NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
(Senate - July 07, 1997)
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[Pages S6877-
S6906]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of
S.
936, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (
S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:
Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton,
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd,
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution
to our work on this amendment.
Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established,
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC] and the International
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the
International Nuclear Safety Program.
Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three
programs.
reduction in the ctr request
Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed,
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a
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cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III;
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat
of proliferation.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential
projects.
Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and
Ukraine.
I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was
motivated in part because:
Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally,
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.
In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific
projects and specific countries.
Belarus Decertification
The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified
in fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that
it remains in that status.
Japanese Container Purchase
The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer,
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the
50,000 container requirement.
In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new,
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and
deserves our support.
Unobligated CTR Funds
Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one.
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in
currently unobligated CTR funds.
For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year.
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24
elimination in Ukraine.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.
the material protection, control, and accounting program
Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear
materials.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's,
MPC improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific
examples: MPC upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable
material; upgraded MPC systems for all weapons-usable nuclear
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material at these
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sites; a national MPC training center has been established at
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC training courses and
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC upgrades
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at
several sites.
Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:
U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and
funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996
(funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
impact opportunities arise.
In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations,
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the
1998-2002 timeframe.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country.
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
International Nuclear Safety Program
Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear
reactors.
The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation,
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address,
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects,
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a
number of key activities have been completed, including:
Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine;
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important.
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant,
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are
funded through another program.
Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority
activities in 1998, that include:
Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges
and cooperative research and development between the Russian
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
This program is part of a larger international effort designed to
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international
nuclear reactor safety norms.
Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC Program; and $50 million
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further
Chernobyls.
I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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Amendment No. 658
(Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the
authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related
Department of Energy programs)
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask
unanimous consent it be made in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin
proposes an amendment numbered 658.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:
SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.
(a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by
$40,000,000.
(b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by
$19,000,000.
(c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
(d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by
$20,000,000.
(e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by
$60,000,000.
(f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is
hereby increased by $56,000,000.
(g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by
$25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e)
that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations
under such section 3103(1)(B)).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of
Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in
carrying out programs relating to international nuclear
safety that are necessary for national security in the amount
of $50,000,000.
(i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section
1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C.
2331) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use
of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the
development of programs relating to such use.''.
(j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year
1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts
available under the proceeding sentence shall be available
until September 30, 1999.''.
(j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110
Stat. 2732) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
(2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469)
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the
funding level requested by the administration for these important
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the
United States.
The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million,
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the
United
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States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be
used.
Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious
than the response has been so far.
One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut.
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material
available for threat or diversion.
So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan,
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia,
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states,
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr.
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos,
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this
area.
Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why?
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the
legislation.
They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops
of that situation.
The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry,
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the
recipient country.
Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance,
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr.
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All
of that must occur.
Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification,
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time,
this lengthy process of certification and notification and
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously
careful
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to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any
more.
I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact,
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage
throughout the world.
This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union
countries.
Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has,
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the
level of funding that the administration requested in three different
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC funds--that stands for
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and
administered by the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in
making progress on these programs.
We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S.
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective,
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on
that list.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or
programs like these.
Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19,
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong
support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in
the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for
the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs.
Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests
and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result
from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a
nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC)
program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are
inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of
criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by
the Committee, there will
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be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay
in achieving the program objectives by approximately two
years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three
years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in
Russia. Today, the MPC program has secured tens of tons of
material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites
where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly
Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds
are restored to this program, the work that could secure
hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for
full funding to continue this vital work.
The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy
instrument available to ensure that the world will not face
another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall
national security goal of helping to stabilize the former
Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and
Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the
operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in
the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety
culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with
Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the
Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that,
if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident
that would severely impact the region's political and
economic stability, the environment and our national
interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is
essential to help prevent that from happening.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been
essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic
missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of
warheads from strategic systems. Without this program,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons,
instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also
supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and
Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium
in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium
production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I
support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally
important program.
In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of
preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge
you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments
by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR.
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which
to threaten the United States or our allies.
Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote,
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with
nuclear weapons.
I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is
essential to our national security interests.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC in
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware,
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC Program in our own national
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC Program so that this
valuable work can continue without pause.
The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl,
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to
vote to restore this important program.
As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its
conviction that CTR, MPC, INSP, and related programs serve our
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC, and INSP, we buy ourselves a
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support
restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense
Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for
three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear
Safety program.
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Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former
Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
continues to be one of our highest security priorities.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance
from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This
program has been essential to the destruction and/or
dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The Department of Energy's Material Protection and
Accounting (MPC) program and its International Nuclear
Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The
MPC program is targeted at improving the security of
nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union.
Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear
weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a
principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of
Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off
another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our
ability to come up with solutions to important security
problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives
in this region. These programs are making a difference
against today's threats to the American people. I urge your
support in restoring these funds.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its
consideration of
S. 450, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines
our ability to accomplish the program's important national
security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore
the full CTR request.
The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of
hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers,
intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in
the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads
from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons;
instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR
program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be
done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed
by START II and III; increased safety and security for the
transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads;
an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical
weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of
mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of
their proliferation.
Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the
program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All
unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for
specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million
is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization
of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are
several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our
strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine,
that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million
level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with
a very tight budget.
Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important
national security program.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
Amendment No. 658, As Modified
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to
the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The modification follows:
On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently
reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
(Senate - July 07, 1997)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages S6877-
S6906]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of
S.
936, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (
S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:
Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton,
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd,
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution
to our work on this amendment.
Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established,
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC] and the International
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the
International Nuclear Safety Program.
Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three
programs.
reduction in the ctr request
Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed,
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a
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cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III;
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat
of proliferation.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential
projects.
Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and
Ukraine.
I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was
motivated in part because:
Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally,
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.
In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific
projects and specific countries.
Belarus Decertification
The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified
in fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that
it remains in that status.
Japanese Container Purchase
The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer,
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the
50,000 container requirement.
In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new,
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and
deserves our support.
Unobligated CTR Funds
Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one.
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in
currently unobligated CTR funds.
For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year.
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24
elimination in Ukraine.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.
the material protection, control, and accounting program
Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear
materials.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's,
MPC improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific
examples: MPC upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable
material; upgraded MPC systems for all weapons-usable nuclear
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material at these
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sites; a national MPC training center has been established at
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC training courses and
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC upgrades
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at
several sites.
Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:
U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and
funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996
(funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
impact opportunities arise.
In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations,
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the
1998-2002 timeframe.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country.
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
International Nuclear Safety Program
Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear
reactors.
The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation,
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address,
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects,
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a
number of key activities have been completed, including:
Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine;
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important.
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant,
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are
funded through another program.
Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority
activities in 1998, that include:
Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges
and cooperative research and development between the Russian
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
This program is part of a larger international effort designed to
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international
nuclear reactor safety norms.
Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC Program; and $50 million
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further
Chernobyls.
I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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Amendment No. 658
(Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the
authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related
Department of Energy programs)
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask
unanimous consent it be made in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin
proposes an amendment numbered 658.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:
SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.
(a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by
$40,000,000.
(b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by
$19,000,000.
(c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
(d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by
$20,000,000.
(e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by
$60,000,000.
(f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is
hereby increased by $56,000,000.
(g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by
$25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e)
that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations
under such section 3103(1)(B)).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of
Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in
carrying out programs relating to international nuclear
safety that are necessary for national security in the amount
of $50,000,000.
(i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section
1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C.
2331) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use
of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the
development of programs relating to such use.''.
(j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year
1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts
available under the proceeding sentence shall be available
until September 30, 1999.''.
(j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110
Stat. 2732) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
(2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469)
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the
funding level requested by the administration for these important
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the
United States.
The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million,
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the
United
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States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be
used.
Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious
than the response has been so far.
One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut.
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material
available for threat or diversion.
So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan,
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia,
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states,
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr.
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos,
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this
area.
Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why?
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the
legislation.
They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops
of that situation.
The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry,
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the
recipient country.
Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance,
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr.
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All
of that must occur.
Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification,
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time,
this lengthy process of certification and notification and
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously
careful
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to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any
more.
I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact,
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage
throughout the world.
This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union
countries.
Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has,
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the
level of funding that the administration requested in three different
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC funds--that stands for
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and
administered by the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in
making progress on these programs.
We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S.
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective,
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on
that list.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or
programs like these.
Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19,
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong
support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in
the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for
the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs.
Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests
and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result
from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a
nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC)
program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are
inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of
criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by
the Committee, there will
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be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay
in achieving the program objectives by approximately two
years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three
years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in
Russia. Today, the MPC program has secured tens of tons of
material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites
where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly
Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds
are restored to this program, the work that could secure
hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for
full funding to continue this vital work.
The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy
instrument available to ensure that the world will not face
another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall
national security goal of helping to stabilize the former
Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and
Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the
operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in
the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety
culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with
Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the
Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that,
if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident
that would severely impact the region's political and
economic stability, the environment and our national
interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is
essential to help prevent that from happening.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been
essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic
missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of
warheads from strategic systems. Without this program,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons,
instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also
supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and
Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium
in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium
production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I
support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally
important program.
In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of
preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge
you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments
by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR.
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which
to threaten the United States or our allies.
Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote,
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with
nuclear weapons.
I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is
essential to our national security interests.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC in
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware,
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC Program in our own national
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC Program so that this
valuable work can continue without pause.
The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl,
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to
vote to restore this important program.
As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its
conviction that CTR, MPC, INSP, and related programs serve our
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC, and INSP, we buy ourselves a
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support
restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense
Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for
three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear
Safety program.
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Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former
Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
continues to be one of our highest security priorities.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance
from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This
program has been essential to the destruction and/or
dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The Department of Energy's Material Protection and
Accounting (MPC) program and its International Nuclear
Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The
MPC program is targeted at improving the security of
nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union.
Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear
weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a
principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of
Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off
another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our
ability to come up with solutions to important security
problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives
in this region. These programs are making a difference
against today's threats to the American people. I urge your
support in restoring these funds.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its
consideration of
S. 450, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines
our ability to accomplish the program's important national
security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore
the full CTR request.
The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of
hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers,
intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in
the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads
from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons;
instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR
program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be
done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed
by START II and III; increased safety and security for the
transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads;
an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical
weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of
mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of
their proliferation.
Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the
program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All
unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for
specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million
is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization
of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are
several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our
strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine,
that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million
level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with
a very tight budget.
Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important
national security program.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
Amendment No. 658, As Modified
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to
the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The modification follows:
On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently
reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICE
Amendments:
Cosponsors:
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
Sponsor:
Summary:
All articles in Senate section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
(Senate - July 07, 1997)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
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[Pages S6877-
S6906]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of
S.
936, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (
S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:
Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton,
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd,
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution
to our work on this amendment.
Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established,
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC] and the International
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the
International Nuclear Safety Program.
Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three
programs.
reduction in the ctr request
Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed,
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a
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cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III;
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat
of proliferation.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential
projects.
Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and
Ukraine.
I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was
motivated in part because:
Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally,
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.
In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific
projects and specific countries.
Belarus Decertification
The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified
in fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that
it remains in that status.
Japanese Container Purchase
The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer,
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the
50,000 container requirement.
In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new,
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and
deserves our support.
Unobligated CTR Funds
Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one.
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in
currently unobligated CTR funds.
For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year.
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24
elimination in Ukraine.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.
the material protection, control, and accounting program
Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear
materials.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's,
MPC improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific
examples: MPC upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable
material; upgraded MPC systems for all weapons-usable nuclear
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material at these
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sites; a national MPC training center has been established at
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC training courses and
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC upgrades
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at
several sites.
Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:
U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and
funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996
(funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
impact opportunities arise.
In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations,
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the
1998-2002 timeframe.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country.
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
International Nuclear Safety Program
Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear
reactors.
The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation,
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address,
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects,
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a
number of key activities have been completed, including:
Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine;
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important.
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant,
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are
funded through another program.
Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority
activities in 1998, that include:
Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges
and cooperative research and development between the Russian
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
This program is part of a larger international effort designed to
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international
nuclear reactor safety norms.
Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC Program; and $50 million
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further
Chernobyls.
I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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Amendment No. 658
(Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the
authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related
Department of Energy programs)
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask
unanimous consent it be made in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin
proposes an amendment numbered 658.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:
SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.
(a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by
$40,000,000.
(b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by
$19,000,000.
(c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
(d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by
$20,000,000.
(e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by
$60,000,000.
(f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is
hereby increased by $56,000,000.
(g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by
$25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e)
that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations
under such section 3103(1)(B)).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of
Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in
carrying out programs relating to international nuclear
safety that are necessary for national security in the amount
of $50,000,000.
(i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section
1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C.
2331) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use
of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the
development of programs relating to such use.''.
(j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year
1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts
available under the proceeding sentence shall be available
until September 30, 1999.''.
(j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110
Stat. 2732) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
(2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469)
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the
funding level requested by the administration for these important
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the
United States.
The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million,
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the
United
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States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be
used.
Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious
than the response has been so far.
One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut.
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material
available for threat or diversion.
So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan,
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia,
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states,
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr.
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos,
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this
area.
Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why?
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the
legislation.
They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops
of that situation.
The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry,
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the
recipient country.
Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance,
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr.
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All
of that must occur.
Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification,
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time,
this lengthy process of certification and notification and
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously
careful
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to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any
more.
I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact,
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage
throughout the world.
This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union
countries.
Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has,
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the
level of funding that the administration requested in three different
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC funds--that stands for
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and
administered by the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in
making progress on these programs.
We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S.
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective,
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on
that list.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or
programs like these.
Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19,
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong
support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in
the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for
the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs.
Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests
and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result
from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a
nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC)
program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are
inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of
criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by
the Committee, there will
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be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay
in achieving the program objectives by approximately two
years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three
years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in
Russia. Today, the MPC program has secured tens of tons of
material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites
where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly
Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds
are restored to this program, the work that could secure
hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for
full funding to continue this vital work.
The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy
instrument available to ensure that the world will not face
another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall
national security goal of helping to stabilize the former
Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and
Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the
operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in
the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety
culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with
Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the
Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that,
if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident
that would severely impact the region's political and
economic stability, the environment and our national
interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is
essential to help prevent that from happening.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been
essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic
missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of
warheads from strategic systems. Without this program,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons,
instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also
supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and
Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium
in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium
production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I
support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally
important program.
In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of
preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge
you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments
by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR.
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which
to threaten the United States or our allies.
Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote,
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with
nuclear weapons.
I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is
essential to our national security interests.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC in
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware,
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC Program in our own national
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC Program so that this
valuable work can continue without pause.
The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl,
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to
vote to restore this important program.
As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its
conviction that CTR, MPC, INSP, and related programs serve our
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC, and INSP, we buy ourselves a
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support
restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense
Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for
three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear
Safety program.
[[Page
S6884]]
Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former
Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
continues to be one of our highest security priorities.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance
from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This
program has been essential to the destruction and/or
dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The Department of Energy's Material Protection and
Accounting (MPC) program and its International Nuclear
Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The
MPC program is targeted at improving the security of
nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union.
Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear
weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a
principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of
Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off
another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our
ability to come up with solutions to important security
problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives
in this region. These programs are making a difference
against today's threats to the American people. I urge your
support in restoring these funds.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its
consideration of
S. 450, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines
our ability to accomplish the program's important national
security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore
the full CTR request.
The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of
hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers,
intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in
the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads
from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons;
instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR
program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be
done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed
by START II and III; increased safety and security for the
transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads;
an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical
weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of
mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of
their proliferation.
Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the
program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All
unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for
specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million
is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization
of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are
several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our
strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine,
that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million
level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with
a very tight budget.
Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important
national security program.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
Amendment No. 658, As Modified
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to
the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The modification follows:
On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently
reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
(Senate - July 07, 1997)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages S6877-
S6906]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of
S.
936, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (
S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:
Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton,
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd,
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution
to our work on this amendment.
Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established,
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC] and the International
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the
International Nuclear Safety Program.
Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three
programs.
reduction in the ctr request
Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed,
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a
[[Page
S6878]]
cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III;
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat
of proliferation.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential
projects.
Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and
Ukraine.
I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was
motivated in part because:
Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally,
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.
In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific
projects and specific countries.
Belarus Decertification
The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified
in fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that
it remains in that status.
Japanese Container Purchase
The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer,
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the
50,000 container requirement.
In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new,
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and
deserves our support.
Unobligated CTR Funds
Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one.
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in
currently unobligated CTR funds.
For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year.
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24
elimination in Ukraine.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.
the material protection, control, and accounting program
Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear
materials.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's,
MPC improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific
examples: MPC upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable
material; upgraded MPC systems for all weapons-usable nuclear
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material at these
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S6879]]
sites; a national MPC training center has been established at
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC training courses and
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC upgrades
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at
several sites.
Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:
U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and
funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996
(funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
impact opportunities arise.
In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations,
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the
1998-2002 timeframe.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country.
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
International Nuclear Safety Program
Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear
reactors.
The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation,
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address,
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects,
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a
number of key activities have been completed, including:
Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine;
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important.
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant,
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are
funded through another program.
Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority
activities in 1998, that include:
Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges
and cooperative research and development between the Russian
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
This program is part of a larger international effort designed to
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international
nuclear reactor safety norms.
Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC Program; and $50 million
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further
Chernobyls.
I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
[[Page
S6880]]
Amendment No. 658
(Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the
authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related
Department of Energy programs)
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask
unanimous consent it be made in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin
proposes an amendment numbered 658.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:
SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.
(a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by
$40,000,000.
(b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by
$19,000,000.
(c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
(d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by
$20,000,000.
(e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by
$60,000,000.
(f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is
hereby increased by $56,000,000.
(g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by
$25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e)
that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations
under such section 3103(1)(B)).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of
Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in
carrying out programs relating to international nuclear
safety that are necessary for national security in the amount
of $50,000,000.
(i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section
1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C.
2331) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use
of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the
development of programs relating to such use.''.
(j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year
1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts
available under the proceeding sentence shall be available
until September 30, 1999.''.
(j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110
Stat. 2732) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
(2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469)
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the
funding level requested by the administration for these important
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the
United States.
The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million,
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the
United
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States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be
used.
Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious
than the response has been so far.
One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut.
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material
available for threat or diversion.
So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan,
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia,
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states,
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr.
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos,
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this
area.
Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why?
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the
legislation.
They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops
of that situation.
The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry,
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the
recipient country.
Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance,
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr.
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All
of that must occur.
Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification,
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time,
this lengthy process of certification and notification and
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously
careful
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to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any
more.
I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact,
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage
throughout the world.
This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union
countries.
Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has,
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the
level of funding that the administration requested in three different
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC funds--that stands for
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and
administered by the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in
making progress on these programs.
We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S.
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective,
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on
that list.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or
programs like these.
Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19,
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong
support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in
the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for
the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs.
Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests
and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result
from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a
nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC)
program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are
inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of
criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by
the Committee, there will
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be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay
in achieving the program objectives by approximately two
years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three
years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in
Russia. Today, the MPC program has secured tens of tons of
material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites
where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly
Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds
are restored to this program, the work that could secure
hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for
full funding to continue this vital work.
The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy
instrument available to ensure that the world will not face
another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall
national security goal of helping to stabilize the former
Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and
Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the
operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in
the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety
culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with
Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the
Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that,
if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident
that would severely impact the region's political and
economic stability, the environment and our national
interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is
essential to help prevent that from happening.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been
essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic
missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of
warheads from strategic systems. Without this program,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons,
instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also
supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and
Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium
in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium
production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I
support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally
important program.
In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of
preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge
you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments
by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR.
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which
to threaten the United States or our allies.
Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote,
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with
nuclear weapons.
I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is
essential to our national security interests.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC in
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware,
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC Program in our own national
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC Program so that this
valuable work can continue without pause.
The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl,
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to
vote to restore this important program.
As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its
conviction that CTR, MPC, INSP, and related programs serve our
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC, and INSP, we buy ourselves a
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support
restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense
Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for
three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear
Safety program.
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Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former
Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
continues to be one of our highest security priorities.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance
from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This
program has been essential to the destruction and/or
dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The Department of Energy's Material Protection and
Accounting (MPC) program and its International Nuclear
Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The
MPC program is targeted at improving the security of
nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union.
Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear
weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a
principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of
Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off
another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our
ability to come up with solutions to important security
problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives
in this region. These programs are making a difference
against today's threats to the American people. I urge your
support in restoring these funds.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its
consideration of
S. 450, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines
our ability to accomplish the program's important national
security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore
the full CTR request.
The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of
hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers,
intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in
the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads
from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons;
instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR
program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be
done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed
by START II and III; increased safety and security for the
transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads;
an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical
weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of
mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of
their proliferation.
Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the
program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All
unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for
specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million
is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization
of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are
several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our
strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine,
that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million
level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with
a very tight budget.
Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important
national security program.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
Amendment No. 658, As Modified
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to
the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The modification follows:
On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently
reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICE
Amendments:
Cosponsors: