NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(House of Representatives - May 14, 1996)
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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 430 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3230.
{time} 1555
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(
H.R. 3230) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Barrett of Nebraska in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will each control 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
altering order of consideration of amendments
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4(c) of House
Resolution 430, I request that during the consideration of
H.R. 3230,
amendments Nos. 1 and 2 printed in part A of House Report 104-570 be
considered after all other amendments printed in that part of the
report.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request is noted.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 continues an effort we began last
year to revitalize this country's national defenses after a decade of
spending decline and force structure reductions. For the second
consecutive year, and in a bipartisan fashion, the National Security
Committee has reported a bill that I believe considers the future more
realistically, and address shortfalls and shortcomings in the present
more aggressively, than does the administration. Moreover, the
committee's efforts have been undertaken within the broader context and
constraints of a commitment to balance the budget by the year 2002.
The primary mission of our military forces has not changed very much
since the fall of the Berlin Wall--it remains the protection and
promotion of vital U.S. interests around the world. Despite the end of
the cold war, the events of just the past year clearly demonstrate that
new challenges to U.S. global interests are emerging on many fronts.
China, as an emerging power, has demonstrated a disturbing
willingness to use military force as a tool of coercion as it threatens
stability, prosperity and the growth of democracy in East Asia. The
administration's decision last week to waive sanctions against the
Chinese for their export of nuclear sensitive technology to Pakistan
undermines this country's commitment to nonproliferation in the eyes of
much of the world, and seemingly rewards Beijing's leaders for their
increasingly assertive and aggressive diplomacy throughout the region.
Russia, as a disintegrating military superpower, careens back and
forth from extreme nationalism to unreconstructed communism as it
struggles to hold itself together in the post-cold-war world. As it
does, it
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wages a bloody war in Chechnya, threatens the use of nuclear weapons in
response to NATO expansion and sells advanced weaponry of all kinds--
including nuclear technologies--to anyone willing to pay cash. We spend
United States taxpayer's dollars to assist Russia and other countries
of the former Soviet Union to dismantle their nuclear weapons, yet
Moscow maintains its nuclear forces at cold war levels of readiness and
continues to invest scarce resources in further strategic
modernization.
And throughout the world, America confronts a lengthening list of
failed and failing states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict. The events of
the past year and the range of U.S. peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions testifies to the rise of ethnic violence, terrorism and other
challenges to the evolving post-cold-war world.
The administration's underfunding of U.S. military forces stands in
stark contrast to this troubling strategic landscape, as does its
extensive use of the military on missions of peripheral U.S. national
interest. The gap between our national military strategy and the
resources this administration has decided to commit to executing that
strategy, estimated by some to be greater than $100 billion, continues
to widen. So the result is a Department of Defense that has been
designed to carry out one set of missions, is being called upon to
execute an entirely different set of missions, and is inadequately
funded for either. The result is a deepening sense of confusion,
frustration, and disarray in our military.
Consequently,
H.R. 3230 once again attempts to address the shortfalls
and shortcomings created by the internal contradictions of the
administration's defense program. Beginning last year, the committee
focused its efforts on the four key pillars of a sound national
defense; improving the quality of military life; sustaining core
readiness; revitalizing an underfunded modernization plan; reforming
and innovating the Pentagon.
H.R. 3230 builds on last year's efforts in
these four key areas.
The bill provides $266.7 billion in budget authority for Department
of Defense and Department of Energy programs and is $600 million below
the spending levels set by the Budget Committee for the national
security budget function in fiscal year 1997. The bill provides for
$2.4 billion more than current fiscal year 1996 authorized spending
which, when adjusted for inflation, represents a real decline of
approximately 1.5 percent in spending and not an increase. The fact
that this bill authorizes defense spending at a level that is $12.4
billion greater than the President's request, yet still reflects
spending decline, speaks volumes about the extent to which the
President is underfunding the military.
I will leave discussion of the many important initiatives in the bill
to my colleagues on the National Security Committee who have worked
very hard since late February to get this bill to the floor this early
in the year. In particular, I would like to recognize the diligence and
dedication of the subcommittee and panel chairman and ranking members.
Unlike most committees in the House, the National Security Committee's
seven subcommittees and panels are each responsible for producing
discreet pieces of the broader bill. From the outset of the process,
ensuring that the bill comes together in a coherent product requires a
lot of planning, coordination and teamwork, all of which I have
consistently been able to count on.
Because our fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill was not
enacted until this past February, the National Security Committee had
no chance to pause before launching into the fiscal year 1997 hearing
and mark-up process in order to get the bill to the floor this early in
the legislative cycle. I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the
committee, all or who are responsible for us being here today.
In particular, I would like to recognize the contributions of the
gentleman from California, the committee's ranking member, Mr. Dellums.
He is one of this institution's most articulate Members as well as
strongest proponents of the deliberative process. The committee's work,
and this bill, are that much better because of it.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the staff. This bill
authorizes funding for approximately 50 percent of the Federal
Government's discretionary budget. To say it is a lot of work is an
understatement. We have a small staff relative to the size of the
committee and the magnitude of our oversight responsibilities, so the
work gets done only through great dedication and effort.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge strong bipartisan support for this
bipartisan bill. The Constitution makes raising and maintaining the
military one of Congress's most fundamental responsibilities.
H.R. 3230
clearly demonstrates the extent to which the National Security
Committee has taken this responsibility seriously.
{time} 1600
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I take a few moments to express my concerns with
H.R.
3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. I
would begin at the outset by thanking my distinguished colleague for
his very kind and generous remarks with respect to this gentleman in
his opening remarks.
Second, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina,
Chairman Spence, again for a more bipartisan approach to this year's
bill, both at the staff and member level. But I would hasten to add,
Mr. Chairman, civility, collegiality and some effort at bipartisanship
notwithstanding, there remain many issues that caused me to vote
against the bill in committee and to offer additional and dissenting
views on its reports.
I refer my colleagues who are interested to those views and will
request that at the appropriate time they be approved for inclusion
into the Record.
Let me enumerate some of my concerns. First, Mr. Chairman, the
unwarranted, I underscore, unwarranted addition of nearly $13 billion
to the defense topline is justified primarily to meet a notional
modernization crisis. The hue and cry over modernization reminds me of
last year's readiness crisis, another purported crisis that quickly
evaporated before conference was concluded on last year's bill.
Careful thinking would conclude that there is no modernization
crisis. The leadership of the Department of Defense has offered a
cogent and calm viewpoint demonstrating that the drawdown of our forces
has allowed for a slower replacement of our weapon systems. The
carefully crafted future years defense plan adequately meets
modernization requirements while allowing us to fund other important
accounts in our overall budget.
In many cases, it would appear that the committee adds were made with
little consideration to the ability to sustain the program, which will
cause disruptive program instabilities and forestall our ability to
meet future program needs.
Rather than, Mr. Chairman, buying more hardware now, we should invest
in technologies of the future, both the direct military technologies,
including innovative nonlethal weapons technology more appropriate to
operations other than war, to operations such as operations that are
being carried out in Bosnia, humanitarian efforts in other parts of the
world and into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan and invest
wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims about a
modernization crisis will harm our national security in both the short
and long term.
Mr. Chairman, it is true as well that failure to fund the domestic
education and economic development programs that form a critical
element of our national security strategy is contrary to our long-term
national interests.
Second, the bill fails to take advantage of the opportunities to move
further beyond the nuclear abyss, Mr. Chairman, whether it is in the
form of constraints on the cooperative threat reduction program,
euphemistically referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, that destroys
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union or the needless acceleration
of Department of Energy weapons programs or the continuing restrictions
on retiring strategic systems, these are all missed opportunities.
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Third, the bill contains the funding for an overly aggressive and
unnecessary national missile defense program that would be noncompliant
with the ABM Treaty.
The combination of all these three issues, when combined with the
prospect of near-term NATO expansion, has contributed dramatically, in
this gentleman's view, to destabilizing our relationship with Russia.
In turn, it has reduced the prospect that we can work with democratic
forces in Eastern Europe to achieve long-term stability in Europe,
stability based upon a respect for human rights, economic development
and a nonthreatening balance of military power in the region.
Fourth, the bill grabs hold of numerous hot button cultural issues.
The Committee, without hearings, Mr. Chairman, negated the do not ask
do not tell policy in its mark and returns us to an era in which
capable, willing gay men and lesbians are completely denied the
opportunity to serve their Nation in uniform.
The committee, again without hearings, required the discharge of
personnel who test positively for HIV-1 virus, which is neither
medically nor militarily necessary. It flies in the face, Mr. Chairman,
it flies in the face of Congress's very recent appeal of such a policy
before it even went into effect. Our service personnel, who have served
this Nation with honor, with distinction and professionalism, need
better treatment from their Government than this.
The committee refused to return the right of secure safe abortion to
servicewomen serving overseas. The committee trampled on the
Constitution's first amendment protections by embracing overly broad
and vague language in an effort to suppress lascivious literature and
other media.
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me just say that I believe that
because all of these reasons, in order to make it in order that we be
able to more successfully fix the problems that are in this bill, I
urge the committee to reject this bill as reported by the committee.
With whatever time I have remaining, I would like to point out to my
colleagues that, as I said before, the topline in this budget increases
President Clinton's budget request by nearly $13 billion, no small sum
at all. That is what makes politics. That is why there is a Republican
Party and a Democratic Party, left, right and center on the political
perspective.
What is tragic to this gentleman, who has always attempted to take
the floor of this body not to challenge on the basis of partisanship,
not to challenge on the basis of personality but to be prepared to
challenge any Member of Congress on the issues of the day, on the
critical, vital issues of our time, we ought to be able to debate, win
or lose. The tragedy is that the rule that governed this bill did not
allow, Mr. Chairman, not one single amendment to reduce the overall
level of the military budget in a post-cold-war environment.
Some may rationalize the inclusion of 13 additional billion dollars.
But there are some of us in this body who are prepared to discuss
rationally, intelligently and cogently and substantively that there is
no rational military requirement to add $13 billion in a post-cold war
so-called balanced budget limited dollar environment. But we were
denied the opportunity.
For the first time in my 25-plus years in the Congress, denied
outright any opportunity to cut the budget, rendering those of us who
believe that $13 billion additional in the budget is virtually obscene,
rendered us impotent in our capacity to challenge on behalf of
constituencies in this country who believe that there is no need for
$13 billion additional. No opportunity whatsoever.
Mr. Chairman, if we look at the amendments that were made in order,
it does not allow us not only to break into the topline, we cannot even
get at the priorities. Of the six major amendments that have been made
in order, two of them are not going to be offered. So we are down to
four. Of the 35 minor amendments that were primarily language
amendments, noncontroversial, seeking studies and reports, most of
those 35 amendments will be rolled into two omnibus amendments,
bipartisan, noncontroversial. So for a military budget of close to $170
billion, we will move across this floor with a degree of alacrity that
staggers the imagination, in this gentleman's opinion, is frightening.
In the atmosphere of a balanced budget, we ought to pay more
attention to nearly $270 billion. In a post-cold-war environment, where
we are not moving into an era of change and transition and challenge
and opportunity, we ought to be able to talk about a rational military
budget that walks us into the 21st century with pride and dignity and
competence and capability. But to deny that in the rule means that when
my colleagues adopted the rule, they adopted this budget. With rare
exception we could have given the rule, and what I am saying to my
colleagues is, with rare exception, this military budget, $267 billion,
could have been offered on the suspension calendar. There are no major
amendments here; there are no amendments that take $1 out of this
budget. There are no amendments, with rare exception, that make any
major policy changes.
{time} 1615
Something is wrong with this process. I did not labor marching uphill
to find us in a post-cold war environment with great opportunities for
25 years, to come to the floor, rendered totally impotent, in my
capacity to try to shake the reality, along with my colleagues, of the
billions of dollars we are spending on defense and to move us in a
direction that makes sense.
I conclude that I will oppose this bill for all the reasons that I
have enunciated. I urge my colleagues to reject this bill. Let us go
back to committee and fix the problems.
Mr. Chairman, I include the following material for the Record:
Additional and Dissenting Views of Ronald V. Dellums
I offer dissenting views because I am deeply troubled by
several aspects of the authorization bill and its report,
most especially by its overall focus and directions. I remain
convinced that the authorization top line is significantly
higher than required for the military aspects of our national
security strategy. It may be true that the committee marked
to a top line that it anticipates in the coming fiscal year
1997 budget resolution. Despite this, I believe it had the
opportunity to make prudent reductions in the overall program
authorization, thereby providing guidance to the Committee on
the Budget as to how better to meet deficit reduction goals.
Moreover, I remain convinced that the significant plus-up
over the President's request has caused a lack of focus and a
lack of discipline in our procurement and research and
development accounts, a point to which I will return later.
Despite the collegial and effective working relationship
between the committee's majority leadership and the minority,
there has at times been a troubling partisan appearance to
some of the committee's business and is reflected in the
committee report as well. Most troubling has been an
unwillingness to hear from administration witnesses on
important policy issues before the committee. It is certainly
true that outside experts provide important insight into the
policy choices and strategic circumstances we confront, but
we owe ourselves the responsibility to hear also from
government experts and responsible officials. What is
especially troubling is that we have failed to request the
traditional intelligence threat briefing which has provided a
cogent perspective on the strategic requirements that we
face. Given our rapidly changing world, this annual review is
even more important now than it was during the period of the
Cold War.
A small but important additional example of this problem is
the committee's determination to plumb the conclusions
reached by the Intelligence Community in a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States. Whether or not there is a legitimate
concern about the development of the NIE and whatever
questions one has regarding the validity of its conclusions,
it is unconscionable that we have failed to have the
Intelligence Community before the committee to testify on the
NIE's contents and its methodology. I have requested such a
committee hearing on several occasions, and am disappointed
that this has not occurred. While I am willing to support the
provisions contained in the committee report asking the
Director of Central Intelligence to review both the matter of
the NIE and to develop an updated and expanded assessment,
and while I accept the majority's interest in having an
alternative analysis analysis rendered, it concerns me that
we have gotten to this point without a full committee
deliberation on the substance and development of the IN.
While the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill reported by
the committee does not itself contain highly contentious
provisions on the command and control of U.S. armed forces
participating in peacekeeping operations, the issue arises in
a free-standing piece of legislation marked-up the same day
by the committee and reported as
H.R. 3308 just three months
after the Congress sustained the President's veto of the
National Defense
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on this issue, among
other reasons.
The same point can be made for the committee's decision to
report out
H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars''
missile defense program. A less extreme formulation for
national missile defense program activity was met with a
Presidential veto on last year's defense authorization bill.
As with the command and control issue, it strikes this
gentleman that there is a little legislative reason to have
decided to push forward an even more extreme ballistic
missile defense program, given that it is surely destined to
meet a Presidential veto as well. Our committee must achieve
its policy goals through legislation, and obviously that
activity must be bound by the constraints of our
Constitution's separation of powers between the Branches.
Pursuing legislation knowing that it will be vetoed, when
nothing has occurred to change the imaginable outcome seems a
political rather than a legislative course.
But the national ballistic missile defense issue is also
embedded in the committee recommendation and report on
H.R.
3230 in important ways. And there is much more commonality
between the administration and the Congress on this issue
than the political rhetoric would suggest. Many of the
differences between the two approaches are rooted on a
perception of the timing of the appearance of a threat to
which we would need such a response. This is essentially a
function of risk management, and how to determine what type
of ``insurance policy'' we wish to purchase against such a
future contingency. What is less focused on but should be
very central to the debate, is the cost and character of the
alternative ``insurance policies'' that are available to the
Nation. And this is where the parties diverge.
The administration's current national ballistic missile
defense plan can provide for an affordable defense against
limited ballistic missile threats before those threats will
emerge. It does so in a way that anticipates likely changes
in the threat from today's estimates. It also does so in a
way that avoids becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-
sac by a premature deployment of a potentially misdirected
system.
The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty
considerations and the threat reduction and strategic
stability goals that the treaties promise.
This course of action commits us as well to an incredibly
expensive and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the
department'
s 3+3 program and the Spratt substitute to
H.R.
3144, provide for a more capable missile defense system when
deployed, and one that is affordable within current budget
projections. It blends arms control and
counterproliferation activities with deterrence and
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles
from being deployed at all, while providing a prudent
``insurance policy'' against limited but as of yet non-
existent threats.
The overreliance by the committee on a ``hardware''
solution to intercept incoming missiles in the final minutes
of their flight time, risks constructing a very expensive
21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy may well
prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we might
face as the original Maginot Line was in defending France
during World War II.
Returning now to refocus on the issue of the size of the
top line and its impact on our procurement choices, I am
reminded of echoes from last year's debate on the fiscal year
1996 authorization bill.
During that debate, we heard a hue and cry that there
existed a readiness crisis in the services. Foregone training
and maintenance, as well as ``optempo'' stress were all
allegedly impacting adversely on the U.S. armed force's
ability to perform its principal missions. This hue and cry
was raised despite assurances by the top military leadership
that the force was receiving historically high levels of
operational funding and was as ready a force as we had ever
had. Facts have borne out their more sober assessment and,
indeed, one can say that the relatively modest increased
investment that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization
conference in the end committed to the readiness accounts
confirmed the view that a ``crisis'' did not really exist.
The small increase in the readiness account proposed in the
fiscal year 1997 authorization bill lends additional credence
to this assessment.
This year's hue and cry is that there is a
``modernization'' crisis, with much displaying of data to
support the view that low levels of procurement spending must
equate with an insufficient modernization strategy. What is
so remarkably similar about this debate with last year's
debate on readiness are three things.
First, the services generally agree that they could all
``use'' more money for procurement this year, but that they
could meet their requirements with what had been budgeted as
long as long-term trends supported their needs. This sounds
very much like ``we're missing some training'' but ``we're as
ready as we've ever been.''
Second, the leadership of the Department of Defense has
offered a cogent and calm viewpoint that the drawdown of the
force structure from its Cold War levels allowed them one
more year's grace before they needed to begin to replace
equipment that had been procured in large numbers during the
1980s for a much larger force. In other words, they had a
plan, it was being managed, and they could perform their
mission. And they could more appropriately use defense
resources in other accounts and reserve for the future year's
defense plan a significant increase in procurement dollars.
Third, while the committee invited the service chiefs to
submit their ``wish list'' for additional procurement items,
it has not followed the Secretary of Defense's plea to limit
procurement additions to those items needed by the services.
By my calculation approximately half of the procurement
plus-up does not meet that qualification.
Not satisfied with this explanation the committee
recommendation would spend an additional $7.5 billion on
procurement, and as I noted above much of that on
requirements not established by the service chiefs. I believe
that this unsolicited largess is imprudent and will have
significant adverse impact on our ability to meet real future
requirements. It will provoke budget and program disruptions
in the near term and it will preempt important opportunities
into the future.
In many cases it would appear that these adds were made
with little consideration to the ability to sustain the
program in the next year. The disruptive business and human
implications of creating program instabilities by ``spiking''
procurement for one or two years could haunt the military
industrial base for years to come. This is a costly and
ineffective way to approach long-term modernization
requirements. In addition, it would also appear that program
risks, indeed even assessing the department's ability to even
execute a program, may not have been given adequate
consideration in determining authorization levels.
Equally important and worse, the committee recommendation
throws much of this money into systems that were designed
``to fight the last war.'' This is a common failing that is
so easily avoidable. In addition, the procurement ``theme''
to solve the ``crisis'' appears to be only to buy more, and
often not more of what the service chiefs requested. This
binge in procurement both purchases needlessly redundant
weapons capabilities and does so in excessive amounts. With
regard to the former, we will end making purchases of too
many different systems, rather than making choices and
sticking with the best choice. With regard to the latter, we
are spending our investment capital to buy unneeded equipment
for today that will prevent us from purchasing the right
equipment when it becomes available tomorrow.
Rather than buying more hardware now, we should invest in
the technologies of the future, both the direct military
technologies, including innovative non-lethal weapons
technology more appropriate to operations other than war, and
into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan
and invest wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims
about a modernization ``crisis'' will harm our national
security in both the short and long term.
Much more could be said about this particular problem. Let
me summarize my views in this area by saying that this
extravagant level of spending is neither needed for our
current military requirements nor prudent for meeting the
needs of the future. In addition, it contributes to a defense
authorization top line that needlessly consumes resources
from the two other elements of our national security triad:
our economy and our foreign policy program that can dampen
the circumstances that give rise to war. And, unlike money
put into the operations and maintenance accounts, it is not
easily or efficaciously diverted to other priorities when
hindsight establishes that the perceived requirement in fact
does not exist.
There are other issues and problems in this report other
than with its dollar level and the procurement choices. They
deserve illumination as well.
Foremost among them are the several issues that erupted in
the personnel title of the bill and report. While I do not
support the current ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy on gays
and lesbians serving in the military, I more strongly reject
the committee's view that we should return to an era in which
capable and willing gay men and lesbians were denied the
opportunity to serve their nation in uniform. I support a
policy that would allow individuals to serve regardless of
sexual orientation. Clearly ``don't ask, don't tell'' has not
provided the protections to such individuals that its
crafters felt it would; but a return to an era of repression
and intolerance is not the solution.
By way of explanation of the necessity for the change in
policy under section 566 of this legislation, the committee
elsewhere in this report cites at length the decision in the
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Paul G. Thomasson, Lieutenant, United
States Navy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense; John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendants-Applies.
It is useful to note that this case is but one of several
that are expected to be heard before the United States
Supreme Court later this year on the issue of the
Administration's ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy. No fewer
than eight other cases on the policy are presently before the
federal courts. In the last year, judges in two of those
cases reached the opposite view of the judges in
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the Thomasson case, yet the committee does not make reference
to those decisions.
The committee has not held a single hearing on the issue of
gays and lesbians in the military in either the first or
second session of the 104th Congress--the period during which
the current policy has been implemented. Though the committee
obviously feels that it is of utmost importance to change the
current policy, it did not choose to expend any time or
effort to get the views of witnesses from the military, the
administration or the public on the issue. Instead, it relies
on the decision on one court case to base a major change to
military policy.
If the committee is to make an informed and thoughtful
decision on this matter, it should make the effort to shed
light on the competing views and experiences that represent
all sides on this complex and important issue through the
committee hearing process. The committee avoids the subject
by relying instead on the judicial branch for justification
and to explain Congressional intent. By including legislative
provisions in the subcommittee chairman's mark without any
discussion of the matter, the committee demonstrates a lack
of faith in the hearing process, betrays a lack of confidence
that its provision would prevail under scrutiny, and abuses
the prerogatives of the majority.
Similarly the committee's recommendation to discharge
personnel who test positive for the HIV-1 virus is medically
and militarily unnecessary and flies in the face of the
Congress's very recent determination to rescind such a policy
even before it went into effect. Of even greater concern than
having established a policy for which there is no military
requirement, the committee's recommendation pretends that it
has protected the medical disability rights of personnel
who will face discharge under its provisions. This is a
disingenuous formulation given that the committee was
fully apprised that in order to provide such protection it
would have to do so in legislative language, which it
refused to do because of the direct spending implications
that would have forced funding cuts in other accounts. Our
service personnel who have served this nation with honor,
distinction and professionalism need better from their
government than this.
In language on section 567, elsewhere in this report, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ``deem
separating service members determined to be HIV-positive as
meeting all other requirements for disability retirement * *
*.''
While giving the appearance of providing for medical
retirement, the fact is that such language had to be stripped
from the bill by amendment in the full committee markup
because of direct spending implications. The Congressional
Budget Office has scored this provision as costing $27
million over the next five years, and it could not be enacted
without identifying an offset to pay for it. The committee
could not accomplish this and, instead, decided to foist the
problem off on the Department of Defense as an unfunded
mandate, and then take credit for supposedly providing the
medical retirement benefit.
Worse yet, it turns out that the Secretary of Defense may
not have the statutory authority to fund such a mandate ``out
of hide'' in any case. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 and 1204 direct
DoD to use the Department of Veterans Affairs rating
schedule. While the tables currently indicate that a
servicemember who is symptomatic of AIDS is eligible for
medical retirement, it rates a servicemember who has
asymptomatic HIV with a zero percent disability rating.
Consequently, they would not be entitled to disability
retired pay.
Under these circumstances, and since the law which would be
reinstated by this section was repealed, the member who is
discharged under section 567 would have no medical or
retirement benefits at all, nor would the members of his or
her family. He or she would be promptly discharged within two
months of testing positive for HIV-1 virus. It would be the
height of irresponsibility to enact such a provision without
first clearing up these discrepancies.
The committee's refusal to return the right to secure safe
abortion services to servicewomen serving overseas is an
additional reason why I could not support the bill being
reported. Of equal concern to our servicewomen should be the
committee's apparent view of the role of women in combat-
related specialties and the important equal-opportunity
problems that its position raises.
On another social issue, the committee has trampled on the
Constitution's First Amendment protections by embracing
overly broad and vague language in an effort to suppress
pornographic literature and other media. Despite the
obviously degrading and sexist imagery of such media, those
who would publish, sell or purchase them enjoy the protection
of the Constitution. Surely better ways exist to overcome
these problems than by legislating overly broad and
unconstitutional attacks on the problem.
The committee's decision to weigh in on these cultural
battles in this manner will, I believe, be to the ultimate
detriment of the morale and welfare of our service personnel.
We are a diverse society, with varying views on these issues.
As such, we should decline as a legislature to impose a
narrow view that fails to account fully for the human dignity
of all in our society. Civility, morality and the
Constitution all argue for such restraint. Failure to yield
to the natural progression of expanded civil and human rights
will only result in further turmoil, which will be adverse to
the national security interests of our nation.
In this regard, let me note my appreciation for the
committee's action to confront in a purposeful and reasonable
manner the problem of hate crime in the military. Obviously,
we are a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society, a society with varying religious traditions. With a
Constitution committed to the equality of each person, we
seek to vindicate the promise of that equality. The provision
in the committee recommendation helps to build upon the
military's successes in moving toward making that principle a
reality, and should help to overcome the shortcomings where
they have occurred.
The committee's treatment of international, peacekeeping
and arms control issues displays a continuing resistance to
realign our requirements and resources to the realities
emerging in this new strategic era. It has become apparent
that operations other than war, such as our participation in
the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will become
more and more common. Yet the image of the U.S. servicemember
as peacekeeper is new and it does not yet fit comfortably in
the view of the committee. As a result, the committee
attempts to micromanage the services, and the Commander in
Chief, as I noted above, as they seek to implement these
efforts at which we are relatively new participants. The
report language requiring probing insight into military plans
to withdraw from what is thus far a highly successful effort
in Bosnia, for example, is both insulting to our service
leadership and potentially dangerous in what it could reveal
about our planning process.
The committee and the Congress surely have an oversight
responsibility; but it is equally clear that we do not have
management responsibility, and the Framers of our
Constitution clearly viewed it that way. I would have hoped
that we could have demonstrated more confidence in our
service leaderships and their ability to develop and
implement an appropriate plan for the withdrawal of the U.S.
forces in Bosnia. Similarly, the committee's recommendations
concerning humanitarian demining and amending the prospective
land-mine use moratorium are disturbing and will unduly
constrain our theater CINCS in pursuing demining programs
that are an essential part of their overall strategy in their
area of responsibility.
On another positive note, let me support the determination
reached in this bill that the environmental management and
restoration programs operated by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Energy are important and integral parts
of our military requirements. I am pleased that we have not
had the same struggle over both funding levels and authority
that I believe plagued last year's effort and I look forward
to continuing to work with the committee to fashion effective
programs for accelerating clean-up, making environmental
management more effective and efficient and for saving
money on these accounts as a result.
I remain concerned though with the funding levels and
program direction of the nuclear weapons program accounts of
Title XXXI. The addition of funds to the requested levels for
stockpile stewardship and management seem unnecessary given
the still pending Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
on Stockpile Stewardship and Management. While I appreciate
the committee's responsiveness in establishing a modest fence
around the stewardship increase, I do not believe that the
committee has taken sufficient time to inquire fully into the
opportunities available for a more fundamental reassessment
of our nuclear weapons policy.
The permanent extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty
concluded last year was achieved in part because of the U.S.
reaffirmation of its adherence to the Treaty's Article VI
requirement to reduce our arsenal towards elimination.
Despite the fact, that this is, and remains, the policy of
our government, we are not proceeding outside of our
bilateral discussions with Russia under the START process to
pursue further reductions. I am concerned that such a failure
will lead to lost opportunities that seemed so promising only
a year and a half ago, when President Clinton and Russian
President Yeltsin jointly declared that each nation would
consider pursuing such unilateral initiatives.
Finally, let me note that, despite my disagreements with
the committee report, I applaud the chairman and my
colleagues for their willingness to work cooperatively where
possible to find common ground on the important issues
covered in the recommended bill and its accompanying report.
I am concerned that, despite this collegiality, we may have
produced a committee recommendation that remains vulnerable
to a Presidential veto because of the weight of the many
contentious matters that it contains.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter] who is chairman of our Subcommittee on
Procurement.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me start off by giving also my
congratulations to our chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] who has done a superb job of working on this defense bill,
walking us through
[[Page
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the hearings that we had to have in rapid fire order, marshaling this
great staff that we have got on the majority side and the minority side
to put this bill together, answering the tough questions and the tough
issues that we had to answer this year in bringing it to the floor. Let
me thank him.
Let me also thank the ranking member the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dullums], and let me tell my colleagues as we go through the
debate, and Mr. Dellums reminded us that we have had in the past some
long debates on defense issues, I remember the 6-week debate we had on
the nuclear freeze that we Republicans enjoyed, quite frankly, and the
great times that we have had engaging. I wish myself that we had more
time to discuss the top line because I think it is a great debate; I
agree with the gentleman that it is an important issue for the country.
Let me answer what I think are three important questions that the
American people have about this bill. First, do we need this level of
spending? And this level of spending is a little over $12 million above
what the President has asked for. The answer, I think is yes, and I
think our hearings showed that we need this level of spending.
When we asked the Secretary of Defense if he wanted to get to $60
billion in modernization spending instead of the $38.9 billion that we
have got this year in the President's budget, he said yes. He said I
want to get there as soon as possible. General Shalikashvili said, yes,
I want to get there as soon as possible. They had recommended initially
having that level of spending in 1998, $60 billion in spending instead
of $38.9. When President Clinton put his defense budget together 2
years ago in 1995 and said here is what I am going to want in 1997,
here is a blueprint, his blueprint for this year was $50 billion. Well,
we have gone up from $38.9 billion $6.2 billion. We have added an
additional $6.2. We asked the services to come in and tell us what
equipment they needed; they gave us a list. This is the uniformed
services of the Clinton administration, gave us a list for about $15
billion, and when we decided on the new equipment we were going to put
in, the things that we have put in for additions in terms of
modernized equipment were 95 percent in commonality with what the
services asked for.
So if the question is did the services ask for this equipment, the
answer is, yes, the services asked for this equipment, and if somebody
could throw me down that Marine ammo belt that I have been carrying
around for the past couple of days, some people told me that is a silly
prop, but I think that is the essence of this defense bill because this
Marine ammo belt symbolizes the meeting that I had with the Marines and
with the other services, with all of the people who are in charge of
ammunition supply for the services. The Marines looked us in the eye
and said, Mr. Chairman, Congressman, we cannot fight the two-war
scenario that the President has given us the responsibility to fight,
and they said we are short of M-16 bullets and a lot of other ammo. We
found out they were 96 million M-16 bullets short. That means they run
out unless they borrow from somebody else, and if that other service
has their minimum requirement, then they are out of ammunition.
So we plussed up over $300 million for Marine ammunition. That was
the M-16 and mortar rounds and many other things that they needed.
So, yes, we do safety upgrade the Marine Harriers, the AV-8B's the
crashes. They said that they would like to have those 24 Harriers that
the administration did not plan to upgrade safety upgraded to give
those pilots a better chance of surviving. We did provide ammunition,
and we did help to modernize the forces across the board.
We have done the right thing for America. This is a good defense
bill, and I ask every Member to support this work that the committee
has done.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], the ranking
member, the senior Democrat on our side.
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding me this time and to thank
him, for over the years he has been my chairman, for many years, for
the support he has given me; sometimes, not that much, we have
disagreed on military matters, but he is always considerate and fair to
me, and I certainly want this to appear in the Record today. And
Chairman Spence I thank for our cooperation over the years, and I have
enjoyed working with him very, very much, as to as well the committee
and also to the staff.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the defense authorization
bill. The National Guard, and I know I am taking some by surprise that
I will talk about the National Guard and Reserve, they have done very
well in this legislation. We have tried to improve the readiness,
modernization and standard of living in this bill. We have added $805
million for Guard and Reserve equipment, modernization, above the
President's budget. We have increased the good year retirement points
for the Reserves from 60 points to 75 points. This had not been changed
since 1948. There is a 3-percent military pay raise for both the active
and reserve forces. We have allowed active guard and reserve enlisted
members to retire at the highest rank that they will obtain. Officers
can do that now.
However, I am disappointed that the Defense Department provided the
Guard and Reserve $294 million for military construction. Now, Mr.
Chairman, this is only 3 percent of the total funds for construction
for all the military, and the Guard and Reserve, I point this out, have
40 percent of the mission. We have inserted in this bill asking the
military to give us a report of actually what the Guard and Reserve
need for military construction and armory construction, and I might say
that the chairman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] and ranking member, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz] were very fair to us. They tried to
help.
We have added the funding to keep the air guard fighters at 15 in a
squadron instead of dropping the level to less effective 12 planes per
squadron. By adopting the amendment that will mean en bloc reservists
will have a second chance to take out mobilization insurance if they
decide to go into the Guard or the Reserve.
We have done many other things. We have a revitalization for the
Guard and Reserve, and finally, Mr. Chairman, I am very glad that my
good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] will not be
offering his amendment to this bill. Now there is strong feeling on
both sides whether the Army Reserve should report to two commanders or
one commander. We prefer the one commander, just like the other reserve
services do. The committee has supported our position on this
throughout the debate. We are trying, Mr. Chairman, to improve the Army
Reserve, not tear it down, and I am pleased that this amendment will
not be offered and we can work out this disagreement in conference.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I might add this particular point. As a lot of people
realize, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] is retiring
after this year, and personally I would like to offer him my gratitude
for all he has meant to this committee and to this country for his
service here over the years. I know of no one who stood stronger and
taller for national defense than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], and he is going to be going down in history and known as
Mr. National Guard and Reserve, and we are going to miss you, Sonny.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Bateman].
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, less than 2 years ago, the National
Security Committee brought to light the downward trend in readiness
throughout the military services resulting from defense spending cuts,
diversion of funds to meet unbudgeted contingency operations, force
structure reductions, and a high pace of operations. Routine training
was being canceled. We also heard reports of deferred maintenance,
spare parts shortages, and a quality of life for our servicemembers
which was suffering. under the strong leadership of Chairman Spence,
the committee undertook a multifaceted strategy to maintain readiness
which has helped to address the unacceptable trends in short-term
readiness.
[[Page
H4931]]
Readiness is a perishable commodity which demands our constant
attention. The root causes which led to the readiness problems less
than 2 years ago still exist. Defense spending is being cut, force
structure is being reduced, and the pace of operations is still high.
Adding to my concern is what I view as the administration trying to
squeeze defense requirements into a topline driven budget which does
not satisfy the current and future needs of our military forces. This
has resulted in a juggling exercise that unfortunately pits near-term
readiness against modernization. This should not be an either-or-
proposition.
H.R. 3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 continues last year's work, achieving the goals that we all share:
providing the necessary resources to ensure force readiness and
improving the quality of life for the men and women of our Armed
Forces.
H.R. 3230 fully funds the military services' operations and training
accounts, and adds significant resources to other important readiness
activities which have been underfunded by the Department of Defense in
the fiscal year 1997 budget request, including real property
maintenance to address health, safety, and mission critical
deficiencies; depot maintenance to reduce backlogs; base operations
support to address shortfalls in programs which sustain mission
capability, quality of life and work force productivity, mobility
enhancements to help deploy U.S. forces more rapidly and efficiently,
and reserve component training.
The bill also contains several provisions in the area of civilian
employees to provide the Department of Defense better tools for
managing the work force and for saving resources.
I would like to thank the ranking member of the Readiness
Subcommittee, my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky for his
outstanding cooperation, knowledge, and leadership through the year on
the many issues which came before the Readiness Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 is a responsible, meaningful bill that will
provide adequate resources for the continued readiness of our military
forces. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the bill.
{time} 1630
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky], the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the Committee on
National Security.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the DOD
authorization bill.
This bill will go a long way toward supporting and sustaining our
U.S. military forces.
As ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I want to commend
our chairman, Herb Bateman.
He continues to have the foresight necessary to address some of the
long-term issues we have identified.
We worked together to add nearly $2 billion to O accounts, from $89
billion to $91 billion.
We added $1 billion to real property maintenance, $190 million to
depots, $190 million to base ops, $100 million to mobility, and $90
million for reserve component training.
But what we did not do may be just as important.
We did not authorize DOD to go forward with their privatization plan.
As one who represents significant public and private sector
interests, let me tell you why.
DOD recognizes that they save money through public-private
competition.
Nevertheless, DOD wants to eliminate the public sector as a
competitor.
DOD believes the private sector can do anything better and cheaper.
I'm here to tell you that I've ``been there, done that''--and ``it
ain't necessarily so.''
We've got to responsibly pick and choose where and when we give
someone a monopoly.
We've got to have the business sense to recognize that two overheads
cost more than one--whether you talk about air logistics centers, or
working on 5-inch guns in Louisville.
It's simple arithmetic, but when you factor in brac politics, it
comes out as new math nobody understands.
I don't think anyone opposes it, but we oppose going into it blind--
with such a vague roadmap of the future.
Our silence on the privatization issue tells DOD they need to go back
to the drawing board on this one.
The issue is far too important to risk national security by going too
far, too fast. We need to be careful.
Herb Bateman and I also worked to reform DOD financial management,
specifically the defense business operating fund--or DBOF.
DBOF has long been a thorn in the side of some of the most dedicated
proponents of better business practices at DOD.
Centralized cash management and standardized cost accounting is
absolutely necessary to run an organization as big as DOD.
However, to create an $80 billion slush fund to pay for unfunded
contingencies--as they did early on--or to hide the real cost of brac--
or maybe even environmental clean-up--behind the fig leaf of DBOF
cannot be allowed to continue.
Our bill says DOD will develop a plan to improve DOD cash management
by the end of September, 1997.
They will implement those plans and terminate DBOF by October 1,
1998.
Bill language outlines nine specific elements of any new plan--such
as rates that more accurately reflect real operating costs--as opposed
to surcharges tacked on to replenish losses in entirely unrelated
areas.
As is often the case, had DOD been willing to do this in the first
place, legislation wouldn't be necessary.
In conclusion, I think the bill, on balance, achieves many of the
goals Members of both parties have said they wanted to reach at DOD.
I think it is a good bill, it deserves strong bipartisan support with
a few exceptions and I ask my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of our Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Committee on National Security, has
just returned from Moscow, where he met with all the senior Russian
military people. He can give us a report on it.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise and thank the
distinguished chairman of our full committee and the ranking member,
two fine gentlemen who have worked together with us to achieve this
piece of legislation. While we may disagree in certain elements, we
certainly come together and respect each other's views. In the end,
hopefully we will have a bill that all of us can support.
In terms of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to thank the ranking member, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] for his cooperation and support. The
request by the administration was $34.7 billion, $1.5 billion less than
the fiscal year 1996 request. Because of the request by the service
chiefs, which amounted to $20 billion of additional funding in the R
area alone, we increase slightly the R account to a level of $35.5
billion.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, the service chiefs asked us for an
additional $20 billion that we just could not provide. It is somewhat
discouraging, Mr. Chairman, that we were criticized very heavily last
year by both the White House and the Secretary of Defense's office for
plusing up the defense budget, but then in this year's hearings, the
Secretary came in and showed us charts taking credit for flattening out
the acquisition downturn; in effect, taking credit for funds that we
were criticized for putting in last year. The same thing is happening
this year, Mr. Chairman. That is somewhat disheartening to me, as
someone who tries to support the administration and their defense
requests, and the requests of the service chiefs.
In particular, we have plused up some specific priorities that were
raised in our hearings, and by the members of our subcommittee,
Major Actions:
All articles in House section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(House of Representatives - May 14, 1996)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
H4925-H5033]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 430 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3230.
{time} 1555
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(
H.R. 3230) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Barrett of Nebraska in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will each control 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
altering order of consideration of amendments
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4(c) of House
Resolution 430, I request that during the consideration of
H.R. 3230,
amendments Nos. 1 and 2 printed in part A of House Report 104-570 be
considered after all other amendments printed in that part of the
report.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request is noted.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 continues an effort we began last
year to revitalize this country's national defenses after a decade of
spending decline and force structure reductions. For the second
consecutive year, and in a bipartisan fashion, the National Security
Committee has reported a bill that I believe considers the future more
realistically, and address shortfalls and shortcomings in the present
more aggressively, than does the administration. Moreover, the
committee's efforts have been undertaken within the broader context and
constraints of a commitment to balance the budget by the year 2002.
The primary mission of our military forces has not changed very much
since the fall of the Berlin Wall--it remains the protection and
promotion of vital U.S. interests around the world. Despite the end of
the cold war, the events of just the past year clearly demonstrate that
new challenges to U.S. global interests are emerging on many fronts.
China, as an emerging power, has demonstrated a disturbing
willingness to use military force as a tool of coercion as it threatens
stability, prosperity and the growth of democracy in East Asia. The
administration's decision last week to waive sanctions against the
Chinese for their export of nuclear sensitive technology to Pakistan
undermines this country's commitment to nonproliferation in the eyes of
much of the world, and seemingly rewards Beijing's leaders for their
increasingly assertive and aggressive diplomacy throughout the region.
Russia, as a disintegrating military superpower, careens back and
forth from extreme nationalism to unreconstructed communism as it
struggles to hold itself together in the post-cold-war world. As it
does, it
[[Page
H4926]]
wages a bloody war in Chechnya, threatens the use of nuclear weapons in
response to NATO expansion and sells advanced weaponry of all kinds--
including nuclear technologies--to anyone willing to pay cash. We spend
United States taxpayer's dollars to assist Russia and other countries
of the former Soviet Union to dismantle their nuclear weapons, yet
Moscow maintains its nuclear forces at cold war levels of readiness and
continues to invest scarce resources in further strategic
modernization.
And throughout the world, America confronts a lengthening list of
failed and failing states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict. The events of
the past year and the range of U.S. peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions testifies to the rise of ethnic violence, terrorism and other
challenges to the evolving post-cold-war world.
The administration's underfunding of U.S. military forces stands in
stark contrast to this troubling strategic landscape, as does its
extensive use of the military on missions of peripheral U.S. national
interest. The gap between our national military strategy and the
resources this administration has decided to commit to executing that
strategy, estimated by some to be greater than $100 billion, continues
to widen. So the result is a Department of Defense that has been
designed to carry out one set of missions, is being called upon to
execute an entirely different set of missions, and is inadequately
funded for either. The result is a deepening sense of confusion,
frustration, and disarray in our military.
Consequently,
H.R. 3230 once again attempts to address the shortfalls
and shortcomings created by the internal contradictions of the
administration's defense program. Beginning last year, the committee
focused its efforts on the four key pillars of a sound national
defense; improving the quality of military life; sustaining core
readiness; revitalizing an underfunded modernization plan; reforming
and innovating the Pentagon.
H.R. 3230 builds on last year's efforts in
these four key areas.
The bill provides $266.7 billion in budget authority for Department
of Defense and Department of Energy programs and is $600 million below
the spending levels set by the Budget Committee for the national
security budget function in fiscal year 1997. The bill provides for
$2.4 billion more than current fiscal year 1996 authorized spending
which, when adjusted for inflation, represents a real decline of
approximately 1.5 percent in spending and not an increase. The fact
that this bill authorizes defense spending at a level that is $12.4
billion greater than the President's request, yet still reflects
spending decline, speaks volumes about the extent to which the
President is underfunding the military.
I will leave discussion of the many important initiatives in the bill
to my colleagues on the National Security Committee who have worked
very hard since late February to get this bill to the floor this early
in the year. In particular, I would like to recognize the diligence and
dedication of the subcommittee and panel chairman and ranking members.
Unlike most committees in the House, the National Security Committee's
seven subcommittees and panels are each responsible for producing
discreet pieces of the broader bill. From the outset of the process,
ensuring that the bill comes together in a coherent product requires a
lot of planning, coordination and teamwork, all of which I have
consistently been able to count on.
Because our fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill was not
enacted until this past February, the National Security Committee had
no chance to pause before launching into the fiscal year 1997 hearing
and mark-up process in order to get the bill to the floor this early in
the legislative cycle. I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the
committee, all or who are responsible for us being here today.
In particular, I would like to recognize the contributions of the
gentleman from California, the committee's ranking member, Mr. Dellums.
He is one of this institution's most articulate Members as well as
strongest proponents of the deliberative process. The committee's work,
and this bill, are that much better because of it.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the staff. This bill
authorizes funding for approximately 50 percent of the Federal
Government's discretionary budget. To say it is a lot of work is an
understatement. We have a small staff relative to the size of the
committee and the magnitude of our oversight responsibilities, so the
work gets done only through great dedication and effort.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge strong bipartisan support for this
bipartisan bill. The Constitution makes raising and maintaining the
military one of Congress's most fundamental responsibilities.
H.R. 3230
clearly demonstrates the extent to which the National Security
Committee has taken this responsibility seriously.
{time} 1600
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I take a few moments to express my concerns with
H.R.
3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. I
would begin at the outset by thanking my distinguished colleague for
his very kind and generous remarks with respect to this gentleman in
his opening remarks.
Second, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina,
Chairman Spence, again for a more bipartisan approach to this year's
bill, both at the staff and member level. But I would hasten to add,
Mr. Chairman, civility, collegiality and some effort at bipartisanship
notwithstanding, there remain many issues that caused me to vote
against the bill in committee and to offer additional and dissenting
views on its reports.
I refer my colleagues who are interested to those views and will
request that at the appropriate time they be approved for inclusion
into the Record.
Let me enumerate some of my concerns. First, Mr. Chairman, the
unwarranted, I underscore, unwarranted addition of nearly $13 billion
to the defense topline is justified primarily to meet a notional
modernization crisis. The hue and cry over modernization reminds me of
last year's readiness crisis, another purported crisis that quickly
evaporated before conference was concluded on last year's bill.
Careful thinking would conclude that there is no modernization
crisis. The leadership of the Department of Defense has offered a
cogent and calm viewpoint demonstrating that the drawdown of our forces
has allowed for a slower replacement of our weapon systems. The
carefully crafted future years defense plan adequately meets
modernization requirements while allowing us to fund other important
accounts in our overall budget.
In many cases, it would appear that the committee adds were made with
little consideration to the ability to sustain the program, which will
cause disruptive program instabilities and forestall our ability to
meet future program needs.
Rather than, Mr. Chairman, buying more hardware now, we should invest
in technologies of the future, both the direct military technologies,
including innovative nonlethal weapons technology more appropriate to
operations other than war, to operations such as operations that are
being carried out in Bosnia, humanitarian efforts in other parts of the
world and into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan and invest
wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims about a
modernization crisis will harm our national security in both the short
and long term.
Mr. Chairman, it is true as well that failure to fund the domestic
education and economic development programs that form a critical
element of our national security strategy is contrary to our long-term
national interests.
Second, the bill fails to take advantage of the opportunities to move
further beyond the nuclear abyss, Mr. Chairman, whether it is in the
form of constraints on the cooperative threat reduction program,
euphemistically referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, that destroys
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union or the needless acceleration
of Department of Energy weapons programs or the continuing restrictions
on retiring strategic systems, these are all missed opportunities.
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Third, the bill contains the funding for an overly aggressive and
unnecessary national missile defense program that would be noncompliant
with the ABM Treaty.
The combination of all these three issues, when combined with the
prospect of near-term NATO expansion, has contributed dramatically, in
this gentleman's view, to destabilizing our relationship with Russia.
In turn, it has reduced the prospect that we can work with democratic
forces in Eastern Europe to achieve long-term stability in Europe,
stability based upon a respect for human rights, economic development
and a nonthreatening balance of military power in the region.
Fourth, the bill grabs hold of numerous hot button cultural issues.
The Committee, without hearings, Mr. Chairman, negated the do not ask
do not tell policy in its mark and returns us to an era in which
capable, willing gay men and lesbians are completely denied the
opportunity to serve their Nation in uniform.
The committee, again without hearings, required the discharge of
personnel who test positively for HIV-1 virus, which is neither
medically nor militarily necessary. It flies in the face, Mr. Chairman,
it flies in the face of Congress's very recent appeal of such a policy
before it even went into effect. Our service personnel, who have served
this Nation with honor, with distinction and professionalism, need
better treatment from their Government than this.
The committee refused to return the right of secure safe abortion to
servicewomen serving overseas. The committee trampled on the
Constitution's first amendment protections by embracing overly broad
and vague language in an effort to suppress lascivious literature and
other media.
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me just say that I believe that
because all of these reasons, in order to make it in order that we be
able to more successfully fix the problems that are in this bill, I
urge the committee to reject this bill as reported by the committee.
With whatever time I have remaining, I would like to point out to my
colleagues that, as I said before, the topline in this budget increases
President Clinton's budget request by nearly $13 billion, no small sum
at all. That is what makes politics. That is why there is a Republican
Party and a Democratic Party, left, right and center on the political
perspective.
What is tragic to this gentleman, who has always attempted to take
the floor of this body not to challenge on the basis of partisanship,
not to challenge on the basis of personality but to be prepared to
challenge any Member of Congress on the issues of the day, on the
critical, vital issues of our time, we ought to be able to debate, win
or lose. The tragedy is that the rule that governed this bill did not
allow, Mr. Chairman, not one single amendment to reduce the overall
level of the military budget in a post-cold-war environment.
Some may rationalize the inclusion of 13 additional billion dollars.
But there are some of us in this body who are prepared to discuss
rationally, intelligently and cogently and substantively that there is
no rational military requirement to add $13 billion in a post-cold war
so-called balanced budget limited dollar environment. But we were
denied the opportunity.
For the first time in my 25-plus years in the Congress, denied
outright any opportunity to cut the budget, rendering those of us who
believe that $13 billion additional in the budget is virtually obscene,
rendered us impotent in our capacity to challenge on behalf of
constituencies in this country who believe that there is no need for
$13 billion additional. No opportunity whatsoever.
Mr. Chairman, if we look at the amendments that were made in order,
it does not allow us not only to break into the topline, we cannot even
get at the priorities. Of the six major amendments that have been made
in order, two of them are not going to be offered. So we are down to
four. Of the 35 minor amendments that were primarily language
amendments, noncontroversial, seeking studies and reports, most of
those 35 amendments will be rolled into two omnibus amendments,
bipartisan, noncontroversial. So for a military budget of close to $170
billion, we will move across this floor with a degree of alacrity that
staggers the imagination, in this gentleman's opinion, is frightening.
In the atmosphere of a balanced budget, we ought to pay more
attention to nearly $270 billion. In a post-cold-war environment, where
we are not moving into an era of change and transition and challenge
and opportunity, we ought to be able to talk about a rational military
budget that walks us into the 21st century with pride and dignity and
competence and capability. But to deny that in the rule means that when
my colleagues adopted the rule, they adopted this budget. With rare
exception we could have given the rule, and what I am saying to my
colleagues is, with rare exception, this military budget, $267 billion,
could have been offered on the suspension calendar. There are no major
amendments here; there are no amendments that take $1 out of this
budget. There are no amendments, with rare exception, that make any
major policy changes.
{time} 1615
Something is wrong with this process. I did not labor marching uphill
to find us in a post-cold war environment with great opportunities for
25 years, to come to the floor, rendered totally impotent, in my
capacity to try to shake the reality, along with my colleagues, of the
billions of dollars we are spending on defense and to move us in a
direction that makes sense.
I conclude that I will oppose this bill for all the reasons that I
have enunciated. I urge my colleagues to reject this bill. Let us go
back to committee and fix the problems.
Mr. Chairman, I include the following material for the Record:
Additional and Dissenting Views of Ronald V. Dellums
I offer dissenting views because I am deeply troubled by
several aspects of the authorization bill and its report,
most especially by its overall focus and directions. I remain
convinced that the authorization top line is significantly
higher than required for the military aspects of our national
security strategy. It may be true that the committee marked
to a top line that it anticipates in the coming fiscal year
1997 budget resolution. Despite this, I believe it had the
opportunity to make prudent reductions in the overall program
authorization, thereby providing guidance to the Committee on
the Budget as to how better to meet deficit reduction goals.
Moreover, I remain convinced that the significant plus-up
over the President's request has caused a lack of focus and a
lack of discipline in our procurement and research and
development accounts, a point to which I will return later.
Despite the collegial and effective working relationship
between the committee's majority leadership and the minority,
there has at times been a troubling partisan appearance to
some of the committee's business and is reflected in the
committee report as well. Most troubling has been an
unwillingness to hear from administration witnesses on
important policy issues before the committee. It is certainly
true that outside experts provide important insight into the
policy choices and strategic circumstances we confront, but
we owe ourselves the responsibility to hear also from
government experts and responsible officials. What is
especially troubling is that we have failed to request the
traditional intelligence threat briefing which has provided a
cogent perspective on the strategic requirements that we
face. Given our rapidly changing world, this annual review is
even more important now than it was during the period of the
Cold War.
A small but important additional example of this problem is
the committee's determination to plumb the conclusions
reached by the Intelligence Community in a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States. Whether or not there is a legitimate
concern about the development of the NIE and whatever
questions one has regarding the validity of its conclusions,
it is unconscionable that we have failed to have the
Intelligence Community before the committee to testify on the
NIE's contents and its methodology. I have requested such a
committee hearing on several occasions, and am disappointed
that this has not occurred. While I am willing to support the
provisions contained in the committee report asking the
Director of Central Intelligence to review both the matter of
the NIE and to develop an updated and expanded assessment,
and while I accept the majority's interest in having an
alternative analysis analysis rendered, it concerns me that
we have gotten to this point without a full committee
deliberation on the substance and development of the IN.
While the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill reported by
the committee does not itself contain highly contentious
provisions on the command and control of U.S. armed forces
participating in peacekeeping operations, the issue arises in
a free-standing piece of legislation marked-up the same day
by the committee and reported as
H.R. 3308 just three months
after the Congress sustained the President's veto of the
National Defense
[[Page
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on this issue, among
other reasons.
The same point can be made for the committee's decision to
report out
H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars''
missile defense program. A less extreme formulation for
national missile defense program activity was met with a
Presidential veto on last year's defense authorization bill.
As with the command and control issue, it strikes this
gentleman that there is a little legislative reason to have
decided to push forward an even more extreme ballistic
missile defense program, given that it is surely destined to
meet a Presidential veto as well. Our committee must achieve
its policy goals through legislation, and obviously that
activity must be bound by the constraints of our
Constitution's separation of powers between the Branches.
Pursuing legislation knowing that it will be vetoed, when
nothing has occurred to change the imaginable outcome seems a
political rather than a legislative course.
But the national ballistic missile defense issue is also
embedded in the committee recommendation and report on
H.R.
3230 in important ways. And there is much more commonality
between the administration and the Congress on this issue
than the political rhetoric would suggest. Many of the
differences between the two approaches are rooted on a
perception of the timing of the appearance of a threat to
which we would need such a response. This is essentially a
function of risk management, and how to determine what type
of ``insurance policy'' we wish to purchase against such a
future contingency. What is less focused on but should be
very central to the debate, is the cost and character of the
alternative ``insurance policies'' that are available to the
Nation. And this is where the parties diverge.
The administration's current national ballistic missile
defense plan can provide for an affordable defense against
limited ballistic missile threats before those threats will
emerge. It does so in a way that anticipates likely changes
in the threat from today's estimates. It also does so in a
way that avoids becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-
sac by a premature deployment of a potentially misdirected
system.
The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty
considerations and the threat reduction and strategic
stability goals that the treaties promise.
This course of action commits us as well to an incredibly
expensive and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the
department'
s 3+3 program and the Spratt substitute to
H.R.
3144, provide for a more capable missile defense system when
deployed, and one that is affordable within current budget
projections. It blends arms control and
counterproliferation activities with deterrence and
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles
from being deployed at all, while providing a prudent
``insurance policy'' against limited but as of yet non-
existent threats.
The overreliance by the committee on a ``hardware''
solution to intercept incoming missiles in the final minutes
of their flight time, risks constructing a very expensive
21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy may well
prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we might
face as the original Maginot Line was in defending France
during World War II.
Returning now to refocus on the issue of the size of the
top line and its impact on our procurement choices, I am
reminded of echoes from last year's debate on the fiscal year
1996 authorization bill.
During that debate, we heard a hue and cry that there
existed a readiness crisis in the services. Foregone training
and maintenance, as well as ``optempo'' stress were all
allegedly impacting adversely on the U.S. armed force's
ability to perform its principal missions. This hue and cry
was raised despite assurances by the top military leadership
that the force was receiving historically high levels of
operational funding and was as ready a force as we had ever
had. Facts have borne out their more sober assessment and,
indeed, one can say that the relatively modest increased
investment that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization
conference in the end committed to the readiness accounts
confirmed the view that a ``crisis'' did not really exist.
The small increase in the readiness account proposed in the
fiscal year 1997 authorization bill lends additional credence
to this assessment.
This year's hue and cry is that there is a
``modernization'' crisis, with much displaying of data to
support the view that low levels of procurement spending must
equate with an insufficient modernization strategy. What is
so remarkably similar about this debate with last year's
debate on readiness are three things.
First, the services generally agree that they could all
``use'' more money for procurement this year, but that they
could meet their requirements with what had been budgeted as
long as long-term trends supported their needs. This sounds
very much like ``we're missing some training'' but ``we're as
ready as we've ever been.''
Second, the leadership of the Department of Defense has
offered a cogent and calm viewpoint that the drawdown of the
force structure from its Cold War levels allowed them one
more year's grace before they needed to begin to replace
equipment that had been procured in large numbers during the
1980s for a much larger force. In other words, they had a
plan, it was being managed, and they could perform their
mission. And they could more appropriately use defense
resources in other accounts and reserve for the future year's
defense plan a significant increase in procurement dollars.
Third, while the committee invited the service chiefs to
submit their ``wish list'' for additional procurement items,
it has not followed the Secretary of Defense's plea to limit
procurement additions to those items needed by the services.
By my calculation approximately half of the procurement
plus-up does not meet that qualification.
Not satisfied with this explanation the committee
recommendation would spend an additional $7.5 billion on
procurement, and as I noted above much of that on
requirements not established by the service chiefs. I believe
that this unsolicited largess is imprudent and will have
significant adverse impact on our ability to meet real future
requirements. It will provoke budget and program disruptions
in the near term and it will preempt important opportunities
into the future.
In many cases it would appear that these adds were made
with little consideration to the ability to sustain the
program in the next year. The disruptive business and human
implications of creating program instabilities by ``spiking''
procurement for one or two years could haunt the military
industrial base for years to come. This is a costly and
ineffective way to approach long-term modernization
requirements. In addition, it would also appear that program
risks, indeed even assessing the department's ability to even
execute a program, may not have been given adequate
consideration in determining authorization levels.
Equally important and worse, the committee recommendation
throws much of this money into systems that were designed
``to fight the last war.'' This is a common failing that is
so easily avoidable. In addition, the procurement ``theme''
to solve the ``crisis'' appears to be only to buy more, and
often not more of what the service chiefs requested. This
binge in procurement both purchases needlessly redundant
weapons capabilities and does so in excessive amounts. With
regard to the former, we will end making purchases of too
many different systems, rather than making choices and
sticking with the best choice. With regard to the latter, we
are spending our investment capital to buy unneeded equipment
for today that will prevent us from purchasing the right
equipment when it becomes available tomorrow.
Rather than buying more hardware now, we should invest in
the technologies of the future, both the direct military
technologies, including innovative non-lethal weapons
technology more appropriate to operations other than war, and
into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan
and invest wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims
about a modernization ``crisis'' will harm our national
security in both the short and long term.
Much more could be said about this particular problem. Let
me summarize my views in this area by saying that this
extravagant level of spending is neither needed for our
current military requirements nor prudent for meeting the
needs of the future. In addition, it contributes to a defense
authorization top line that needlessly consumes resources
from the two other elements of our national security triad:
our economy and our foreign policy program that can dampen
the circumstances that give rise to war. And, unlike money
put into the operations and maintenance accounts, it is not
easily or efficaciously diverted to other priorities when
hindsight establishes that the perceived requirement in fact
does not exist.
There are other issues and problems in this report other
than with its dollar level and the procurement choices. They
deserve illumination as well.
Foremost among them are the several issues that erupted in
the personnel title of the bill and report. While I do not
support the current ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy on gays
and lesbians serving in the military, I more strongly reject
the committee's view that we should return to an era in which
capable and willing gay men and lesbians were denied the
opportunity to serve their nation in uniform. I support a
policy that would allow individuals to serve regardless of
sexual orientation. Clearly ``don't ask, don't tell'' has not
provided the protections to such individuals that its
crafters felt it would; but a return to an era of repression
and intolerance is not the solution.
By way of explanation of the necessity for the change in
policy under section 566 of this legislation, the committee
elsewhere in this report cites at length the decision in the
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Paul G. Thomasson, Lieutenant, United
States Navy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense; John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendants-Applies.
It is useful to note that this case is but one of several
that are expected to be heard before the United States
Supreme Court later this year on the issue of the
Administration's ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy. No fewer
than eight other cases on the policy are presently before the
federal courts. In the last year, judges in two of those
cases reached the opposite view of the judges in
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the Thomasson case, yet the committee does not make reference
to those decisions.
The committee has not held a single hearing on the issue of
gays and lesbians in the military in either the first or
second session of the 104th Congress--the period during which
the current policy has been implemented. Though the committee
obviously feels that it is of utmost importance to change the
current policy, it did not choose to expend any time or
effort to get the views of witnesses from the military, the
administration or the public on the issue. Instead, it relies
on the decision on one court case to base a major change to
military policy.
If the committee is to make an informed and thoughtful
decision on this matter, it should make the effort to shed
light on the competing views and experiences that represent
all sides on this complex and important issue through the
committee hearing process. The committee avoids the subject
by relying instead on the judicial branch for justification
and to explain Congressional intent. By including legislative
provisions in the subcommittee chairman's mark without any
discussion of the matter, the committee demonstrates a lack
of faith in the hearing process, betrays a lack of confidence
that its provision would prevail under scrutiny, and abuses
the prerogatives of the majority.
Similarly the committee's recommendation to discharge
personnel who test positive for the HIV-1 virus is medically
and militarily unnecessary and flies in the face of the
Congress's very recent determination to rescind such a policy
even before it went into effect. Of even greater concern than
having established a policy for which there is no military
requirement, the committee's recommendation pretends that it
has protected the medical disability rights of personnel
who will face discharge under its provisions. This is a
disingenuous formulation given that the committee was
fully apprised that in order to provide such protection it
would have to do so in legislative language, which it
refused to do because of the direct spending implications
that would have forced funding cuts in other accounts. Our
service personnel who have served this nation with honor,
distinction and professionalism need better from their
government than this.
In language on section 567, elsewhere in this report, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ``deem
separating service members determined to be HIV-positive as
meeting all other requirements for disability retirement * *
*.''
While giving the appearance of providing for medical
retirement, the fact is that such language had to be stripped
from the bill by amendment in the full committee markup
because of direct spending implications. The Congressional
Budget Office has scored this provision as costing $27
million over the next five years, and it could not be enacted
without identifying an offset to pay for it. The committee
could not accomplish this and, instead, decided to foist the
problem off on the Department of Defense as an unfunded
mandate, and then take credit for supposedly providing the
medical retirement benefit.
Worse yet, it turns out that the Secretary of Defense may
not have the statutory authority to fund such a mandate ``out
of hide'' in any case. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 and 1204 direct
DoD to use the Department of Veterans Affairs rating
schedule. While the tables currently indicate that a
servicemember who is symptomatic of AIDS is eligible for
medical retirement, it rates a servicemember who has
asymptomatic HIV with a zero percent disability rating.
Consequently, they would not be entitled to disability
retired pay.
Under these circumstances, and since the law which would be
reinstated by this section was repealed, the member who is
discharged under section 567 would have no medical or
retirement benefits at all, nor would the members of his or
her family. He or she would be promptly discharged within two
months of testing positive for HIV-1 virus. It would be the
height of irresponsibility to enact such a provision without
first clearing up these discrepancies.
The committee's refusal to return the right to secure safe
abortion services to servicewomen serving overseas is an
additional reason why I could not support the bill being
reported. Of equal concern to our servicewomen should be the
committee's apparent view of the role of women in combat-
related specialties and the important equal-opportunity
problems that its position raises.
On another social issue, the committee has trampled on the
Constitution's First Amendment protections by embracing
overly broad and vague language in an effort to suppress
pornographic literature and other media. Despite the
obviously degrading and sexist imagery of such media, those
who would publish, sell or purchase them enjoy the protection
of the Constitution. Surely better ways exist to overcome
these problems than by legislating overly broad and
unconstitutional attacks on the problem.
The committee's decision to weigh in on these cultural
battles in this manner will, I believe, be to the ultimate
detriment of the morale and welfare of our service personnel.
We are a diverse society, with varying views on these issues.
As such, we should decline as a legislature to impose a
narrow view that fails to account fully for the human dignity
of all in our society. Civility, morality and the
Constitution all argue for such restraint. Failure to yield
to the natural progression of expanded civil and human rights
will only result in further turmoil, which will be adverse to
the national security interests of our nation.
In this regard, let me note my appreciation for the
committee's action to confront in a purposeful and reasonable
manner the problem of hate crime in the military. Obviously,
we are a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society, a society with varying religious traditions. With a
Constitution committed to the equality of each person, we
seek to vindicate the promise of that equality. The provision
in the committee recommendation helps to build upon the
military's successes in moving toward making that principle a
reality, and should help to overcome the shortcomings where
they have occurred.
The committee's treatment of international, peacekeeping
and arms control issues displays a continuing resistance to
realign our requirements and resources to the realities
emerging in this new strategic era. It has become apparent
that operations other than war, such as our participation in
the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will become
more and more common. Yet the image of the U.S. servicemember
as peacekeeper is new and it does not yet fit comfortably in
the view of the committee. As a result, the committee
attempts to micromanage the services, and the Commander in
Chief, as I noted above, as they seek to implement these
efforts at which we are relatively new participants. The
report language requiring probing insight into military plans
to withdraw from what is thus far a highly successful effort
in Bosnia, for example, is both insulting to our service
leadership and potentially dangerous in what it could reveal
about our planning process.
The committee and the Congress surely have an oversight
responsibility; but it is equally clear that we do not have
management responsibility, and the Framers of our
Constitution clearly viewed it that way. I would have hoped
that we could have demonstrated more confidence in our
service leaderships and their ability to develop and
implement an appropriate plan for the withdrawal of the U.S.
forces in Bosnia. Similarly, the committee's recommendations
concerning humanitarian demining and amending the prospective
land-mine use moratorium are disturbing and will unduly
constrain our theater CINCS in pursuing demining programs
that are an essential part of their overall strategy in their
area of responsibility.
On another positive note, let me support the determination
reached in this bill that the environmental management and
restoration programs operated by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Energy are important and integral parts
of our military requirements. I am pleased that we have not
had the same struggle over both funding levels and authority
that I believe plagued last year's effort and I look forward
to continuing to work with the committee to fashion effective
programs for accelerating clean-up, making environmental
management more effective and efficient and for saving
money on these accounts as a result.
I remain concerned though with the funding levels and
program direction of the nuclear weapons program accounts of
Title XXXI. The addition of funds to the requested levels for
stockpile stewardship and management seem unnecessary given
the still pending Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
on Stockpile Stewardship and Management. While I appreciate
the committee's responsiveness in establishing a modest fence
around the stewardship increase, I do not believe that the
committee has taken sufficient time to inquire fully into the
opportunities available for a more fundamental reassessment
of our nuclear weapons policy.
The permanent extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty
concluded last year was achieved in part because of the U.S.
reaffirmation of its adherence to the Treaty's Article VI
requirement to reduce our arsenal towards elimination.
Despite the fact, that this is, and remains, the policy of
our government, we are not proceeding outside of our
bilateral discussions with Russia under the START process to
pursue further reductions. I am concerned that such a failure
will lead to lost opportunities that seemed so promising only
a year and a half ago, when President Clinton and Russian
President Yeltsin jointly declared that each nation would
consider pursuing such unilateral initiatives.
Finally, let me note that, despite my disagreements with
the committee report, I applaud the chairman and my
colleagues for their willingness to work cooperatively where
possible to find common ground on the important issues
covered in the recommended bill and its accompanying report.
I am concerned that, despite this collegiality, we may have
produced a committee recommendation that remains vulnerable
to a Presidential veto because of the weight of the many
contentious matters that it contains.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter] who is chairman of our Subcommittee on
Procurement.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me start off by giving also my
congratulations to our chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] who has done a superb job of working on this defense bill,
walking us through
[[Page
H4930]]
the hearings that we had to have in rapid fire order, marshaling this
great staff that we have got on the majority side and the minority side
to put this bill together, answering the tough questions and the tough
issues that we had to answer this year in bringing it to the floor. Let
me thank him.
Let me also thank the ranking member the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dullums], and let me tell my colleagues as we go through the
debate, and Mr. Dellums reminded us that we have had in the past some
long debates on defense issues, I remember the 6-week debate we had on
the nuclear freeze that we Republicans enjoyed, quite frankly, and the
great times that we have had engaging. I wish myself that we had more
time to discuss the top line because I think it is a great debate; I
agree with the gentleman that it is an important issue for the country.
Let me answer what I think are three important questions that the
American people have about this bill. First, do we need this level of
spending? And this level of spending is a little over $12 million above
what the President has asked for. The answer, I think is yes, and I
think our hearings showed that we need this level of spending.
When we asked the Secretary of Defense if he wanted to get to $60
billion in modernization spending instead of the $38.9 billion that we
have got this year in the President's budget, he said yes. He said I
want to get there as soon as possible. General Shalikashvili said, yes,
I want to get there as soon as possible. They had recommended initially
having that level of spending in 1998, $60 billion in spending instead
of $38.9. When President Clinton put his defense budget together 2
years ago in 1995 and said here is what I am going to want in 1997,
here is a blueprint, his blueprint for this year was $50 billion. Well,
we have gone up from $38.9 billion $6.2 billion. We have added an
additional $6.2. We asked the services to come in and tell us what
equipment they needed; they gave us a list. This is the uniformed
services of the Clinton administration, gave us a list for about $15
billion, and when we decided on the new equipment we were going to put
in, the things that we have put in for additions in terms of
modernized equipment were 95 percent in commonality with what the
services asked for.
So if the question is did the services ask for this equipment, the
answer is, yes, the services asked for this equipment, and if somebody
could throw me down that Marine ammo belt that I have been carrying
around for the past couple of days, some people told me that is a silly
prop, but I think that is the essence of this defense bill because this
Marine ammo belt symbolizes the meeting that I had with the Marines and
with the other services, with all of the people who are in charge of
ammunition supply for the services. The Marines looked us in the eye
and said, Mr. Chairman, Congressman, we cannot fight the two-war
scenario that the President has given us the responsibility to fight,
and they said we are short of M-16 bullets and a lot of other ammo. We
found out they were 96 million M-16 bullets short. That means they run
out unless they borrow from somebody else, and if that other service
has their minimum requirement, then they are out of ammunition.
So we plussed up over $300 million for Marine ammunition. That was
the M-16 and mortar rounds and many other things that they needed.
So, yes, we do safety upgrade the Marine Harriers, the AV-8B's the
crashes. They said that they would like to have those 24 Harriers that
the administration did not plan to upgrade safety upgraded to give
those pilots a better chance of surviving. We did provide ammunition,
and we did help to modernize the forces across the board.
We have done the right thing for America. This is a good defense
bill, and I ask every Member to support this work that the committee
has done.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], the ranking
member, the senior Democrat on our side.
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding me this time and to thank
him, for over the years he has been my chairman, for many years, for
the support he has given me; sometimes, not that much, we have
disagreed on military matters, but he is always considerate and fair to
me, and I certainly want this to appear in the Record today. And
Chairman Spence I thank for our cooperation over the years, and I have
enjoyed working with him very, very much, as to as well the committee
and also to the staff.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the defense authorization
bill. The National Guard, and I know I am taking some by surprise that
I will talk about the National Guard and Reserve, they have done very
well in this legislation. We have tried to improve the readiness,
modernization and standard of living in this bill. We have added $805
million for Guard and Reserve equipment, modernization, above the
President's budget. We have increased the good year retirement points
for the Reserves from 60 points to 75 points. This had not been changed
since 1948. There is a 3-percent military pay raise for both the active
and reserve forces. We have allowed active guard and reserve enlisted
members to retire at the highest rank that they will obtain. Officers
can do that now.
However, I am disappointed that the Defense Department provided the
Guard and Reserve $294 million for military construction. Now, Mr.
Chairman, this is only 3 percent of the total funds for construction
for all the military, and the Guard and Reserve, I point this out, have
40 percent of the mission. We have inserted in this bill asking the
military to give us a report of actually what the Guard and Reserve
need for military construction and armory construction, and I might say
that the chairman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] and ranking member, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz] were very fair to us. They tried to
help.
We have added the funding to keep the air guard fighters at 15 in a
squadron instead of dropping the level to less effective 12 planes per
squadron. By adopting the amendment that will mean en bloc reservists
will have a second chance to take out mobilization insurance if they
decide to go into the Guard or the Reserve.
We have done many other things. We have a revitalization for the
Guard and Reserve, and finally, Mr. Chairman, I am very glad that my
good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] will not be
offering his amendment to this bill. Now there is strong feeling on
both sides whether the Army Reserve should report to two commanders or
one commander. We prefer the one commander, just like the other reserve
services do. The committee has supported our position on this
throughout the debate. We are trying, Mr. Chairman, to improve the Army
Reserve, not tear it down, and I am pleased that this amendment will
not be offered and we can work out this disagreement in conference.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I might add this particular point. As a lot of people
realize, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] is retiring
after this year, and personally I would like to offer him my gratitude
for all he has meant to this committee and to this country for his
service here over the years. I know of no one who stood stronger and
taller for national defense than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], and he is going to be going down in history and known as
Mr. National Guard and Reserve, and we are going to miss you, Sonny.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Bateman].
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, less than 2 years ago, the National
Security Committee brought to light the downward trend in readiness
throughout the military services resulting from defense spending cuts,
diversion of funds to meet unbudgeted contingency operations, force
structure reductions, and a high pace of operations. Routine training
was being canceled. We also heard reports of deferred maintenance,
spare parts shortages, and a quality of life for our servicemembers
which was suffering. under the strong leadership of Chairman Spence,
the committee undertook a multifaceted strategy to maintain readiness
which has helped to address the unacceptable trends in short-term
readiness.
[[Page
H4931]]
Readiness is a perishable commodity which demands our constant
attention. The root causes which led to the readiness problems less
than 2 years ago still exist. Defense spending is being cut, force
structure is being reduced, and the pace of operations is still high.
Adding to my concern is what I view as the administration trying to
squeeze defense requirements into a topline driven budget which does
not satisfy the current and future needs of our military forces. This
has resulted in a juggling exercise that unfortunately pits near-term
readiness against modernization. This should not be an either-or-
proposition.
H.R. 3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 continues last year's work, achieving the goals that we all share:
providing the necessary resources to ensure force readiness and
improving the quality of life for the men and women of our Armed
Forces.
H.R. 3230 fully funds the military services' operations and training
accounts, and adds significant resources to other important readiness
activities which have been underfunded by the Department of Defense in
the fiscal year 1997 budget request, including real property
maintenance to address health, safety, and mission critical
deficiencies; depot maintenance to reduce backlogs; base operations
support to address shortfalls in programs which sustain mission
capability, quality of life and work force productivity, mobility
enhancements to help deploy U.S. forces more rapidly and efficiently,
and reserve component training.
The bill also contains several provisions in the area of civilian
employees to provide the Department of Defense better tools for
managing the work force and for saving resources.
I would like to thank the ranking member of the Readiness
Subcommittee, my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky for his
outstanding cooperation, knowledge, and leadership through the year on
the many issues which came before the Readiness Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 is a responsible, meaningful bill that will
provide adequate resources for the continued readiness of our military
forces. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the bill.
{time} 1630
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky], the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the Committee on
National Security.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the DOD
authorization bill.
This bill will go a long way toward supporting and sustaining our
U.S. military forces.
As ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I want to commend
our chairman, Herb Bateman.
He continues to have the foresight necessary to address some of the
long-term issues we have identified.
We worked together to add nearly $2 billion to O accounts, from $89
billion to $91 billion.
We added $1 billion to real property maintenance, $190 million to
depots, $190 million to base ops, $100 million to mobility, and $90
million for reserve component training.
But what we did not do may be just as important.
We did not authorize DOD to go forward with their privatization plan.
As one who represents significant public and private sector
interests, let me tell you why.
DOD recognizes that they save money through public-private
competition.
Nevertheless, DOD wants to eliminate the public sector as a
competitor.
DOD believes the private sector can do anything better and cheaper.
I'm here to tell you that I've ``been there, done that''--and ``it
ain't necessarily so.''
We've got to responsibly pick and choose where and when we give
someone a monopoly.
We've got to have the business sense to recognize that two overheads
cost more than one--whether you talk about air logistics centers, or
working on 5-inch guns in Louisville.
It's simple arithmetic, but when you factor in brac politics, it
comes out as new math nobody understands.
I don't think anyone opposes it, but we oppose going into it blind--
with such a vague roadmap of the future.
Our silence on the privatization issue tells DOD they need to go back
to the drawing board on this one.
The issue is far too important to risk national security by going too
far, too fast. We need to be careful.
Herb Bateman and I also worked to reform DOD financial management,
specifically the defense business operating fund--or DBOF.
DBOF has long been a thorn in the side of some of the most dedicated
proponents of better business practices at DOD.
Centralized cash management and standardized cost accounting is
absolutely necessary to run an organization as big as DOD.
However, to create an $80 billion slush fund to pay for unfunded
contingencies--as they did early on--or to hide the real cost of brac--
or maybe even environmental clean-up--behind the fig leaf of DBOF
cannot be allowed to continue.
Our bill says DOD will develop a plan to improve DOD cash management
by the end of September, 1997.
They will implement those plans and terminate DBOF by October 1,
1998.
Bill language outlines nine specific elements of any new plan--such
as rates that more accurately reflect real operating costs--as opposed
to surcharges tacked on to replenish losses in entirely unrelated
areas.
As is often the case, had DOD been willing to do this in the first
place, legislation wouldn't be necessary.
In conclusion, I think the bill, on balance, achieves many of the
goals Members of both parties have said they wanted to reach at DOD.
I think it is a good bill, it deserves strong bipartisan support with
a few exceptions and I ask my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of our Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Committee on National Security, has
just returned from Moscow, where he met with all the senior Russian
military people. He can give us a report on it.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise and thank the
distinguished chairman of our full committee and the ranking member,
two fine gentlemen who have worked together with us to achieve this
piece of legislation. While we may disagree in certain elements, we
certainly come together and respect each other's views. In the end,
hopefully we will have a bill that all of us can support.
In terms of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to thank the ranking member, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] for his cooperation and support. The
request by the administration was $34.7 billion, $1.5 billion less than
the fiscal year 1996 request. Because of the request by the service
chiefs, which amounted to $20 billion of additional funding in the R
area alone, we increase slightly the R account to a level of $35.5
billion.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, the service chiefs asked us for an
additional $20 billion that we just could not provide. It is somewhat
discouraging, Mr. Chairman, that we were criticized very heavily last
year by both the White House and the Secretary of Defense's office for
plusing up the defense budget, but then in this year's hearings, the
Secretary came in and showed us charts taking credit for flattening out
the acquisition downturn; in effect, taking credit for funds that we
were criticized for putting in last year. The same thing is happening
this year, Mr. Chairman. That is somewhat disheartening to me, as
someone who tries to support the administration and their defense
requests, and the requests of the service chiefs.
In particular, we have plused up some specific priorities that were
raised in our hearings, and by the members of our subcommittee,
including chemical biological
Amendments:
Cosponsors:
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
Sponsor:
Summary:
All articles in House section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(House of Representatives - May 14, 1996)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
H4925-H5033]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 430 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3230.
{time} 1555
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(
H.R. 3230) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Barrett of Nebraska in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will each control 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
altering order of consideration of amendments
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4(c) of House
Resolution 430, I request that during the consideration of
H.R. 3230,
amendments Nos. 1 and 2 printed in part A of House Report 104-570 be
considered after all other amendments printed in that part of the
report.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request is noted.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 continues an effort we began last
year to revitalize this country's national defenses after a decade of
spending decline and force structure reductions. For the second
consecutive year, and in a bipartisan fashion, the National Security
Committee has reported a bill that I believe considers the future more
realistically, and address shortfalls and shortcomings in the present
more aggressively, than does the administration. Moreover, the
committee's efforts have been undertaken within the broader context and
constraints of a commitment to balance the budget by the year 2002.
The primary mission of our military forces has not changed very much
since the fall of the Berlin Wall--it remains the protection and
promotion of vital U.S. interests around the world. Despite the end of
the cold war, the events of just the past year clearly demonstrate that
new challenges to U.S. global interests are emerging on many fronts.
China, as an emerging power, has demonstrated a disturbing
willingness to use military force as a tool of coercion as it threatens
stability, prosperity and the growth of democracy in East Asia. The
administration's decision last week to waive sanctions against the
Chinese for their export of nuclear sensitive technology to Pakistan
undermines this country's commitment to nonproliferation in the eyes of
much of the world, and seemingly rewards Beijing's leaders for their
increasingly assertive and aggressive diplomacy throughout the region.
Russia, as a disintegrating military superpower, careens back and
forth from extreme nationalism to unreconstructed communism as it
struggles to hold itself together in the post-cold-war world. As it
does, it
[[Page
H4926]]
wages a bloody war in Chechnya, threatens the use of nuclear weapons in
response to NATO expansion and sells advanced weaponry of all kinds--
including nuclear technologies--to anyone willing to pay cash. We spend
United States taxpayer's dollars to assist Russia and other countries
of the former Soviet Union to dismantle their nuclear weapons, yet
Moscow maintains its nuclear forces at cold war levels of readiness and
continues to invest scarce resources in further strategic
modernization.
And throughout the world, America confronts a lengthening list of
failed and failing states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict. The events of
the past year and the range of U.S. peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions testifies to the rise of ethnic violence, terrorism and other
challenges to the evolving post-cold-war world.
The administration's underfunding of U.S. military forces stands in
stark contrast to this troubling strategic landscape, as does its
extensive use of the military on missions of peripheral U.S. national
interest. The gap between our national military strategy and the
resources this administration has decided to commit to executing that
strategy, estimated by some to be greater than $100 billion, continues
to widen. So the result is a Department of Defense that has been
designed to carry out one set of missions, is being called upon to
execute an entirely different set of missions, and is inadequately
funded for either. The result is a deepening sense of confusion,
frustration, and disarray in our military.
Consequently,
H.R. 3230 once again attempts to address the shortfalls
and shortcomings created by the internal contradictions of the
administration's defense program. Beginning last year, the committee
focused its efforts on the four key pillars of a sound national
defense; improving the quality of military life; sustaining core
readiness; revitalizing an underfunded modernization plan; reforming
and innovating the Pentagon.
H.R. 3230 builds on last year's efforts in
these four key areas.
The bill provides $266.7 billion in budget authority for Department
of Defense and Department of Energy programs and is $600 million below
the spending levels set by the Budget Committee for the national
security budget function in fiscal year 1997. The bill provides for
$2.4 billion more than current fiscal year 1996 authorized spending
which, when adjusted for inflation, represents a real decline of
approximately 1.5 percent in spending and not an increase. The fact
that this bill authorizes defense spending at a level that is $12.4
billion greater than the President's request, yet still reflects
spending decline, speaks volumes about the extent to which the
President is underfunding the military.
I will leave discussion of the many important initiatives in the bill
to my colleagues on the National Security Committee who have worked
very hard since late February to get this bill to the floor this early
in the year. In particular, I would like to recognize the diligence and
dedication of the subcommittee and panel chairman and ranking members.
Unlike most committees in the House, the National Security Committee's
seven subcommittees and panels are each responsible for producing
discreet pieces of the broader bill. From the outset of the process,
ensuring that the bill comes together in a coherent product requires a
lot of planning, coordination and teamwork, all of which I have
consistently been able to count on.
Because our fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill was not
enacted until this past February, the National Security Committee had
no chance to pause before launching into the fiscal year 1997 hearing
and mark-up process in order to get the bill to the floor this early in
the legislative cycle. I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the
committee, all or who are responsible for us being here today.
In particular, I would like to recognize the contributions of the
gentleman from California, the committee's ranking member, Mr. Dellums.
He is one of this institution's most articulate Members as well as
strongest proponents of the deliberative process. The committee's work,
and this bill, are that much better because of it.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the staff. This bill
authorizes funding for approximately 50 percent of the Federal
Government's discretionary budget. To say it is a lot of work is an
understatement. We have a small staff relative to the size of the
committee and the magnitude of our oversight responsibilities, so the
work gets done only through great dedication and effort.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge strong bipartisan support for this
bipartisan bill. The Constitution makes raising and maintaining the
military one of Congress's most fundamental responsibilities.
H.R. 3230
clearly demonstrates the extent to which the National Security
Committee has taken this responsibility seriously.
{time} 1600
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I take a few moments to express my concerns with
H.R.
3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. I
would begin at the outset by thanking my distinguished colleague for
his very kind and generous remarks with respect to this gentleman in
his opening remarks.
Second, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina,
Chairman Spence, again for a more bipartisan approach to this year's
bill, both at the staff and member level. But I would hasten to add,
Mr. Chairman, civility, collegiality and some effort at bipartisanship
notwithstanding, there remain many issues that caused me to vote
against the bill in committee and to offer additional and dissenting
views on its reports.
I refer my colleagues who are interested to those views and will
request that at the appropriate time they be approved for inclusion
into the Record.
Let me enumerate some of my concerns. First, Mr. Chairman, the
unwarranted, I underscore, unwarranted addition of nearly $13 billion
to the defense topline is justified primarily to meet a notional
modernization crisis. The hue and cry over modernization reminds me of
last year's readiness crisis, another purported crisis that quickly
evaporated before conference was concluded on last year's bill.
Careful thinking would conclude that there is no modernization
crisis. The leadership of the Department of Defense has offered a
cogent and calm viewpoint demonstrating that the drawdown of our forces
has allowed for a slower replacement of our weapon systems. The
carefully crafted future years defense plan adequately meets
modernization requirements while allowing us to fund other important
accounts in our overall budget.
In many cases, it would appear that the committee adds were made with
little consideration to the ability to sustain the program, which will
cause disruptive program instabilities and forestall our ability to
meet future program needs.
Rather than, Mr. Chairman, buying more hardware now, we should invest
in technologies of the future, both the direct military technologies,
including innovative nonlethal weapons technology more appropriate to
operations other than war, to operations such as operations that are
being carried out in Bosnia, humanitarian efforts in other parts of the
world and into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan and invest
wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims about a
modernization crisis will harm our national security in both the short
and long term.
Mr. Chairman, it is true as well that failure to fund the domestic
education and economic development programs that form a critical
element of our national security strategy is contrary to our long-term
national interests.
Second, the bill fails to take advantage of the opportunities to move
further beyond the nuclear abyss, Mr. Chairman, whether it is in the
form of constraints on the cooperative threat reduction program,
euphemistically referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, that destroys
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union or the needless acceleration
of Department of Energy weapons programs or the continuing restrictions
on retiring strategic systems, these are all missed opportunities.
[[Page
H4927]]
Third, the bill contains the funding for an overly aggressive and
unnecessary national missile defense program that would be noncompliant
with the ABM Treaty.
The combination of all these three issues, when combined with the
prospect of near-term NATO expansion, has contributed dramatically, in
this gentleman's view, to destabilizing our relationship with Russia.
In turn, it has reduced the prospect that we can work with democratic
forces in Eastern Europe to achieve long-term stability in Europe,
stability based upon a respect for human rights, economic development
and a nonthreatening balance of military power in the region.
Fourth, the bill grabs hold of numerous hot button cultural issues.
The Committee, without hearings, Mr. Chairman, negated the do not ask
do not tell policy in its mark and returns us to an era in which
capable, willing gay men and lesbians are completely denied the
opportunity to serve their Nation in uniform.
The committee, again without hearings, required the discharge of
personnel who test positively for HIV-1 virus, which is neither
medically nor militarily necessary. It flies in the face, Mr. Chairman,
it flies in the face of Congress's very recent appeal of such a policy
before it even went into effect. Our service personnel, who have served
this Nation with honor, with distinction and professionalism, need
better treatment from their Government than this.
The committee refused to return the right of secure safe abortion to
servicewomen serving overseas. The committee trampled on the
Constitution's first amendment protections by embracing overly broad
and vague language in an effort to suppress lascivious literature and
other media.
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me just say that I believe that
because all of these reasons, in order to make it in order that we be
able to more successfully fix the problems that are in this bill, I
urge the committee to reject this bill as reported by the committee.
With whatever time I have remaining, I would like to point out to my
colleagues that, as I said before, the topline in this budget increases
President Clinton's budget request by nearly $13 billion, no small sum
at all. That is what makes politics. That is why there is a Republican
Party and a Democratic Party, left, right and center on the political
perspective.
What is tragic to this gentleman, who has always attempted to take
the floor of this body not to challenge on the basis of partisanship,
not to challenge on the basis of personality but to be prepared to
challenge any Member of Congress on the issues of the day, on the
critical, vital issues of our time, we ought to be able to debate, win
or lose. The tragedy is that the rule that governed this bill did not
allow, Mr. Chairman, not one single amendment to reduce the overall
level of the military budget in a post-cold-war environment.
Some may rationalize the inclusion of 13 additional billion dollars.
But there are some of us in this body who are prepared to discuss
rationally, intelligently and cogently and substantively that there is
no rational military requirement to add $13 billion in a post-cold war
so-called balanced budget limited dollar environment. But we were
denied the opportunity.
For the first time in my 25-plus years in the Congress, denied
outright any opportunity to cut the budget, rendering those of us who
believe that $13 billion additional in the budget is virtually obscene,
rendered us impotent in our capacity to challenge on behalf of
constituencies in this country who believe that there is no need for
$13 billion additional. No opportunity whatsoever.
Mr. Chairman, if we look at the amendments that were made in order,
it does not allow us not only to break into the topline, we cannot even
get at the priorities. Of the six major amendments that have been made
in order, two of them are not going to be offered. So we are down to
four. Of the 35 minor amendments that were primarily language
amendments, noncontroversial, seeking studies and reports, most of
those 35 amendments will be rolled into two omnibus amendments,
bipartisan, noncontroversial. So for a military budget of close to $170
billion, we will move across this floor with a degree of alacrity that
staggers the imagination, in this gentleman's opinion, is frightening.
In the atmosphere of a balanced budget, we ought to pay more
attention to nearly $270 billion. In a post-cold-war environment, where
we are not moving into an era of change and transition and challenge
and opportunity, we ought to be able to talk about a rational military
budget that walks us into the 21st century with pride and dignity and
competence and capability. But to deny that in the rule means that when
my colleagues adopted the rule, they adopted this budget. With rare
exception we could have given the rule, and what I am saying to my
colleagues is, with rare exception, this military budget, $267 billion,
could have been offered on the suspension calendar. There are no major
amendments here; there are no amendments that take $1 out of this
budget. There are no amendments, with rare exception, that make any
major policy changes.
{time} 1615
Something is wrong with this process. I did not labor marching uphill
to find us in a post-cold war environment with great opportunities for
25 years, to come to the floor, rendered totally impotent, in my
capacity to try to shake the reality, along with my colleagues, of the
billions of dollars we are spending on defense and to move us in a
direction that makes sense.
I conclude that I will oppose this bill for all the reasons that I
have enunciated. I urge my colleagues to reject this bill. Let us go
back to committee and fix the problems.
Mr. Chairman, I include the following material for the Record:
Additional and Dissenting Views of Ronald V. Dellums
I offer dissenting views because I am deeply troubled by
several aspects of the authorization bill and its report,
most especially by its overall focus and directions. I remain
convinced that the authorization top line is significantly
higher than required for the military aspects of our national
security strategy. It may be true that the committee marked
to a top line that it anticipates in the coming fiscal year
1997 budget resolution. Despite this, I believe it had the
opportunity to make prudent reductions in the overall program
authorization, thereby providing guidance to the Committee on
the Budget as to how better to meet deficit reduction goals.
Moreover, I remain convinced that the significant plus-up
over the President's request has caused a lack of focus and a
lack of discipline in our procurement and research and
development accounts, a point to which I will return later.
Despite the collegial and effective working relationship
between the committee's majority leadership and the minority,
there has at times been a troubling partisan appearance to
some of the committee's business and is reflected in the
committee report as well. Most troubling has been an
unwillingness to hear from administration witnesses on
important policy issues before the committee. It is certainly
true that outside experts provide important insight into the
policy choices and strategic circumstances we confront, but
we owe ourselves the responsibility to hear also from
government experts and responsible officials. What is
especially troubling is that we have failed to request the
traditional intelligence threat briefing which has provided a
cogent perspective on the strategic requirements that we
face. Given our rapidly changing world, this annual review is
even more important now than it was during the period of the
Cold War.
A small but important additional example of this problem is
the committee's determination to plumb the conclusions
reached by the Intelligence Community in a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States. Whether or not there is a legitimate
concern about the development of the NIE and whatever
questions one has regarding the validity of its conclusions,
it is unconscionable that we have failed to have the
Intelligence Community before the committee to testify on the
NIE's contents and its methodology. I have requested such a
committee hearing on several occasions, and am disappointed
that this has not occurred. While I am willing to support the
provisions contained in the committee report asking the
Director of Central Intelligence to review both the matter of
the NIE and to develop an updated and expanded assessment,
and while I accept the majority's interest in having an
alternative analysis analysis rendered, it concerns me that
we have gotten to this point without a full committee
deliberation on the substance and development of the IN.
While the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill reported by
the committee does not itself contain highly contentious
provisions on the command and control of U.S. armed forces
participating in peacekeeping operations, the issue arises in
a free-standing piece of legislation marked-up the same day
by the committee and reported as
H.R. 3308 just three months
after the Congress sustained the President's veto of the
National Defense
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on this issue, among
other reasons.
The same point can be made for the committee's decision to
report out
H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars''
missile defense program. A less extreme formulation for
national missile defense program activity was met with a
Presidential veto on last year's defense authorization bill.
As with the command and control issue, it strikes this
gentleman that there is a little legislative reason to have
decided to push forward an even more extreme ballistic
missile defense program, given that it is surely destined to
meet a Presidential veto as well. Our committee must achieve
its policy goals through legislation, and obviously that
activity must be bound by the constraints of our
Constitution's separation of powers between the Branches.
Pursuing legislation knowing that it will be vetoed, when
nothing has occurred to change the imaginable outcome seems a
political rather than a legislative course.
But the national ballistic missile defense issue is also
embedded in the committee recommendation and report on
H.R.
3230 in important ways. And there is much more commonality
between the administration and the Congress on this issue
than the political rhetoric would suggest. Many of the
differences between the two approaches are rooted on a
perception of the timing of the appearance of a threat to
which we would need such a response. This is essentially a
function of risk management, and how to determine what type
of ``insurance policy'' we wish to purchase against such a
future contingency. What is less focused on but should be
very central to the debate, is the cost and character of the
alternative ``insurance policies'' that are available to the
Nation. And this is where the parties diverge.
The administration's current national ballistic missile
defense plan can provide for an affordable defense against
limited ballistic missile threats before those threats will
emerge. It does so in a way that anticipates likely changes
in the threat from today's estimates. It also does so in a
way that avoids becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-
sac by a premature deployment of a potentially misdirected
system.
The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty
considerations and the threat reduction and strategic
stability goals that the treaties promise.
This course of action commits us as well to an incredibly
expensive and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the
department'
s 3+3 program and the Spratt substitute to
H.R.
3144, provide for a more capable missile defense system when
deployed, and one that is affordable within current budget
projections. It blends arms control and
counterproliferation activities with deterrence and
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles
from being deployed at all, while providing a prudent
``insurance policy'' against limited but as of yet non-
existent threats.
The overreliance by the committee on a ``hardware''
solution to intercept incoming missiles in the final minutes
of their flight time, risks constructing a very expensive
21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy may well
prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we might
face as the original Maginot Line was in defending France
during World War II.
Returning now to refocus on the issue of the size of the
top line and its impact on our procurement choices, I am
reminded of echoes from last year's debate on the fiscal year
1996 authorization bill.
During that debate, we heard a hue and cry that there
existed a readiness crisis in the services. Foregone training
and maintenance, as well as ``optempo'' stress were all
allegedly impacting adversely on the U.S. armed force's
ability to perform its principal missions. This hue and cry
was raised despite assurances by the top military leadership
that the force was receiving historically high levels of
operational funding and was as ready a force as we had ever
had. Facts have borne out their more sober assessment and,
indeed, one can say that the relatively modest increased
investment that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization
conference in the end committed to the readiness accounts
confirmed the view that a ``crisis'' did not really exist.
The small increase in the readiness account proposed in the
fiscal year 1997 authorization bill lends additional credence
to this assessment.
This year's hue and cry is that there is a
``modernization'' crisis, with much displaying of data to
support the view that low levels of procurement spending must
equate with an insufficient modernization strategy. What is
so remarkably similar about this debate with last year's
debate on readiness are three things.
First, the services generally agree that they could all
``use'' more money for procurement this year, but that they
could meet their requirements with what had been budgeted as
long as long-term trends supported their needs. This sounds
very much like ``we're missing some training'' but ``we're as
ready as we've ever been.''
Second, the leadership of the Department of Defense has
offered a cogent and calm viewpoint that the drawdown of the
force structure from its Cold War levels allowed them one
more year's grace before they needed to begin to replace
equipment that had been procured in large numbers during the
1980s for a much larger force. In other words, they had a
plan, it was being managed, and they could perform their
mission. And they could more appropriately use defense
resources in other accounts and reserve for the future year's
defense plan a significant increase in procurement dollars.
Third, while the committee invited the service chiefs to
submit their ``wish list'' for additional procurement items,
it has not followed the Secretary of Defense's plea to limit
procurement additions to those items needed by the services.
By my calculation approximately half of the procurement
plus-up does not meet that qualification.
Not satisfied with this explanation the committee
recommendation would spend an additional $7.5 billion on
procurement, and as I noted above much of that on
requirements not established by the service chiefs. I believe
that this unsolicited largess is imprudent and will have
significant adverse impact on our ability to meet real future
requirements. It will provoke budget and program disruptions
in the near term and it will preempt important opportunities
into the future.
In many cases it would appear that these adds were made
with little consideration to the ability to sustain the
program in the next year. The disruptive business and human
implications of creating program instabilities by ``spiking''
procurement for one or two years could haunt the military
industrial base for years to come. This is a costly and
ineffective way to approach long-term modernization
requirements. In addition, it would also appear that program
risks, indeed even assessing the department's ability to even
execute a program, may not have been given adequate
consideration in determining authorization levels.
Equally important and worse, the committee recommendation
throws much of this money into systems that were designed
``to fight the last war.'' This is a common failing that is
so easily avoidable. In addition, the procurement ``theme''
to solve the ``crisis'' appears to be only to buy more, and
often not more of what the service chiefs requested. This
binge in procurement both purchases needlessly redundant
weapons capabilities and does so in excessive amounts. With
regard to the former, we will end making purchases of too
many different systems, rather than making choices and
sticking with the best choice. With regard to the latter, we
are spending our investment capital to buy unneeded equipment
for today that will prevent us from purchasing the right
equipment when it becomes available tomorrow.
Rather than buying more hardware now, we should invest in
the technologies of the future, both the direct military
technologies, including innovative non-lethal weapons
technology more appropriate to operations other than war, and
into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan
and invest wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims
about a modernization ``crisis'' will harm our national
security in both the short and long term.
Much more could be said about this particular problem. Let
me summarize my views in this area by saying that this
extravagant level of spending is neither needed for our
current military requirements nor prudent for meeting the
needs of the future. In addition, it contributes to a defense
authorization top line that needlessly consumes resources
from the two other elements of our national security triad:
our economy and our foreign policy program that can dampen
the circumstances that give rise to war. And, unlike money
put into the operations and maintenance accounts, it is not
easily or efficaciously diverted to other priorities when
hindsight establishes that the perceived requirement in fact
does not exist.
There are other issues and problems in this report other
than with its dollar level and the procurement choices. They
deserve illumination as well.
Foremost among them are the several issues that erupted in
the personnel title of the bill and report. While I do not
support the current ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy on gays
and lesbians serving in the military, I more strongly reject
the committee's view that we should return to an era in which
capable and willing gay men and lesbians were denied the
opportunity to serve their nation in uniform. I support a
policy that would allow individuals to serve regardless of
sexual orientation. Clearly ``don't ask, don't tell'' has not
provided the protections to such individuals that its
crafters felt it would; but a return to an era of repression
and intolerance is not the solution.
By way of explanation of the necessity for the change in
policy under section 566 of this legislation, the committee
elsewhere in this report cites at length the decision in the
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Paul G. Thomasson, Lieutenant, United
States Navy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense; John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendants-Applies.
It is useful to note that this case is but one of several
that are expected to be heard before the United States
Supreme Court later this year on the issue of the
Administration's ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy. No fewer
than eight other cases on the policy are presently before the
federal courts. In the last year, judges in two of those
cases reached the opposite view of the judges in
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the Thomasson case, yet the committee does not make reference
to those decisions.
The committee has not held a single hearing on the issue of
gays and lesbians in the military in either the first or
second session of the 104th Congress--the period during which
the current policy has been implemented. Though the committee
obviously feels that it is of utmost importance to change the
current policy, it did not choose to expend any time or
effort to get the views of witnesses from the military, the
administration or the public on the issue. Instead, it relies
on the decision on one court case to base a major change to
military policy.
If the committee is to make an informed and thoughtful
decision on this matter, it should make the effort to shed
light on the competing views and experiences that represent
all sides on this complex and important issue through the
committee hearing process. The committee avoids the subject
by relying instead on the judicial branch for justification
and to explain Congressional intent. By including legislative
provisions in the subcommittee chairman's mark without any
discussion of the matter, the committee demonstrates a lack
of faith in the hearing process, betrays a lack of confidence
that its provision would prevail under scrutiny, and abuses
the prerogatives of the majority.
Similarly the committee's recommendation to discharge
personnel who test positive for the HIV-1 virus is medically
and militarily unnecessary and flies in the face of the
Congress's very recent determination to rescind such a policy
even before it went into effect. Of even greater concern than
having established a policy for which there is no military
requirement, the committee's recommendation pretends that it
has protected the medical disability rights of personnel
who will face discharge under its provisions. This is a
disingenuous formulation given that the committee was
fully apprised that in order to provide such protection it
would have to do so in legislative language, which it
refused to do because of the direct spending implications
that would have forced funding cuts in other accounts. Our
service personnel who have served this nation with honor,
distinction and professionalism need better from their
government than this.
In language on section 567, elsewhere in this report, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ``deem
separating service members determined to be HIV-positive as
meeting all other requirements for disability retirement * *
*.''
While giving the appearance of providing for medical
retirement, the fact is that such language had to be stripped
from the bill by amendment in the full committee markup
because of direct spending implications. The Congressional
Budget Office has scored this provision as costing $27
million over the next five years, and it could not be enacted
without identifying an offset to pay for it. The committee
could not accomplish this and, instead, decided to foist the
problem off on the Department of Defense as an unfunded
mandate, and then take credit for supposedly providing the
medical retirement benefit.
Worse yet, it turns out that the Secretary of Defense may
not have the statutory authority to fund such a mandate ``out
of hide'' in any case. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 and 1204 direct
DoD to use the Department of Veterans Affairs rating
schedule. While the tables currently indicate that a
servicemember who is symptomatic of AIDS is eligible for
medical retirement, it rates a servicemember who has
asymptomatic HIV with a zero percent disability rating.
Consequently, they would not be entitled to disability
retired pay.
Under these circumstances, and since the law which would be
reinstated by this section was repealed, the member who is
discharged under section 567 would have no medical or
retirement benefits at all, nor would the members of his or
her family. He or she would be promptly discharged within two
months of testing positive for HIV-1 virus. It would be the
height of irresponsibility to enact such a provision without
first clearing up these discrepancies.
The committee's refusal to return the right to secure safe
abortion services to servicewomen serving overseas is an
additional reason why I could not support the bill being
reported. Of equal concern to our servicewomen should be the
committee's apparent view of the role of women in combat-
related specialties and the important equal-opportunity
problems that its position raises.
On another social issue, the committee has trampled on the
Constitution's First Amendment protections by embracing
overly broad and vague language in an effort to suppress
pornographic literature and other media. Despite the
obviously degrading and sexist imagery of such media, those
who would publish, sell or purchase them enjoy the protection
of the Constitution. Surely better ways exist to overcome
these problems than by legislating overly broad and
unconstitutional attacks on the problem.
The committee's decision to weigh in on these cultural
battles in this manner will, I believe, be to the ultimate
detriment of the morale and welfare of our service personnel.
We are a diverse society, with varying views on these issues.
As such, we should decline as a legislature to impose a
narrow view that fails to account fully for the human dignity
of all in our society. Civility, morality and the
Constitution all argue for such restraint. Failure to yield
to the natural progression of expanded civil and human rights
will only result in further turmoil, which will be adverse to
the national security interests of our nation.
In this regard, let me note my appreciation for the
committee's action to confront in a purposeful and reasonable
manner the problem of hate crime in the military. Obviously,
we are a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society, a society with varying religious traditions. With a
Constitution committed to the equality of each person, we
seek to vindicate the promise of that equality. The provision
in the committee recommendation helps to build upon the
military's successes in moving toward making that principle a
reality, and should help to overcome the shortcomings where
they have occurred.
The committee's treatment of international, peacekeeping
and arms control issues displays a continuing resistance to
realign our requirements and resources to the realities
emerging in this new strategic era. It has become apparent
that operations other than war, such as our participation in
the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will become
more and more common. Yet the image of the U.S. servicemember
as peacekeeper is new and it does not yet fit comfortably in
the view of the committee. As a result, the committee
attempts to micromanage the services, and the Commander in
Chief, as I noted above, as they seek to implement these
efforts at which we are relatively new participants. The
report language requiring probing insight into military plans
to withdraw from what is thus far a highly successful effort
in Bosnia, for example, is both insulting to our service
leadership and potentially dangerous in what it could reveal
about our planning process.
The committee and the Congress surely have an oversight
responsibility; but it is equally clear that we do not have
management responsibility, and the Framers of our
Constitution clearly viewed it that way. I would have hoped
that we could have demonstrated more confidence in our
service leaderships and their ability to develop and
implement an appropriate plan for the withdrawal of the U.S.
forces in Bosnia. Similarly, the committee's recommendations
concerning humanitarian demining and amending the prospective
land-mine use moratorium are disturbing and will unduly
constrain our theater CINCS in pursuing demining programs
that are an essential part of their overall strategy in their
area of responsibility.
On another positive note, let me support the determination
reached in this bill that the environmental management and
restoration programs operated by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Energy are important and integral parts
of our military requirements. I am pleased that we have not
had the same struggle over both funding levels and authority
that I believe plagued last year's effort and I look forward
to continuing to work with the committee to fashion effective
programs for accelerating clean-up, making environmental
management more effective and efficient and for saving
money on these accounts as a result.
I remain concerned though with the funding levels and
program direction of the nuclear weapons program accounts of
Title XXXI. The addition of funds to the requested levels for
stockpile stewardship and management seem unnecessary given
the still pending Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
on Stockpile Stewardship and Management. While I appreciate
the committee's responsiveness in establishing a modest fence
around the stewardship increase, I do not believe that the
committee has taken sufficient time to inquire fully into the
opportunities available for a more fundamental reassessment
of our nuclear weapons policy.
The permanent extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty
concluded last year was achieved in part because of the U.S.
reaffirmation of its adherence to the Treaty's Article VI
requirement to reduce our arsenal towards elimination.
Despite the fact, that this is, and remains, the policy of
our government, we are not proceeding outside of our
bilateral discussions with Russia under the START process to
pursue further reductions. I am concerned that such a failure
will lead to lost opportunities that seemed so promising only
a year and a half ago, when President Clinton and Russian
President Yeltsin jointly declared that each nation would
consider pursuing such unilateral initiatives.
Finally, let me note that, despite my disagreements with
the committee report, I applaud the chairman and my
colleagues for their willingness to work cooperatively where
possible to find common ground on the important issues
covered in the recommended bill and its accompanying report.
I am concerned that, despite this collegiality, we may have
produced a committee recommendation that remains vulnerable
to a Presidential veto because of the weight of the many
contentious matters that it contains.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter] who is chairman of our Subcommittee on
Procurement.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me start off by giving also my
congratulations to our chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] who has done a superb job of working on this defense bill,
walking us through
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the hearings that we had to have in rapid fire order, marshaling this
great staff that we have got on the majority side and the minority side
to put this bill together, answering the tough questions and the tough
issues that we had to answer this year in bringing it to the floor. Let
me thank him.
Let me also thank the ranking member the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dullums], and let me tell my colleagues as we go through the
debate, and Mr. Dellums reminded us that we have had in the past some
long debates on defense issues, I remember the 6-week debate we had on
the nuclear freeze that we Republicans enjoyed, quite frankly, and the
great times that we have had engaging. I wish myself that we had more
time to discuss the top line because I think it is a great debate; I
agree with the gentleman that it is an important issue for the country.
Let me answer what I think are three important questions that the
American people have about this bill. First, do we need this level of
spending? And this level of spending is a little over $12 million above
what the President has asked for. The answer, I think is yes, and I
think our hearings showed that we need this level of spending.
When we asked the Secretary of Defense if he wanted to get to $60
billion in modernization spending instead of the $38.9 billion that we
have got this year in the President's budget, he said yes. He said I
want to get there as soon as possible. General Shalikashvili said, yes,
I want to get there as soon as possible. They had recommended initially
having that level of spending in 1998, $60 billion in spending instead
of $38.9. When President Clinton put his defense budget together 2
years ago in 1995 and said here is what I am going to want in 1997,
here is a blueprint, his blueprint for this year was $50 billion. Well,
we have gone up from $38.9 billion $6.2 billion. We have added an
additional $6.2. We asked the services to come in and tell us what
equipment they needed; they gave us a list. This is the uniformed
services of the Clinton administration, gave us a list for about $15
billion, and when we decided on the new equipment we were going to put
in, the things that we have put in for additions in terms of
modernized equipment were 95 percent in commonality with what the
services asked for.
So if the question is did the services ask for this equipment, the
answer is, yes, the services asked for this equipment, and if somebody
could throw me down that Marine ammo belt that I have been carrying
around for the past couple of days, some people told me that is a silly
prop, but I think that is the essence of this defense bill because this
Marine ammo belt symbolizes the meeting that I had with the Marines and
with the other services, with all of the people who are in charge of
ammunition supply for the services. The Marines looked us in the eye
and said, Mr. Chairman, Congressman, we cannot fight the two-war
scenario that the President has given us the responsibility to fight,
and they said we are short of M-16 bullets and a lot of other ammo. We
found out they were 96 million M-16 bullets short. That means they run
out unless they borrow from somebody else, and if that other service
has their minimum requirement, then they are out of ammunition.
So we plussed up over $300 million for Marine ammunition. That was
the M-16 and mortar rounds and many other things that they needed.
So, yes, we do safety upgrade the Marine Harriers, the AV-8B's the
crashes. They said that they would like to have those 24 Harriers that
the administration did not plan to upgrade safety upgraded to give
those pilots a better chance of surviving. We did provide ammunition,
and we did help to modernize the forces across the board.
We have done the right thing for America. This is a good defense
bill, and I ask every Member to support this work that the committee
has done.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], the ranking
member, the senior Democrat on our side.
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding me this time and to thank
him, for over the years he has been my chairman, for many years, for
the support he has given me; sometimes, not that much, we have
disagreed on military matters, but he is always considerate and fair to
me, and I certainly want this to appear in the Record today. And
Chairman Spence I thank for our cooperation over the years, and I have
enjoyed working with him very, very much, as to as well the committee
and also to the staff.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the defense authorization
bill. The National Guard, and I know I am taking some by surprise that
I will talk about the National Guard and Reserve, they have done very
well in this legislation. We have tried to improve the readiness,
modernization and standard of living in this bill. We have added $805
million for Guard and Reserve equipment, modernization, above the
President's budget. We have increased the good year retirement points
for the Reserves from 60 points to 75 points. This had not been changed
since 1948. There is a 3-percent military pay raise for both the active
and reserve forces. We have allowed active guard and reserve enlisted
members to retire at the highest rank that they will obtain. Officers
can do that now.
However, I am disappointed that the Defense Department provided the
Guard and Reserve $294 million for military construction. Now, Mr.
Chairman, this is only 3 percent of the total funds for construction
for all the military, and the Guard and Reserve, I point this out, have
40 percent of the mission. We have inserted in this bill asking the
military to give us a report of actually what the Guard and Reserve
need for military construction and armory construction, and I might say
that the chairman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] and ranking member, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz] were very fair to us. They tried to
help.
We have added the funding to keep the air guard fighters at 15 in a
squadron instead of dropping the level to less effective 12 planes per
squadron. By adopting the amendment that will mean en bloc reservists
will have a second chance to take out mobilization insurance if they
decide to go into the Guard or the Reserve.
We have done many other things. We have a revitalization for the
Guard and Reserve, and finally, Mr. Chairman, I am very glad that my
good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] will not be
offering his amendment to this bill. Now there is strong feeling on
both sides whether the Army Reserve should report to two commanders or
one commander. We prefer the one commander, just like the other reserve
services do. The committee has supported our position on this
throughout the debate. We are trying, Mr. Chairman, to improve the Army
Reserve, not tear it down, and I am pleased that this amendment will
not be offered and we can work out this disagreement in conference.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I might add this particular point. As a lot of people
realize, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] is retiring
after this year, and personally I would like to offer him my gratitude
for all he has meant to this committee and to this country for his
service here over the years. I know of no one who stood stronger and
taller for national defense than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], and he is going to be going down in history and known as
Mr. National Guard and Reserve, and we are going to miss you, Sonny.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Bateman].
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, less than 2 years ago, the National
Security Committee brought to light the downward trend in readiness
throughout the military services resulting from defense spending cuts,
diversion of funds to meet unbudgeted contingency operations, force
structure reductions, and a high pace of operations. Routine training
was being canceled. We also heard reports of deferred maintenance,
spare parts shortages, and a quality of life for our servicemembers
which was suffering. under the strong leadership of Chairman Spence,
the committee undertook a multifaceted strategy to maintain readiness
which has helped to address the unacceptable trends in short-term
readiness.
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Readiness is a perishable commodity which demands our constant
attention. The root causes which led to the readiness problems less
than 2 years ago still exist. Defense spending is being cut, force
structure is being reduced, and the pace of operations is still high.
Adding to my concern is what I view as the administration trying to
squeeze defense requirements into a topline driven budget which does
not satisfy the current and future needs of our military forces. This
has resulted in a juggling exercise that unfortunately pits near-term
readiness against modernization. This should not be an either-or-
proposition.
H.R. 3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 continues last year's work, achieving the goals that we all share:
providing the necessary resources to ensure force readiness and
improving the quality of life for the men and women of our Armed
Forces.
H.R. 3230 fully funds the military services' operations and training
accounts, and adds significant resources to other important readiness
activities which have been underfunded by the Department of Defense in
the fiscal year 1997 budget request, including real property
maintenance to address health, safety, and mission critical
deficiencies; depot maintenance to reduce backlogs; base operations
support to address shortfalls in programs which sustain mission
capability, quality of life and work force productivity, mobility
enhancements to help deploy U.S. forces more rapidly and efficiently,
and reserve component training.
The bill also contains several provisions in the area of civilian
employees to provide the Department of Defense better tools for
managing the work force and for saving resources.
I would like to thank the ranking member of the Readiness
Subcommittee, my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky for his
outstanding cooperation, knowledge, and leadership through the year on
the many issues which came before the Readiness Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 is a responsible, meaningful bill that will
provide adequate resources for the continued readiness of our military
forces. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the bill.
{time} 1630
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky], the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the Committee on
National Security.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the DOD
authorization bill.
This bill will go a long way toward supporting and sustaining our
U.S. military forces.
As ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I want to commend
our chairman, Herb Bateman.
He continues to have the foresight necessary to address some of the
long-term issues we have identified.
We worked together to add nearly $2 billion to O accounts, from $89
billion to $91 billion.
We added $1 billion to real property maintenance, $190 million to
depots, $190 million to base ops, $100 million to mobility, and $90
million for reserve component training.
But what we did not do may be just as important.
We did not authorize DOD to go forward with their privatization plan.
As one who represents significant public and private sector
interests, let me tell you why.
DOD recognizes that they save money through public-private
competition.
Nevertheless, DOD wants to eliminate the public sector as a
competitor.
DOD believes the private sector can do anything better and cheaper.
I'm here to tell you that I've ``been there, done that''--and ``it
ain't necessarily so.''
We've got to responsibly pick and choose where and when we give
someone a monopoly.
We've got to have the business sense to recognize that two overheads
cost more than one--whether you talk about air logistics centers, or
working on 5-inch guns in Louisville.
It's simple arithmetic, but when you factor in brac politics, it
comes out as new math nobody understands.
I don't think anyone opposes it, but we oppose going into it blind--
with such a vague roadmap of the future.
Our silence on the privatization issue tells DOD they need to go back
to the drawing board on this one.
The issue is far too important to risk national security by going too
far, too fast. We need to be careful.
Herb Bateman and I also worked to reform DOD financial management,
specifically the defense business operating fund--or DBOF.
DBOF has long been a thorn in the side of some of the most dedicated
proponents of better business practices at DOD.
Centralized cash management and standardized cost accounting is
absolutely necessary to run an organization as big as DOD.
However, to create an $80 billion slush fund to pay for unfunded
contingencies--as they did early on--or to hide the real cost of brac--
or maybe even environmental clean-up--behind the fig leaf of DBOF
cannot be allowed to continue.
Our bill says DOD will develop a plan to improve DOD cash management
by the end of September, 1997.
They will implement those plans and terminate DBOF by October 1,
1998.
Bill language outlines nine specific elements of any new plan--such
as rates that more accurately reflect real operating costs--as opposed
to surcharges tacked on to replenish losses in entirely unrelated
areas.
As is often the case, had DOD been willing to do this in the first
place, legislation wouldn't be necessary.
In conclusion, I think the bill, on balance, achieves many of the
goals Members of both parties have said they wanted to reach at DOD.
I think it is a good bill, it deserves strong bipartisan support with
a few exceptions and I ask my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of our Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Committee on National Security, has
just returned from Moscow, where he met with all the senior Russian
military people. He can give us a report on it.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise and thank the
distinguished chairman of our full committee and the ranking member,
two fine gentlemen who have worked together with us to achieve this
piece of legislation. While we may disagree in certain elements, we
certainly come together and respect each other's views. In the end,
hopefully we will have a bill that all of us can support.
In terms of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to thank the ranking member, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] for his cooperation and support. The
request by the administration was $34.7 billion, $1.5 billion less than
the fiscal year 1996 request. Because of the request by the service
chiefs, which amounted to $20 billion of additional funding in the R
area alone, we increase slightly the R account to a level of $35.5
billion.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, the service chiefs asked us for an
additional $20 billion that we just could not provide. It is somewhat
discouraging, Mr. Chairman, that we were criticized very heavily last
year by both the White House and the Secretary of Defense's office for
plusing up the defense budget, but then in this year's hearings, the
Secretary came in and showed us charts taking credit for flattening out
the acquisition downturn; in effect, taking credit for funds that we
were criticized for putting in last year. The same thing is happening
this year, Mr. Chairman. That is somewhat disheartening to me, as
someone who tries to support the administration and their defense
requests, and the requests of the service chiefs.
In particular, we have plused up some specific priorities that were
raised in our hearings, and by the members of our subcommittee,
Major Actions:
All articles in House section
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(House of Representatives - May 14, 1996)
Text of this article available as:
TXT
PDF
[Pages
H4925-H5033]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 430 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3230.
{time} 1555
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(
H.R. 3230) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Barrett of Nebraska in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will each control 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
altering order of consideration of amendments
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4(c) of House
Resolution 430, I request that during the consideration of
H.R. 3230,
amendments Nos. 1 and 2 printed in part A of House Report 104-570 be
considered after all other amendments printed in that part of the
report.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request is noted.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 continues an effort we began last
year to revitalize this country's national defenses after a decade of
spending decline and force structure reductions. For the second
consecutive year, and in a bipartisan fashion, the National Security
Committee has reported a bill that I believe considers the future more
realistically, and address shortfalls and shortcomings in the present
more aggressively, than does the administration. Moreover, the
committee's efforts have been undertaken within the broader context and
constraints of a commitment to balance the budget by the year 2002.
The primary mission of our military forces has not changed very much
since the fall of the Berlin Wall--it remains the protection and
promotion of vital U.S. interests around the world. Despite the end of
the cold war, the events of just the past year clearly demonstrate that
new challenges to U.S. global interests are emerging on many fronts.
China, as an emerging power, has demonstrated a disturbing
willingness to use military force as a tool of coercion as it threatens
stability, prosperity and the growth of democracy in East Asia. The
administration's decision last week to waive sanctions against the
Chinese for their export of nuclear sensitive technology to Pakistan
undermines this country's commitment to nonproliferation in the eyes of
much of the world, and seemingly rewards Beijing's leaders for their
increasingly assertive and aggressive diplomacy throughout the region.
Russia, as a disintegrating military superpower, careens back and
forth from extreme nationalism to unreconstructed communism as it
struggles to hold itself together in the post-cold-war world. As it
does, it
[[Page
H4926]]
wages a bloody war in Chechnya, threatens the use of nuclear weapons in
response to NATO expansion and sells advanced weaponry of all kinds--
including nuclear technologies--to anyone willing to pay cash. We spend
United States taxpayer's dollars to assist Russia and other countries
of the former Soviet Union to dismantle their nuclear weapons, yet
Moscow maintains its nuclear forces at cold war levels of readiness and
continues to invest scarce resources in further strategic
modernization.
And throughout the world, America confronts a lengthening list of
failed and failing states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict. The events of
the past year and the range of U.S. peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions testifies to the rise of ethnic violence, terrorism and other
challenges to the evolving post-cold-war world.
The administration's underfunding of U.S. military forces stands in
stark contrast to this troubling strategic landscape, as does its
extensive use of the military on missions of peripheral U.S. national
interest. The gap between our national military strategy and the
resources this administration has decided to commit to executing that
strategy, estimated by some to be greater than $100 billion, continues
to widen. So the result is a Department of Defense that has been
designed to carry out one set of missions, is being called upon to
execute an entirely different set of missions, and is inadequately
funded for either. The result is a deepening sense of confusion,
frustration, and disarray in our military.
Consequently,
H.R. 3230 once again attempts to address the shortfalls
and shortcomings created by the internal contradictions of the
administration's defense program. Beginning last year, the committee
focused its efforts on the four key pillars of a sound national
defense; improving the quality of military life; sustaining core
readiness; revitalizing an underfunded modernization plan; reforming
and innovating the Pentagon.
H.R. 3230 builds on last year's efforts in
these four key areas.
The bill provides $266.7 billion in budget authority for Department
of Defense and Department of Energy programs and is $600 million below
the spending levels set by the Budget Committee for the national
security budget function in fiscal year 1997. The bill provides for
$2.4 billion more than current fiscal year 1996 authorized spending
which, when adjusted for inflation, represents a real decline of
approximately 1.5 percent in spending and not an increase. The fact
that this bill authorizes defense spending at a level that is $12.4
billion greater than the President's request, yet still reflects
spending decline, speaks volumes about the extent to which the
President is underfunding the military.
I will leave discussion of the many important initiatives in the bill
to my colleagues on the National Security Committee who have worked
very hard since late February to get this bill to the floor this early
in the year. In particular, I would like to recognize the diligence and
dedication of the subcommittee and panel chairman and ranking members.
Unlike most committees in the House, the National Security Committee's
seven subcommittees and panels are each responsible for producing
discreet pieces of the broader bill. From the outset of the process,
ensuring that the bill comes together in a coherent product requires a
lot of planning, coordination and teamwork, all of which I have
consistently been able to count on.
Because our fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill was not
enacted until this past February, the National Security Committee had
no chance to pause before launching into the fiscal year 1997 hearing
and mark-up process in order to get the bill to the floor this early in
the legislative cycle. I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the
committee, all or who are responsible for us being here today.
In particular, I would like to recognize the contributions of the
gentleman from California, the committee's ranking member, Mr. Dellums.
He is one of this institution's most articulate Members as well as
strongest proponents of the deliberative process. The committee's work,
and this bill, are that much better because of it.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the staff. This bill
authorizes funding for approximately 50 percent of the Federal
Government's discretionary budget. To say it is a lot of work is an
understatement. We have a small staff relative to the size of the
committee and the magnitude of our oversight responsibilities, so the
work gets done only through great dedication and effort.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge strong bipartisan support for this
bipartisan bill. The Constitution makes raising and maintaining the
military one of Congress's most fundamental responsibilities.
H.R. 3230
clearly demonstrates the extent to which the National Security
Committee has taken this responsibility seriously.
{time} 1600
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I take a few moments to express my concerns with
H.R.
3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. I
would begin at the outset by thanking my distinguished colleague for
his very kind and generous remarks with respect to this gentleman in
his opening remarks.
Second, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina,
Chairman Spence, again for a more bipartisan approach to this year's
bill, both at the staff and member level. But I would hasten to add,
Mr. Chairman, civility, collegiality and some effort at bipartisanship
notwithstanding, there remain many issues that caused me to vote
against the bill in committee and to offer additional and dissenting
views on its reports.
I refer my colleagues who are interested to those views and will
request that at the appropriate time they be approved for inclusion
into the Record.
Let me enumerate some of my concerns. First, Mr. Chairman, the
unwarranted, I underscore, unwarranted addition of nearly $13 billion
to the defense topline is justified primarily to meet a notional
modernization crisis. The hue and cry over modernization reminds me of
last year's readiness crisis, another purported crisis that quickly
evaporated before conference was concluded on last year's bill.
Careful thinking would conclude that there is no modernization
crisis. The leadership of the Department of Defense has offered a
cogent and calm viewpoint demonstrating that the drawdown of our forces
has allowed for a slower replacement of our weapon systems. The
carefully crafted future years defense plan adequately meets
modernization requirements while allowing us to fund other important
accounts in our overall budget.
In many cases, it would appear that the committee adds were made with
little consideration to the ability to sustain the program, which will
cause disruptive program instabilities and forestall our ability to
meet future program needs.
Rather than, Mr. Chairman, buying more hardware now, we should invest
in technologies of the future, both the direct military technologies,
including innovative nonlethal weapons technology more appropriate to
operations other than war, to operations such as operations that are
being carried out in Bosnia, humanitarian efforts in other parts of the
world and into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan and invest
wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims about a
modernization crisis will harm our national security in both the short
and long term.
Mr. Chairman, it is true as well that failure to fund the domestic
education and economic development programs that form a critical
element of our national security strategy is contrary to our long-term
national interests.
Second, the bill fails to take advantage of the opportunities to move
further beyond the nuclear abyss, Mr. Chairman, whether it is in the
form of constraints on the cooperative threat reduction program,
euphemistically referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, that destroys
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union or the needless acceleration
of Department of Energy weapons programs or the continuing restrictions
on retiring strategic systems, these are all missed opportunities.
[[Page
H4927]]
Third, the bill contains the funding for an overly aggressive and
unnecessary national missile defense program that would be noncompliant
with the ABM Treaty.
The combination of all these three issues, when combined with the
prospect of near-term NATO expansion, has contributed dramatically, in
this gentleman's view, to destabilizing our relationship with Russia.
In turn, it has reduced the prospect that we can work with democratic
forces in Eastern Europe to achieve long-term stability in Europe,
stability based upon a respect for human rights, economic development
and a nonthreatening balance of military power in the region.
Fourth, the bill grabs hold of numerous hot button cultural issues.
The Committee, without hearings, Mr. Chairman, negated the do not ask
do not tell policy in its mark and returns us to an era in which
capable, willing gay men and lesbians are completely denied the
opportunity to serve their Nation in uniform.
The committee, again without hearings, required the discharge of
personnel who test positively for HIV-1 virus, which is neither
medically nor militarily necessary. It flies in the face, Mr. Chairman,
it flies in the face of Congress's very recent appeal of such a policy
before it even went into effect. Our service personnel, who have served
this Nation with honor, with distinction and professionalism, need
better treatment from their Government than this.
The committee refused to return the right of secure safe abortion to
servicewomen serving overseas. The committee trampled on the
Constitution's first amendment protections by embracing overly broad
and vague language in an effort to suppress lascivious literature and
other media.
Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me just say that I believe that
because all of these reasons, in order to make it in order that we be
able to more successfully fix the problems that are in this bill, I
urge the committee to reject this bill as reported by the committee.
With whatever time I have remaining, I would like to point out to my
colleagues that, as I said before, the topline in this budget increases
President Clinton's budget request by nearly $13 billion, no small sum
at all. That is what makes politics. That is why there is a Republican
Party and a Democratic Party, left, right and center on the political
perspective.
What is tragic to this gentleman, who has always attempted to take
the floor of this body not to challenge on the basis of partisanship,
not to challenge on the basis of personality but to be prepared to
challenge any Member of Congress on the issues of the day, on the
critical, vital issues of our time, we ought to be able to debate, win
or lose. The tragedy is that the rule that governed this bill did not
allow, Mr. Chairman, not one single amendment to reduce the overall
level of the military budget in a post-cold-war environment.
Some may rationalize the inclusion of 13 additional billion dollars.
But there are some of us in this body who are prepared to discuss
rationally, intelligently and cogently and substantively that there is
no rational military requirement to add $13 billion in a post-cold war
so-called balanced budget limited dollar environment. But we were
denied the opportunity.
For the first time in my 25-plus years in the Congress, denied
outright any opportunity to cut the budget, rendering those of us who
believe that $13 billion additional in the budget is virtually obscene,
rendered us impotent in our capacity to challenge on behalf of
constituencies in this country who believe that there is no need for
$13 billion additional. No opportunity whatsoever.
Mr. Chairman, if we look at the amendments that were made in order,
it does not allow us not only to break into the topline, we cannot even
get at the priorities. Of the six major amendments that have been made
in order, two of them are not going to be offered. So we are down to
four. Of the 35 minor amendments that were primarily language
amendments, noncontroversial, seeking studies and reports, most of
those 35 amendments will be rolled into two omnibus amendments,
bipartisan, noncontroversial. So for a military budget of close to $170
billion, we will move across this floor with a degree of alacrity that
staggers the imagination, in this gentleman's opinion, is frightening.
In the atmosphere of a balanced budget, we ought to pay more
attention to nearly $270 billion. In a post-cold-war environment, where
we are not moving into an era of change and transition and challenge
and opportunity, we ought to be able to talk about a rational military
budget that walks us into the 21st century with pride and dignity and
competence and capability. But to deny that in the rule means that when
my colleagues adopted the rule, they adopted this budget. With rare
exception we could have given the rule, and what I am saying to my
colleagues is, with rare exception, this military budget, $267 billion,
could have been offered on the suspension calendar. There are no major
amendments here; there are no amendments that take $1 out of this
budget. There are no amendments, with rare exception, that make any
major policy changes.
{time} 1615
Something is wrong with this process. I did not labor marching uphill
to find us in a post-cold war environment with great opportunities for
25 years, to come to the floor, rendered totally impotent, in my
capacity to try to shake the reality, along with my colleagues, of the
billions of dollars we are spending on defense and to move us in a
direction that makes sense.
I conclude that I will oppose this bill for all the reasons that I
have enunciated. I urge my colleagues to reject this bill. Let us go
back to committee and fix the problems.
Mr. Chairman, I include the following material for the Record:
Additional and Dissenting Views of Ronald V. Dellums
I offer dissenting views because I am deeply troubled by
several aspects of the authorization bill and its report,
most especially by its overall focus and directions. I remain
convinced that the authorization top line is significantly
higher than required for the military aspects of our national
security strategy. It may be true that the committee marked
to a top line that it anticipates in the coming fiscal year
1997 budget resolution. Despite this, I believe it had the
opportunity to make prudent reductions in the overall program
authorization, thereby providing guidance to the Committee on
the Budget as to how better to meet deficit reduction goals.
Moreover, I remain convinced that the significant plus-up
over the President's request has caused a lack of focus and a
lack of discipline in our procurement and research and
development accounts, a point to which I will return later.
Despite the collegial and effective working relationship
between the committee's majority leadership and the minority,
there has at times been a troubling partisan appearance to
some of the committee's business and is reflected in the
committee report as well. Most troubling has been an
unwillingness to hear from administration witnesses on
important policy issues before the committee. It is certainly
true that outside experts provide important insight into the
policy choices and strategic circumstances we confront, but
we owe ourselves the responsibility to hear also from
government experts and responsible officials. What is
especially troubling is that we have failed to request the
traditional intelligence threat briefing which has provided a
cogent perspective on the strategic requirements that we
face. Given our rapidly changing world, this annual review is
even more important now than it was during the period of the
Cold War.
A small but important additional example of this problem is
the committee's determination to plumb the conclusions
reached by the Intelligence Community in a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States. Whether or not there is a legitimate
concern about the development of the NIE and whatever
questions one has regarding the validity of its conclusions,
it is unconscionable that we have failed to have the
Intelligence Community before the committee to testify on the
NIE's contents and its methodology. I have requested such a
committee hearing on several occasions, and am disappointed
that this has not occurred. While I am willing to support the
provisions contained in the committee report asking the
Director of Central Intelligence to review both the matter of
the NIE and to develop an updated and expanded assessment,
and while I accept the majority's interest in having an
alternative analysis analysis rendered, it concerns me that
we have gotten to this point without a full committee
deliberation on the substance and development of the IN.
While the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill reported by
the committee does not itself contain highly contentious
provisions on the command and control of U.S. armed forces
participating in peacekeeping operations, the issue arises in
a free-standing piece of legislation marked-up the same day
by the committee and reported as
H.R. 3308 just three months
after the Congress sustained the President's veto of the
National Defense
[[Page
H4928]]
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on this issue, among
other reasons.
The same point can be made for the committee's decision to
report out
H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars''
missile defense program. A less extreme formulation for
national missile defense program activity was met with a
Presidential veto on last year's defense authorization bill.
As with the command and control issue, it strikes this
gentleman that there is a little legislative reason to have
decided to push forward an even more extreme ballistic
missile defense program, given that it is surely destined to
meet a Presidential veto as well. Our committee must achieve
its policy goals through legislation, and obviously that
activity must be bound by the constraints of our
Constitution's separation of powers between the Branches.
Pursuing legislation knowing that it will be vetoed, when
nothing has occurred to change the imaginable outcome seems a
political rather than a legislative course.
But the national ballistic missile defense issue is also
embedded in the committee recommendation and report on
H.R.
3230 in important ways. And there is much more commonality
between the administration and the Congress on this issue
than the political rhetoric would suggest. Many of the
differences between the two approaches are rooted on a
perception of the timing of the appearance of a threat to
which we would need such a response. This is essentially a
function of risk management, and how to determine what type
of ``insurance policy'' we wish to purchase against such a
future contingency. What is less focused on but should be
very central to the debate, is the cost and character of the
alternative ``insurance policies'' that are available to the
Nation. And this is where the parties diverge.
The administration's current national ballistic missile
defense plan can provide for an affordable defense against
limited ballistic missile threats before those threats will
emerge. It does so in a way that anticipates likely changes
in the threat from today's estimates. It also does so in a
way that avoids becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-
sac by a premature deployment of a potentially misdirected
system.
The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty
considerations and the threat reduction and strategic
stability goals that the treaties promise.
This course of action commits us as well to an incredibly
expensive and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the
department'
s 3+3 program and the Spratt substitute to
H.R.
3144, provide for a more capable missile defense system when
deployed, and one that is affordable within current budget
projections. It blends arms control and
counterproliferation activities with deterrence and
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles
from being deployed at all, while providing a prudent
``insurance policy'' against limited but as of yet non-
existent threats.
The overreliance by the committee on a ``hardware''
solution to intercept incoming missiles in the final minutes
of their flight time, risks constructing a very expensive
21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy may well
prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we might
face as the original Maginot Line was in defending France
during World War II.
Returning now to refocus on the issue of the size of the
top line and its impact on our procurement choices, I am
reminded of echoes from last year's debate on the fiscal year
1996 authorization bill.
During that debate, we heard a hue and cry that there
existed a readiness crisis in the services. Foregone training
and maintenance, as well as ``optempo'' stress were all
allegedly impacting adversely on the U.S. armed force's
ability to perform its principal missions. This hue and cry
was raised despite assurances by the top military leadership
that the force was receiving historically high levels of
operational funding and was as ready a force as we had ever
had. Facts have borne out their more sober assessment and,
indeed, one can say that the relatively modest increased
investment that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization
conference in the end committed to the readiness accounts
confirmed the view that a ``crisis'' did not really exist.
The small increase in the readiness account proposed in the
fiscal year 1997 authorization bill lends additional credence
to this assessment.
This year's hue and cry is that there is a
``modernization'' crisis, with much displaying of data to
support the view that low levels of procurement spending must
equate with an insufficient modernization strategy. What is
so remarkably similar about this debate with last year's
debate on readiness are three things.
First, the services generally agree that they could all
``use'' more money for procurement this year, but that they
could meet their requirements with what had been budgeted as
long as long-term trends supported their needs. This sounds
very much like ``we're missing some training'' but ``we're as
ready as we've ever been.''
Second, the leadership of the Department of Defense has
offered a cogent and calm viewpoint that the drawdown of the
force structure from its Cold War levels allowed them one
more year's grace before they needed to begin to replace
equipment that had been procured in large numbers during the
1980s for a much larger force. In other words, they had a
plan, it was being managed, and they could perform their
mission. And they could more appropriately use defense
resources in other accounts and reserve for the future year's
defense plan a significant increase in procurement dollars.
Third, while the committee invited the service chiefs to
submit their ``wish list'' for additional procurement items,
it has not followed the Secretary of Defense's plea to limit
procurement additions to those items needed by the services.
By my calculation approximately half of the procurement
plus-up does not meet that qualification.
Not satisfied with this explanation the committee
recommendation would spend an additional $7.5 billion on
procurement, and as I noted above much of that on
requirements not established by the service chiefs. I believe
that this unsolicited largess is imprudent and will have
significant adverse impact on our ability to meet real future
requirements. It will provoke budget and program disruptions
in the near term and it will preempt important opportunities
into the future.
In many cases it would appear that these adds were made
with little consideration to the ability to sustain the
program in the next year. The disruptive business and human
implications of creating program instabilities by ``spiking''
procurement for one or two years could haunt the military
industrial base for years to come. This is a costly and
ineffective way to approach long-term modernization
requirements. In addition, it would also appear that program
risks, indeed even assessing the department's ability to even
execute a program, may not have been given adequate
consideration in determining authorization levels.
Equally important and worse, the committee recommendation
throws much of this money into systems that were designed
``to fight the last war.'' This is a common failing that is
so easily avoidable. In addition, the procurement ``theme''
to solve the ``crisis'' appears to be only to buy more, and
often not more of what the service chiefs requested. This
binge in procurement both purchases needlessly redundant
weapons capabilities and does so in excessive amounts. With
regard to the former, we will end making purchases of too
many different systems, rather than making choices and
sticking with the best choice. With regard to the latter, we
are spending our investment capital to buy unneeded equipment
for today that will prevent us from purchasing the right
equipment when it becomes available tomorrow.
Rather than buying more hardware now, we should invest in
the technologies of the future, both the direct military
technologies, including innovative non-lethal weapons
technology more appropriate to operations other than war, and
into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a
leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan
and invest wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims
about a modernization ``crisis'' will harm our national
security in both the short and long term.
Much more could be said about this particular problem. Let
me summarize my views in this area by saying that this
extravagant level of spending is neither needed for our
current military requirements nor prudent for meeting the
needs of the future. In addition, it contributes to a defense
authorization top line that needlessly consumes resources
from the two other elements of our national security triad:
our economy and our foreign policy program that can dampen
the circumstances that give rise to war. And, unlike money
put into the operations and maintenance accounts, it is not
easily or efficaciously diverted to other priorities when
hindsight establishes that the perceived requirement in fact
does not exist.
There are other issues and problems in this report other
than with its dollar level and the procurement choices. They
deserve illumination as well.
Foremost among them are the several issues that erupted in
the personnel title of the bill and report. While I do not
support the current ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy on gays
and lesbians serving in the military, I more strongly reject
the committee's view that we should return to an era in which
capable and willing gay men and lesbians were denied the
opportunity to serve their nation in uniform. I support a
policy that would allow individuals to serve regardless of
sexual orientation. Clearly ``don't ask, don't tell'' has not
provided the protections to such individuals that its
crafters felt it would; but a return to an era of repression
and intolerance is not the solution.
By way of explanation of the necessity for the change in
policy under section 566 of this legislation, the committee
elsewhere in this report cites at length the decision in the
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Paul G. Thomasson, Lieutenant, United
States Navy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense; John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendants-Applies.
It is useful to note that this case is but one of several
that are expected to be heard before the United States
Supreme Court later this year on the issue of the
Administration's ``don't ask, don't tell'' policy. No fewer
than eight other cases on the policy are presently before the
federal courts. In the last year, judges in two of those
cases reached the opposite view of the judges in
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the Thomasson case, yet the committee does not make reference
to those decisions.
The committee has not held a single hearing on the issue of
gays and lesbians in the military in either the first or
second session of the 104th Congress--the period during which
the current policy has been implemented. Though the committee
obviously feels that it is of utmost importance to change the
current policy, it did not choose to expend any time or
effort to get the views of witnesses from the military, the
administration or the public on the issue. Instead, it relies
on the decision on one court case to base a major change to
military policy.
If the committee is to make an informed and thoughtful
decision on this matter, it should make the effort to shed
light on the competing views and experiences that represent
all sides on this complex and important issue through the
committee hearing process. The committee avoids the subject
by relying instead on the judicial branch for justification
and to explain Congressional intent. By including legislative
provisions in the subcommittee chairman's mark without any
discussion of the matter, the committee demonstrates a lack
of faith in the hearing process, betrays a lack of confidence
that its provision would prevail under scrutiny, and abuses
the prerogatives of the majority.
Similarly the committee's recommendation to discharge
personnel who test positive for the HIV-1 virus is medically
and militarily unnecessary and flies in the face of the
Congress's very recent determination to rescind such a policy
even before it went into effect. Of even greater concern than
having established a policy for which there is no military
requirement, the committee's recommendation pretends that it
has protected the medical disability rights of personnel
who will face discharge under its provisions. This is a
disingenuous formulation given that the committee was
fully apprised that in order to provide such protection it
would have to do so in legislative language, which it
refused to do because of the direct spending implications
that would have forced funding cuts in other accounts. Our
service personnel who have served this nation with honor,
distinction and professionalism need better from their
government than this.
In language on section 567, elsewhere in this report, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ``deem
separating service members determined to be HIV-positive as
meeting all other requirements for disability retirement * *
*.''
While giving the appearance of providing for medical
retirement, the fact is that such language had to be stripped
from the bill by amendment in the full committee markup
because of direct spending implications. The Congressional
Budget Office has scored this provision as costing $27
million over the next five years, and it could not be enacted
without identifying an offset to pay for it. The committee
could not accomplish this and, instead, decided to foist the
problem off on the Department of Defense as an unfunded
mandate, and then take credit for supposedly providing the
medical retirement benefit.
Worse yet, it turns out that the Secretary of Defense may
not have the statutory authority to fund such a mandate ``out
of hide'' in any case. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 and 1204 direct
DoD to use the Department of Veterans Affairs rating
schedule. While the tables currently indicate that a
servicemember who is symptomatic of AIDS is eligible for
medical retirement, it rates a servicemember who has
asymptomatic HIV with a zero percent disability rating.
Consequently, they would not be entitled to disability
retired pay.
Under these circumstances, and since the law which would be
reinstated by this section was repealed, the member who is
discharged under section 567 would have no medical or
retirement benefits at all, nor would the members of his or
her family. He or she would be promptly discharged within two
months of testing positive for HIV-1 virus. It would be the
height of irresponsibility to enact such a provision without
first clearing up these discrepancies.
The committee's refusal to return the right to secure safe
abortion services to servicewomen serving overseas is an
additional reason why I could not support the bill being
reported. Of equal concern to our servicewomen should be the
committee's apparent view of the role of women in combat-
related specialties and the important equal-opportunity
problems that its position raises.
On another social issue, the committee has trampled on the
Constitution's First Amendment protections by embracing
overly broad and vague language in an effort to suppress
pornographic literature and other media. Despite the
obviously degrading and sexist imagery of such media, those
who would publish, sell or purchase them enjoy the protection
of the Constitution. Surely better ways exist to overcome
these problems than by legislating overly broad and
unconstitutional attacks on the problem.
The committee's decision to weigh in on these cultural
battles in this manner will, I believe, be to the ultimate
detriment of the morale and welfare of our service personnel.
We are a diverse society, with varying views on these issues.
As such, we should decline as a legislature to impose a
narrow view that fails to account fully for the human dignity
of all in our society. Civility, morality and the
Constitution all argue for such restraint. Failure to yield
to the natural progression of expanded civil and human rights
will only result in further turmoil, which will be adverse to
the national security interests of our nation.
In this regard, let me note my appreciation for the
committee's action to confront in a purposeful and reasonable
manner the problem of hate crime in the military. Obviously,
we are a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society, a society with varying religious traditions. With a
Constitution committed to the equality of each person, we
seek to vindicate the promise of that equality. The provision
in the committee recommendation helps to build upon the
military's successes in moving toward making that principle a
reality, and should help to overcome the shortcomings where
they have occurred.
The committee's treatment of international, peacekeeping
and arms control issues displays a continuing resistance to
realign our requirements and resources to the realities
emerging in this new strategic era. It has become apparent
that operations other than war, such as our participation in
the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will become
more and more common. Yet the image of the U.S. servicemember
as peacekeeper is new and it does not yet fit comfortably in
the view of the committee. As a result, the committee
attempts to micromanage the services, and the Commander in
Chief, as I noted above, as they seek to implement these
efforts at which we are relatively new participants. The
report language requiring probing insight into military plans
to withdraw from what is thus far a highly successful effort
in Bosnia, for example, is both insulting to our service
leadership and potentially dangerous in what it could reveal
about our planning process.
The committee and the Congress surely have an oversight
responsibility; but it is equally clear that we do not have
management responsibility, and the Framers of our
Constitution clearly viewed it that way. I would have hoped
that we could have demonstrated more confidence in our
service leaderships and their ability to develop and
implement an appropriate plan for the withdrawal of the U.S.
forces in Bosnia. Similarly, the committee's recommendations
concerning humanitarian demining and amending the prospective
land-mine use moratorium are disturbing and will unduly
constrain our theater CINCS in pursuing demining programs
that are an essential part of their overall strategy in their
area of responsibility.
On another positive note, let me support the determination
reached in this bill that the environmental management and
restoration programs operated by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Energy are important and integral parts
of our military requirements. I am pleased that we have not
had the same struggle over both funding levels and authority
that I believe plagued last year's effort and I look forward
to continuing to work with the committee to fashion effective
programs for accelerating clean-up, making environmental
management more effective and efficient and for saving
money on these accounts as a result.
I remain concerned though with the funding levels and
program direction of the nuclear weapons program accounts of
Title XXXI. The addition of funds to the requested levels for
stockpile stewardship and management seem unnecessary given
the still pending Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
on Stockpile Stewardship and Management. While I appreciate
the committee's responsiveness in establishing a modest fence
around the stewardship increase, I do not believe that the
committee has taken sufficient time to inquire fully into the
opportunities available for a more fundamental reassessment
of our nuclear weapons policy.
The permanent extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty
concluded last year was achieved in part because of the U.S.
reaffirmation of its adherence to the Treaty's Article VI
requirement to reduce our arsenal towards elimination.
Despite the fact, that this is, and remains, the policy of
our government, we are not proceeding outside of our
bilateral discussions with Russia under the START process to
pursue further reductions. I am concerned that such a failure
will lead to lost opportunities that seemed so promising only
a year and a half ago, when President Clinton and Russian
President Yeltsin jointly declared that each nation would
consider pursuing such unilateral initiatives.
Finally, let me note that, despite my disagreements with
the committee report, I applaud the chairman and my
colleagues for their willingness to work cooperatively where
possible to find common ground on the important issues
covered in the recommended bill and its accompanying report.
I am concerned that, despite this collegiality, we may have
produced a committee recommendation that remains vulnerable
to a Presidential veto because of the weight of the many
contentious matters that it contains.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter] who is chairman of our Subcommittee on
Procurement.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me start off by giving also my
congratulations to our chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] who has done a superb job of working on this defense bill,
walking us through
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the hearings that we had to have in rapid fire order, marshaling this
great staff that we have got on the majority side and the minority side
to put this bill together, answering the tough questions and the tough
issues that we had to answer this year in bringing it to the floor. Let
me thank him.
Let me also thank the ranking member the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dullums], and let me tell my colleagues as we go through the
debate, and Mr. Dellums reminded us that we have had in the past some
long debates on defense issues, I remember the 6-week debate we had on
the nuclear freeze that we Republicans enjoyed, quite frankly, and the
great times that we have had engaging. I wish myself that we had more
time to discuss the top line because I think it is a great debate; I
agree with the gentleman that it is an important issue for the country.
Let me answer what I think are three important questions that the
American people have about this bill. First, do we need this level of
spending? And this level of spending is a little over $12 million above
what the President has asked for. The answer, I think is yes, and I
think our hearings showed that we need this level of spending.
When we asked the Secretary of Defense if he wanted to get to $60
billion in modernization spending instead of the $38.9 billion that we
have got this year in the President's budget, he said yes. He said I
want to get there as soon as possible. General Shalikashvili said, yes,
I want to get there as soon as possible. They had recommended initially
having that level of spending in 1998, $60 billion in spending instead
of $38.9. When President Clinton put his defense budget together 2
years ago in 1995 and said here is what I am going to want in 1997,
here is a blueprint, his blueprint for this year was $50 billion. Well,
we have gone up from $38.9 billion $6.2 billion. We have added an
additional $6.2. We asked the services to come in and tell us what
equipment they needed; they gave us a list. This is the uniformed
services of the Clinton administration, gave us a list for about $15
billion, and when we decided on the new equipment we were going to put
in, the things that we have put in for additions in terms of
modernized equipment were 95 percent in commonality with what the
services asked for.
So if the question is did the services ask for this equipment, the
answer is, yes, the services asked for this equipment, and if somebody
could throw me down that Marine ammo belt that I have been carrying
around for the past couple of days, some people told me that is a silly
prop, but I think that is the essence of this defense bill because this
Marine ammo belt symbolizes the meeting that I had with the Marines and
with the other services, with all of the people who are in charge of
ammunition supply for the services. The Marines looked us in the eye
and said, Mr. Chairman, Congressman, we cannot fight the two-war
scenario that the President has given us the responsibility to fight,
and they said we are short of M-16 bullets and a lot of other ammo. We
found out they were 96 million M-16 bullets short. That means they run
out unless they borrow from somebody else, and if that other service
has their minimum requirement, then they are out of ammunition.
So we plussed up over $300 million for Marine ammunition. That was
the M-16 and mortar rounds and many other things that they needed.
So, yes, we do safety upgrade the Marine Harriers, the AV-8B's the
crashes. They said that they would like to have those 24 Harriers that
the administration did not plan to upgrade safety upgraded to give
those pilots a better chance of surviving. We did provide ammunition,
and we did help to modernize the forces across the board.
We have done the right thing for America. This is a good defense
bill, and I ask every Member to support this work that the committee
has done.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], the ranking
member, the senior Democrat on our side.
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding me this time and to thank
him, for over the years he has been my chairman, for many years, for
the support he has given me; sometimes, not that much, we have
disagreed on military matters, but he is always considerate and fair to
me, and I certainly want this to appear in the Record today. And
Chairman Spence I thank for our cooperation over the years, and I have
enjoyed working with him very, very much, as to as well the committee
and also to the staff.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the defense authorization
bill. The National Guard, and I know I am taking some by surprise that
I will talk about the National Guard and Reserve, they have done very
well in this legislation. We have tried to improve the readiness,
modernization and standard of living in this bill. We have added $805
million for Guard and Reserve equipment, modernization, above the
President's budget. We have increased the good year retirement points
for the Reserves from 60 points to 75 points. This had not been changed
since 1948. There is a 3-percent military pay raise for both the active
and reserve forces. We have allowed active guard and reserve enlisted
members to retire at the highest rank that they will obtain. Officers
can do that now.
However, I am disappointed that the Defense Department provided the
Guard and Reserve $294 million for military construction. Now, Mr.
Chairman, this is only 3 percent of the total funds for construction
for all the military, and the Guard and Reserve, I point this out, have
40 percent of the mission. We have inserted in this bill asking the
military to give us a report of actually what the Guard and Reserve
need for military construction and armory construction, and I might say
that the chairman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] and ranking member, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz] were very fair to us. They tried to
help.
We have added the funding to keep the air guard fighters at 15 in a
squadron instead of dropping the level to less effective 12 planes per
squadron. By adopting the amendment that will mean en bloc reservists
will have a second chance to take out mobilization insurance if they
decide to go into the Guard or the Reserve.
We have done many other things. We have a revitalization for the
Guard and Reserve, and finally, Mr. Chairman, I am very glad that my
good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] will not be
offering his amendment to this bill. Now there is strong feeling on
both sides whether the Army Reserve should report to two commanders or
one commander. We prefer the one commander, just like the other reserve
services do. The committee has supported our position on this
throughout the debate. We are trying, Mr. Chairman, to improve the Army
Reserve, not tear it down, and I am pleased that this amendment will
not be offered and we can work out this disagreement in conference.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I might add this particular point. As a lot of people
realize, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] is retiring
after this year, and personally I would like to offer him my gratitude
for all he has meant to this committee and to this country for his
service here over the years. I know of no one who stood stronger and
taller for national defense than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], and he is going to be going down in history and known as
Mr. National Guard and Reserve, and we are going to miss you, Sonny.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Bateman].
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, less than 2 years ago, the National
Security Committee brought to light the downward trend in readiness
throughout the military services resulting from defense spending cuts,
diversion of funds to meet unbudgeted contingency operations, force
structure reductions, and a high pace of operations. Routine training
was being canceled. We also heard reports of deferred maintenance,
spare parts shortages, and a quality of life for our servicemembers
which was suffering. under the strong leadership of Chairman Spence,
the committee undertook a multifaceted strategy to maintain readiness
which has helped to address the unacceptable trends in short-term
readiness.
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Readiness is a perishable commodity which demands our constant
attention. The root causes which led to the readiness problems less
than 2 years ago still exist. Defense spending is being cut, force
structure is being reduced, and the pace of operations is still high.
Adding to my concern is what I view as the administration trying to
squeeze defense requirements into a topline driven budget which does
not satisfy the current and future needs of our military forces. This
has resulted in a juggling exercise that unfortunately pits near-term
readiness against modernization. This should not be an either-or-
proposition.
H.R. 3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 continues last year's work, achieving the goals that we all share:
providing the necessary resources to ensure force readiness and
improving the quality of life for the men and women of our Armed
Forces.
H.R. 3230 fully funds the military services' operations and training
accounts, and adds significant resources to other important readiness
activities which have been underfunded by the Department of Defense in
the fiscal year 1997 budget request, including real property
maintenance to address health, safety, and mission critical
deficiencies; depot maintenance to reduce backlogs; base operations
support to address shortfalls in programs which sustain mission
capability, quality of life and work force productivity, mobility
enhancements to help deploy U.S. forces more rapidly and efficiently,
and reserve component training.
The bill also contains several provisions in the area of civilian
employees to provide the Department of Defense better tools for
managing the work force and for saving resources.
I would like to thank the ranking member of the Readiness
Subcommittee, my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky for his
outstanding cooperation, knowledge, and leadership through the year on
the many issues which came before the Readiness Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman,
H.R. 3230 is a responsible, meaningful bill that will
provide adequate resources for the continued readiness of our military
forces. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the bill.
{time} 1630
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky], the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the Committee on
National Security.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the DOD
authorization bill.
This bill will go a long way toward supporting and sustaining our
U.S. military forces.
As ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I want to commend
our chairman, Herb Bateman.
He continues to have the foresight necessary to address some of the
long-term issues we have identified.
We worked together to add nearly $2 billion to O accounts, from $89
billion to $91 billion.
We added $1 billion to real property maintenance, $190 million to
depots, $190 million to base ops, $100 million to mobility, and $90
million for reserve component training.
But what we did not do may be just as important.
We did not authorize DOD to go forward with their privatization plan.
As one who represents significant public and private sector
interests, let me tell you why.
DOD recognizes that they save money through public-private
competition.
Nevertheless, DOD wants to eliminate the public sector as a
competitor.
DOD believes the private sector can do anything better and cheaper.
I'm here to tell you that I've ``been there, done that''--and ``it
ain't necessarily so.''
We've got to responsibly pick and choose where and when we give
someone a monopoly.
We've got to have the business sense to recognize that two overheads
cost more than one--whether you talk about air logistics centers, or
working on 5-inch guns in Louisville.
It's simple arithmetic, but when you factor in brac politics, it
comes out as new math nobody understands.
I don't think anyone opposes it, but we oppose going into it blind--
with such a vague roadmap of the future.
Our silence on the privatization issue tells DOD they need to go back
to the drawing board on this one.
The issue is far too important to risk national security by going too
far, too fast. We need to be careful.
Herb Bateman and I also worked to reform DOD financial management,
specifically the defense business operating fund--or DBOF.
DBOF has long been a thorn in the side of some of the most dedicated
proponents of better business practices at DOD.
Centralized cash management and standardized cost accounting is
absolutely necessary to run an organization as big as DOD.
However, to create an $80 billion slush fund to pay for unfunded
contingencies--as they did early on--or to hide the real cost of brac--
or maybe even environmental clean-up--behind the fig leaf of DBOF
cannot be allowed to continue.
Our bill says DOD will develop a plan to improve DOD cash management
by the end of September, 1997.
They will implement those plans and terminate DBOF by October 1,
1998.
Bill language outlines nine specific elements of any new plan--such
as rates that more accurately reflect real operating costs--as opposed
to surcharges tacked on to replenish losses in entirely unrelated
areas.
As is often the case, had DOD been willing to do this in the first
place, legislation wouldn't be necessary.
In conclusion, I think the bill, on balance, achieves many of the
goals Members of both parties have said they wanted to reach at DOD.
I think it is a good bill, it deserves strong bipartisan support with
a few exceptions and I ask my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of our Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Committee on National Security, has
just returned from Moscow, where he met with all the senior Russian
military people. He can give us a report on it.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise and thank the
distinguished chairman of our full committee and the ranking member,
two fine gentlemen who have worked together with us to achieve this
piece of legislation. While we may disagree in certain elements, we
certainly come together and respect each other's views. In the end,
hopefully we will have a bill that all of us can support.
In terms of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to thank the ranking member, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] for his cooperation and support. The
request by the administration was $34.7 billion, $1.5 billion less than
the fiscal year 1996 request. Because of the request by the service
chiefs, which amounted to $20 billion of additional funding in the R
area alone, we increase slightly the R account to a level of $35.5
billion.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, the service chiefs asked us for an
additional $20 billion that we just could not provide. It is somewhat
discouraging, Mr. Chairman, that we were criticized very heavily last
year by both the White House and the Secretary of Defense's office for
plusing up the defense budget, but then in this year's hearings, the
Secretary came in and showed us charts taking credit for flattening out
the acquisition downturn; in effect, taking credit for funds that we
were criticized for putting in last year. The same thing is happening
this year, Mr. Chairman. That is somewhat disheartening to me, as
someone who tries to support the administration and their defense
requests, and the requests of the service chiefs.
In particular, we have plused up some specific priorities that were
raised in our hearings, and by the members of our subcommittee,
including chemical biological
Amendments:
Cosponsors:
