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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(Senate - April 24, 1997)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S3570-S3658] CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged to the Senator from Delaware? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from Delaware. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the chairman. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a historical context. Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause for international sanctions. In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war. Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated: The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added: In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * * Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons. The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening again. Declaring something to be violation of international law does not solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added biological weapons to the declaration. In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did not happen. Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international conventions. As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185 members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic weapon been used in warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC are suspected. If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the Republic. Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The President pleads. Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations, if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then- chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33 conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are. The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions. Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps: those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or ``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty, most importantly led by Senator Lodge. There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and [[Page S3571]] worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate. To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to lose the most in a state of world anarchy.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important treaty. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from Minnesota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the Chemical Weapons Convention debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons, including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf war. These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical agents was a factor. Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health. The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction. If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans-- will be the worse for it. Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this treaty. Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards. To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified. After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out front on this convention. This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration, crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush and Clinton were and have been committed. By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the courage to lead? I certainly hope not. Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent poll, favors this treaty. But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who [[Page S3572]] were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents. Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty, their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty. And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it. Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty. I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war, including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our national interest to ratify the treaty. While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held 17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine the treaty? Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention. Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S. leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around the world. While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably opposed to them: CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma. As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.'' I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can this be in our national interest? CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly support striking this condition. CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty: to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like China even if United States national security might be better served by letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so since the [[Page S3573]] Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments. Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive CW capabilities. In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid justification for scrapping article X. Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals. Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export controls. Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs. Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability. I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S. capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC. Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing, chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC, well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in voting to strike condition No. 33. In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used again in warfare. But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people? Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had with gulf war veterans. To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone to stop using this junk.'' I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr. President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the United States of America has taken a leadership position in the international community, in the international arena, it would be, I think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement. I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota. I thank the Chair. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be deducted equally. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the Senate for our advice and consent. We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America and also people around the world. There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to limit arms. They vote against all of the arms [[Page S3574]] control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven wrong in a number of areas. In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist any longer. In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers. Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America? Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised, aimed at our country. Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would suffer no consequences. My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind. There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision. We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70 other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas. That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate because we face a critical end date of April 29. I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that. I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons and poison gas. I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying this critically important treaty for our future. Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a quorum is not present. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under the agreement. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does not have that power to do so. Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure. Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised, unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it. I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be looking at the way we have done this. In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts. In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of materials as easily available as fertilizer. [[Page S3575]] So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in, especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making today. I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610, having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate before the Memorial Day recess. I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet this year, but maybe on this issue we could. We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November 1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too. In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr. President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this, along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons, including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and assistance to anyone engaging in these activities. The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those unsavory few. In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security, about what a burden it will be on American business--the same businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed these charges for what they are: flat-out false. What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the United States is not going to use them. So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it alone, with all the problems that would entail? Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about constitutional violations. Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we make. I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me. Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of international conduct. To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments. It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they would suffer international condemnation and sanctions. In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say: [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to further delay its own accession to the CWC. [[Page S3576]] Former Secretary of State James Baker says: [S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention, the United States should line up with them, rather than the rest of the world. Secretary of Defense William Cohen says: [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogues. . . . And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said: We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle. I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC. By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured. Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time, criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct. And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with it themselves. The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of activity. These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations, negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing. And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time. I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The President has made the case very, very well, and members of his administration have too. I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said. These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty. Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty. When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in. No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And that is the only way. So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate. Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed by landmines than by chemical weapons? The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel landmines. If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons as it is making in support of the CWC. They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote: We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997] U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty (By Robert G. Bell) To the Editor: Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April 22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate will vote on April 24: Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give ``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that would help them evade the defenses of responsible states. Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding condition that the United States will limit our assistance to countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies. And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons. Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated, has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68 countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger [[Page S3577]] to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because, like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not need. What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion. In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger. They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time. I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and so on who will take longer to do it. If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of every one of us. So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to make the treaty a reality. And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the sidelines. I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, and others. They said: We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only humane, but also militarily responsible. I quote further: The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause casualties among innocent people. . . . They said further: Given the wide range of weaponry available to military forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential. Thus, banning them would not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other nations. Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that pressure would be enormous. I reserve the balance-- Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from Vermont? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes. Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request. My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could make some remarks and maybe expedite this process. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on this. I have 27 minutes remaining. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You actually have 32 minutes left. Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes. Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator. Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California. Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much. I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to proceed. I may

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(Senate - April 24, 1997)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S3570-S3658] CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged to the Senator from Delaware? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from Delaware. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the chairman. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a historical context. Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause for international sanctions. In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war. Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated: The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added: In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * * Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons. The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening again. Declaring something to be violation of international law does not solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added biological weapons to the declaration. In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did not happen. Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international conventions. As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185 members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic weapon been used in warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC are suspected. If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the Republic. Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The President pleads. Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations, if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then- chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33 conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are. The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions. Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps: those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or ``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty, most importantly led by Senator Lodge. There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and [[Page S3571]] worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate. To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to lose the most in a state of world anarchy.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important treaty. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from Minnesota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the Chemical Weapons Convention debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons, including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf war. These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical agents was a factor. Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health. The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction. If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans-- will be the worse for it. Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this treaty. Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards. To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified. After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out front on this convention. This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration, crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush and Clinton were and have been committed. By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the courage to lead? I certainly hope not. Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent poll, favors this treaty. But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who [[Page S3572]] were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents. Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty, their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty. And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it. Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty. I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war, including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our national interest to ratify the treaty. While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held 17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine the treaty? Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention. Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S. leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around the world. While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably opposed to them: CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma. As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.'' I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can this be in our national interest? CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly support striking this condition. CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty: to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like China even if United States national security might be better served by letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so since the [[Page S3573]] Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments. Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive CW capabilities. In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid justification for scrapping article X. Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals. Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export controls. Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs. Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability. I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S. capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC. Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing, chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC, well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in voting to strike condition No. 33. In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used again in warfare. But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people? Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had with gulf war veterans. To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone to stop using this junk.'' I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr. President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the United States of America has taken a leadership position in the international community, in the international arena, it would be, I think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement. I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota. I thank the Chair. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be deducted equally. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the Senate for our advice and consent. We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America and also people around the world. There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to limit arms. They vote against all of the arms [[Page S3574]] control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven wrong in a number of areas. In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist any longer. In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers. Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America? Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised, aimed at our country. Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would suffer no consequences. My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind. There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision. We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70 other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas. That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate because we face a critical end date of April 29. I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that. I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons and poison gas. I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying this critically important treaty for our future. Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a quorum is not present. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under the agreement. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does not have that power to do so. Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure. Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised, unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it. I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be looking at the way we have done this. In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts. In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of materials as easily available as fertilizer. [[Page S3575]] So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in, especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making today. I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610, having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate before the Memorial Day recess. I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet this year, but maybe on this issue we could. We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November 1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too. In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr. President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this, along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons, including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and assistance to anyone engaging in these activities. The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those unsavory few. In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security, about what a burden it will be on American business--the same businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed these charges for what they are: flat-out false. What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the United States is not going to use them. So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it alone, with all the problems that would entail? Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about constitutional violations. Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we make. I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me. Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of international conduct. To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments. It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they would suffer international condemnation and sanctions. In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say: [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to further delay its own accession to the CWC. [[Page S3576]] Former Secretary of State James Baker says: [S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention, the United States should line up with them, rather than the rest of the world. Secretary of Defense William Cohen says: [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogues. . . . And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said: We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle. I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC. By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured. Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time, criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct. And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with it themselves. The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of activity. These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations, negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing. And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time. I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The President has made the case very, very well, and members of his administration have too. I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said. These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty. Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty. When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in. No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And that is the only way. So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate. Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed by landmines than by chemical weapons? The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel landmines. If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons as it is making in support of the CWC. They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote: We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997] U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty (By Robert G. Bell) To the Editor: Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April 22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate will vote on April 24: Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give ``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that would help them evade the defenses of responsible states. Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding condition that the United States will limit our assistance to countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies. And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons. Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated, has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68 countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger [[Page S3577]] to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because, like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not need. What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion. In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger. They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time. I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and so on who will take longer to do it. If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of every one of us. So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to make the treaty a reality. And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the sidelines. I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, and others. They said: We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only humane, but also militarily responsible. I quote further: The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause casualties among innocent people. . . . They said further: Given the wide range of weaponry available to military forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential. Thus, banning them would not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other nations. Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that pressure would be enormous. I reserve the balance-- Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from Vermont? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes. Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request. My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could make some remarks and maybe expedite this process. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on this. I have 27 minutes remaining. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You actually have 32 minutes left. Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes. Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator. Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California. Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much. I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to procee

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(Senate - April 24, 1997)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S3570-S3658] CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged to the Senator from Delaware? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from Delaware. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the chairman. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a historical context. Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause for international sanctions. In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war. Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated: The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added: In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * * Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons. The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening again. Declaring something to be violation of international law does not solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added biological weapons to the declaration. In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did not happen. Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international conventions. As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185 members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic weapon been used in warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC are suspected. If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the Republic. Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The President pleads. Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations, if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then- chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33 conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are. The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions. Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps: those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or ``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty, most importantly led by Senator Lodge. There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and [[Page S3571]] worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate. To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to lose the most in a state of world anarchy.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important treaty. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from Minnesota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the Chemical Weapons Convention debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons, including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf war. These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical agents was a factor. Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health. The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction. If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans-- will be the worse for it. Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this treaty. Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards. To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified. After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out front on this convention. This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration, crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush and Clinton were and have been committed. By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the courage to lead? I certainly hope not. Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent poll, favors this treaty. But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who [[Page S3572]] were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents. Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty, their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty. And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it. Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty. I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war, including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our national interest to ratify the treaty. While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held 17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine the treaty? Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention. Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S. leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around the world. While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably opposed to them: CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma. As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.'' I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can this be in our national interest? CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly support striking this condition. CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty: to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like China even if United States national security might be better served by letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so since the [[Page S3573]] Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments. Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive CW capabilities. In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid justification for scrapping article X. Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals. Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export controls. Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs. Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability. I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S. capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC. Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing, chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC, well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in voting to strike condition No. 33. In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used again in warfare. But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people? Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had with gulf war veterans. To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone to stop using this junk.'' I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr. President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the United States of America has taken a leadership position in the international community, in the international arena, it would be, I think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement. I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota. I thank the Chair. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be deducted equally. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the Senate for our advice and consent. We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America and also people around the world. There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to limit arms. They vote against all of the arms [[Page S3574]] control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven wrong in a number of areas. In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist any longer. In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers. Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America? Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised, aimed at our country. Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would suffer no consequences. My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind. There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision. We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70 other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas. That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate because we face a critical end date of April 29. I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that. I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons and poison gas. I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying this critically important treaty for our future. Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a quorum is not present. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under the agreement. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does not have that power to do so. Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure. Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised, unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it. I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be looking at the way we have done this. In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts. In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of materials as easily available as fertilizer. [[Page S3575]] So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in, especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making today. I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610, having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate before the Memorial Day recess. I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet this year, but maybe on this issue we could. We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November 1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too. In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr. President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this, along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons, including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and assistance to anyone engaging in these activities. The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those unsavory few. In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security, about what a burden it will be on American business--the same businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed these charges for what they are: flat-out false. What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the United States is not going to use them. So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it alone, with all the problems that would entail? Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about constitutional violations. Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we make. I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me. Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of international conduct. To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments. It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they would suffer international condemnation and sanctions. In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say: [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to further delay its own accession to the CWC. [[Page S3576]] Former Secretary of State James Baker says: [S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention, the United States should line up with them, rather than the rest of the world. Secretary of Defense William Cohen says: [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogues. . . . And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said: We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle. I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC. By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured. Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time, criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct. And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with it themselves. The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of activity. These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations, negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing. And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time. I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The President has made the case very, very well, and members of his administration have too. I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said. These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty. Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty. When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in. No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And that is the only way. So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate. Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed by landmines than by chemical weapons? The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel landmines. If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons as it is making in support of the CWC. They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote: We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997] U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty (By Robert G. Bell) To the Editor: Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April 22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate will vote on April 24: Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give ``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that would help them evade the defenses of responsible states. Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding condition that the United States will limit our assistance to countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies. And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons. Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated, has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68 countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger [[Page S3577]] to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because, like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not need. What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion. In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger. They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time. I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and so on who will take longer to do it. If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of every one of us. So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to make the treaty a reality. And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the sidelines. I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, and others. They said: We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only humane, but also militarily responsible. I quote further: The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause casualties among innocent people. . . . They said further: Given the wide range of weaponry available to military forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential. Thus, banning them would not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other nations. Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that pressure would be enormous. I reserve the balance-- Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from Vermont? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes. Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request. My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could make some remarks and maybe expedite this process. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on this. I have 27 minutes remaining. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You actually have 32 minutes left. Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes. Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator. Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California. Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much. I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to proceed. I may

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(Senate - April 24, 1997)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S3570-S3658] CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged to the Senator from Delaware? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from Delaware. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the chairman. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a historical context. Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause for international sanctions. In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war. Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated: The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added: In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * * Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons. The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening again. Declaring something to be violation of international law does not solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added biological weapons to the declaration. In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did not happen. Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international conventions. As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185 members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic weapon been used in warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC are suspected. If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the Republic. Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The President pleads. Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations, if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then- chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33 conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are. The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions. Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps: those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or ``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty, most importantly led by Senator Lodge. There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and [[Page S3571]] worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate. To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to lose the most in a state of world anarchy.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important treaty. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from Minnesota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the Chemical Weapons Convention debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons, including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf war. These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical agents was a factor. Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health. The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction. If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans-- will be the worse for it. Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this treaty. Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards. To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified. After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out front on this convention. This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration, crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush and Clinton were and have been committed. By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the courage to lead? I certainly hope not. Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent poll, favors this treaty. But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who [[Page S3572]] were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents. Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty, their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty. And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it. Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty. I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war, including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our national interest to ratify the treaty. While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held 17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine the treaty? Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention. Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S. leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around the world. While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably opposed to them: CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma. As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.'' I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can this be in our national interest? CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly support striking this condition. CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty: to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like China even if United States national security might be better served by letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so since the [[Page S3573]] Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments. Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive CW capabilities. In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid justification for scrapping article X. Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals. Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export controls. Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs. Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability. I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to strike this condition. CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S. capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC. Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing, chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC, well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in voting to strike condition No. 33. In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used again in warfare. But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people? Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had with gulf war veterans. To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone to stop using this junk.'' I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr. President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the United States of America has taken a leadership position in the international community, in the international arena, it would be, I think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement. I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota. I thank the Chair. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be deducted equally. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the Senate for our advice and consent. We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America and also people around the world. There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to limit arms. They vote against all of the arms [[Page S3574]] control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven wrong in a number of areas. In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist any longer. In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers. Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America? Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised, aimed at our country. Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would suffer no consequences. My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind. There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision. We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70 other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas. That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate because we face a critical end date of April 29. I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that. I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons and poison gas. I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying this critically important treaty for our future. Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a quorum is not present. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under the agreement. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does not have that power to do so. Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure. Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised, unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it. I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be looking at the way we have done this. In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts. In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of materials as easily available as fertilizer. [[Page S3575]] So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in, especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making today. I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610, having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate before the Memorial Day recess. I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet this year, but maybe on this issue we could. We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November 1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too. In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr. President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this, along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons, including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and assistance to anyone engaging in these activities. The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those unsavory few. In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security, about what a burden it will be on American business--the same businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed these charges for what they are: flat-out false. What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the United States is not going to use them. So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it alone, with all the problems that would entail? Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about constitutional violations. Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we make. I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me. Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of international conduct. To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments. It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they would suffer international condemnation and sanctions. In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say: [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to further delay its own accession to the CWC. [[Page S3576]] Former Secretary of State James Baker says: [S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention, the United States should line up with them, rather than the rest of the world. Secretary of Defense William Cohen says: [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogues. . . . And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said: We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle. I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC. By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured. Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time, criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct. And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with it themselves. The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of activity. These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations, negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing. And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time. I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The President has made the case very, very well, and members of his administration have too. I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said. These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty. Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty. When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in. No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And that is the only way. So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate. Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed by landmines than by chemical weapons? The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel landmines. If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons as it is making in support of the CWC. They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote: We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997] U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty (By Robert G. Bell) To the Editor: Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April 22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate will vote on April 24: Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give ``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that would help them evade the defenses of responsible states. Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding condition that the United States will limit our assistance to countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies. And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons. Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated, has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68 countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger [[Page S3577]] to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because, like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not need. What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion. In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger. They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time. I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and so on who will take longer to do it. If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of every one of us. So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to make the treaty a reality. And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the sidelines. I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, and others. They said: We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only humane, but also militarily responsible. I quote further: The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause casualties among innocent people. . . . They said further: Given the wide range of weaponry available to military forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential. Thus, banning them would not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other nations. Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that pressure would be enormous. I reserve the balance-- Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from Vermont? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes. Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request. My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could make some remarks and maybe expedite this process. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on this. I have 27 minutes remaining. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You actually have 32 minutes left. Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes. Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator. Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California. Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much. I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to procee