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped. Over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes. Hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, their homes and villages burned. Women raped, thousands of the residents killed, children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. From Acareva to Zim, villages in Kosovo have been burned by Serb forces. In Cirez, as many as 20,000 Albanian refugees were reportedly recently used as human shields against NATO bombings. In Djakovica, over 100 ethnic Albanians were reportedly summarily executed by Serb forces. In Goden, the Serbs reportedly executed over 20 men, including schoolteachers, before burning the village to the ground. In Kuraz, 21 schoolteachers were reported by refugees to have been executed in this village near Srbica, with hundreds more being held there by Serb paramilitary forces. In Pastasel, the bodies of over 70 ethnic Albanians, ranging in age from 14 to 50, were discovered by refugees on April 1. In Podujevo, Serb forces may have executed over 200 military- age Kosovar men, removing some from their cars and shooting them on the spot, at point-blank range. In Pristina, the Serbs appear to have completed their military operations in the city and have been ethnically cleansing the entire city. Approximately 25,000 Kosovars were forcibly expelled from the city last month, shipped to Macedonia by rail cars in scenes eerily reminiscent of the holocaust trains, and approximately 200,000 more may be detained there, awaiting their forced expulsion. In Prizren, Serb forces reportedly executed between 20 and 30 civilians. In Srbica, after emptying the town of its Kosovar inhabitants, Serb forces are believed to have executed 115 ethnic Albanian males over the age of 18. Over twenty thousand prisoners are reportedly still being housed in an ammunition factory near the town, under Serbian guard. Just last week, Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horrors goes on and on. [[Page S4519]] We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands homeless, without shelter and without food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators and we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway, by our own government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless non- governmental humanitarian relief organizations and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of this unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain, and there will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now, and so long as our military forces are engaged in this mission they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' And I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are, and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets--I would like to see equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's views on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb Security forces--or at least, to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for non-governmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. And we need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including on the key issue of the composition of an international military presence to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the U.S., and that US- Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We need to really put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. And I think, as I've said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The situation is so tense that it is being reported there have been near-riots in some camps over the desperate conditions there, and the situation in camps near Blace in Macedonia and at Kukes in northern Albania are especially grim. Shortly, we will consider an emergency supplemental package to fund the military and humanitarian costs for the Kosovo crisis. I am deeply concerned that the amount requested for refugee assistance may not be enough to meet the overwhelming needs of this emergency--the largest refugee crisis since World War II. We are meeting the military challenge by spending millions a day to assist NATO in its war against Serb aggression. The humanitarian challenge we face is just as great. If we have learned anything in recent weeks, it is that we must prepare for the worst of the worst- case scenarios. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still trapped inside Kosovo, waiting for an opportunity to escape. A further massive exodus seems likely. We must be prepared to meet their needs. Extensive medical supplies and possibly another field hospital will also be needed, since more and more new arrivals are requiring medical attention. Our experience in Bosnia has taught us that these refugees will not be going home anytime soon. Long-term assistance is required. Further, we must support Albania and Macedonia who are struggling to meet basic needs of their own people, let alone those of the Kosovar refugees. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo, and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the US government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and our other NATO allies who share this burden will be called upon do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development and relocation aid--all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo, and to deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and very high human costs. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying that the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear we have made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, and other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying anti-missile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward our air strikes against those paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks against civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. There will be time to determine whether our bombing accelerated, or whether it increased, the slaughter. In any case, it now seems clear, from detailed and credible reports in the media and elsewhere, that the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, labeled the other day by the Washington Post as ``one of the most ambitiously ruthless military campaigns in Europe in half a century,'' was carefully and meticulously planned for months before the bombing. The attacks have reportedly seriously damaged over 250 villages, with well over 50 being completely burned to the ground. Systematically integrating Interior Ministry (MUP) forces, regular Yugoslav army forces, police units and paramilitary gangs for the first time, [[Page S4520]] this effort was clearly coldly calculated to terrorize the populace, and ultimately to rid the entire province of its ethnic Albanian majority. It is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on, and on, and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly non-military targets appear to be selected--including the radio and tv network, the Milosevic Party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb War effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target lists in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion to civilian industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. I am also very concerned about reports from the NATO summit that future targeting decisions will likely be placed in the hands of NATO military officials, without careful review of elected civilian representatives--a policy that I think is at odds with our constitutional insistence upon civilian control. And what other future military plans are being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? While I recognize the legitimate concern of NATO military officials that we must not put pilots' lives at risk to hit oil production and distribution facilities servicing the Serb armies, while allowing oil to pour in to them through ports in Montenegro or through other means, we must be very careful as we proceed here. And then there is the question of the introduction of ground troops. After the NATO summit last weekend, plans are being ``taken off the shelf and updated.'' Propositioning of ground troops is being advocated by some within our own government. It doesn't take clairvoyance to see where some seem to be headed. This resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me, in some ways, of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam War. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops, the President of the U.S. has not asked Congress to authorize them; we should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now, under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And so, once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it's time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable time-out. Yes, a time-out, before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it's too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counter proposals being discussed. Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends, in and out of NATO, are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing for consideration--if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops, and would not risk Serb resupply of their war machine--is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be a slide toward the bombing of a broader array of non-military targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort. But a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses, and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. I know there are risks and costs associated with such an even temporary halt in the airstrikes. I am not yet sure, for example, that we could develop a verifiable time-out plan which would prevent Serb forces from quickly repairing their air defense systems such that they would pose new risks to NATO pilots; that cannot be allowed. I know there would be real problems in verifying that Serb attacks on the ground in Kosovo had stopped, and military and paramilitary units were actually pulling back, during any bombing pause. I am no military expert, but I am posing those and other questions to US military officials and others, to see if there is not room for such an initiative. Such a pause may well be worthwhile; if it works to prompt a cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons, it may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's longer-term goals, which I support, can be met. A brief cessation might also enable non-governmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in, and then distribute, relief supplies to the internally-displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea, and other similar proposals, in their discussion today. I intend to explore and refine this idea further with Administration officials in the coming days, to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive, and I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. It has been argued by the Administration and others that an intense and sustained conflict in Kosovo, which has sent hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders and could potentially draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into a wider war would be disastrous. That is true. We may not be able to contain a wider Balkan war [[Page S4521]] without far greater risk and cost than has been contemplated. And we could well face an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than we face now in the weeks and months to come. I am not just talking about a geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. For fifty years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. I believe we must again work with the Europeans--and now with the Russians and others who have historic ties to the Serbs--to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and of the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. Stepped-up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Arkansas as he may consume. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I especially thank him for his strong leadership on this issue and for pushing this issue to the point that we are having this debate on the floor of the Senate. I have believed for some time that this debate has been sorely needed and greatly lacking. Senator McCain is truly an American hero. He is one that I respect immensely, along with Senator Hagel and the other cosponsors of this resolution. Though I disagree with them and though I rise in opposition to the resolution, I believe they have taken a principled position, a principled stand that is justifiable and behind which there are rational arguments. I believe they reciprocate that respect for the principled position and belief that we do not have a vital national interest in the Balkans and that we have made a policy mistake and that given where we are, the placement of ground troops is not the next step that we should be taking. I regret the silence that has characterized Congress to this point, particularly the Senate. I applaud those who have pushed that we might have this time today. As I read the resolution, I read that it authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means. That, I do believe, is a blank check. I believe it grants blanket authority, and it does take us out of what is a very, very important role for the Congress. I read also that all necessary force and other means is granted to accomplish NATO's objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. One of the questions I have is, what are our objectives? I do not believe those objectives have been clearly outlined. Does the resolution refer to military objectives, which we have been told means to degrade the military capability of Milosevic--whatever that term ``degrade'' may mean, subjective as it is--or does this reference to the objectives of NATO refer to political objectives, which have been defined in a much broader sense in reference to the withdrawal of Milosevic, the incorporation of an international peacekeeping force, humanitarian aid and a number of things? So I am not certain what objectives are in mind in the resolution or how one would determine whether or not they have been achieved. When I made reference to the silence that I think has been embarrassing for the Senate, I think Members of the Senate have been reluctant to speak on this for a couple of reasons. We have been reticent to speak out because nobody wants to be portrayed as not being in support of American troops. I went to Aviano. We have the bravest young men and women imaginable involved in this. They are willing and have been risking their lives daily in pursuit of this policy and the orders they have been given. I support them and I believe in them. I believe in their effectiveness and I believe in their courage. But I think that is one reason people have been hesitant to get into this debate, because they are afraid of being portrayed as not being supportive of the military, and also because of the horrible atrocities that have been committed by the Serbs and the Milosevic

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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Senate - May 03, 1999)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S4514-S4547] DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 20, which the clerk will report. The legislative assistant read as follows: A resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCAIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator. Mr. WELLSTONE. I know Senator Byrd wants to speak. I wonder whether I could ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from West Virginia speak, I be allowed to speak. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Today, Mr. President, the Senate should begin a constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership, both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the President of the United States, has determined that we will limit debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead this nation can be avoided indefinitely. I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now is not the time for this debate. When is the right time, Mr. President? After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the outcome is known? Shall those who oppose NATO's attack on Serbia wait until NATO's defeat is certain before voting their conscience? Shall those of us who believe American interests and values are now so at risk in the Balkans that they must be protected by all necessary force wait until victory is certain before voting our conscience? I would hope not, Mr. President. For that would mean that we have allowed American pilots and, possibly, American soldiers to risk their lives for a cause that we will not risk our careers for. I think we are better people than that. I think we are a better institution than that. And I think we should use this debate to prove it. All Senators should, for a start, use the opportunity provided by debate on this resolution to declare unequivocally their support or opposition for the war. Having declared their support or opposition, Senators should then endorse that course of action allowed Congress that logically and ethically corresponds to their views on the war. If Senators believe this war is worth fighting, then recognize that the President should exercise the authority vested in his office to use the power of the United States effectively to achieve victory as quickly as possible. If Senators believe that this war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure necessary to win it, then take the only course open to you to prevent further bloodshed. Vote to refuse the funds necessary to prosecute it. Senators cannot say that they oppose the war, but support our pilots, and then allow our pilots to continue fighting a war that they believe cannot justify their loss. If the war is not worth fighting for, then it is not worth letting Americans die for it. Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such a message to our servicemen and women, to the American public and to the world. They voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces. Such a contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the Senate not see our duty a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to our words? Should we meet our responsibilities honorably, we will not only have acted more forthrightly than the other body, we will have acted more forthrightly than has the President. The supporters of this resolution find ourselves defending the authority of the Presidency without the support of the President, a curious, but sadly, not unexpected position. Opponents have observed that the resolution gives the President authority he has not asked for. They are correct. The President has not asked for this resolution. Indeed, it is quite evident that he shares the leadership's preference that the Senate not address this matter. But, in truth, he need not ask for this authority. He possesses it already, whether he wants it or not. I cannot join my Republican friends in the other body by supporting the unconstitutional presumptions of the War Powers Act. Every Congress and every President since the act's inception has ignored it with good reason until now. We should have repealed the Act long ago, but that would have required us to surrender a little of the ambiguity that we find so useful in this city. Only Congress can declare war. But Congress cannot deny the President the ability to use force unless we refuse him the funds to do so. By taking neither aciton, Congress leaves the President free to prosecute this war to whatever extent he deems necessary. Although I can speak only for myself, I believe the sponsors of this resolution offered it to encourage the President to do what almost every experienced statesmen has said he should do--prepare for the use of ground troops in Kosovo if they are necessary to achieve victory. Regrettably, the President owuld rather not be encouraged. But his irresponsibility does not excuse Congress'. I beleive it is now imperative that we pass this resolution to distinguish the powers of the Presidency from the muddled claim made upon them by the House of Representatives. During the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this resolution, my friend, the Senator from Missouri, Senator Ashcroft, criticized the wording as too broad a grant of authority to the President, and an infringement of congressional authority. How, Mr. President, can Congress claim authority that it neither possesses constitutionally nor, as we see, cares to exercise even if we did possess it? No, Mr. President, the authority belongs to the President unless we deny it to him by means expressly identified in the Constitution. In short, and I welcome arguments to the contrary, only Congress can declare war but the President can wage one unless we deprive him of the means to do so. Therefore, I feel it is urgent that the Senate contradict the actions of the other body and clarify to the public, and to America's allies and our enemies that the President may, indeed, wage this war. And, with our encouragement, he might wage this war more effectively than he has done thus far. If he does not, the shame is on him and not on us. I regret to say that I have on more than one occasion suspected, as I suspect today, that the President and some of us among the loyal opposition suffer from the same failing. It seems to me that the President, in his poll driven approach to his every responsibility, fails to distinguish the office he holds from himself. And some of us in Congress are so distrustful of the President that we feel obliged to damage the office in order to restrain the current occupant. Both sides have lost the ability to tell the office from the man. Publicly and repeatedly ruling out ground troops may be smart politics according to the President's pollster, but it is inexcusably irresponsible leadership. In this determination to put politics over national security, the President even acquiesced to the other body's attempt to deprive him of his office's authority. He sent a letter promising that he would seek Congress' permission to introduce ground troops in the unlikely event he ever discovers the will to use them. My Republican colleagues in the House, who sought to uphold a law that [[Page S4515]] I doubt any of them believed in before last week, should take greater care with an office that will prove vital to our security in the years ahead. President Clinton will not stand for re-election again. Twenty months from now we will have a new President. And whoever he or she is will need all the powers of the office to begin to repair the terrible damage that this President has done to the national security interests of the United States. It is to avoid further damage to those interests and to the office of the President that I ask my colleagues to consider voting for this resolution. The irony that this resolution is being considered only because of a statute I oppose is not lost on me. But bad laws often produce unexpected irony along with their other, more damaging effects. So we have made what good use of it we can. We are here beginning a debate that many did not want, and few will mind seeing disposed of quickly. In my opening comments, I know I have spoken provocatively. Although I believe my points are correct, I could have been a little more restrained in offering them. I was not because I hope it will encourage, perhaps incite is a better word, greater debate today than is contemplated by our leaders. I meant to offend no one, but if any took offense, I hope they will come to the floor to make their case. Let us have the kind of debate today that the matter we are considering surely deserves. Mr. President, we are debating war. Not Bill Clinton's war. Not Madeleine Albright's war. America's war. It became America's war the moment the first American flew into harm's way to fight it. Nothing anyone can do will change that. If we lose this war, the entire country, and the world will suffer the consequences. Yes, the President would leave office with yet another mark against him. But he will not suffer this indignity alone. We will all be less secure. We will all be dishonored. This is America's war, and we are America's elected leaders. As we speak, tens of thousands of Americans are ready to die if they must to win it. They risk their lives for us, and for the values that define our good Nation. Can we not risk our political fortunes for them? Don't they deserve more than a few hours of perfunctory and sparsely attended debate? They do, Mr. President, they deserve much better than that. We might lose those vote and we might lose it badly. That would be a tragedy. But I would rather fight and lose, than not fight at all. I hope that an extended debate might persuade more Members to support the resolution. The resolution does not instruct the President to begin a ground war in Yugoslavia. Nor does it grant the President authority he does not already possess. Nor does it require the President to pursue additional objectives in the Balkans. But if Members would be more comfortable if those objectives and realities were expressed in the resolution than I am sure the sponsors would welcome amendments to that effect. But even if a majority of Members can never be persuaded to support this resolution, let us all agree that a debate--an honest, extensive, responsible debate--is appropriate in these circumstances. Surely, our consciences are agreed on that. Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how is the time controlled? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is equally divided between the proponents and the opponents. Mr. BYRD. Who has control of the time in opposition to the resolution? The PRESIDING OFFICER. No individual Senator has control. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, there is no division of time here. This is a unanimous consent agreement, that time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised that the time control is written in the War Powers Act. Mr. McCAIN. Thank you. I stand corrected. I appreciate the outstanding work of the Parliamentarian. On behalf of the other side, I ask unanimous consent to allow Senator Byrd to speak for as long as he may deem necessary. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I thank him for his courtesy. I thank him for his leadership on this resolution and for his leadership on many of the great issues that we have debated in this Senate from time to time. There are occasions when I vote with Mr. McCain. There are occasions when I feel that we do not see eye to eye. That is not to say that I do not have the greatest respect for his position, for his viewpoint. I do have. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain, and I commend the other Senators, Senator Biden and the others, who have cosponsored this resolution, for having the courage of their convictions and for standing up for that in which they believe. I am sorry that I cannot agree on this occasion, but there may be a time down the road when we will be working together and I can agree and they can agree with me. I shall not use more than 5 minutes, Mr. President. The course of action that they are advocating--giving the President blanket authority to use whatever force he deems necessary to resolve the Kosovo conflict--is a bold and possibly risky stroke. But whatever the outcome, they are forcing the Senate to confront the Kosovo crisis head-on, and that in itself is noteworthy. Unfortunately, this resolution troubles me for a number of reasons. First, in my judgment, it is premature. In response to a request from the President, the Senate authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia in March. To date, the President has not requested any expansion of that authority. In fact, he has specifically stated on numerous occasions that the use of ground troops is not being contemplated. I think that has been a mistake from the very beginning, virtually saying to the Yugoslavian leader that we have no intention whatsoever of confronting you with ground troops. That loosens whatever bonds or chains Mr. Milosevic may otherwise feel constrain him. But the President has not announced that. Now it is deep into our spring, and by the time we put ground troops on the ground, I assume it will be nearing winter in the Balkans. I think that the President has made a mistake from the very beginning in saying we have no intent. I would prefer to let Mr. Milosevic guess as to our intent than tell him we have no intent of doing thus and so. If the intent of this resolution is to send a message to Slobodan Milosevic that the United States is serious about its commitment to the NATO operation in Kosovo, there are better ways to accomplish that objective. Swift action on the emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the Kosovo operation would be a good first step. Second, this resolution has the practical effect of releasing the President from any obligation to consult with Congress over future action in Kosovo. With this language, the Senate is effectively bowing out of the Kosovo debate and ceding all authority to the executive branch. My friends may say that the Senate is not entertaining any debate anyhow, but at least it might do so. I do not think this is in the best interest of the Nation. The President needs to consult Congress, but nobody can seem to agree on just exactly what ``consultation'' means. The President has had a few of us down to the White House upon several occasions. I have gone upon three occasions, and I have declined to go upon one, I believe, but those consultations, while they are probably beneficial and should be had, are really not enough. But the President does need to consult with Congress, and if he determines ground troops are needed in Kosovo, he needs to make that case to the American people. He has to make the case. Nobody can make that case for him. The Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, cannot make the case. The Vice President cannot make the case. Who is going to listen to Sandy Berger? I am not going to listen very much. So who can make the case? Nobody but the President can really make the case. We in the Senate will do the President no favor by giving him the means to short circuit the process. Third, this resolution goes beyond policy and infringes on the power of [[Page S4516]] Congress to control the purse. If the Senate gives the President blanket authorization to ``use all necessary force and other means'' to accomplish the goals and objectives set by NATO for the Kosovo operation, the Senate has no choice but to back that up with a blank check to pay for it. I think I have to agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona in most of what he said. Practically speaking, he is exactly right. He is precisely correct when he says that the only real check that the Congress has upon the President is the power over the purse. Money talks. That is the raw power. Congress alone has that power. If we were to adopt this resolution, we would be essentially committing the United States to pay an undetermined amount of money for an unknown period of time to finance an uncertain and open-ended military offensive. Mr. President, that, by any standard, is not sound policy. I believe there are better ways for the Senate to address the conflict in Kosovo, ways in which we can encourage the administration to work with Congress and to listen to the views of the American people as expressed through their representatives in Congress. I have repeatedly urged the President to provide Congress--and the American people--with more details on the Kosovo strategy, including the projected level of U.S. involvement in terms of personnel and equipment, the estimated cost and source of funding, the expected duration and exit strategy, and the anticipated impact on military readiness and morale. Of course, we heard the promises made in connection with Bosnia: We were only going to be there a year. Repeatedly, we put that question to the administration people and they assured us, ``It will only take about a year.'' We have heard those promises before. We do not pay much attention to them anymore. Those assurances do not mean anything. The President has certainly made a good faith effort to date to consult on this matter, with Members of Congress, but we are only in the opening stages of this operation, and the path ahead is very unclear. The President would be well served to continue consulting closely with Congress and to seek Congressional support for any decision that he contemplates involving ground forces. For its part, the Senate should not take any action that would jeopardize this dialog, as I believe this resolution would do. Mr. President, again I commend Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and the other Senators who are cosponsors, for seeking a straightforward determination of the role that Congress will play in the Kosovo conflict. There is no question where the Senator from Arizona stands. He steps up to the plate, takes hold of the bat, says, here is how I stand, this is what I believe in. He is willing to have the Senate vote. I admire him for that. I admire his patriotism. I admire his determination to have the Senate speak. But I do not believe that this resolution is the appropriate action to take at this time. I urge my colleagues to table it. I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Minnesota is to be recognized. Mr. McCAIN. May I ask, for planning purposes, how long the Senator from Minnesota plans to speak? Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to keep this under 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I believe silence equals betrayal, and I think we should be debating this question. Besides having a great deal of respect for him, I appreciate his efforts. We may be in disagreement, but I thank the Senator from Arizona for his important efforts. It was with this deep belief in my soul that I voted 6 weeks ago to authorize the participation of the United States in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart and not without foreboding, because I knew once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence would likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence, and yet there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that it is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was about to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a rollcall vote on the subject, I sought to make sure that the Record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision, and today I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of the initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: the significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever the importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one: Inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence is absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has been, indeed, unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped: over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes; hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, and their homes and villages burned; women raped, thousands of the residents killed, and children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. Just last week, the Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horror goes on and on and on. I met a woman from Kosovo in my office on Friday with a businessman. They told me of four little children they had met in a refugee camp. The children had bandages over their eyes. They thought perhaps they had been near an explosion. That was not the case. The Serbs had raped their mother. They had witnessed the rape, and the Serbs cut their eyes out--they cut their eyes out. I do not understand this level of hatred. I do not understand this frame of reference. I have no way of knowing how people can do this. We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands are homeless, without shelter and food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators. And we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway by our own Government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations, and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of the unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain. There will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now. So long as our military forces are engaged in this mission, they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts [[Page S4517]] to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week, I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pushing and pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets. I would like to see an equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott, and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's view on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political, and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb security forces--or at least to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for nongovernmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. We need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including the key issue of the composition of an international military presence--and it must be a military presence--to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be responsible and flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the United States, and that United States-Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We really need to put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. I think, as I have said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the U.S. Government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million dollars to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and other NATO allies who will share this burden will be called upon to do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development, and relocation aid all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of millions of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo and deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and a very high human cost. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear that we made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied, and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying antimissile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward with these airstrikes against these paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks on civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. Mr. President, it is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on and on and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly nonmilitary targets appear to be selected--including the radio and TV network, Milosevic party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual-use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb war effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not the least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target list in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion of civilian, industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. What are the future military plans being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? Mr. President, this resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me in some ways of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam war. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops. The President of the United States has not asked Congress to authorize them. We should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And we should have the debate. Once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it is time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable timeout. Yes, a timeout before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it is too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counterproposals being discussed. [[Page S4518]] Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends in and out of NATO are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing on the floor of the Senate for consideration, if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops and would not risk Serb resupply of the war machine, is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be the slide toward the bombing of a broader array of nonmilitary targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort; but a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. .I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. Such a pause may well be worthwhile, if it works to prompt the cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons. .It may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's larger term goals, which I support, can be met. .A brief cessation might also enable nongovernmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in and then distribute relief supplies to the internally displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. .These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. .I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea and other similar proposals in their discussion today. .I intend to explore and refine these ideas further with administration officials in the coming days to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive. .I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. .But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. .One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. I am not just talking about a geographical or geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. .I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. .For 50 years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. .I believe we must again work with the Europeans, and now with the Russians and others, who have historic ties to the Serbs to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. .Stepped up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Silence equals betrayal. It was with that belief deep in my soul that I voted, six weeks ago, to authorize the United States participation in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart, and not without foreboding, because I knew that, once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's greatest superpower to put a stop to violence will likely lead to more violence. Violence begets violence. And yet, there are those extremely rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that that is the only remaining course available to us. I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every diplomatic possibility, and that our best and most credible information was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian disaster was beginning to occur. Just as the Senate was about to conduct a roll call vote on this subject, I sought to make sure that the record reflected the rightness of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands of innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces. I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision. And today, I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of that initial course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other rationales involved: The significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. Whatever importance these factors may have played in the decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one--inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence was absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped. I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated against the innocents of Kosovo has indeed been unspeakable. My only regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped. Over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their homes. Hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, their homes and villages burned. Women raped, thousands of the residents killed, children separated from their families. The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. From Acareva to Zim, villages in Kosovo have been burned by Serb forces. In Cirez, as many as 20,000 Albanian refugees were reportedly recently used as human shields against NATO bombings. In Djakovica, over 100 ethnic Albanians were reportedly summarily executed by Serb forces. In Goden, the Serbs reportedly executed over 20 men, including schoolteachers, before burning the village to the ground. In Kuraz, 21 schoolteachers were reported by refugees to have been executed in this village near Srbica, with hundreds more being held there by Serb paramilitary forces. In Pastasel, the bodies of over 70 ethnic Albanians, ranging in age from 14 to 50, were discovered by refugees on April 1. In Podujevo, Serb forces may have executed over 200 military- age Kosovar men, removing some from their cars and shooting them on the spot, at point-blank range. In Pristina, the Serbs appear to have completed their military operations in the city and have been ethnically cleansing the entire city. Approximately 25,000 Kosovars were forcibly expelled from the city last month, shipped to Macedonia by rail cars in scenes eerily reminiscent of the holocaust trains, and approximately 200,000 more may be detained there, awaiting their forced expulsion. In Prizren, Serb forces reportedly executed between 20 and 30 civilians. In Srbica, after emptying the town of its Kosovar inhabitants, Serb forces are believed to have executed 115 ethnic Albanian males over the age of 18. Over twenty thousand prisoners are reportedly still being housed in an ammunition factory near the town, under Serbian guard. Just last week, Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to their fellow refugees. The catalog of horrors goes on and on. [[Page S4519]] We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their doorstep. Hundreds of thousands homeless, without shelter and without food, wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding. Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators and we cry out for justice to be done. We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway, by our own government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless non- governmental humanitarian relief organizations and we weep at the abundant good that exists in the world in the face of this unspeakable horror. As I said, legitimate questions remain, and there will undoubtedly be hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter this conflict. But that time is not now, and so long as our military forces are engaged in this mission they deserve our full support. I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' And I believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we are, and where we are headed. First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week I think it is imperative that we put as much energy into pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting military targets--I would like to see equal emphasis on evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott and I think he is representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's views on how a settlement should be reached. I support the basic military, political and humanitarian goals which NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the withdrawal of Serb Security forces--or at least, to halt the bombing, a start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable; the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for non-governmental organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different ways to meet these goals. And we need to be open to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including on the key issue of the composition of an international military presence to establish and then keep the peace there. We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister-- a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement. Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and assure them that NATO will be flexible in its response. I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the U.S., and that US- Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if possible. I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We need to really put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. And I think, as I've said, the Russians may have a key role to play. Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps throughout the region. The situation is so tense that it is being reported there have been near-riots in some camps over the desperate conditions there, and the situation in camps near Blace in Macedonia and at Kukes in northern Albania are especially grim. Shortly, we will consider an emergency supplemental package to fund the military and humanitarian costs for the Kosovo crisis. I am deeply concerned that the amount requested for refugee assistance may not be enough to meet the overwhelming needs of this emergency--the largest refugee crisis since World War II. We are meeting the military challenge by spending millions a day to assist NATO in its war against Serb aggression. The humanitarian challenge we face is just as great. If we have learned anything in recent weeks, it is that we must prepare for the worst of the worst- case scenarios. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still trapped inside Kosovo, waiting for an opportunity to escape. A further massive exodus seems likely. We must be prepared to meet their needs. Extensive medical supplies and possibly another field hospital will also be needed, since more and more new arrivals are requiring medical attention. Our experience in Bosnia has taught us that these refugees will not be going home anytime soon. Long-term assistance is required. Further, we must support Albania and Macedonia who are struggling to meet basic needs of their own people, let alone those of the Kosovar refugees. The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo, and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the US government to be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well- being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding request by several hundred million to provide the aid that will be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we and our other NATO allies who share this burden will be called upon do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term economic development and relocation aid--all will be critical to relieving this crisis. Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of innocent civilians throughout Kosovo, and to deter further Serb aggression against them. So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and very high human costs. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying that the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic cleansing. While it is clear we have made progress in weakening the Serb military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo, oil and munitions sites, and other military sites, the hard truth is that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted, emptied and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying anti-missile systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward our air strikes against those paramilitary forces in Kosovo most responsible for the most brutal attacks against civilians. There can be no excuse for further delays. There will be time to determine whether our bombing accelerated, or whether it increased, the slaughter. In any case, it now seems clear, from detailed and credible reports in the media and elsewhere, that the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, labeled the other day by the Washington Post as ``one of the most ambitiously ruthless military campaigns in Europe in half a century,'' was carefully and meticulously planned for months before the bombing. The attacks have reportedly seriously damaged over 250 villages, with well over 50 being completely burned to the ground. Systematically integrating Interior Ministry (MUP) forces, regular Yugoslav army forces, police units and paramilitary gangs for the first time, [[Page S4520]] this effort was clearly coldly calculated to terrorize the populace, and ultimately to rid the entire province of its ethnic Albanian majority. It is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter. Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on, and on, and on. Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia, and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly non-military targets appear to be selected--including the radio and tv network, the Milosevic Party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual use targets, especially those directly related to the Serb War effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not least because it undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo. Expanding the target lists in this way is wrong. Not only does the expansion to civilian industrial and economic sites greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population-- people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine. I am also very concerned about reports from the NATO summit that future targeting decisions will likely be placed in the hands of NATO military officials, without careful review of elected civilian representatives--a policy that I think is at odds with our constitutional insistence upon civilian control. And what other future military plans are being discussed? These now apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the next targets of NATO forces? While I recognize the legitimate concern of NATO military officials that we must not put pilots' lives at risk to hit oil production and distribution facilities servicing the Serb armies, while allowing oil to pour in to them through ports in Montenegro or through other means, we must be very careful as we proceed here. And then there is the question of the introduction of ground troops. After the NATO summit last weekend, plans are being ``taken off the shelf and updated.'' Propositioning of ground troops is being advocated by some within our own government. It doesn't take clairvoyance to see where some seem to be headed. This resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me, in some ways, of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped trigger the Vietnam War. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground troops, the President of the U.S. has not asked Congress to authorize them; we should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now, under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict. And so, once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it's time for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable time-out. Yes, a time-out, before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope of further military action, before it's too late to turn back. There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are proposals and counter proposals being discussed. Some are being interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being explored. Some of our friends, in and out of NATO, are discussing various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work. With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what I am proposing for consideration--if it can be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops, and would not risk Serb resupply of their war machine--is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be a slide toward the bombing of a broader array of non-military targets, a potential oil embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I believe we could come to regret. I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open- ended halt in our effort. But a temporary pause of 48 hours or so, offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to resupply troops or to repair his air defenses, and that he immediately orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. I believe that we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring these horrors to an end. I know there are risks and costs associated with such an even temporary halt in the airstrikes. I am not yet sure, for example, that we could develop a verifiable time-out plan which would prevent Serb forces from quickly repairing their air defense systems such that they would pose new risks to NATO pilots; that cannot be allowed. I know there would be real problems in verifying that Serb attacks on the ground in Kosovo had stopped, and military and paramilitary units were actually pulling back, during any bombing pause. I am no military expert, but I am posing those and other questions to US military officials and others, to see if there is not room for such an initiative. Such a pause may well be worthwhile; if it works to prompt a cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their garrisons, it may create the conditions for the possibility of further talks on the conditions under which NATO's longer-term goals, which I support, can be met. A brief cessation might also enable non-governmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in, and then distribute, relief supplies to the internally-displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. These people must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to enable aid organizations to get to them. I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea, and other similar proposals, in their discussion today. I intend to explore and refine this idea further with Administration officials in the coming days, to see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive, and I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such exploration. But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further. One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks. It has been argued by the Administration and others that an intense and sustained conflict in Kosovo, which has sent hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders and could potentially draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into a wider war would be disastrous. That is true. We may not be able to contain a wider Balkan war [[Page S4521]] without far greater risk and cost than has been contemplated. And we could well face an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than we face now in the weeks and months to come. I am not just talking about a geopolitical abstraction, the stability of the region. I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan conflict. For fifty years, we have spent the blood and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe. I believe we must again work with the Europeans--and now with the Russians and others who have historic ties to the Serbs--to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and of the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. Stepped-up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be pursued right now. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Arkansas as he may consume. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I especially thank him for his strong leadership on this issue and for pushing this issue to the point that we are having this debate on the floor of the Senate. I have believed for some time that this debate has been sorely needed and greatly lacking. Senator McCain is truly an American hero. He is one that I respect immensely, along with Senator Hagel and the other cosponsors of this resolution. Though I disagree with them and though I rise in opposition to the resolution, I believe they have taken a principled position, a principled stand that is justifiable and behind which there are rational arguments. I believe they reciprocate that respect for the principled position and belief that we do not have a vital national interest in the Balkans and that we have made a policy mistake and that given where we are, the placement of ground troops is not the next step that we should be taking. I regret the silence that has characterized Congress to this point, particularly the Senate. I applaud those who have pushed that we might have this time today. As I read the resolution, I read that it authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means. That, I do believe, is a blank check. I believe it grants blanket authority, and it does take us out of what is a very, very important role for the Congress. I read also that all necessary force and other means is granted to accomplish NATO's objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. One of the questions I have is, what are our objectives? I do not believe those objectives have been clearly outlined. Does the resolution refer to military objectives, which we have been told means to degrade the military capability of Milosevic--whatever that term ``degrade'' may mean, subjective as it is--or does this reference to the objectives of NATO refer to political objectives, which have been defined in a much broader sense in reference to the withdrawal of Milosevic, the incorporation of an international peacekeeping force, humanitarian aid and a number of things? So I am not certain what objectives are in mind in the resolution or how one would determine whether or not they have been achieved. When I made reference to the silence that I think has been embarrassing for the Senate, I think Members of the Senate have been reluctant to speak on this for a couple of reasons. We have been reticent to speak out because nobody wants to be portrayed as not being in support of American troops. I went to Aviano. We have the bravest young men and women imaginable involved in this. They are willing and have been risking their lives daily in pursuit of this policy and the orders they have been given. I support them and I believe in them. I believe in their effectiveness and I believe in their courage. But I think that is one reason people have been hesitant to get into this debate, because they are afraid of being portrayed as not being supportive of the military, and also because of the horrible atrocities that have been committed by the Serbs and the