Summary:
All articles in Senate section
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - June 29, 1995)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
S9422-S9465]
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were
read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:
By Mr. DASCHLE (for himself, Mr. Dole, Mr. Ford, Mr.
Lott, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Akaka,
Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Biden, Mr.
Bingaman, Mr. Bond, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Bradley, Mr.
Breaux, Mr. Brown, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Burns,
Mr. Campbell, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Coats, Mr. Cochran, Mr.
Cohen, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Craig, Mr.
D'Amato, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Domenici, Mr.
Dorgan, Mr. Exon, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Feingold, Mrs.
Feinstein, Mr. Frist, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Gorton, Mr.
Graham, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Grams, Mr. Grassley, Mr.
Gregg, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Hatfield, Mr.
Heflin, Mr. Helms, Mr. Hollings, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr.
Inhofe, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Johnston, Mrs.
Kassebaum, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kerrey,
Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr.
Leahy, Mr. Levin, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Mack,
Mr. McCain, Mr. McConnell, Ms. Mikulski, Ms. Moseley-
Braun, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Murkowski, Mrs. Murray, Mr.
Nickles, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Packwood, Mr. Pell, Mr.
Pressler, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Reid, Mr. Robb, Mr.
Rockefeller, Mr. Roth, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Sarbanes,
Mr. Shelby, Mr. Simon, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Smith, Ms.
Snowe, Mr. Specter, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thomas, Mr.
Thompson, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Wellstone):
S. Res. 143. A resolution commending C. Abbot Saffold
(Abby) for her long, faithful, and exemplary service to the
U.S. Senate; considered and agreed to.
By Mr. WELLSTONE (for himself and Mr. Feingold):
S. Res. 144. A resolution to express the sense of the
Senate that, by the end of the 104th Congress, the Senate
should pass health care legislation to provide all Americans
with coverage that is at least as good as the Senate provides
for itself; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.
By Mr. DASCHLE:
S. Res. 145. A resolution to elect Martin P. Paone
secretary for the minority; considered and agreed to.
By Mr. DOLE:
S. Con. Res. 20. A concurrent resolution providing for a
conditional recess or adjournment of the Senate on Thursday,
June 29, 1995, or Friday, June 30, 1995, until Monday, July
10, 1995, and a conditional adjournment of the House on the
legislative day of Friday, June 30, 1995, until Monday, July
10, 1995; considered and agreed to.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. KYL (for himself, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Grassley):
S. 982. A bill to protect the national information infrastructure,
and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 1995
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I introduce the Kyl-Leahy National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995. I thank Senator
Leahy for his sponsorship of this bill, and his leadership in combating
computer crime. I am pleased to introduce this bill, which will
strengthen current public law on computer crime and protect the
national information infrastructure. My fear is that our national
infrastructure--the information that bonds all Americans--is not
adequately protected. I addressed this issue in the terrorism bill and
I offer this bill as a protection to one of America's greatest
commodities--information.
Although there has never been an accurate nationwide reporting system
for computer crime, specific reports suggest that computer crime is
rising. For example, the computer emergency and response team [CERT] a
Carnegie-Mellon University reports that computer intrusions have
increased from 132 in 1989 to 2,341 last year. A June 14 Wall Street
Journal article stated that a Rand Corp. study reported 1,172 hacking
incidents occurred during the first 6 months of last year. A report
commissioned last year by the Department of Defense and the CIA stated
that ``[a]ttacks against information systems are becoming more
aggressive, not only seeking access to confidential information, but
also stealing and degrading service and destroying data.'' Clearly
there is a need to reform the current criminal statutes covering
computers.
Many computer offenses have found their origin in our new
technologies. For example, the horrific damage caused by inserting a
virus into a global computer network cannot be prosecuted adequately by
relying on common law criminal mischief statutes. The need to reevalute
our computer statues on a continual basis is inevitable; and protecting
our nation's information is vital. I, therefore, introduce the National
Information Infrastructure Protection of 1995.
Mr. President, the Internet is a worldwide system of computers and
computer networks that enables users to communicate and share
information. The system is comparable to the worldwide telephone
network. According to a Time magazine article, the Internet connects
over 4.8 million host systems, including educational institutions,
government facilities, military bases, and commercial businesses.
Millions of private individuals are connected to the Internet through
their personal computers and modems.
Computer criminals have quickly recognized the Internet as a haven
for criminal possibilities. During the 1980's, the development and
broadbased appeal of the personal computer sparked a period of dramatic
technological growth. This has raised the stakes in the battle over
control of the Internet and all computer systems. Computer criminals
know all the ways to exploit the Internet's easy access, open nature,
and global scope. From the safety of a telephone in a discrete
location, the computer criminal can anonymously access personal,
business, and government files. And because these criminals can easily
gain access without disclosing their identities, it is extremely
difficult to apprehend and prosecute them successfully.
Prosecution of computer criminals is complicated further by
continually changing technology, lack of precedence, and weak or
nonexistent State and Federal laws. And the costs are passed on to
service providers, the judicial system, and most importantly--the
victims.
Because computers are the nerve centers of the world's information
and communication system, there are catastrophic possibilities. Imagine
an international terrorist penetrating the Federal Reserve System and
bringing
[[Page
S 9423]]
to a halt every Federal financial transaction. Or worse yet, imagine a
terrorist who gains access to the Department of Defense, and gains
control over NORAD. The June 14 Wall Street Journal article reported
that security experts were used to hack into 12,000 Defense Department
computer systems connected to the Internet. The results are astounding.
The experts hacked their way into 88 percent of the systems, and 4
percent of the attacks went undetected.
An example of the pending threat is illustrated in the Wednesday, May
10 headline from the Hill entitled ``Hired Hackers Crack House
Computers.'' Auditors from Price Waterhouse managed to break into House
Members' computer systems. According to the article, the auditors'
report stated that they could have changed documents, passwords, and
other sensitive information in those systems. What is to stop
international terrorists from gaining similar access, and obtaining
secret information relating to our national security?
In a September 1994 Los Angeles Times article about computer
intrusion, Scott Charney, chief of the computer crime unit for the U.S.
Department of Justice, stated, ``the threat is an increasing threat,''
and ``[i]t could be a 16-year-old kid out for fun or it could be
someone who is actively working to get information from the United
States.''
He added, there is a ``growing new breed of digital outlaws who
threaten national security and public safety.'' For example, the Lo
Angeles Times article reported that, in Los Angeles alone, there are at
least four outlaw computer hackers who, in recent years, have
demonstrated they can seize control of telephones and break into
government computers.
The article also mentioned that government reports further reveal
that foreign intelligence agencies and mercenary computer hackers have
been breaking into military computers. For example, a hacker is
awaiting trial in San Francisco on espionage charges for cracking an
Army computer system and accessing files on an FBI investigation of
former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. According to the 1993
Department of Defense report, such a threat is very real: ``The nature
of this changing motivation makes computer intruders' skills high-
interest targets for criminal elements and hostile adversaries.''
Mr. President, the September 1993 Department of Defense report added
that, if hired by terrorists, these hackers could cripple the Nation's
telephone system, ``create significant public health and safety
problems, and cause serious economic shocks.'' The hackers could bring
an entire city to a standstill. The report states that, as the world
becomes wired for computer networks, there is a greater threat the
networks will be used for spying and terrorism. In a 1992 report, the
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
warned, ``known individuals in the hacker community have ties with
adversary organizations. Hackers frequently have international ties.''
A 1991 Chicago Tribune article detailed the criminal activity of a
group of Dutch teenagers who were able to hack into Defense Department
computers which contained sensitive national security information,
including one system which directly supported Operation Desert Storm.
According to the article, Jack L. Brock, former Director of Government
Information for the General Accounting Office, said that ``this type of
information could be very useful to a foreign intelligence operation.''
These startling examples illustrate the necessity for action. Mr.
President, that is why I am here today--to take action. I would, at
this time, like to highlight a few provisions of the bill. This bill
strengthens the language currently in section 1030 of title 18 of the
United States Code. I would eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the
definition of ``trespassing'' in a government computer. This bill
toughens penalties in current law to ensure that felony level sanctions
apply when unauthorized use of the computer is significant. Current law
does not adequately address the act of trespassing into a computer. But
a breach of a computer security system alone can have a significant
impact. For example, an intruder may trespass into a computer system
and view information
--without stealing or destroying it. The administrator of the system
will spend time, money, and resources to restore security to the
system. Damage occurs simply by trespassing. We can no longer accept
mere trespass into computers, and regard these intrusions as
incidental.
This bill redefines a protected computer to include those computers
used in foreign communications. The best known international case of
computer intrusion is detailed in the book, ``The Cuckoo's Egg.'' In
March 1989, West German authorities arrested computer hackers and
charged them with a series of intrusions into United States computer
systems through the University of California at Berkeley. Eastern bloc
intelligence agencies had sponsored the activities of the hackers
beginning in May 1986. The only punishment the hackers were given was
probation.
This bill deters criminal activity by strengthening the penalties on
computer crime. It will elevate to felony status, the reckless damage
of computer trespassers and it will criminalize computer trespassers
who cause negligent damage. A new subsection is added in section 1030
of title 18, United States Code to respond to the interstate
transmission of threats directed against computers and computer
networks. In certain cases, according to the Department of Justice,
individuals have threatened to crash a computer system unless they are
granted access to the system and given an account. The provision will
protect the data and programs of computers and computer networks
against any interstate or international transmission of threats. The
statutory language will be changed to ensure that anyone who is
convicted twice of committing a computer offense will be subject to
enhanced penalties. This bill will make the criminals think twice
before illegally accessing computer files.
Everybody recognizes that it is wrong for an intruder to enter a home
and wander around; it doesn't make sense to view a criminal who breaks
into a computer system differently. We have a national antistalking law
to protect citizens on the street, but it doesn't cover stalking on the
communications network. We should not treat these criminals differently
simply because they possess new weapons.
These new technologies, which so many Americans enjoy, were developed
over many years. I understand that policy can't catch up with
technology overnight, but we can start filling in the gaps created by
these tremendous advancements. We cannot allow complicated technology
to paralyze us into inactivity. It is vital that we protect the
information and infrastructure of this country.
Because not everyone is computer literate, there is a tendency to
view those who are computer literate as somewhat magical and that the
normal rules don't apply. Hackers have developed a cult following with
their computer antics, which are regarded with awe. These criminals
disregard computer security and authority. In 1990, a hacker cracked
the NASA computer system and gained access to 68 computer systems
linked by the Space Analysis Network. He even came across the log on
screen for the U.S. Controller of the Currency. After being caught, the
hacker's comment about NASA officials was, ``I still think they're
bozos,'' and he added ``[i]f they had done a halfway competent job,
this wouldn't have happened.''
Mr. President, the Kyl-Leahy National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act of 1995 will deter criminal activity and protect our
Nation's infrastructure. I urge my colleagues to support this
bill.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce with Senators Kyl
and Grassley the ``National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1995'' [NIIPA]. This bill will increase protection for both
government and private computers, and the information on those
computers, from the growing threat of computer crime.
We increasingly depend on the availability, integrity, and
confidentiality of computer systems and information to conduct our
business, communicate with our friends and families, and even to be
entertained. With a modem and a
[[Page
S 9424]]
computer, a business person can communicate with his or her office, a
student can access an on-line encyclopedia at home, or researcher can
get weather information from Australia over the Internet.
Unfortunately, computer criminals can also use this technology to pry
into our secrets, steal confidential Government information, and damage
important telecommunications systems. With the advances in global
communication, these criminals can do this virtually anywhere in the
world.
The facts speak for themselves--computer crime is on the rise. The
computer emergency and response team at Carnegie-Mellon University
reports that, since 1991, there has been a 498 percent increase in the
number of computer intrusions, and a 702 percent rise in the number of
sites affected. About 40,000 Internet computers were attacked in 2,460
incidents in 1994 alone. We need to increase protection for this vital
information infrastructure to stem the online crime epidemic.
The NII Protection Act seeks to improve the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act by providing more protection to computerized information and
systems, by designating new computer crimes, and by extending
protection to computer systems used in foreign or interstate commerce
or communications. The bill closes a number of gaps in our current laws
to strengthen law enforcement's hands in fighting crimes targeted at
computers, computer systems, and computer information.
First, the bill would bring the protection for classified national
defense or foreign relations information maintained on computers in
line with our other espionage laws. While existing espionage laws
prohibit the theft and peddling of Government secrets to foreign
agents, the bill would specifically target those persons who
deliberately break into a computer to obtain the Government secrets
that they then try to peddle.
Second, the bill would increase protection for the privacy and
confidentiality of computer information. Recently, computer hackers
have accessed sensitive data regarding Operation Desert
Storm, penetrated NASA computers, and broken into Federal courthouse
computer systems containing confidential records. Others have abused
their privileges on Government computers by snooping through
confidential tax returns, or selling confidential criminal history
information from the National Crime Information Center.
The bill would criminalize these activities by making all those who
misuse computers to obtain Government information and, where
appropriate, information held by the private sector, subject to
prosecution. The harshest penalties would be reserved for those who
obtain classified information that could be used to injur the United
States or assist a foreign state. Those who break into a computer
system, or insiders who intentionally abuse their computer access
privileges, to secret information off a computer system for commercial
advantage, private financial gain or to commit any criminal or tortious
act would also be subject to felony prosecution. Individuals who
intentionally break into, or abuse their authority to use, a computer
and thereby obtain information of minimal value, would be subject to a
misdemeanor penalty.
Third, the bill would protect against damage to computers caused by
either outside hackers or malicious insiders. Computer crime does not
just put information is at risk, but also the computer networks
themselves. Hackers, or malicious insiders, can destroy crucial
information with a carefully placed code or command. Hackers, like
Robert Morris, can bring the Internet to its knees with computer
``viruses'' or ``worms.'' This bill would protect our Nation's computer
systems from such intentional damage, regardless of whether the
perpetrator was an insider or outside hacker.
Under the bill, insiders, who are authorized to access a computer,
face criminal liability only if they intend to cause damage to the
computer, not for recklessly or negligently causing damage. By
contrast, hackers who break into a computer could be punished for any
intentional, reckless, or negligent damages they cause by their
trespass.
Fourth, the bill would expand the protection of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act to cover those computers used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communications. The law already gives special protection to
the computer systems of financial institutions and consumer reporting
agencies, because of their significance to the economy of our Nation
and the privacy of our citizens. Yet, increasingly computer systems
provide the vital backbone to many other industries, such as the
telecommunications network.
Current law falls short of protecting this infrastructure. Generally,
hacker intrusions that do not cross State lines are not Federal
offenses. The NII Protection Act would change that limitation and
extend Federal protection to computers or computer systems used in
interstate or foreign commerce or communications.
Fifth, this bill addresses a new and emerging problem of computer-age
blackmail. In a recent case, an individual threatened to crash a
computer system unless he was granted access to the system and given an
account. The bill adds a new provision to the law that would ensure law
enforcement's ability to prosecute these modern day blackmailers, who
threaten to harm or shut down computer networks unless their
extortionate demands are met.
Finally, the statutory scheme provided in this bill will provide a
better understanding of the computer crime problem. By consolidating
computer crimes in one section of title 18, reliable crime statistics
can be generated. Moreover, by centralizing computer crimes under one
statute, we may better measure existing harms, anticipate trends, and
determine the need for legislative reform. Additionally, as new
computer technologies are introduced, and new computer crimes follow,
reformers need only look to section 1030 to update our criminal laws,
without parsing through the entire United States Code.
The Kyl-Leahy NII Protection Act would provide much needed protection
for our Nation's important information infrastructure. It will help
ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information and protect
computer networks from those who would seek to damage these networks.
I commend the Department of Justice for their diligent work on this
bill, and their continued assistance in addressing this critical area
of our criminal law. I look forward to working with my colleagues on
refining and improving this bill, as necessary.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995--Section-by-
Section Analysis
The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of
1995 amends the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1030, to increase protection for the confidentiality,
integrity and security of computer systems and the
information on such systems.
Sec. 1. Short Title. The Act may be cited as the ``National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995.''
Sec. 2. Computer Crime. (1) The bill amends five of the
prohibited acts in, and adds a new prohibited act to, 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a).
(A) Subsection 1030(a)(1)--Protection of Classified
Government Information.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(1) to increase
protection for computerized classified data. The statute
currently provides that anyone who knowingly accesses a
computer without, or in excess of, authorization and obtains
classified information ``with the intent or reason to believe
that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury
of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation'' is subject to a fine or a maximum of ten years'
imprisonment. The amendment would modify the scienter
requirement to conform to the knowledge requirement in 18
U.S.C. Sec. 793(e), which provides a maximum penalty of ten
years' imprisonment for obtaining from any source information
connected with the national defense. Unlike Sec. 793(e),
however, Sec. 1030(a)(1) would require proof that the
individual knowingly used a computer without, or in excess
of, authority in obtaining the classified information.
As amended, Sec. 1030(a)(1) would prohibit anyone from
knowingly accessing a computer, without, or in excess of,
authorization, and obtaining classified national defense,
foreign relations information, or restricted data under the
Atomic Energy Act, with reason to believe the information
could be used to the injury of the United States or the
advantage of a foreign country, and willfully communicating,
delivering or transmitting, or causing the same, or willfully
retaining the information and failing to deliver it
[[Page
S 9425]]
to the appropriate government agent. The amendment specifically covers
the conduct of a person who deliberately breaks into a
computer without authority, or an insider who exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains classified information
and then communicates the information to another person, or
retains it without delivering it to the proper authorities.
(B) Subsection 1030(a)(2)--Protection of Financial,
Government and Other Computer Information.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(2) to further
protect the confidentiality of computer data by extending the
protection for computerized financial records in current law
to protecting information from any department and agency of
the United States and on computers subject to unauthorized
access involving interstate or foreign communications.
This amendment is designed to protect against the
interstate or foreign theft of information by computer. This
provision is necessary in light of United States v. Brown,
925 F.2d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 1991), where the court held
that purely intangible intellectual property, such as
computer programs, cannot constitute goods, wares,
merchandise, securities, or monies which have been stolen,
converted, or taken within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 2314.
The seriousness of a breach in confidentiality depends on
the value of the information taken or on what is planned for
the information after it is obtained. The statutory penalties
are structured to reflect these considerations. Specifically,
first-time offenses for obtaining, without or in excess of
authorization, information of minimal value from government
or protected computers is a misdemeanor. The crime becomes a
felony, subject to a fine and up to five years' imprisonment,
if the offense was committed for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or
if the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000.
(C) Subsection 1030(a)(3)--Protection for Government
Computer Systems.
The bill would make two changes to Sec. 1030(a)(3), which
currently prohibits intentionally accessing, without
authorization, computers used by or for any department or
agency of the United States and thereby ``adversely''
affecting ``the use of the Government's operation of such
computer.'' First, the amendment would delete the word
``adversely'' since this term suggests, inappropriately, that
trespassing in a government computer may be benign. Second,
the amendment would replace the phrase ``the use of the
Government's operation of such computer'' with the term
``that use by or for the Government.'' When a computer is
used for the government, the government is not necessarily
the operator, and the old phrase may lead to confusion. The
amendment would make a similar change to the definition of
``protected computer'' in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(A).
(D) Subsection 1030(a)(4)--Increased Penalties for
Significant Unauthorized Use of Computers.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(4) to insure that
felony level sanctions apply when the fraudulent use of a
computer without, or in excess of, authority is significant.
The current statute penalizes, with fines and up to five
years' imprisonment, knowingly and with intent to defraud,
accessing a computer without, or in excess of, authorization
to further the fraud or obtain anything of value, unless the
object of the fraud and the thing obtained is only the use of
the computer. The blanket exception for computer use is too
broad since trespassing in a computer and using computer time
may cause large expense to the victim. Hackers, for example,
have broken into Cray supercomputers for the purpose of
running password cracking programs, sometimes amassing
computer
time worth far more than $5,000. The amendment would
restrict the exception for trespassing, in which only
computer use is obtained, to cases involving less than
$5,000 during any one-year period.
(E) Subsection 1030(a)(5)--Protection from Damage to
Computers.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(5) to further
protect computers and computer systems covered by the statute
from damage both by outsiders, who gain access to a computer
without authorization, and by insiders, who intentionally
damage a computer. Subsection 1030(a)(5)(A) of the bill would
penalize with a fine and up to five years' imprisonment
anyone who knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
information, code or command and intentionally causes damage
without authorization to a protected computer. This would
cover anyone who intentionally damages a computer, regardless
of whether they were authorized to access the computer.
Subsection 1030(a)(5)(B) of the bill would penalize with a
fine and up to five years' imprisonment anyone who
intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization and, as a result of that trespass, recklessly
causes damage.
Finally, subsection 1030(a)(5)(C) of the bill would impose
a misdemeanor penalty of a fine and no more than one year
imprisonment for intentionally accessing a protected computer
without authorization and, as a result of that trespass,
causing damage.
The bill would punish anyone who knowingly invades a
computer system without authority and causes significant
losses to the victim, even when the damage caused is not
intentional. In such cases, it is the intentional act of
computer trespass that makes the conduct criminal. Otherwise,
hackers could break into computers or computer systems, safe
in the knowledge that no matter how much damage they cause,
it is no crime unless the damage was intentional or reckless.
By contrast, persons who are authorized to access the
computer are criminally liable only if they intend to cause
damage to the computer without authority, not for recklessly
or negligently causing damage.
As discussed more fully below, the bill adds a definition
of ``damage'' to encompass significant financial loss of more
than $5,000 during any one year period, potential impact on
medical treatment, physical injury to any person, and threats
to public health and safety.
(F) Subsection 1030(a)(7)--Protection from Threats Directed
Against Computers.
The bill adds a new section to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a) to
provide penalties for the interstate transmission of threats
directed against computers and computer systems. It is not
clear that such threats would be covered under existing laws,
such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 (interference with
commerce by extortion), or
18 U.S.C. Sec. 875(d) (interstate communication of threat to
injure the property of another). The ``property''
protected under these statutes does not clearly include
the operation of a computer, the data or programs stored
in a computer or its peripheral equipment, or the decoding
keys to encrypted data.
The new subsection (a)(7) covers any interstate or
international transmission of threats against computers,
computer systems, and their data and programs, whether the
threat is received by mail, telephone, electronic mail, or
through a computerized messaging service. Unlawful threats
could include interference in any way with the normal
operation of the computer or system in question, such as
denying access to authorized users, erasing or corrupting
data or programs, slowing down the operation of the computer
or system, or encrypting data and then demanding money for
the key.
(2) Subsection 1030(c)--Increased Penalties for Recidivists
and Other Sentencing Changes. The bill amends 18 U.S.C.
1030(c) to increase penalties for those who have previously
violated any subsection of Sec. 1030. The current statute
subjects recidivists to enhanced penalties only if they
violated the same subsection twice. For example, a person who
violates the current statute by committing fraud by computer
under Sec. 1030(a)(4) and later commits another computer
crime offense by intentionally destroying medical records
under Sec. 1030(a)(5), is not treated as a recidivist because
his conduct violated two separate subsections of Sec. 1030.
The amendment would provide that anyone who is convicted
twice of committing a computer offense under Sec. 1030 would
be subjected to enhanced penalties.
The penalty provisions in Sec. 1030(c) are also changed to
reflect modifications to the prohibited acts, as discussed
above.
(3) Subsection 1030(d)--Jurisdiction of Secret Service. The
bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(d) to grant the United States
Secret Service authority to investigate offenses only under
subsections (a)(2) (A) and (B), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5) and
(a)(6). The current statute grants the Secret Service
authority to investigate any offense under Sec. 1030, subject
to agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary
of the Treasury. The new crimes proposed in the bill,
however, do not fall under the Secret Service's traditional
jurisdiction. Specifically, proposed Sec. 1030(a)(2)(C)
addresses gaps in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314 (interstate
transportation of stolen property), and proposed
Sec. 1030(a)(7) addresses gaps in 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1951
(the Hobbs Act) and 875 (interstate threats). These statutes
are within the jurisdiction of the FBI, which should retain
exclusive jurisdiction over these types of offenses, even
when they are committed by computer.
(4) Subsection 1030(e)--Definitions. The bill contains
three new definitions for ``protected computer,'' ``damage,''
and ``government entity.''
The term ``protected computer'' would replace the term
``federal interest computer'' used currently in Sec. 1030.
The new definition of ``protected computer'' would slightly
modify the current description in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(A) of
computers used by financial institutions or the United States
Government, to make it clear that if the computers are not
exclusively used by those entities, the computers are
protected if the offending conduct affects the use by or for
a financial institution or the Government.
The new definition of ``protected computer'' would also
replace the current description in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(B) of a
covered computer being ``one of two or more computers used in
committing the offense, not all of which are located in the
same State.'' Instead, ``protected computer'' would include
computers ``in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.'' Thus, hackers who attack computers in their
own State would be subject to this law, if the requisite
damage threshold is met and the computer is used in
interstate commerce or foreign commerce or communications.
The tern ``damage,'' as used in new Sec. 1030(a)(5), would
mean any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,
information, program or system which (A) causes loss of more
than $5,000 during any one-year period; (B) modifies or
impairs the medical examination, diagnosis or treatment of a
[[Page
S 9426]]
person; (C) causes physical injury to any person; or (D) threatens the
public health or safety. Computers are increasingly being
used for access to critical services, such as emergency
response systems and air traffic control. ``Damage'' is
therefore broadly defined to encompass the types of harms
against which people should be protected from any computer
hacker or those insiders who intentionally cause harm.
The term ``government entity,'' as used in new
Sec. 1030(a)(7), would be defined to include the United
States government, any State or political subdivision
thereof, any foreign country, and any state, provincial,
municipal or other political subdivision of a foreign
country.
(5) Subsection 1030(g)--Civil Actions. The bill amends the
civil penalty provision in Sec. 1030(g) to reflect the
proposed changes in Sec. 1030(a)(5). The 1994 amendments to
the Act authorized victims of certain computer abuse to
maintain civil actions against violators to obtain
compensatory damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable
relief, with damages limited to economic damages, unless the
violator modified or impaired the medical examination,
diagnosis or treatment of a person.
Under the bill, damages recoverable in civil actions would
be limited to economic losses for violations causing losses
of $5,000 or more during any one-year period. No limit on
damages would be imposed for violations that modified or
impaired the medical examination, diagnosis or treatment of a
person; caused physical injury to any person; or threatened
the public health or safety.
______
By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. McCain):
S. 983. A bill to reduce the number of executive branch political
appointees; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
executive branch political appointees legislation
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, along with my good friend the senior
Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], I am introducing legislation today
to reduce the number of political employees who are appointed by the
President. Specifically, the bill caps the number of political
appointees at 2,000. The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimates
the current number averages 2,800. Thus an estimated 800 of these
positions would be saved. The measure, based on one of the options
outlined by the CBO in its publication ``Reducing the Deficit: Spending
and Revenue Options,'' is estimated to save $363 million over the next
5 years. The savings for fiscal year 1996 is estimated to be $45
million.
Mr. President, this proposal is consistent with the recommendations
of the Vice President's National Performance Review, which called for
reduction in the number of Federal managers and supervisors, arguing
that ``over-control and micromanagement'' not only ``stifle the
creativity of line managers and workers, they consume billions per year
in salary, benefits, and administrative costs.''
That argument may be particularly true will respect to political
appointees, whose numbers grew by over 17 percent between 1980 and
1992, over three times as fast as the total number of executive branch
employees. And if we look back further, to 1960, the growth is even
more dramatic. In his recently published book, ``Thickening Government:
Federal Government and the Diffusion of Accountability,'' author Paul
Light reports a startling 430-percent increase in the number of
political appointees and senior executives in Federal Government
between 1960 and 1992.
The sentiments expressed in the National Performance Review were also
reflected in the 1989 report of the National Commission on the Public
Service, chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker.
Arguing that the growing number of Presidential appointees may
``actually undermine effective Presidential control of the executive
branch,'' the Volcker Commission recommended limiting the number of
political appointees to 2,000, as this legislation does. Mr. President,
it is essential that any administration be able to implement the
policies that brought it into office in the first place. Government
must be responsive to the priorities of the electorate. But as the
Volcker Commission noted, the great increase in the number of political
appointees in recent years has not made Government more effective or
more responsive to political leadership.
The Commission report cited three reasons. First, it noted that the
large number of Presidential appointees simply cannot be managed
effectively by any President or White House. This lack of control is
aggravated by the often competing political agendas and constituencies
that some appointees might bring with them to their new positions.
Altogether, the Commission argued that this lack of control and
political focus ``may actually dilute the President's ability to
develop and enforce a coherent,
coordinated program and to hold cabinet secretaries accountable.''
Second, the report argued that the excessive number of appointees are
a barrier to critical expertise, distancing the President and his
principal assistants from the most experienced career officials. Though
bureaucracies can certainly impede needed reforms, they can also be a
source of unbiased analysis. Adding organizational layers of political
appointees can restrict access to important resources, while doing
nothing to reduce bureaucratic impediments.
Author Paul Light says, ``As this sediment has thickened over the
decades, presidents have grown increasingly distant from the lines of
government, and the front lines from them.'' Light adds that
``Presidential leadership, therefore, may reside in stripping
government of the barriers to doing its job effectively . . .''
Finally, the Volcker Commission asserted that this thickening barrier
of temporary appointees between the President and career officials can
undermine development of a proficient civil service by discouraging
talented individuals from remaining in Government service or even
pursuing a career in Government in the first place.
Mr. President, former Attorney General Elliot Richardson put it well
when he noted:
But a White House personnel assistant sees the position of
deputy assistant secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his
eyes that makes it an ideal reward for a fourth-echelon
political type--a campaign advance man, or a regional
political organizer. For a senior civil servant, it's irksome
to see a position one has spent 20 or 30 years preparing for
preempted by an outsider who doesn't know the difference
between an audit exception and an authorizing bill.
Mr. President, many will recall the difficulties the current
administration has had in filling even some of the more visible
political appointments.
A story in the National Journal in November 1993, focusing upon the
delays in the Clinton administration in filling political positions,
noted that in Great Britain, the transition to a new government is
finished a week after it begins, once 40 or so political appointments
are made. That certainly is not the case in the United States,
recognizing, of course, that we have a quite different system of
government from the British Parliament form of government.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the vast number of political
appointments that are currently made creates a somewhat cumbersome
process, even in the best of circumstances. The long delays and logjams
created in filling these positions under the Clinton administration
simply illustrates another reason why the number of positions should be
cut back.
The consequences of having so many critical positions unfilled when
an administration changes can be serious. In
the first 2 years of the Clinton administration, there were a number
of stories of problems created by delays in making these appointments.
From strained relationships with foreign allies over failures to make
ambassadorship appointments to the 2-year vacancy at the top of the
National Archives, the record is replete with examples of agencies left
drifting while a political appointment was delayed. Obviously, there
are a number of situations were the delays were caused by circumstances
beyond control of the administration. The current case involving the
position of Surgeon General of the United States is a clear example.
Nonetheless, it is clear that with a reduced number of political
appointments to fill, the process of selecting and appointing
individuals to key positions in a new administration is likely to be
enhanced.
Mr. President, let me also stress that the problem is not simply the
initial filling of a political appointment, but keeping someone in that
position over time. In a report released last year, the General
Accounting Office reviewed a portion of these positions for the period
of 1981 to 1991, and found high levels of turnover--7 appointees in 10
[[Page
S 9427]]
years for one position--as well as delays, usually of months but
sometimes years, in filling vacancies.
Mr. President, I recognize that this legislative proposal is not
likely to be popular with many people, both within this administration
and perhaps among members of the other party who hope to win back the
White House in the next election.
I want to stress that I do not view efforts to reduce the number of
political appointees to be a partisan issue. Indeed, I think it adds to
the credibility and merits of this proposal that a Democratic Senator
is proposing to cut back these appointments at a time when there is a
Democratic administration in place.
The legislation has been drafted to take effect as of October 1,
1995. It provides for reduction in force procedures to accomplish this
goal. In other words, this administration would be required to reduce
the number of political appointees to comply with this legislation. It
would obviously apply to any further administration as well.
The sacrifices that deficit reduction efforts require must be spread
among all of us. This measure requires us to bite the bullet and impose
limitations upon political appointments that both parties may well wish
to retain. The test of commitment to deficit reduction, however, is not
simply to propose measures that impact someone else.
As we move forward to implement the NPR recommendations to reduce the
number of Government employees, streamline agencies, and make
Government more responsive, we should also right size the number of
political appointees, ensuring a sufficient number to implement the
policies of any administration without burdening the Federal budget
with unnecessary, possibly counterproductive political jobs.
Mr. President, when I ran for the U.S. Senate in 1992, I developed an
82-point plan to reduce the Federal deficit and achieve a balanced
budget. Since that time, I have continued to work toward enactment of
many of the provisions of that plan and have added new provisions on a
regular basis.
The legislation I am introducing today reflects one of the points
included on the original 82-point plan calling for streamlining various
Federal agencies and reducing agency overhead costs. I am pleased to
have this opportunity to continue to work toward implementation of the
elements of the deficit reduction plan.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 983
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES.
(a) Definition.--For purposes of this section the term
``political appointee'' means any individual who--
(1) is employed in a position on the executive schedule
under sections 5312 through 5316 of title 5, United States
Code;
(2) is a limited term appointee, limited emergency
appointee, or noncareer appointee in the senior executive
service as defined under section 3232(a) (5), (6), and (7) of
title 5, United States Code, respectively; or
(3) is employed in a position in the executive branch of
the Government of a confidential or policy-determining
cheracter under Schedule C of subpart C of part 213 of title
5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Limitation.--The President, acting through the Office
of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel
Management, shall take such actions as necessary (including
reduction in force actions under procedures established under
section 3595 of title 5, United States Code) to ensure that
the total number of political appointees shall not exceed
2,000.
(c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on
October 1, 1995.
______
By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself, Mr. Lott, Mr. Helms, and Mr.
Cochran):
S. 984. A bill to protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct
the upbringing of a child, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ACT OF 1995
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995 to reaffirm the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. While most parents
assume this right is protected, some lower courts and Government
bureaucrats have acted to limit this basic freedom. The bill I am
introducing will protect the family from unwarranted intrusions by the
Government. Congressmen Steve Largent and Mike Parker have joined me to
pursue this initiative.
While the Constitution does not explicitly address the parent-child
relationship, the Supreme Court clearly regards the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children as a fundamental right under
the 14th amendment to the Constitution. Fundamental rights, such as
freedom of speech and religion receive the highest legal protection.
Two cases in the 1920's affirmed the Court's high regard for the
integrity of the parent-child relationship. In Meyer versus Nebraska,
the Court declared that the 14th amendment,
[W]ithout doubt, . . . denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . .
. marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience. . . .
The second important case was Pierce versus. Society of Sisters. In
this case, the Court declared that:
[In] this day and under our civilization, the child of man
is his parent's child and not the state's . . . It is not
seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's
child intellectually and religiously is a most substantial
part of the liberty and freedom of the parent.
The Court went on to hold that parents are chiefly responsible for
the education and upbringing of their children.
While the Supreme Court's intent to protect parental rights is
unquestionable, lower courts have not always followed this high
standard to protect the parent-child relationship. The recent lower
court assault on the rights of parents to direct their children's
education, health care decisions, and discipline is unprecedented.
Several examples of lower court cases will demonstrate the need for
this bill. A group of parents in Chelmsford, MA, sued when their
children were required to sit through a 90-minute AIDS awareness
presentation by ``Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc.'' In this so-
called group sexual experience students were instructed to engage in
activities which some parents considered outrageous and pornographic.
When the parents challenged the propriety of the school's actions, the
court held that the parents, who were never told about the
presentation, did not have a right to know and consent to this sexually
explicit program before their children were required to attend.
The Washington State Supreme Court ruled that it was not a violation
of parents' rights to remove an eighth-grade child from her family
because she objected to the ground rules established in the home. The
parents in this case grounded their daughter because she wanted to
smoke marijuana and sleep with her boyfriend. She objected, and the
courts removed her from the home. Most parents would consider these
rules imminently reasonable. But the court held that although the
family structure is a fundamental institution of our society, and
parental prerogatives are entitled to considerable legal deference,
they are not absolute and must yield to fundamental rights of the child
or important interests of the state.
Recent news accounts reported of a father who was accused of child
abuse because he publicly spanked his 4-year-old daughter. When she
deliberately slammed the car door on her brother's hand, her father
acted promptly to discipline her by a reasonably administered spanking.
A passer-by called the police and the father had to defend against the
charge of child abuse. While the father won his case, it is amazing to
most parents that they could be dragged into court against their will
to defend against such an outrageous charge as child abuse for
disciplining their child for open rebellion.
Unfortunately, these cases are only a few of the many examples of
parents' rights being violated when trying to direct the training and
nurturing of their children. Recent public debate has also contributed
to the movement to violate parental rights.
[[Page
S 9428]]
Dr. Jack Westman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison proposes that
the State license parents as a means of conveying the seriousness of
the parental responsibility. While there is no question of the awesome
responsibility to raise and nurture a child, the proposal to have the
State license potential parents for the right to have children raises
many serious questions. Who will decide what will be the appropriate
standards for parenthood? These and other questions stretch the
imagination of freedom loving American parents.
With recent lower court cases and the flow of public debate around
``Parental licensing'', it is easy to see the need for the Parental
Rights Act of 1995.
The goal of the PRA is to reaffirm the parental right to direct the
upbringing of their children in four major areas: First, Directing or
providing for the education of the child; two, making health care
decisions for the child; three, disciplining the child, including
reasonable corporal discipline; and four, directing or providing for
the religious teaching of the child.
The PRA accomplishes this goal by simply clarifying for lower courts
and administrative tribunals that the proper standard to use in
disputes between the Government and parents is the highest legal
standard available. This standard, known as ``The Compelling Interest
Standard'' means that before the Government can interfere in the
parent-child relationship, it must demonstrate that there is a
compelling interest to protect and that the means the Government is
using to protect this interest is the least restrictive means
available.
Practically speaking, this means that the law in question is not so
broad in application that it sweeps in more than is necessary to
protect the interest in question.
An example will help to clarify this point. Unfortunately, there are
parents who abuse and neglect their children. Clearly, protecting
children from abuse and neglect would fit into any reasonable person's
definition of a compelling interest of the State. One of the stated
purposes of the PRA is to protect children from abuse and neglect.
Another stated goal is to recognize that protecting children in these
circumstances is a compelling Government interest. Abusing or
neglecting your child has never been considered a protected parental
right.
Using the least restrictive means available to protect children from
abuse and neglect means that a parents who are appropriately meeting
their child's needs could not fall victim to an overzealous State law.
The law would be written in such a way that it would cover parents who
are abusing or neglecting their children but it would not cover parents
who are not.
If the law is written so poorly that even good, loving parents could
be accused of child abuse, it would not pass the test of being the
least restrictive means available and would have to be modified.
You might ask, ``How is the PRA going to work?'' It uses the
traditional four-step process to evaluate fundamental rights which
balances the interests of parents, children and the Government. First,
parents are required to demonstrate that the actions being questioned
are within their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their
child.
Second, they must show that the Government interfered with this
right. If the parents are able to prove these two things, then the
burden shifts to the Government to show that the interference was
essential to accomplish a compelling Government interest and that the
Government's method of interfering was the least restrictive means to
accomplish its goal.
In these cases, the court would balance the parents' right to make
decisions on behalf of their children against the Government's right to
intervene in the family relationship and decide what was the proper
balance.
While it would be better if lower courts and administrative agencies
would use the appropriate legal standard outlined by the Supreme Court
without Congress having to clarify the standard, the history shows this
is not likely to occur. My bill will clarify this standard with
finality.
Two specific concerns were raised that I want to address. The first
is from child abuse prosecutors and advocates. As we moved through
discussions on the early drafts of this bill, I made clear that I
firmly believed child abuse and neglect is a compelling Government
interest.
With this in mind, I incorporated suggestions from prosecutors and
advocates on this issue. I am comfortable that the changes made address
their concerns.
The second issue was infanticide and abortion. The National Right to
Life Committee was concerned that the bill would overturn the baby doe
laws protecting handicapped children after birth. After consultation
with other attorneys who agreed that this was a concern, I changed my
draft to clarify that the PRA could not be used in this way.
The second point that NRL raised was that the PRA would somehow
empower parents to coerce a young woman to have an abortion against her
wishes. This is because the PRA allows parents to make health care
decisions for their child unless the parents' neglect or refusal to act
will risk the life of the child or risk serious physical injury to the
child. I have consulted with other pro-life organizations and advocates
who do not share this concern and have endorsed the bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It is critical to the
proper balance of parents' rights against the Government's actions.
Without the PRA, lower courts, Government bureaucrats, and
administrative tribunals will continue to interfere needlessly in the
parent-child relationship.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL (for himself and Mr. Brown):
S. 985. A bill to provide for the exchange of certain lands in Gilpin
County, CO; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
the gilpin land exchange act
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I, and my colleague, Senator
Brown, are introducing legislation to exchange approximately 300 acres
of fragmented Bureau of Land Management lands near Black Hawk, CO, for
approximately 4,000 acres that will be added to Rocky Mountain National
Park and to other Department of the Interior holdings in Colorado,
while dedicating any remaining equalization funds to the purchase of
land and water rights for the Blanca Wetlands Management Area near
Alamosa, CO.
This legislation is supported by local governments, environmental
groups, and land developers in Colorado. More specifically, the bill:
Will enable Rocky Mountain National Park to obtain an adjacent 40-acre
parcel known as the Circle C Ranch. The Park Service has long sought to
acquire the ranch to avoid its subdivision and development; will result
in the public acquisition of approximately 4,000 acres of elk winter
range and other important wildlife habitat at the headwaters of La Jara
Canyon and Fox Creek, approximately 10 miles from Antonito, CO; and
will create a fund from cash equalization moneys that may be paid to
the United States as a result of the exchange, with the fund to be used
to augment fish and wildlife habitat in the BLM's Blanca Wetlands
Management Area. The BLM has wanted funds for these purposes for many
years.
In exchange for picking up over 4,000 acres of land, 130 parcels of
highly fragmented BLM land totalling about 300 acres will be made
available for private acquisition. Of these 130 parcels, 88 are less
than 1 acre in size. The BLM, through its established land use planning
process, has already identified these lands as appropriate for
disposal.
I hope my colleagues will support this effort, and I ask unanimous
consent that the text of the bill, along with letters of support from
the city of Central, the city of Blackhawk, the Gilpin County Board of
County Commissioners, and the Huerfano County Board of County
Commissioners be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 985
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) certain scattered parcels of Federal land in Gilpin
County, Colorado, are adm
Major Actions:
All articles in Senate section
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
(Senate - June 29, 1995)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
S9422-S9465]
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were
read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:
By Mr. DASCHLE (for himself, Mr. Dole, Mr. Ford, Mr.
Lott, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Akaka,
Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Biden, Mr.
Bingaman, Mr. Bond, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Bradley, Mr.
Breaux, Mr. Brown, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Burns,
Mr. Campbell, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Coats, Mr. Cochran, Mr.
Cohen, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Craig, Mr.
D'Amato, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Domenici, Mr.
Dorgan, Mr. Exon, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Feingold, Mrs.
Feinstein, Mr. Frist, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Gorton, Mr.
Graham, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Grams, Mr. Grassley, Mr.
Gregg, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Hatfield, Mr.
Heflin, Mr. Helms, Mr. Hollings, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr.
Inhofe, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Johnston, Mrs.
Kassebaum, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kerrey,
Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr.
Leahy, Mr. Levin, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Mack,
Mr. McCain, Mr. McConnell, Ms. Mikulski, Ms. Moseley-
Braun, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Murkowski, Mrs. Murray, Mr.
Nickles, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Packwood, Mr. Pell, Mr.
Pressler, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Reid, Mr. Robb, Mr.
Rockefeller, Mr. Roth, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Sarbanes,
Mr. Shelby, Mr. Simon, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Smith, Ms.
Snowe, Mr. Specter, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thomas, Mr.
Thompson, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Wellstone):
S. Res. 143. A resolution commending C. Abbot Saffold
(Abby) for her long, faithful, and exemplary service to the
U.S. Senate; considered and agreed to.
By Mr. WELLSTONE (for himself and Mr. Feingold):
S. Res. 144. A resolution to express the sense of the
Senate that, by the end of the 104th Congress, the Senate
should pass health care legislation to provide all Americans
with coverage that is at least as good as the Senate provides
for itself; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.
By Mr. DASCHLE:
S. Res. 145. A resolution to elect Martin P. Paone
secretary for the minority; considered and agreed to.
By Mr. DOLE:
S. Con. Res. 20. A concurrent resolution providing for a
conditional recess or adjournment of the Senate on Thursday,
June 29, 1995, or Friday, June 30, 1995, until Monday, July
10, 1995, and a conditional adjournment of the House on the
legislative day of Friday, June 30, 1995, until Monday, July
10, 1995; considered and agreed to.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. KYL (for himself, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Grassley):
S. 982. A bill to protect the national information infrastructure,
and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 1995
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I introduce the Kyl-Leahy National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995. I thank Senator
Leahy for his sponsorship of this bill, and his leadership in combating
computer crime. I am pleased to introduce this bill, which will
strengthen current public law on computer crime and protect the
national information infrastructure. My fear is that our national
infrastructure--the information that bonds all Americans--is not
adequately protected. I addressed this issue in the terrorism bill and
I offer this bill as a protection to one of America's greatest
commodities--information.
Although there has never been an accurate nationwide reporting system
for computer crime, specific reports suggest that computer crime is
rising. For example, the computer emergency and response team [CERT] a
Carnegie-Mellon University reports that computer intrusions have
increased from 132 in 1989 to 2,341 last year. A June 14 Wall Street
Journal article stated that a Rand Corp. study reported 1,172 hacking
incidents occurred during the first 6 months of last year. A report
commissioned last year by the Department of Defense and the CIA stated
that ``[a]ttacks against information systems are becoming more
aggressive, not only seeking access to confidential information, but
also stealing and degrading service and destroying data.'' Clearly
there is a need to reform the current criminal statutes covering
computers.
Many computer offenses have found their origin in our new
technologies. For example, the horrific damage caused by inserting a
virus into a global computer network cannot be prosecuted adequately by
relying on common law criminal mischief statutes. The need to reevalute
our computer statues on a continual basis is inevitable; and protecting
our nation's information is vital. I, therefore, introduce the National
Information Infrastructure Protection of 1995.
Mr. President, the Internet is a worldwide system of computers and
computer networks that enables users to communicate and share
information. The system is comparable to the worldwide telephone
network. According to a Time magazine article, the Internet connects
over 4.8 million host systems, including educational institutions,
government facilities, military bases, and commercial businesses.
Millions of private individuals are connected to the Internet through
their personal computers and modems.
Computer criminals have quickly recognized the Internet as a haven
for criminal possibilities. During the 1980's, the development and
broadbased appeal of the personal computer sparked a period of dramatic
technological growth. This has raised the stakes in the battle over
control of the Internet and all computer systems. Computer criminals
know all the ways to exploit the Internet's easy access, open nature,
and global scope. From the safety of a telephone in a discrete
location, the computer criminal can anonymously access personal,
business, and government files. And because these criminals can easily
gain access without disclosing their identities, it is extremely
difficult to apprehend and prosecute them successfully.
Prosecution of computer criminals is complicated further by
continually changing technology, lack of precedence, and weak or
nonexistent State and Federal laws. And the costs are passed on to
service providers, the judicial system, and most importantly--the
victims.
Because computers are the nerve centers of the world's information
and communication system, there are catastrophic possibilities. Imagine
an international terrorist penetrating the Federal Reserve System and
bringing
[[Page
S 9423]]
to a halt every Federal financial transaction. Or worse yet, imagine a
terrorist who gains access to the Department of Defense, and gains
control over NORAD. The June 14 Wall Street Journal article reported
that security experts were used to hack into 12,000 Defense Department
computer systems connected to the Internet. The results are astounding.
The experts hacked their way into 88 percent of the systems, and 4
percent of the attacks went undetected.
An example of the pending threat is illustrated in the Wednesday, May
10 headline from the Hill entitled ``Hired Hackers Crack House
Computers.'' Auditors from Price Waterhouse managed to break into House
Members' computer systems. According to the article, the auditors'
report stated that they could have changed documents, passwords, and
other sensitive information in those systems. What is to stop
international terrorists from gaining similar access, and obtaining
secret information relating to our national security?
In a September 1994 Los Angeles Times article about computer
intrusion, Scott Charney, chief of the computer crime unit for the U.S.
Department of Justice, stated, ``the threat is an increasing threat,''
and ``[i]t could be a 16-year-old kid out for fun or it could be
someone who is actively working to get information from the United
States.''
He added, there is a ``growing new breed of digital outlaws who
threaten national security and public safety.'' For example, the Lo
Angeles Times article reported that, in Los Angeles alone, there are at
least four outlaw computer hackers who, in recent years, have
demonstrated they can seize control of telephones and break into
government computers.
The article also mentioned that government reports further reveal
that foreign intelligence agencies and mercenary computer hackers have
been breaking into military computers. For example, a hacker is
awaiting trial in San Francisco on espionage charges for cracking an
Army computer system and accessing files on an FBI investigation of
former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. According to the 1993
Department of Defense report, such a threat is very real: ``The nature
of this changing motivation makes computer intruders' skills high-
interest targets for criminal elements and hostile adversaries.''
Mr. President, the September 1993 Department of Defense report added
that, if hired by terrorists, these hackers could cripple the Nation's
telephone system, ``create significant public health and safety
problems, and cause serious economic shocks.'' The hackers could bring
an entire city to a standstill. The report states that, as the world
becomes wired for computer networks, there is a greater threat the
networks will be used for spying and terrorism. In a 1992 report, the
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
warned, ``known individuals in the hacker community have ties with
adversary organizations. Hackers frequently have international ties.''
A 1991 Chicago Tribune article detailed the criminal activity of a
group of Dutch teenagers who were able to hack into Defense Department
computers which contained sensitive national security information,
including one system which directly supported Operation Desert Storm.
According to the article, Jack L. Brock, former Director of Government
Information for the General Accounting Office, said that ``this type of
information could be very useful to a foreign intelligence operation.''
These startling examples illustrate the necessity for action. Mr.
President, that is why I am here today--to take action. I would, at
this time, like to highlight a few provisions of the bill. This bill
strengthens the language currently in section 1030 of title 18 of the
United States Code. I would eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the
definition of ``trespassing'' in a government computer. This bill
toughens penalties in current law to ensure that felony level sanctions
apply when unauthorized use of the computer is significant. Current law
does not adequately address the act of trespassing into a computer. But
a breach of a computer security system alone can have a significant
impact. For example, an intruder may trespass into a computer system
and view information
--without stealing or destroying it. The administrator of the system
will spend time, money, and resources to restore security to the
system. Damage occurs simply by trespassing. We can no longer accept
mere trespass into computers, and regard these intrusions as
incidental.
This bill redefines a protected computer to include those computers
used in foreign communications. The best known international case of
computer intrusion is detailed in the book, ``The Cuckoo's Egg.'' In
March 1989, West German authorities arrested computer hackers and
charged them with a series of intrusions into United States computer
systems through the University of California at Berkeley. Eastern bloc
intelligence agencies had sponsored the activities of the hackers
beginning in May 1986. The only punishment the hackers were given was
probation.
This bill deters criminal activity by strengthening the penalties on
computer crime. It will elevate to felony status, the reckless damage
of computer trespassers and it will criminalize computer trespassers
who cause negligent damage. A new subsection is added in section 1030
of title 18, United States Code to respond to the interstate
transmission of threats directed against computers and computer
networks. In certain cases, according to the Department of Justice,
individuals have threatened to crash a computer system unless they are
granted access to the system and given an account. The provision will
protect the data and programs of computers and computer networks
against any interstate or international transmission of threats. The
statutory language will be changed to ensure that anyone who is
convicted twice of committing a computer offense will be subject to
enhanced penalties. This bill will make the criminals think twice
before illegally accessing computer files.
Everybody recognizes that it is wrong for an intruder to enter a home
and wander around; it doesn't make sense to view a criminal who breaks
into a computer system differently. We have a national antistalking law
to protect citizens on the street, but it doesn't cover stalking on the
communications network. We should not treat these criminals differently
simply because they possess new weapons.
These new technologies, which so many Americans enjoy, were developed
over many years. I understand that policy can't catch up with
technology overnight, but we can start filling in the gaps created by
these tremendous advancements. We cannot allow complicated technology
to paralyze us into inactivity. It is vital that we protect the
information and infrastructure of this country.
Because not everyone is computer literate, there is a tendency to
view those who are computer literate as somewhat magical and that the
normal rules don't apply. Hackers have developed a cult following with
their computer antics, which are regarded with awe. These criminals
disregard computer security and authority. In 1990, a hacker cracked
the NASA computer system and gained access to 68 computer systems
linked by the Space Analysis Network. He even came across the log on
screen for the U.S. Controller of the Currency. After being caught, the
hacker's comment about NASA officials was, ``I still think they're
bozos,'' and he added ``[i]f they had done a halfway competent job,
this wouldn't have happened.''
Mr. President, the Kyl-Leahy National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act of 1995 will deter criminal activity and protect our
Nation's infrastructure. I urge my colleagues to support this
bill.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce with Senators Kyl
and Grassley the ``National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1995'' [NIIPA]. This bill will increase protection for both
government and private computers, and the information on those
computers, from the growing threat of computer crime.
We increasingly depend on the availability, integrity, and
confidentiality of computer systems and information to conduct our
business, communicate with our friends and families, and even to be
entertained. With a modem and a
[[Page
S 9424]]
computer, a business person can communicate with his or her office, a
student can access an on-line encyclopedia at home, or researcher can
get weather information from Australia over the Internet.
Unfortunately, computer criminals can also use this technology to pry
into our secrets, steal confidential Government information, and damage
important telecommunications systems. With the advances in global
communication, these criminals can do this virtually anywhere in the
world.
The facts speak for themselves--computer crime is on the rise. The
computer emergency and response team at Carnegie-Mellon University
reports that, since 1991, there has been a 498 percent increase in the
number of computer intrusions, and a 702 percent rise in the number of
sites affected. About 40,000 Internet computers were attacked in 2,460
incidents in 1994 alone. We need to increase protection for this vital
information infrastructure to stem the online crime epidemic.
The NII Protection Act seeks to improve the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act by providing more protection to computerized information and
systems, by designating new computer crimes, and by extending
protection to computer systems used in foreign or interstate commerce
or communications. The bill closes a number of gaps in our current laws
to strengthen law enforcement's hands in fighting crimes targeted at
computers, computer systems, and computer information.
First, the bill would bring the protection for classified national
defense or foreign relations information maintained on computers in
line with our other espionage laws. While existing espionage laws
prohibit the theft and peddling of Government secrets to foreign
agents, the bill would specifically target those persons who
deliberately break into a computer to obtain the Government secrets
that they then try to peddle.
Second, the bill would increase protection for the privacy and
confidentiality of computer information. Recently, computer hackers
have accessed sensitive data regarding Operation Desert
Storm, penetrated NASA computers, and broken into Federal courthouse
computer systems containing confidential records. Others have abused
their privileges on Government computers by snooping through
confidential tax returns, or selling confidential criminal history
information from the National Crime Information Center.
The bill would criminalize these activities by making all those who
misuse computers to obtain Government information and, where
appropriate, information held by the private sector, subject to
prosecution. The harshest penalties would be reserved for those who
obtain classified information that could be used to injur the United
States or assist a foreign state. Those who break into a computer
system, or insiders who intentionally abuse their computer access
privileges, to secret information off a computer system for commercial
advantage, private financial gain or to commit any criminal or tortious
act would also be subject to felony prosecution. Individuals who
intentionally break into, or abuse their authority to use, a computer
and thereby obtain information of minimal value, would be subject to a
misdemeanor penalty.
Third, the bill would protect against damage to computers caused by
either outside hackers or malicious insiders. Computer crime does not
just put information is at risk, but also the computer networks
themselves. Hackers, or malicious insiders, can destroy crucial
information with a carefully placed code or command. Hackers, like
Robert Morris, can bring the Internet to its knees with computer
``viruses'' or ``worms.'' This bill would protect our Nation's computer
systems from such intentional damage, regardless of whether the
perpetrator was an insider or outside hacker.
Under the bill, insiders, who are authorized to access a computer,
face criminal liability only if they intend to cause damage to the
computer, not for recklessly or negligently causing damage. By
contrast, hackers who break into a computer could be punished for any
intentional, reckless, or negligent damages they cause by their
trespass.
Fourth, the bill would expand the protection of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act to cover those computers used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communications. The law already gives special protection to
the computer systems of financial institutions and consumer reporting
agencies, because of their significance to the economy of our Nation
and the privacy of our citizens. Yet, increasingly computer systems
provide the vital backbone to many other industries, such as the
telecommunications network.
Current law falls short of protecting this infrastructure. Generally,
hacker intrusions that do not cross State lines are not Federal
offenses. The NII Protection Act would change that limitation and
extend Federal protection to computers or computer systems used in
interstate or foreign commerce or communications.
Fifth, this bill addresses a new and emerging problem of computer-age
blackmail. In a recent case, an individual threatened to crash a
computer system unless he was granted access to the system and given an
account. The bill adds a new provision to the law that would ensure law
enforcement's ability to prosecute these modern day blackmailers, who
threaten to harm or shut down computer networks unless their
extortionate demands are met.
Finally, the statutory scheme provided in this bill will provide a
better understanding of the computer crime problem. By consolidating
computer crimes in one section of title 18, reliable crime statistics
can be generated. Moreover, by centralizing computer crimes under one
statute, we may better measure existing harms, anticipate trends, and
determine the need for legislative reform. Additionally, as new
computer technologies are introduced, and new computer crimes follow,
reformers need only look to section 1030 to update our criminal laws,
without parsing through the entire United States Code.
The Kyl-Leahy NII Protection Act would provide much needed protection
for our Nation's important information infrastructure. It will help
ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information and protect
computer networks from those who would seek to damage these networks.
I commend the Department of Justice for their diligent work on this
bill, and their continued assistance in addressing this critical area
of our criminal law. I look forward to working with my colleagues on
refining and improving this bill, as necessary.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995--Section-by-
Section Analysis
The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of
1995 amends the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1030, to increase protection for the confidentiality,
integrity and security of computer systems and the
information on such systems.
Sec. 1. Short Title. The Act may be cited as the ``National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995.''
Sec. 2. Computer Crime. (1) The bill amends five of the
prohibited acts in, and adds a new prohibited act to, 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a).
(A) Subsection 1030(a)(1)--Protection of Classified
Government Information.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(1) to increase
protection for computerized classified data. The statute
currently provides that anyone who knowingly accesses a
computer without, or in excess of, authorization and obtains
classified information ``with the intent or reason to believe
that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury
of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation'' is subject to a fine or a maximum of ten years'
imprisonment. The amendment would modify the scienter
requirement to conform to the knowledge requirement in 18
U.S.C. Sec. 793(e), which provides a maximum penalty of ten
years' imprisonment for obtaining from any source information
connected with the national defense. Unlike Sec. 793(e),
however, Sec. 1030(a)(1) would require proof that the
individual knowingly used a computer without, or in excess
of, authority in obtaining the classified information.
As amended, Sec. 1030(a)(1) would prohibit anyone from
knowingly accessing a computer, without, or in excess of,
authorization, and obtaining classified national defense,
foreign relations information, or restricted data under the
Atomic Energy Act, with reason to believe the information
could be used to the injury of the United States or the
advantage of a foreign country, and willfully communicating,
delivering or transmitting, or causing the same, or willfully
retaining the information and failing to deliver it
[[Page
S 9425]]
to the appropriate government agent. The amendment specifically covers
the conduct of a person who deliberately breaks into a
computer without authority, or an insider who exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains classified information
and then communicates the information to another person, or
retains it without delivering it to the proper authorities.
(B) Subsection 1030(a)(2)--Protection of Financial,
Government and Other Computer Information.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(2) to further
protect the confidentiality of computer data by extending the
protection for computerized financial records in current law
to protecting information from any department and agency of
the United States and on computers subject to unauthorized
access involving interstate or foreign communications.
This amendment is designed to protect against the
interstate or foreign theft of information by computer. This
provision is necessary in light of United States v. Brown,
925 F.2d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 1991), where the court held
that purely intangible intellectual property, such as
computer programs, cannot constitute goods, wares,
merchandise, securities, or monies which have been stolen,
converted, or taken within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 2314.
The seriousness of a breach in confidentiality depends on
the value of the information taken or on what is planned for
the information after it is obtained. The statutory penalties
are structured to reflect these considerations. Specifically,
first-time offenses for obtaining, without or in excess of
authorization, information of minimal value from government
or protected computers is a misdemeanor. The crime becomes a
felony, subject to a fine and up to five years' imprisonment,
if the offense was committed for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or
if the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000.
(C) Subsection 1030(a)(3)--Protection for Government
Computer Systems.
The bill would make two changes to Sec. 1030(a)(3), which
currently prohibits intentionally accessing, without
authorization, computers used by or for any department or
agency of the United States and thereby ``adversely''
affecting ``the use of the Government's operation of such
computer.'' First, the amendment would delete the word
``adversely'' since this term suggests, inappropriately, that
trespassing in a government computer may be benign. Second,
the amendment would replace the phrase ``the use of the
Government's operation of such computer'' with the term
``that use by or for the Government.'' When a computer is
used for the government, the government is not necessarily
the operator, and the old phrase may lead to confusion. The
amendment would make a similar change to the definition of
``protected computer'' in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(A).
(D) Subsection 1030(a)(4)--Increased Penalties for
Significant Unauthorized Use of Computers.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(4) to insure that
felony level sanctions apply when the fraudulent use of a
computer without, or in excess of, authority is significant.
The current statute penalizes, with fines and up to five
years' imprisonment, knowingly and with intent to defraud,
accessing a computer without, or in excess of, authorization
to further the fraud or obtain anything of value, unless the
object of the fraud and the thing obtained is only the use of
the computer. The blanket exception for computer use is too
broad since trespassing in a computer and using computer time
may cause large expense to the victim. Hackers, for example,
have broken into Cray supercomputers for the purpose of
running password cracking programs, sometimes amassing
computer
time worth far more than $5,000. The amendment would
restrict the exception for trespassing, in which only
computer use is obtained, to cases involving less than
$5,000 during any one-year period.
(E) Subsection 1030(a)(5)--Protection from Damage to
Computers.
The bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(5) to further
protect computers and computer systems covered by the statute
from damage both by outsiders, who gain access to a computer
without authorization, and by insiders, who intentionally
damage a computer. Subsection 1030(a)(5)(A) of the bill would
penalize with a fine and up to five years' imprisonment
anyone who knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
information, code or command and intentionally causes damage
without authorization to a protected computer. This would
cover anyone who intentionally damages a computer, regardless
of whether they were authorized to access the computer.
Subsection 1030(a)(5)(B) of the bill would penalize with a
fine and up to five years' imprisonment anyone who
intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization and, as a result of that trespass, recklessly
causes damage.
Finally, subsection 1030(a)(5)(C) of the bill would impose
a misdemeanor penalty of a fine and no more than one year
imprisonment for intentionally accessing a protected computer
without authorization and, as a result of that trespass,
causing damage.
The bill would punish anyone who knowingly invades a
computer system without authority and causes significant
losses to the victim, even when the damage caused is not
intentional. In such cases, it is the intentional act of
computer trespass that makes the conduct criminal. Otherwise,
hackers could break into computers or computer systems, safe
in the knowledge that no matter how much damage they cause,
it is no crime unless the damage was intentional or reckless.
By contrast, persons who are authorized to access the
computer are criminally liable only if they intend to cause
damage to the computer without authority, not for recklessly
or negligently causing damage.
As discussed more fully below, the bill adds a definition
of ``damage'' to encompass significant financial loss of more
than $5,000 during any one year period, potential impact on
medical treatment, physical injury to any person, and threats
to public health and safety.
(F) Subsection 1030(a)(7)--Protection from Threats Directed
Against Computers.
The bill adds a new section to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a) to
provide penalties for the interstate transmission of threats
directed against computers and computer systems. It is not
clear that such threats would be covered under existing laws,
such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 (interference with
commerce by extortion), or
18 U.S.C. Sec. 875(d) (interstate communication of threat to
injure the property of another). The ``property''
protected under these statutes does not clearly include
the operation of a computer, the data or programs stored
in a computer or its peripheral equipment, or the decoding
keys to encrypted data.
The new subsection (a)(7) covers any interstate or
international transmission of threats against computers,
computer systems, and their data and programs, whether the
threat is received by mail, telephone, electronic mail, or
through a computerized messaging service. Unlawful threats
could include interference in any way with the normal
operation of the computer or system in question, such as
denying access to authorized users, erasing or corrupting
data or programs, slowing down the operation of the computer
or system, or encrypting data and then demanding money for
the key.
(2) Subsection 1030(c)--Increased Penalties for Recidivists
and Other Sentencing Changes. The bill amends 18 U.S.C.
1030(c) to increase penalties for those who have previously
violated any subsection of Sec. 1030. The current statute
subjects recidivists to enhanced penalties only if they
violated the same subsection twice. For example, a person who
violates the current statute by committing fraud by computer
under Sec. 1030(a)(4) and later commits another computer
crime offense by intentionally destroying medical records
under Sec. 1030(a)(5), is not treated as a recidivist because
his conduct violated two separate subsections of Sec. 1030.
The amendment would provide that anyone who is convicted
twice of committing a computer offense under Sec. 1030 would
be subjected to enhanced penalties.
The penalty provisions in Sec. 1030(c) are also changed to
reflect modifications to the prohibited acts, as discussed
above.
(3) Subsection 1030(d)--Jurisdiction of Secret Service. The
bill amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(d) to grant the United States
Secret Service authority to investigate offenses only under
subsections (a)(2) (A) and (B), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5) and
(a)(6). The current statute grants the Secret Service
authority to investigate any offense under Sec. 1030, subject
to agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary
of the Treasury. The new crimes proposed in the bill,
however, do not fall under the Secret Service's traditional
jurisdiction. Specifically, proposed Sec. 1030(a)(2)(C)
addresses gaps in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314 (interstate
transportation of stolen property), and proposed
Sec. 1030(a)(7) addresses gaps in 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1951
(the Hobbs Act) and 875 (interstate threats). These statutes
are within the jurisdiction of the FBI, which should retain
exclusive jurisdiction over these types of offenses, even
when they are committed by computer.
(4) Subsection 1030(e)--Definitions. The bill contains
three new definitions for ``protected computer,'' ``damage,''
and ``government entity.''
The term ``protected computer'' would replace the term
``federal interest computer'' used currently in Sec. 1030.
The new definition of ``protected computer'' would slightly
modify the current description in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(A) of
computers used by financial institutions or the United States
Government, to make it clear that if the computers are not
exclusively used by those entities, the computers are
protected if the offending conduct affects the use by or for
a financial institution or the Government.
The new definition of ``protected computer'' would also
replace the current description in Sec. 1030(e)(2)(B) of a
covered computer being ``one of two or more computers used in
committing the offense, not all of which are located in the
same State.'' Instead, ``protected computer'' would include
computers ``in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.'' Thus, hackers who attack computers in their
own State would be subject to this law, if the requisite
damage threshold is met and the computer is used in
interstate commerce or foreign commerce or communications.
The tern ``damage,'' as used in new Sec. 1030(a)(5), would
mean any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,
information, program or system which (A) causes loss of more
than $5,000 during any one-year period; (B) modifies or
impairs the medical examination, diagnosis or treatment of a
[[Page
S 9426]]
person; (C) causes physical injury to any person; or (D) threatens the
public health or safety. Computers are increasingly being
used for access to critical services, such as emergency
response systems and air traffic control. ``Damage'' is
therefore broadly defined to encompass the types of harms
against which people should be protected from any computer
hacker or those insiders who intentionally cause harm.
The term ``government entity,'' as used in new
Sec. 1030(a)(7), would be defined to include the United
States government, any State or political subdivision
thereof, any foreign country, and any state, provincial,
municipal or other political subdivision of a foreign
country.
(5) Subsection 1030(g)--Civil Actions. The bill amends the
civil penalty provision in Sec. 1030(g) to reflect the
proposed changes in Sec. 1030(a)(5). The 1994 amendments to
the Act authorized victims of certain computer abuse to
maintain civil actions against violators to obtain
compensatory damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable
relief, with damages limited to economic damages, unless the
violator modified or impaired the medical examination,
diagnosis or treatment of a person.
Under the bill, damages recoverable in civil actions would
be limited to economic losses for violations causing losses
of $5,000 or more during any one-year period. No limit on
damages would be imposed for violations that modified or
impaired the medical examination, diagnosis or treatment of a
person; caused physical injury to any person; or threatened
the public health or safety.
______
By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. McCain):
S. 983. A bill to reduce the number of executive branch political
appointees; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
executive branch political appointees legislation
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, along with my good friend the senior
Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], I am introducing legislation today
to reduce the number of political employees who are appointed by the
President. Specifically, the bill caps the number of political
appointees at 2,000. The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimates
the current number averages 2,800. Thus an estimated 800 of these
positions would be saved. The measure, based on one of the options
outlined by the CBO in its publication ``Reducing the Deficit: Spending
and Revenue Options,'' is estimated to save $363 million over the next
5 years. The savings for fiscal year 1996 is estimated to be $45
million.
Mr. President, this proposal is consistent with the recommendations
of the Vice President's National Performance Review, which called for
reduction in the number of Federal managers and supervisors, arguing
that ``over-control and micromanagement'' not only ``stifle the
creativity of line managers and workers, they consume billions per year
in salary, benefits, and administrative costs.''
That argument may be particularly true will respect to political
appointees, whose numbers grew by over 17 percent between 1980 and
1992, over three times as fast as the total number of executive branch
employees. And if we look back further, to 1960, the growth is even
more dramatic. In his recently published book, ``Thickening Government:
Federal Government and the Diffusion of Accountability,'' author Paul
Light reports a startling 430-percent increase in the number of
political appointees and senior executives in Federal Government
between 1960 and 1992.
The sentiments expressed in the National Performance Review were also
reflected in the 1989 report of the National Commission on the Public
Service, chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker.
Arguing that the growing number of Presidential appointees may
``actually undermine effective Presidential control of the executive
branch,'' the Volcker Commission recommended limiting the number of
political appointees to 2,000, as this legislation does. Mr. President,
it is essential that any administration be able to implement the
policies that brought it into office in the first place. Government
must be responsive to the priorities of the electorate. But as the
Volcker Commission noted, the great increase in the number of political
appointees in recent years has not made Government more effective or
more responsive to political leadership.
The Commission report cited three reasons. First, it noted that the
large number of Presidential appointees simply cannot be managed
effectively by any President or White House. This lack of control is
aggravated by the often competing political agendas and constituencies
that some appointees might bring with them to their new positions.
Altogether, the Commission argued that this lack of control and
political focus ``may actually dilute the President's ability to
develop and enforce a coherent,
coordinated program and to hold cabinet secretaries accountable.''
Second, the report argued that the excessive number of appointees are
a barrier to critical expertise, distancing the President and his
principal assistants from the most experienced career officials. Though
bureaucracies can certainly impede needed reforms, they can also be a
source of unbiased analysis. Adding organizational layers of political
appointees can restrict access to important resources, while doing
nothing to reduce bureaucratic impediments.
Author Paul Light says, ``As this sediment has thickened over the
decades, presidents have grown increasingly distant from the lines of
government, and the front lines from them.'' Light adds that
``Presidential leadership, therefore, may reside in stripping
government of the barriers to doing its job effectively . . .''
Finally, the Volcker Commission asserted that this thickening barrier
of temporary appointees between the President and career officials can
undermine development of a proficient civil service by discouraging
talented individuals from remaining in Government service or even
pursuing a career in Government in the first place.
Mr. President, former Attorney General Elliot Richardson put it well
when he noted:
But a White House personnel assistant sees the position of
deputy assistant secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his
eyes that makes it an ideal reward for a fourth-echelon
political type--a campaign advance man, or a regional
political organizer. For a senior civil servant, it's irksome
to see a position one has spent 20 or 30 years preparing for
preempted by an outsider who doesn't know the difference
between an audit exception and an authorizing bill.
Mr. President, many will recall the difficulties the current
administration has had in filling even some of the more visible
political appointments.
A story in the National Journal in November 1993, focusing upon the
delays in the Clinton administration in filling political positions,
noted that in Great Britain, the transition to a new government is
finished a week after it begins, once 40 or so political appointments
are made. That certainly is not the case in the United States,
recognizing, of course, that we have a quite different system of
government from the British Parliament form of government.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the vast number of political
appointments that are currently made creates a somewhat cumbersome
process, even in the best of circumstances. The long delays and logjams
created in filling these positions under the Clinton administration
simply illustrates another reason why the number of positions should be
cut back.
The consequences of having so many critical positions unfilled when
an administration changes can be serious. In
the first 2 years of the Clinton administration, there were a number
of stories of problems created by delays in making these appointments.
From strained relationships with foreign allies over failures to make
ambassadorship appointments to the 2-year vacancy at the top of the
National Archives, the record is replete with examples of agencies left
drifting while a political appointment was delayed. Obviously, there
are a number of situations were the delays were caused by circumstances
beyond control of the administration. The current case involving the
position of Surgeon General of the United States is a clear example.
Nonetheless, it is clear that with a reduced number of political
appointments to fill, the process of selecting and appointing
individuals to key positions in a new administration is likely to be
enhanced.
Mr. President, let me also stress that the problem is not simply the
initial filling of a political appointment, but keeping someone in that
position over time. In a report released last year, the General
Accounting Office reviewed a portion of these positions for the period
of 1981 to 1991, and found high levels of turnover--7 appointees in 10
[[Page
S 9427]]
years for one position--as well as delays, usually of months but
sometimes years, in filling vacancies.
Mr. President, I recognize that this legislative proposal is not
likely to be popular with many people, both within this administration
and perhaps among members of the other party who hope to win back the
White House in the next election.
I want to stress that I do not view efforts to reduce the number of
political appointees to be a partisan issue. Indeed, I think it adds to
the credibility and merits of this proposal that a Democratic Senator
is proposing to cut back these appointments at a time when there is a
Democratic administration in place.
The legislation has been drafted to take effect as of October 1,
1995. It provides for reduction in force procedures to accomplish this
goal. In other words, this administration would be required to reduce
the number of political appointees to comply with this legislation. It
would obviously apply to any further administration as well.
The sacrifices that deficit reduction efforts require must be spread
among all of us. This measure requires us to bite the bullet and impose
limitations upon political appointments that both parties may well wish
to retain. The test of commitment to deficit reduction, however, is not
simply to propose measures that impact someone else.
As we move forward to implement the NPR recommendations to reduce the
number of Government employees, streamline agencies, and make
Government more responsive, we should also right size the number of
political appointees, ensuring a sufficient number to implement the
policies of any administration without burdening the Federal budget
with unnecessary, possibly counterproductive political jobs.
Mr. President, when I ran for the U.S. Senate in 1992, I developed an
82-point plan to reduce the Federal deficit and achieve a balanced
budget. Since that time, I have continued to work toward enactment of
many of the provisions of that plan and have added new provisions on a
regular basis.
The legislation I am introducing today reflects one of the points
included on the original 82-point plan calling for streamlining various
Federal agencies and reducing agency overhead costs. I am pleased to
have this opportunity to continue to work toward implementation of the
elements of the deficit reduction plan.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 983
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES.
(a) Definition.--For purposes of this section the term
``political appointee'' means any individual who--
(1) is employed in a position on the executive schedule
under sections 5312 through 5316 of title 5, United States
Code;
(2) is a limited term appointee, limited emergency
appointee, or noncareer appointee in the senior executive
service as defined under section 3232(a) (5), (6), and (7) of
title 5, United States Code, respectively; or
(3) is employed in a position in the executive branch of
the Government of a confidential or policy-determining
cheracter under Schedule C of subpart C of part 213 of title
5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Limitation.--The President, acting through the Office
of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel
Management, shall take such actions as necessary (including
reduction in force actions under procedures established under
section 3595 of title 5, United States Code) to ensure that
the total number of political appointees shall not exceed
2,000.
(c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on
October 1, 1995.
______
By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself, Mr. Lott, Mr. Helms, and Mr.
Cochran):
S. 984. A bill to protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct
the upbringing of a child, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ACT OF 1995
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995 to reaffirm the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. While most parents
assume this right is protected, some lower courts and Government
bureaucrats have acted to limit this basic freedom. The bill I am
introducing will protect the family from unwarranted intrusions by the
Government. Congressmen Steve Largent and Mike Parker have joined me to
pursue this initiative.
While the Constitution does not explicitly address the parent-child
relationship, the Supreme Court clearly regards the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children as a fundamental right under
the 14th amendment to the Constitution. Fundamental rights, such as
freedom of speech and religion receive the highest legal protection.
Two cases in the 1920's affirmed the Court's high regard for the
integrity of the parent-child relationship. In Meyer versus Nebraska,
the Court declared that the 14th amendment,
[W]ithout doubt, . . . denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . .
. marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience. . . .
The second important case was Pierce versus. Society of Sisters. In
this case, the Court declared that:
[In] this day and under our civilization, the child of man
is his parent's child and not the state's . . . It is not
seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's
child intellectually and religiously is a most substantial
part of the liberty and freedom of the parent.
The Court went on to hold that parents are chiefly responsible for
the education and upbringing of their children.
While the Supreme Court's intent to protect parental rights is
unquestionable, lower courts have not always followed this high
standard to protect the parent-child relationship. The recent lower
court assault on the rights of parents to direct their children's
education, health care decisions, and discipline is unprecedented.
Several examples of lower court cases will demonstrate the need for
this bill. A group of parents in Chelmsford, MA, sued when their
children were required to sit through a 90-minute AIDS awareness
presentation by ``Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc.'' In this so-
called group sexual experience students were instructed to engage in
activities which some parents considered outrageous and pornographic.
When the parents challenged the propriety of the school's actions, the
court held that the parents, who were never told about the
presentation, did not have a right to know and consent to this sexually
explicit program before their children were required to attend.
The Washington State Supreme Court ruled that it was not a violation
of parents' rights to remove an eighth-grade child from her family
because she objected to the ground rules established in the home. The
parents in this case grounded their daughter because she wanted to
smoke marijuana and sleep with her boyfriend. She objected, and the
courts removed her from the home. Most parents would consider these
rules imminently reasonable. But the court held that although the
family structure is a fundamental institution of our society, and
parental prerogatives are entitled to considerable legal deference,
they are not absolute and must yield to fundamental rights of the child
or important interests of the state.
Recent news accounts reported of a father who was accused of child
abuse because he publicly spanked his 4-year-old daughter. When she
deliberately slammed the car door on her brother's hand, her father
acted promptly to discipline her by a reasonably administered spanking.
A passer-by called the police and the father had to defend against the
charge of child abuse. While the father won his case, it is amazing to
most parents that they could be dragged into court against their will
to defend against such an outrageous charge as child abuse for
disciplining their child for open rebellion.
Unfortunately, these cases are only a few of the many examples of
parents' rights being violated when trying to direct the training and
nurturing of their children. Recent public debate has also contributed
to the movement to violate parental rights.
[[Page
S 9428]]
Dr. Jack Westman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison proposes that
the State license parents as a means of conveying the seriousness of
the parental responsibility. While there is no question of the awesome
responsibility to raise and nurture a child, the proposal to have the
State license potential parents for the right to have children raises
many serious questions. Who will decide what will be the appropriate
standards for parenthood? These and other questions stretch the
imagination of freedom loving American parents.
With recent lower court cases and the flow of public debate around
``Parental licensing'', it is easy to see the need for the Parental
Rights Act of 1995.
The goal of the PRA is to reaffirm the parental right to direct the
upbringing of their children in four major areas: First, Directing or
providing for the education of the child; two, making health care
decisions for the child; three, disciplining the child, including
reasonable corporal discipline; and four, directing or providing for
the religious teaching of the child.
The PRA accomplishes this goal by simply clarifying for lower courts
and administrative tribunals that the proper standard to use in
disputes between the Government and parents is the highest legal
standard available. This standard, known as ``The Compelling Interest
Standard'' means that before the Government can interfere in the
parent-child relationship, it must demonstrate that there is a
compelling interest to protect and that the means the Government is
using to protect this interest is the least restrictive means
available.
Practically speaking, this means that the law in question is not so
broad in application that it sweeps in more than is necessary to
protect the interest in question.
An example will help to clarify this point. Unfortunately, there are
parents who abuse and neglect their children. Clearly, protecting
children from abuse and neglect would fit into any reasonable person's
definition of a compelling interest of the State. One of the stated
purposes of the PRA is to protect children from abuse and neglect.
Another stated goal is to recognize that protecting children in these
circumstances is a compelling Government interest. Abusing or
neglecting your child has never been considered a protected parental
right.
Using the least restrictive means available to protect children from
abuse and neglect means that a parents who are appropriately meeting
their child's needs could not fall victim to an overzealous State law.
The law would be written in such a way that it would cover parents who
are abusing or neglecting their children but it would not cover parents
who are not.
If the law is written so poorly that even good, loving parents could
be accused of child abuse, it would not pass the test of being the
least restrictive means available and would have to be modified.
You might ask, ``How is the PRA going to work?'' It uses the
traditional four-step process to evaluate fundamental rights which
balances the interests of parents, children and the Government. First,
parents are required to demonstrate that the actions being questioned
are within their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their
child.
Second, they must show that the Government interfered with this
right. If the parents are able to prove these two things, then the
burden shifts to the Government to show that the interference was
essential to accomplish a compelling Government interest and that the
Government's method of interfering was the least restrictive means to
accomplish its goal.
In these cases, the court would balance the parents' right to make
decisions on behalf of their children against the Government's right to
intervene in the family relationship and decide what was the proper
balance.
While it would be better if lower courts and administrative agencies
would use the appropriate legal standard outlined by the Supreme Court
without Congress having to clarify the standard, the history shows this
is not likely to occur. My bill will clarify this standard with
finality.
Two specific concerns were raised that I want to address. The first
is from child abuse prosecutors and advocates. As we moved through
discussions on the early drafts of this bill, I made clear that I
firmly believed child abuse and neglect is a compelling Government
interest.
With this in mind, I incorporated suggestions from prosecutors and
advocates on this issue. I am comfortable that the changes made address
their concerns.
The second issue was infanticide and abortion. The National Right to
Life Committee was concerned that the bill would overturn the baby doe
laws protecting handicapped children after birth. After consultation
with other attorneys who agreed that this was a concern, I changed my
draft to clarify that the PRA could not be used in this way.
The second point that NRL raised was that the PRA would somehow
empower parents to coerce a young woman to have an abortion against her
wishes. This is because the PRA allows parents to make health care
decisions for their child unless the parents' neglect or refusal to act
will risk the life of the child or risk serious physical injury to the
child. I have consulted with other pro-life organizations and advocates
who do not share this concern and have endorsed the bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It is critical to the
proper balance of parents' rights against the Government's actions.
Without the PRA, lower courts, Government bureaucrats, and
administrative tribunals will continue to interfere needlessly in the
parent-child relationship.
______
By Mr. CAMPBELL (for himself and Mr. Brown):
S. 985. A bill to provide for the exchange of certain lands in Gilpin
County, CO; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
the gilpin land exchange act
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I, and my colleague, Senator
Brown, are introducing legislation to exchange approximately 300 acres
of fragmented Bureau of Land Management lands near Black Hawk, CO, for
approximately 4,000 acres that will be added to Rocky Mountain National
Park and to other Department of the Interior holdings in Colorado,
while dedicating any remaining equalization funds to the purchase of
land and water rights for the Blanca Wetlands Management Area near
Alamosa, CO.
This legislation is supported by local governments, environmental
groups, and land developers in Colorado. More specifically, the bill:
Will enable Rocky Mountain National Park to obtain an adjacent 40-acre
parcel known as the Circle C Ranch. The Park Service has long sought to
acquire the ranch to avoid its subdivision and development; will result
in the public acquisition of approximately 4,000 acres of elk winter
range and other important wildlife habitat at the headwaters of La Jara
Canyon and Fox Creek, approximately 10 miles from Antonito, CO; and
will create a fund from cash equalization moneys that may be paid to
the United States as a result of the exchange, with the fund to be used
to augment fish and wildlife habitat in the BLM's Blanca Wetlands
Management Area. The BLM has wanted funds for these purposes for many
years.
In exchange for picking up over 4,000 acres of land, 130 parcels of
highly fragmented BLM land totalling about 300 acres will be made
available for private acquisition. Of these 130 parcels, 88 are less
than 1 acre in size. The BLM, through its established land use planning
process, has already identified these lands as appropriate for
disposal.
I hope my colleagues will support this effort, and I ask unanimous
consent that the text of the bill, along with letters of support from
the city of Central, the city of Blackhawk, the Gilpin County Board of
County Commissioners, and the Huerfano County Board of County
Commissioners be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 985
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) certain scattered parcels of Federal land in Gilpin
County, Colorado, are administered by the Secretary of th
