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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(Senate - June 28, 1996)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S7225-S7264] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 The Senate continued with consideration of the bill. Cloture Motion The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Cloture Motion We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 433, S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill: Trent Lott, Don Nickles, Dirk Kempthorne, Rod Grams, Jim Jeffords, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Christopher S. Bond, John Ashcroft, Conrad Burns, Judd Gregg, Larry Pressler, Orrin G. Hatch, Mitch McConnell, Hank Brown, Sheila Frahm. Vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mandatory quorum call has been waived. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] are necessarily absent. Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] are necessarily absent. The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 53, nays 43, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.] YEAS--53 Abraham Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brown Burns Campbell Chafee Coats Cochran Cohen Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Domenici Faircloth Frahm Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchison Jeffords Kassebaum Kempthorne Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pell Pressler Roth Santorum Shelby Simpson Smith Snowe Specter Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner NAYS--43 Akaka Biden Bingaman Boxer Bradley Breaux Bryan Byrd Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Exon Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Harkin Heflin Inouye Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pryor Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Simon Wellstone Wyden NOT VOTING--4 Baucus Bumpers Hatfield Inhofe The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 53, the nays are 43. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not agreed to. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be set aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [[Page S7226]] Amendment No. 4388 (Purpose: To require a cost-benefit analysis of the F/A-18E/F aircraft program) Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk relating to the F/A-18E/F program on behalf of myself and Senator Kohl. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself and Mr. Kohl, proposes an amendment numbered 4388. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following: SEC. 223. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. (a) Report on Program.--Not later than March 30, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the following: (1) A review of the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (2) An analysis and estimate of the production costs of the program for the total number of aircraft realistically expected to be procured at each of three annual production rates as follows: (A) 18 aircraft. (B) 24 aircraft. (C) 36 aircraft. (3) A comparison of the costs and benefits of the program with the costs and benefits of the F/A-18C/D aircraft program taking into account the operational combat effectiveness of the aircraft. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds Pending Transmittal of Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft before the date that is 90 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the report required under subsection (a). Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment would ``fence'' the funds authorized for production of the 12 F/A-18E/F's authorized in this legislation until such time as the Department of Defense [DOD] submits a cost/benefit analysis to Congress and Congress has an opportunity to evaluate whether production of this aircraft should commence, in light of the cost and concerns about the benefit of the F/A-18E/F in contrast to the F/A-18C/D, a far less costly yet extremely capable aircraft. The genesis for this amendment resulted from a General Accounting Office [GAO] draft report made available recently entitled ``Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost''. In this report GAO studied the rationale and need for the F/A-18E/F in order to determine whether continued development of the aircraft is the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. GAO concluded that the marginal improvements of the F/A-18E/F are outweighed by the high cost of the program. Mr. President, in our current fiscal climate, I have serious concerns about authorizing funding for such a costly program which according to GAO will deliver only marginal improvements over the current C/D version of the F/A-18. As GAO noted in its report, at a projected total program cost of $89.15 billion, the F/A-18E/F program is one of the most costly aviation programs in the Department of Defense. The total program cost is comprised of $5.833 billion in development costs and $83.35 billion in procurement costs for 1,000 aircraft. The administration has requested $2.09 billion in fiscal year 1997 for the procurement of 12 F/A-18E/F's. To date, the Navy has already spent $3.75 billion on the research and development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. Before I begin to describe GAO's findings, I would first like to discuss briefly the role of the F/A-18 aircraft in our Nation's overall naval aviation force structure. The Navy performs its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter (air-to-air combat), strike (air-to- ground combat), and strike/fighter (multicombat role) aircraft. Currently, carrier based F-14 fighter aircraft perform air-to-air missions; A6E's perform air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18's perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the latest version of the Navy's carrier-based F/A-18 strike/fighter plane. The Navy has based the need for development and procurement of the F/ A-18E/F on existing or projected operational deficiencies of the F/A- 18C/D in the following key areas: strike range, carrier recovery payload and survivability. In addition, the Navy notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. In its report, GAO concludes that the operational deficiencies in the C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the E/F either have not materialized as projected or such deficiencies can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional upgrades made which would further improve its capabilities. One of the primary reasons the Navy cites in justifying the E/F is the need for increased range and the C/D's inability to perform long- range unrefueled missions against high-value targets. However, GAO concludes that the Navy's F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met by either the F/A-18E/F or F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, it concludes that the increased range of the E/F is achieved at the expense of its aerial combat performance, and that even with increased range, both aircraft will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions. The F/A-18E/F specification requirements call for the aircraft to have a flight range of 390 nautical miles [nm] while performing low- altitude bombing missions. The F/A-18E/F will achieve a strike range of 465 nm while performing low-altitude missions by carrying 2 external 480 gallon fuel tanks. While current C/D's achieve a flight range of 325 nm with 2-330 gallon fuel tanks while performing low-altitude missions--65 nm below the specification requirement of the E/F--when they are equipped with the 2-480 gallon external fuel tanks that are planned to be used on the E/F, the C/D can achieve a strike range of 393 nm on low-altitude missions. Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18E/F is expected to have a 683 nm strike range when flying a more fuel-efficient, survivable, and lethal high-altitude mission profile rather than the specified low-altitude profile. Similarly, although F/A-18E/F range will be greater than the F/A-18C/D, the C/D could achieve strike ranges--566 nm with 3-330 gallon fuel tanks or 600 nm with 2-480 gallon tanks and 1-330 gallon tank--far greater than the target distances stipulated in the E/F's system specifications by flying the same high- altitude missions as the E/F. Additionally, according to GAO, the E/F's increased strike range is achieved at the expense of the aircraft's aerial combat performance as evidenced by its sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and acceleration which impact its ability to maneuver in either offensive or defensive modes. Mr. President, another significant reason the Navy cites in developing the F/A-18E/F is an anticipated deficiency in F/A-18C carrier recovery payload--the amount of fuel, weapons and external equipment that an aircraft can carry when returning from a mission and landing on a carrier. The deficiency in carrier recovery payload which the Navy anticipated of the F/A-18C simply has not materialized. When initially procured, F/A-18C's had a total carrier recovery payload of 6,300 pounds. Because of the Navy's decision to increase the F/A-18C's maximum allowable carrier landing weight and a lower aircraft operating weight resulting from technological improvements, the F/A-18C now has a carrier recovery payload of 7,113 pounds. F/A-18C's operating in support of Bosnian operations are now routinely returning to carriers with operational loads of 7,166 pounds, which exceeds the Navy's stated carrier recovery payload capacity. This recovery payload is substantially greater than the Navy projected it would be and is even greater than when the F/A-18C was first introduced in 1988. In addition, GAO notes that while it is not necessary, upgrading F/A-18C's with stronger landing gear could allow them to recover carrier payloads of more than 10,000 pounds--greater than that sought for the F/A-18E/F--9,000 pounds. While the Navy also cites a need to improve combat survivability in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, it was not developed to counter a particular military threat that could [[Page S7227]] not be met with existing or improved F/A-18C/D's. Additional improvements have subsequently been made or are planned for the F/A- 18C/D to enhance its survivability including improvements to reduce its radar detectability, while survivability improvements of the F/A-18E/F are questionable. For example, because the F/A-18E/F will be carrying weapons and fuel externally, the radar signature reduction improvements derived from the structural design of the aircraft will be diminished and will only help the aircraft penetrate slightly deeper than the F/A- 18C/D into an integrated defensive system before being detected. In addition to noting the operational capability improvements in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, the Navy also notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. The Navy predicted that by the mid-1990's the F/A- 18C/D would not have growth space to accommodate additional new weapons and systems under development. Specifically, the Navy predicted that by fiscal year 1996 C/D's would only have 0.2 cubic feet of space available for future avionics growth; however, 5.3 cubic feet of available space have been identified for future system growth. Furthermore, technological advancements such as miniaturization, modularity, and consolidation may result in additional growth space for future avionics. The Navy also stated that the F/A-18E/F will provide increased payload capacity as a result of two new outboard weapons stations; however, unless current problems concerning weapons release are resolved--airflow problems around the fuselage and weapons stations-- the types and amounts of weapons the E/F can carry will be restricted and the possible payload increase may be negated. Also, while the E/F will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air capability by carrying two extra missiles, it will not increase its ability to carry the heavier, precision-guided, air-to-ground weapons that are capable of hitting fixed and mobile hard targets and the heavier stand-off weapons that will be used to increase aircraft survivability. Understanding that the F/A-18E/F may not deliver as significant operational capability improvements as originally expected, I would now like to focus on the cost of the F/A-18E/F program and possible alternatives to it. As previously mentioned, the total program cost of the F/A-18E/F is projected to be $89.15 billion. These program costs are based on the procurement assumption of 1,000 aircraft--660 by the Navy and 340 by the Marine Corps--at an annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year. As the GAO report points out, these figures are overstated. According to Marine Corps officials and the Marine Corps aviation master plan, the Marine Corps does not intend to buy any F/A- 18E/F's and, therefore, the projected 1,000 aircraft buy is overstated by 340 aircraft. Furthermore, the Congress has stated that an annual production rate of 72 aircraft is probably not feasible due to funding limitations and directed the Navy to calculate costs based on more realistic production rates as 18, 36 and 54 aircraft per year. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service: ``No naval aircraft have been bought in such quantities in recent years, and it is unlikely that such annual buys will be funded in the 1990's, given expected force reductions and lower inventory requirements and the absence of consensus about future military threats.'' Using the Navy's overstated assumptions about the total number of planes procured and an estimated annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year, the Navy calculates the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/ A-18E/F--costs related to the production of the basic aircraft--at $44 million. However, using GAO's more realistic assumptions of the procurement of 660 aircraft by the Navy, at a production rate of 36 aircraft per year, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the E/F balloons to $53 million. This is compared to the $28 million unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/A-18C/D based on a production rate of 36 aircraft per year. Thus, GAO estimates that this cost difference in unit recurring flyaway would result in a savings of almost $17 billion if the Navy were to procure 660 F/A-18C/D's rather than 660 F/A-18E/F's. Mr. President, this is certainly a significant amount of savings. Now I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production of the F/A-18E/F and instead relying on the F/A-18C/D, we will be mortgaging the future of our naval aviation fleet. However, Mr. President, there is a far less costly program already being developed which may yield more significant returns in operational capability. This program is the Joint Advanced Strike Technology or JAST Program. The JAST Program office is currently developing technology for a family of affordable next generation Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The JSF is expected to be a stealthy strike aircraft built on a single production line with a high degree of parts and cost commonality. The driving focus of JAST is affordability achieved by tri-service commonality. The Navy plans to procure 300 JSF's with a projected initial operational capability around 2007. Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies indicate that the JSF will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy tactical aircraft mission areas, especially range and survivability, at far less cost than the F/A-18E/F. The JSF is expected to be a stand alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war survivable aircraft. Overall, the JSF is expected to be more survivable and capable than any existing or planned tactical aircraft in strike and air-to-air missions, with the possible exception of the F-22 in air-to-air missions. The Navy's JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the F/A-18E/F to attack high-value targets without using external tanks or tanking. Unlike the F/A-18E/F which would carry all of its weapons externally, the Navy's JSF will carry at least 4 weapons for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat internally, thereby maximizing its stealthiness and increasing its survivability. Finally, the JSF would not require jamming support from EA-6B aircraft as does the F/A-18E/F in carrying out its mission in the face of integrated air defense systems. While the JSF is expected to have superior operational capabilities, it is expected to be developed and procured at far less expense than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the Navy's JSF is estimated to range from $32 to $40 million depending on which contractor design is chosen for the aircraft, as compared to GAO's $53 million estimate for the F/A-18E/F. Additional cost benefits of the JSF would result from having common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew and maintenance training requirements. Given the enormous cost and marginal improvement in operational capabilities the F/A-18E/F would provide, it seems that the justification for the E/F is not as evident as once thought. Operational deficiencies in the C/D aircraft either have not materialized or can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the plane. As a result, proceeding with the E/F Program may not be the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. In the short term, the Navy can continue to procure the F/A-18C/ D aircraft, while upgrading it to improve further its operational capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can look toward the next generation strike fighter, the JSF, which will provide more operational capability at far less cost than the E/F. Mr. President, succinctly put, the Navy needs an aircraft that will bridge between the current force and the new, superior JSF which will be operational around 2007. The question is whether the F/A-18C/D can serve that function, as it has demonstrated its ability to exceed predicted capacity or whether we should proceed with an expensive, new plane for a marginal level of improvement. The $17 billion difference in projected costs does not appear to provide a significant return on our investment. In times of severe fiscal constraints and a need to look at all areas of the budget to identify more cost-effective approaches, the F/A-18E/F is a project in need of reevaluation. For these reasons, I think it would be prudent to take a go-slow approach toward the F/A-18E/F program and allow the Congress sufficient time to evaluate GAO's findings and obtain a thorough response from DOD to these issues. I ask my colleagues to support [[Page S7228]] my amendment to fence all fiscal year 1997 funds authorizing the production of F/A-18E/F's until certain conditions are met. I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular aircraft program has been thoroughly examined for program costs, schedule, technical performance, and recent test results. The program is on schedule and on cost. This is one of those clear examples of where the GAO and the Department of Defense are at odds on certain data, and I respect fully the very detailed presentation by our distinguished colleague from Wisconsin. But I have to assure Members of the Senate that this is a matter that has been examined by the Armed Services Committee, and we will strongly oppose the amendment. The analytical tests for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the program was thoroughly examined by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense in 1992. A number of studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats and the capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered. To say now it is a better idea to remain with the earlier model of the 18, in our judgment, ignores all of the analyses that went into the decisions to develop the newer model and threatens one of the best run developmental programs and production programs in progress today. Therefore, Mr. President, the amendment would have the effect of delaying the 18 E/F program for up to 8 months at heavy costs to the American taxpayers until we get another study. There will always be more capable programs postulated for the future and there will always be lesser programs as we look over the past. This program has met all the requirements placed on it, is on schedule and at cost. Therefore, I urge the Senate to oppose the amendment. Mr. President, I see the presence on the floor of the Senator from Missouri who has spent a great deal of time in this program. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, briefly to respond to the Senator from Virginia, I appreciate his remarks and his great knowledge in this area, particularly when it comes to the Navy. Let me simply remind my colleagues what this amendment seeks to do. It asks, in light of this recently released GAO report, released yesterday, that we fence the money until such time as the Department of Defense provides us with a response to this, and then there will be just a 90-day period afterward, during which we would have an opportunity to look at it and GAO would look at it. This is a serious report. There may be disagreement. When you are talking about $17 billion between the C/D and Super Hornet, I think it deserves a look. I am not suggesting, nor have I suggested, the E/F is a bad airplane. Clearly, many of the things you indicated about its capabilities are there. The question that was raised by the report was whether or not the current C/D plane can provide these benefits and that perhaps we could move directly from the C/D plane on to the JSF plane as a cheaper and most cost-effective way. All we are suggesting here then is this brief period when we would have a chance to see whether the GAO was on the right track and see what the Department of Defense has to say about it. Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. I have no objection whatsoever to getting the information on the GAO report from the military. I think that is appropriate. I think the Senator is absolutely right to raise these questions once you have a serious GAO report. But I do not think we can hold up the entire funding on this program. I am told it would cost an 8- to 12- month slip in the program, and then assuming you go forward with the program, you end up spending a whole lot more money. So, in an effort to save money, you end up spending a lot more money. So I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. If the Senator would like to have his staff work with our staff to hold up a reasonable amount of money so it does not throw the whole schedule off, to assure the Senator that the report will be forthcoming, I think that could be accommodated. But to hold up the entire funding, I would have to oppose that. I will leave it up to the Senator whether he would like to get a vote on this now or would like to take 10 minutes to see if there is a portion of the funding that would not disrupt the program but would indicate the seriousness with which the information is received. I think that would work. I have not discussed this with the other side of the aisle. It may be they will not want to do that. Maybe we ought to go ahead with a rollcall vote, if that is appropriate, but I certainly defer to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I always appreciate the knowledge and experience of the Senator from Georgia and particularly his reasonableness. I certainly would like to take the opportunity to consult and see if there might be a way to work that out. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside. Mr. BOND. Reserving the right to object, I will not object to setting aside the amendment, but I do want to add some points on the discussion of it. I have no objection to setting it aside, but I do seek the floor to respond to some of the questions raised by the Senator from Wisconsin. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, let me explain why I think this amendment is not appropriate, it is not a good idea. The distinguished Senator from Georgia has already pointed out that an amendment like this, by delaying the production of the aircraft, would inevitably do little more than add cost to the total program and to the total buy. There are ongoing studies. The Navy and the Defense Department have been conducting these studies. They have reviews ongoing, and we will have access to not only their comments on the GAO report but their reviews. Let me say in summary, the GAO is not flying the airplane. The GAO people are not the ones landing fully-weapons-loaded airplanes on pitching aircraft carriers in the ocean. The Navy people are. They are the ones who made a compelling case for this airplane and the need for it. I should point out the F/A-18E/F exceeds the interdiction mission of the current C/D models in range by some 40 to 50 percent, regardless of the mission profile. There is talk about adding additional tanks or larger tanks on the C/ D, but these have been rejected because of restrictive load limitations and the structural operational limitations on the C/D on board the carrier. The Navy has conducted a thorough engineering analysis on the matter of putting larger tanks, for example, on the C/D's and concluded this was not suitable for carrier operations. The real question is the bringback capability. The current model of C/D fleet is at its operational limit in regard to its ability to bring back weapons. The E/F will be able to bring back the more advanced smart weapons which tend to be heavier than the majority of weapons in the fleet today. The E/F, the next generation of the Super Hornet, provides future room for future growth and flexibility to accommodate the technological advancements into the next century. One point the GAO has made is that there is a waiver for the C/D's landing restrictions. They say it is a permanent waiver. Well, that is not true. NAVAIR has said the waiver was acceptable in the interim, but it was up to individual air wings to approve or disapprove depending on their own assessments. Let me tell you, from the viewpoint of those who have flown on carriers and flown on and off of carriers at sea, what will have to happen. With the current C/D's to bring back fully loaded the weapons and the fuel, the ship will have to increase its speed to maintain 30 knots or more of wind over the deck, which will increase its fuel costs, whether nuclear or conventional; then the pilots will have to fly a full flap approach. But if the wind goes over 35 [[Page S7229]] knots because of unpredictable winds, then the pilot is required by the Navy safety manual to fly at half lap and would not be able to land with the heavier strike munitions load. It is a small and costly window to achieve. Though in some instances it can be achieved, it is only because of the extreme skill of our carrier crews. It is not an ideal situation to put the pilots or the carrier crews at risk when there is such a limited window of acceptable operations. The new E/F Super Hornet will enable the carrier to cruise at its normal speed and the pilots will be able to fly the normal patterns. They will not have to drop either their weapons or dump their fuel into the ocean to below safe minimums to bring back our most sophisticated and expensive ordnance. Let us remember, however, that the F/A-18C/D models will continue to carry numerous ordnance loads safely and without restrictions covering many missions. It is only for certain strike mission loads that the waiver is required. But we have to plan for the future. For the Navy, that future should and must include the F/A-18E/F. The Super Hornet is desired by the customer, the Navy, which has been consistent and vocal in its support of procuring the aircraft rapidly and efficiently. Further delays in a go-slow approach for this program in its current stage are both inappropriate and costly. We cannot sit around and wait for future paper airplanes magically to appear. We have modified to the limit our older aircraft. For many years aviation, and naval aviation in particular, has been subject to technical, administrative and political forces which have given it the appearance of having no direction. We have been clamoring for such direction. Now we have it. The Navy has said, ``This is what we need. This airplane is meeting our specs. We need it.'' Let us go forward with it. I strongly urge this body not to be in a position of ``go-slowing'' this program to death. Our pilots want the aircraft. They need the aircraft to maintain their critical edge. I urge this body not to pull the wings off. Let us let the Navy get about the job of continuing to defend this Nation now and in the future. The F/A-18E/F program has been a model program, by any measure, and remains on cost, on schedule in meeting all performance requirements. The Navy is developing, at one-half to one-third the cost of a new- start program, a highly capable carrier-based tactical aircraft. The amendment, as written, would divert program management attention away from the execution of the program and, if yet another program review were to be required, could impose as much as an 8-month delay in the program. This delay would affect the 3-year flight test program, the operational evaluation, and IOC of the first squadron. I think that the formal program reviews which are already being conducted are enough. The analytical basis of the program was thoroughly examined at the previous milestone decision, and the program has performed precisely to the plan approved at that time. I believe there are studies going on, and thus this amendment is unnecessary to ensure that we continue to get the kind of additional capability that the Navy, its pilots, and its aircraft crews demand and need. I urge my colleagues, if this amendment is brought up for a vote, to oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I am coming to the end of the debate on this portion. I want to respond to the Senator from Missouri very briefly. Let us be clear what we are attempting. We are in a period here where everyone in the country knows we are trying to find places where we can reduce spending. There are a number of areas that receive very strict scrutiny. There is a sense--it is not held by just one party--that perhaps sometimes the defense spending does not get the same scrutiny that other areas do. Sometimes it leads to defense bashing which may not be justified. It is even possible, if people get an attitude that the Defense Department expenditures are not scrutinized, that there may develop an attitude in this country that would actually threaten national security, that it may become difficult for those advocating defense expenditures to be believed, and that there are those who do not take a warning signal seriously. All that we are suggesting here in this amendment is that a very recent report, yesterday, from the General Accounting Office says--not that this is a bad aircraft, I say to the Senator from Missouri, not that it does not provide perhaps some additional benefits; it may be and probably would turn out that in some areas this is a more capable airplane--but the question is, is the marginal benefit of those improvements sufficient to justify a $17 billion difference in cost, vis-a-vis the C/D planes? That is the issue. We are not stopping the plane here. We are not saying it should never be continued. We are saying that when a report comes out from the GAO entitled, ``F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,'' it is incumbent on us in the U.S. Senate to stop for a bit and find out what it is all about. $17 billion is real money. If there is an opportunity here to ask some questions and find out maybe, just possibly, the Navy, the Defense Department could go with the C/D's, I think that is our obligation. The Senator from Georgia has suggested perhaps a way in which we can allow more of this to go forward while the questions are answered. We are exploring that at this point. I yield the floor. Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there is no question that we need to study carefully all of the views and opinions and the best information available on any program like this. But I suggest that if you take a look at the series of reviews and experiments, tests, and evaluations that have been done on this plane and that will be done, there is no need, unless and until we find from the Navy that the GAO has raised questions which they have not addressed or we can find that responses by the Defense Department are not adequate, there is no reason to raise further the cost of this program and delay it even further. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition completed a review of the F/A-18E/F program on March 25 of this year. As of that time, the program review included program cost, schedule, and technical performance, examination of the formal exit criteria which had been approved at the previous milestone, and results of an early operational assessment conducted by the Navy's commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. This assessment was based on extensive documentation review, modeling and simulation, and analysis flight test data from the first two test aircraft. In May 1996, notification was provided to Congress that the review had been successfully completed and the Navy had authorized contracting for long-lead items for the first low-rate initial production of the aircraft. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is scheduled to conduct another program review in March 1997. At that time, all aspects of the program will again be examined prior to authorizing full funding for the procurement of the first low-rate initial production aircraft. The analytical basis for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the F/A-18E/F program was thoroughly evaluated by both the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense prior to the milestone decision in May of 1992. Numerous studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats, and capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered as part of these analyses. It is not to say that we should not continue to review and analyze, look at the cost and determine the capability. That is an ongoing process. What I am saying, Mr. President, is we could significantly increase the cost of the program, throw production off schedule, and delay the availability of aircraft which the Navy said they have needed by putting a roadblock in the way of the initial low-rate production of the aircraft. This is not the time to throw a monkey wrench into a program which has been on schedule, [[Page S7230]] above performance, and well within cost parameters at this time. I urge my colleagues not to delay the program. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Missouri. I think there has been a good debate on this. I suggest the Senator lay aside his amendment. We can see if we can find a way to see that the report is forthcoming, without disrupting the program. It seems to me that is the way to proceed. If not, I would be joined with the Senator from Missouri in moving to table the amendment. I believe the staff is prepared to work with your staff on this. I have a call in for the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, who has two amendments that will require rollcalls. In the meantime, I suggest we clear these amendments that have all been agreed to or are going to be agreed to by both sides. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the pending amendments have been laid aside. Amendment No. 4387 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering is intended to better facilitate our pledge of material assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by ensuring the lowest fair price of the equipment we provide to their cause. When the President dispatched United States troops to Bosnia last year, he did so with the stipulation that they would be there only a year. The administration has since softened the deadline by indicating that troops may still be there on December 19, but that withdrawal will begin on that date. This latest commitment on withdrawal is not entirely reassuring. It is quite plausible that withdrawal will begin as stated, but our overall presence there may be drawn out indefinitely. A deadline was never an exit strategy. Last year, when then Senate majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, and I led the effort to support the President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief and indirectly to support his dispatch of more than 20,000 American troops to Bosnia, we made clear our reservations about simply imposing a deadline. We also suggested the outline of a true exit strategy. The centerpiece of that strategy, as Senator Dole and I have since repeated on countless occasions, was United States leadership in the effort to adequately equip and train the Bosnian Armed Forces. Only when that nation can defend itself against aggression, which over the course of 3\1/2\ years of war reduced its territory by half, will the peace be safe without us. We tried to address this issue last year by including $100 million in drawdown authority for Bosnia in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The amendment I am offering today simply seeks to ensure that the $100 million in equipment to be transferred to Bosnia is accounted for in a manner similar to the way it is in the case of other American allies. I am not advocating unlimited material support for Bosnia because of the impact on our own military readiness. But in order to get the most of the $100 million, we should see to it that the equipment is valued at the lowest possible fair price. This amendment gives us this assurance. The amendment expresses a sense of the Senate that the pricing of equipment be lowest in order to maximize the amount of equipment provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina under current drawdown authority. I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side. Mr. NUNN. This amendment has been cleared. I urge its adoption. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4387) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4389 (Purpose: To authorize the Air National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Exon, I offer an amendment that would allow the Nebraska National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE. Currently, the Air Guard and local authority share this duty. This amendment would eliminate unnecessary duplication. The air guard would be reimbursed for assuming the entire firefighting mission. I believe this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 4389. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following: SEC. 368. AUTHORITY OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD TO PROVIDE CERTAIN SERVICES AT LINCOLN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA. (a) Authority.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Nebraska Air National Guard may provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, Nebraska, on behalf of the Lincoln Municipal Airport Authority, Lincoln, Nebraska. (b) Agreement.--The Nebraska Air National Guard may not provide services under subsection (a) until the Nebraska Air National Guard and the authority enter into an agreement under which the authority reimburses the Nebraska Air National Guard for the cost of the services provided. (c) Conditions.--These services may only be provided to the extent that the provision of such services does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4389) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4390 (Purpose: To state the sense of Congress regarding the authorization of appropriation and appropriation of funds for military equipment and not identified in a budget request of the Department of Defense and for certain military construction) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment on behalf of Senator Robb. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 4390. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following: SEC. 1014. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION AND APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR CERTAIN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) to the maximum extent practicable, each House of Congress should consider the authorization of appropriation, and appropriation, funds for the procurement of military equipment only if the procurement is included-- (A) in the budget request of the President for the Department of Defense; or (B) in a supplemental request list provided to the congressional defense committees, upon request of such committees, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, by the military departments, by the National Guard Bureau, or by the officials responsible for the administration of the Reserves; (2) the recommendations for procurement in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from the budget request referred to in paragraph (1)(A) should be accompanied in the committee report relating to the bill by a justification of the national security interest addressed by the change; (3) the recommendations for military construction projects in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from such a [[Page S7231]] budget request should be accompanied by a justification in the committee report relating to the bill of the national security interest addressed by the change; and (4) the recommendations for procurement of military equipment, or for military construction projects, in a conference to resolve the differences between the two Houses relating to a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill which recommendations reflect a change from the original recommendation of the applicable committee to either House should be accompanied by a justification in the statement of managers of the conference report of the national security interest addressed by the change. Mr. NUNN. This is not the amendment, I believe, that we have problems with. This amendment would state that it is the sense of the Congress that the defense authorization appropriations bills should rely primarily on the budget request. I am told this is not cleared. I withdraw the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment (No. 4390) was withdrawn. Amendment No. 4391 (Purpose: To require a plan for repairs and stabilization of the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Sarbanes, I offer an amendment to require a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures for the historic district of the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Sarbanes, proposes an amendment numbered 4391. The amendment is as follows: At the end of title XXI, add the following: SEC. 2105. PLAN FOR REPAIRS AND STABILIZATION OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICT AT THE FOREST GLEN ANNEX OF WALTER REED MEDICAL CENTER, MARYLAND. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Maryland, together with funding options for the implementation of the plan. Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer an amendment directing the Secretary of the Army to submit a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures needed throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. This plan would also include funding options for the implementation of such plan. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center Annex at Forest Glen, MD is a 190-acre complex located just north of the Silver Spring business district. It was a former women's seminary known as the National Park Seminary. Acquired by the Army in 1943 by authority of the War Powers Act of 1942, it has served as a rehabilitation center and psychiatric facility for soldiers from World War II through the Vietnam war. The former college campus also contains approximately two dozen historic buildings on approximately 24 acres which comprise what is now referred to as the National Park Seminary Historic District. The site was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972. The site contains a number of historic or unique buildings, including houses shaped like a Dutch windmill, an English castle, a Japanese pagoda, a French chateau, and an Italian villa. Unfortunately, over the many years, many of these buildings have suffered substantial deterioration and neglect. The Army has sought unsuccessfully to excess the property for several years and has continued to plan for its eventual disposal. The National Trust has continued to work with the Army to assist in its assessment of options for the reuse of the property. During this time, even the most basic repairs to the buildings were not undertaken. Reports prepared by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save Our Seminary and other organizations have found that, in general, the property is poorly maintained and insufficiently secure. Routine preventative maintenance, such as cleaning out gutters, is not being performed. Repairs to obvious deficiencies, such as holes in the roof and broken windows, are not being made in a timely way. On site security is lax. Fire alarm and fire suppression systems are not being adequately maintained. The military construction appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990 contained a provision directing the Department of the Army to provide up to $3 million for necessary repairs at the annex and to work with the Montgomery County government and local citizens groups in the planning process for this site. Although we understand that $2 million was allocated by the Army for the repair and maintenance of historic buildings, all of this money was apparently used for architectural planning and design of roof work. However, to date, no funding has been provided for these major repairs and the buildings are deteriorating at a faster rate than ever. The Army developed a master plan for the site which called for the existing historic buildings to be maintained and occupied by the Army as long as it retains ownership to ensure their maintenance and security. The master plan also identified specific maintenance priorities with work on repair and replacement of deteriorated roofs at the top of the list. In addition, a previous commanding officer at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center submitted a letter stating, ``WRAMC will continue to request funding for maintenance of the historic district and make every effort to halt the deterioration of these structures.'' Despite the findings of the master plan and the statements of support by Army officials, no work has been done to repair or maintain these buildings. In 1994 following the burning of the historic Odeon Theatre resulting in its destruction by arson, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save our Seminary jointly filed a lawsuit against the Army claiming that the Army's neglect of the buildings violated the National Historic Preservation Act. The lawsuit is still pending. My amendment directs the Department of the Army to develop and submit a plan with appropriate funding options to implement such a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center within 30 days of the enactment of this act. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. McCain. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4391) was agreed to. Mr. NUNN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. McCain. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4392 (Purpose: To modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Bingaman, I offer an amendment authorizing the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to exchange administrative jurisdiction of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico for purposes of creating easily identifiable and manageable boundaries. I believe the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], Mr. Bingaman, for himself, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 4392. The amendment is as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. . MODIFICATION OF BOUNDARIES OF WHITE SANDS NATIONAL MONUMENT AND WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE. (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to effect an exchange between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army of administrative jurisdiction over the lands described in subsection (c) in order to facilitate administration of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Missile range.--The term ``missile range'' means the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, administered by the Secretary of the Army. [[Page S7232]] (2) Monument.--The term ``monument'' means the White Sands National Monument, New Mexico, established by Proclamation No. 2025 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) and administered by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) Exchange of Jurisdiction.--The lands exchanged under this Act are the lands generally depicted on the map entitled ``White Sands National Monument, Boundary Proposal'', numbered 142/80,061 and dated January 1994, comprising-- (1) approximately 2,524 acres of land within the monument that is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; (2) approximately 5,758 acres of land within the missile range abutting the monument, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; and (3) approximately 4,277 acres of land within the monument abutting the missile range, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Army. (d) Boundary Modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred to the Secretary of the Interior and exclude the land transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c). The boundary of the missile range is modified accordingly. (e) Administration.-- (1) Monument.--The Secretary of the Interior shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by subsection (c) in accordance with laws (including regulations) applicable to the monument. (2) Missile range.--The Secretary of the Army shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (3) Airspace.--The Secretary of the Army shall maintain control of the airspace above the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (f) Public Availability of Map.--The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army shall prepare, and the Secretary of the Interior shall keep on file for public inspection in the headquarters of the monument, a map showing the boundary of the monument as modified by this Act. (g) Waiver of Limitation Under Prior Law.--Notwithstanding section 303(b)(1) of the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3476), land or an interest in land that was deleted from the monument by section 301(19) of the Act (92 Stat. 3475) may be exchanged for land owned by the State of New Mexico within the boundaries of any unit of the National Park System in the State of New Mexico, may be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency without monetary consideration, or may be administered as public land, as the Secretary considers appropriate. SEC. . BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT. (a) Findings and Purpose.-- (1) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (A) under the provisions of a special use permit, sewage lagoons for Bandelier National Monument, established by Proclamation No. 1322 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) (referred to in this section as the ``monument'') are located on land administered by the Secretary of Energy that is adjacent to the monument; and (B) modification of the boundary of the monument to include the land on which the sewage lagoons are situated-- (i) would facilitate administration of both the monument and the adjacent land that would remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy; and (ii) can be accomplished at no cost. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to modify the boundary between the monument and adjacent Department of Energy land to facilitate management of the monument and Department of Energy land. (b) Boundary Modification.-- (1) Transfer of administrative jurisdiction.--There is transferred from the Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of the Interior administrative jurisdiction over the land comprised approximately 4.47 acres depicted on the map entitled ``Boundary Map, Bandelier National Monument'', No. 315/80,051, dated March 1995. (2) Boundary modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred by paragraph (1). (3) Public availability of map.--The map described in paragraph (1) shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Lands Office at the Southwest System Support Office of the National Park Service, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in the Superintendent's Office of Bandelier National Monument. Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today, along with Senator Domenici, I propose an amendment that will allow for better administration, law enforcement, and operational procedures for both the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. The bill will exchange about 10,000 acres along the border of the White Sands Missile Range and the White Sands Monument which abut each other. It also transfers to the monument the administrative jurisdiction over about 2,500 acres which lie within the White Sands National Monument but are currently controlled by the White Sands Missile Range. I ask unanimous consent that a letter and an information paper be printed in the Record. The letter, dated June 27, 1996, is from the National Park Service and is signed by Roger G. Kennedy. It states that the Department does not have a problem with the amendment. The letter further states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this report for consideration before the Senate. The second document is an information paper from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Paul W. Johnson. The paper states that the Department of the Army supports this legislation. It also states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this amendment. Mr. President, the area that I am speaking about is a unique geological formation. This gypsum deposit known as ``White Sands'' is very important to my home State of New Mexico. The sands cover approximately 275 square miles with about 40 percent lying within the monument and the remaining portion of the dunes, to the south and the east, belonging to the White Sands Missile Range. As a brief history, on January 18, 1933, President Hoover designated 142, 987 acres, in the Tularosa Basin, as the National Park. From the very beginning, the park has been a success. Within its first 2 years of operation, the White Sands monument shattered the attendance records of the 23-unit Southwestern National Monuments in the Four Corner States of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, DC, June 27, 1996. Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Bingaman: Thank you for providing the National Park Service the opportunity to comment on the draft amendment to modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Ba

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(Senate - June 28, 1996)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S7225-S7264] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 The Senate continued with consideration of the bill. Cloture Motion The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Cloture Motion We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 433, S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill: Trent Lott, Don Nickles, Dirk Kempthorne, Rod Grams, Jim Jeffords, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Christopher S. Bond, John Ashcroft, Conrad Burns, Judd Gregg, Larry Pressler, Orrin G. Hatch, Mitch McConnell, Hank Brown, Sheila Frahm. Vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mandatory quorum call has been waived. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] are necessarily absent. Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] are necessarily absent. The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 53, nays 43, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.] YEAS--53 Abraham Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brown Burns Campbell Chafee Coats Cochran Cohen Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Domenici Faircloth Frahm Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchison Jeffords Kassebaum Kempthorne Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pell Pressler Roth Santorum Shelby Simpson Smith Snowe Specter Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner NAYS--43 Akaka Biden Bingaman Boxer Bradley Breaux Bryan Byrd Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Exon Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Harkin Heflin Inouye Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pryor Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Simon Wellstone Wyden NOT VOTING--4 Baucus Bumpers Hatfield Inhofe The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 53, the nays are 43. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not agreed to. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be set aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [[Page S7226]] Amendment No. 4388 (Purpose: To require a cost-benefit analysis of the F/A-18E/F aircraft program) Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk relating to the F/A-18E/F program on behalf of myself and Senator Kohl. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself and Mr. Kohl, proposes an amendment numbered 4388. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following: SEC. 223. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. (a) Report on Program.--Not later than March 30, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the following: (1) A review of the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (2) An analysis and estimate of the production costs of the program for the total number of aircraft realistically expected to be procured at each of three annual production rates as follows: (A) 18 aircraft. (B) 24 aircraft. (C) 36 aircraft. (3) A comparison of the costs and benefits of the program with the costs and benefits of the F/A-18C/D aircraft program taking into account the operational combat effectiveness of the aircraft. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds Pending Transmittal of Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft before the date that is 90 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the report required under subsection (a). Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment would ``fence'' the funds authorized for production of the 12 F/A-18E/F's authorized in this legislation until such time as the Department of Defense [DOD] submits a cost/benefit analysis to Congress and Congress has an opportunity to evaluate whether production of this aircraft should commence, in light of the cost and concerns about the benefit of the F/A-18E/F in contrast to the F/A-18C/D, a far less costly yet extremely capable aircraft. The genesis for this amendment resulted from a General Accounting Office [GAO] draft report made available recently entitled ``Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost''. In this report GAO studied the rationale and need for the F/A-18E/F in order to determine whether continued development of the aircraft is the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. GAO concluded that the marginal improvements of the F/A-18E/F are outweighed by the high cost of the program. Mr. President, in our current fiscal climate, I have serious concerns about authorizing funding for such a costly program which according to GAO will deliver only marginal improvements over the current C/D version of the F/A-18. As GAO noted in its report, at a projected total program cost of $89.15 billion, the F/A-18E/F program is one of the most costly aviation programs in the Department of Defense. The total program cost is comprised of $5.833 billion in development costs and $83.35 billion in procurement costs for 1,000 aircraft. The administration has requested $2.09 billion in fiscal year 1997 for the procurement of 12 F/A-18E/F's. To date, the Navy has already spent $3.75 billion on the research and development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. Before I begin to describe GAO's findings, I would first like to discuss briefly the role of the F/A-18 aircraft in our Nation's overall naval aviation force structure. The Navy performs its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter (air-to-air combat), strike (air-to- ground combat), and strike/fighter (multicombat role) aircraft. Currently, carrier based F-14 fighter aircraft perform air-to-air missions; A6E's perform air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18's perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the latest version of the Navy's carrier-based F/A-18 strike/fighter plane. The Navy has based the need for development and procurement of the F/ A-18E/F on existing or projected operational deficiencies of the F/A- 18C/D in the following key areas: strike range, carrier recovery payload and survivability. In addition, the Navy notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. In its report, GAO concludes that the operational deficiencies in the C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the E/F either have not materialized as projected or such deficiencies can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional upgrades made which would further improve its capabilities. One of the primary reasons the Navy cites in justifying the E/F is the need for increased range and the C/D's inability to perform long- range unrefueled missions against high-value targets. However, GAO concludes that the Navy's F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met by either the F/A-18E/F or F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, it concludes that the increased range of the E/F is achieved at the expense of its aerial combat performance, and that even with increased range, both aircraft will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions. The F/A-18E/F specification requirements call for the aircraft to have a flight range of 390 nautical miles [nm] while performing low- altitude bombing missions. The F/A-18E/F will achieve a strike range of 465 nm while performing low-altitude missions by carrying 2 external 480 gallon fuel tanks. While current C/D's achieve a flight range of 325 nm with 2-330 gallon fuel tanks while performing low-altitude missions--65 nm below the specification requirement of the E/F--when they are equipped with the 2-480 gallon external fuel tanks that are planned to be used on the E/F, the C/D can achieve a strike range of 393 nm on low-altitude missions. Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18E/F is expected to have a 683 nm strike range when flying a more fuel-efficient, survivable, and lethal high-altitude mission profile rather than the specified low-altitude profile. Similarly, although F/A-18E/F range will be greater than the F/A-18C/D, the C/D could achieve strike ranges--566 nm with 3-330 gallon fuel tanks or 600 nm with 2-480 gallon tanks and 1-330 gallon tank--far greater than the target distances stipulated in the E/F's system specifications by flying the same high- altitude missions as the E/F. Additionally, according to GAO, the E/F's increased strike range is achieved at the expense of the aircraft's aerial combat performance as evidenced by its sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and acceleration which impact its ability to maneuver in either offensive or defensive modes. Mr. President, another significant reason the Navy cites in developing the F/A-18E/F is an anticipated deficiency in F/A-18C carrier recovery payload--the amount of fuel, weapons and external equipment that an aircraft can carry when returning from a mission and landing on a carrier. The deficiency in carrier recovery payload which the Navy anticipated of the F/A-18C simply has not materialized. When initially procured, F/A-18C's had a total carrier recovery payload of 6,300 pounds. Because of the Navy's decision to increase the F/A-18C's maximum allowable carrier landing weight and a lower aircraft operating weight resulting from technological improvements, the F/A-18C now has a carrier recovery payload of 7,113 pounds. F/A-18C's operating in support of Bosnian operations are now routinely returning to carriers with operational loads of 7,166 pounds, which exceeds the Navy's stated carrier recovery payload capacity. This recovery payload is substantially greater than the Navy projected it would be and is even greater than when the F/A-18C was first introduced in 1988. In addition, GAO notes that while it is not necessary, upgrading F/A-18C's with stronger landing gear could allow them to recover carrier payloads of more than 10,000 pounds--greater than that sought for the F/A-18E/F--9,000 pounds. While the Navy also cites a need to improve combat survivability in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, it was not developed to counter a particular military threat that could [[Page S7227]] not be met with existing or improved F/A-18C/D's. Additional improvements have subsequently been made or are planned for the F/A- 18C/D to enhance its survivability including improvements to reduce its radar detectability, while survivability improvements of the F/A-18E/F are questionable. For example, because the F/A-18E/F will be carrying weapons and fuel externally, the radar signature reduction improvements derived from the structural design of the aircraft will be diminished and will only help the aircraft penetrate slightly deeper than the F/A- 18C/D into an integrated defensive system before being detected. In addition to noting the operational capability improvements in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, the Navy also notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. The Navy predicted that by the mid-1990's the F/A- 18C/D would not have growth space to accommodate additional new weapons and systems under development. Specifically, the Navy predicted that by fiscal year 1996 C/D's would only have 0.2 cubic feet of space available for future avionics growth; however, 5.3 cubic feet of available space have been identified for future system growth. Furthermore, technological advancements such as miniaturization, modularity, and consolidation may result in additional growth space for future avionics. The Navy also stated that the F/A-18E/F will provide increased payload capacity as a result of two new outboard weapons stations; however, unless current problems concerning weapons release are resolved--airflow problems around the fuselage and weapons stations-- the types and amounts of weapons the E/F can carry will be restricted and the possible payload increase may be negated. Also, while the E/F will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air capability by carrying two extra missiles, it will not increase its ability to carry the heavier, precision-guided, air-to-ground weapons that are capable of hitting fixed and mobile hard targets and the heavier stand-off weapons that will be used to increase aircraft survivability. Understanding that the F/A-18E/F may not deliver as significant operational capability improvements as originally expected, I would now like to focus on the cost of the F/A-18E/F program and possible alternatives to it. As previously mentioned, the total program cost of the F/A-18E/F is projected to be $89.15 billion. These program costs are based on the procurement assumption of 1,000 aircraft--660 by the Navy and 340 by the Marine Corps--at an annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year. As the GAO report points out, these figures are overstated. According to Marine Corps officials and the Marine Corps aviation master plan, the Marine Corps does not intend to buy any F/A- 18E/F's and, therefore, the projected 1,000 aircraft buy is overstated by 340 aircraft. Furthermore, the Congress has stated that an annual production rate of 72 aircraft is probably not feasible due to funding limitations and directed the Navy to calculate costs based on more realistic production rates as 18, 36 and 54 aircraft per year. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service: ``No naval aircraft have been bought in such quantities in recent years, and it is unlikely that such annual buys will be funded in the 1990's, given expected force reductions and lower inventory requirements and the absence of consensus about future military threats.'' Using the Navy's overstated assumptions about the total number of planes procured and an estimated annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year, the Navy calculates the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/ A-18E/F--costs related to the production of the basic aircraft--at $44 million. However, using GAO's more realistic assumptions of the procurement of 660 aircraft by the Navy, at a production rate of 36 aircraft per year, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the E/F balloons to $53 million. This is compared to the $28 million unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/A-18C/D based on a production rate of 36 aircraft per year. Thus, GAO estimates that this cost difference in unit recurring flyaway would result in a savings of almost $17 billion if the Navy were to procure 660 F/A-18C/D's rather than 660 F/A-18E/F's. Mr. President, this is certainly a significant amount of savings. Now I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production of the F/A-18E/F and instead relying on the F/A-18C/D, we will be mortgaging the future of our naval aviation fleet. However, Mr. President, there is a far less costly program already being developed which may yield more significant returns in operational capability. This program is the Joint Advanced Strike Technology or JAST Program. The JAST Program office is currently developing technology for a family of affordable next generation Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The JSF is expected to be a stealthy strike aircraft built on a single production line with a high degree of parts and cost commonality. The driving focus of JAST is affordability achieved by tri-service commonality. The Navy plans to procure 300 JSF's with a projected initial operational capability around 2007. Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies indicate that the JSF will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy tactical aircraft mission areas, especially range and survivability, at far less cost than the F/A-18E/F. The JSF is expected to be a stand alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war survivable aircraft. Overall, the JSF is expected to be more survivable and capable than any existing or planned tactical aircraft in strike and air-to-air missions, with the possible exception of the F-22 in air-to-air missions. The Navy's JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the F/A-18E/F to attack high-value targets without using external tanks or tanking. Unlike the F/A-18E/F which would carry all of its weapons externally, the Navy's JSF will carry at least 4 weapons for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat internally, thereby maximizing its stealthiness and increasing its survivability. Finally, the JSF would not require jamming support from EA-6B aircraft as does the F/A-18E/F in carrying out its mission in the face of integrated air defense systems. While the JSF is expected to have superior operational capabilities, it is expected to be developed and procured at far less expense than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the Navy's JSF is estimated to range from $32 to $40 million depending on which contractor design is chosen for the aircraft, as compared to GAO's $53 million estimate for the F/A-18E/F. Additional cost benefits of the JSF would result from having common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew and maintenance training requirements. Given the enormous cost and marginal improvement in operational capabilities the F/A-18E/F would provide, it seems that the justification for the E/F is not as evident as once thought. Operational deficiencies in the C/D aircraft either have not materialized or can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the plane. As a result, proceeding with the E/F Program may not be the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. In the short term, the Navy can continue to procure the F/A-18C/ D aircraft, while upgrading it to improve further its operational capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can look toward the next generation strike fighter, the JSF, which will provide more operational capability at far less cost than the E/F. Mr. President, succinctly put, the Navy needs an aircraft that will bridge between the current force and the new, superior JSF which will be operational around 2007. The question is whether the F/A-18C/D can serve that function, as it has demonstrated its ability to exceed predicted capacity or whether we should proceed with an expensive, new plane for a marginal level of improvement. The $17 billion difference in projected costs does not appear to provide a significant return on our investment. In times of severe fiscal constraints and a need to look at all areas of the budget to identify more cost-effective approaches, the F/A-18E/F is a project in need of reevaluation. For these reasons, I think it would be prudent to take a go-slow approach toward the F/A-18E/F program and allow the Congress sufficient time to evaluate GAO's findings and obtain a thorough response from DOD to these issues. I ask my colleagues to support [[Page S7228]] my amendment to fence all fiscal year 1997 funds authorizing the production of F/A-18E/F's until certain conditions are met. I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular aircraft program has been thoroughly examined for program costs, schedule, technical performance, and recent test results. The program is on schedule and on cost. This is one of those clear examples of where the GAO and the Department of Defense are at odds on certain data, and I respect fully the very detailed presentation by our distinguished colleague from Wisconsin. But I have to assure Members of the Senate that this is a matter that has been examined by the Armed Services Committee, and we will strongly oppose the amendment. The analytical tests for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the program was thoroughly examined by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense in 1992. A number of studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats and the capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered. To say now it is a better idea to remain with the earlier model of the 18, in our judgment, ignores all of the analyses that went into the decisions to develop the newer model and threatens one of the best run developmental programs and production programs in progress today. Therefore, Mr. President, the amendment would have the effect of delaying the 18 E/F program for up to 8 months at heavy costs to the American taxpayers until we get another study. There will always be more capable programs postulated for the future and there will always be lesser programs as we look over the past. This program has met all the requirements placed on it, is on schedule and at cost. Therefore, I urge the Senate to oppose the amendment. Mr. President, I see the presence on the floor of the Senator from Missouri who has spent a great deal of time in this program. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, briefly to respond to the Senator from Virginia, I appreciate his remarks and his great knowledge in this area, particularly when it comes to the Navy. Let me simply remind my colleagues what this amendment seeks to do. It asks, in light of this recently released GAO report, released yesterday, that we fence the money until such time as the Department of Defense provides us with a response to this, and then there will be just a 90-day period afterward, during which we would have an opportunity to look at it and GAO would look at it. This is a serious report. There may be disagreement. When you are talking about $17 billion between the C/D and Super Hornet, I think it deserves a look. I am not suggesting, nor have I suggested, the E/F is a bad airplane. Clearly, many of the things you indicated about its capabilities are there. The question that was raised by the report was whether or not the current C/D plane can provide these benefits and that perhaps we could move directly from the C/D plane on to the JSF plane as a cheaper and most cost-effective way. All we are suggesting here then is this brief period when we would have a chance to see whether the GAO was on the right track and see what the Department of Defense has to say about it. Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. I have no objection whatsoever to getting the information on the GAO report from the military. I think that is appropriate. I think the Senator is absolutely right to raise these questions once you have a serious GAO report. But I do not think we can hold up the entire funding on this program. I am told it would cost an 8- to 12- month slip in the program, and then assuming you go forward with the program, you end up spending a whole lot more money. So, in an effort to save money, you end up spending a lot more money. So I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. If the Senator would like to have his staff work with our staff to hold up a reasonable amount of money so it does not throw the whole schedule off, to assure the Senator that the report will be forthcoming, I think that could be accommodated. But to hold up the entire funding, I would have to oppose that. I will leave it up to the Senator whether he would like to get a vote on this now or would like to take 10 minutes to see if there is a portion of the funding that would not disrupt the program but would indicate the seriousness with which the information is received. I think that would work. I have not discussed this with the other side of the aisle. It may be they will not want to do that. Maybe we ought to go ahead with a rollcall vote, if that is appropriate, but I certainly defer to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I always appreciate the knowledge and experience of the Senator from Georgia and particularly his reasonableness. I certainly would like to take the opportunity to consult and see if there might be a way to work that out. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside. Mr. BOND. Reserving the right to object, I will not object to setting aside the amendment, but I do want to add some points on the discussion of it. I have no objection to setting it aside, but I do seek the floor to respond to some of the questions raised by the Senator from Wisconsin. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, let me explain why I think this amendment is not appropriate, it is not a good idea. The distinguished Senator from Georgia has already pointed out that an amendment like this, by delaying the production of the aircraft, would inevitably do little more than add cost to the total program and to the total buy. There are ongoing studies. The Navy and the Defense Department have been conducting these studies. They have reviews ongoing, and we will have access to not only their comments on the GAO report but their reviews. Let me say in summary, the GAO is not flying the airplane. The GAO people are not the ones landing fully-weapons-loaded airplanes on pitching aircraft carriers in the ocean. The Navy people are. They are the ones who made a compelling case for this airplane and the need for it. I should point out the F/A-18E/F exceeds the interdiction mission of the current C/D models in range by some 40 to 50 percent, regardless of the mission profile. There is talk about adding additional tanks or larger tanks on the C/ D, but these have been rejected because of restrictive load limitations and the structural operational limitations on the C/D on board the carrier. The Navy has conducted a thorough engineering analysis on the matter of putting larger tanks, for example, on the C/D's and concluded this was not suitable for carrier operations. The real question is the bringback capability. The current model of C/D fleet is at its operational limit in regard to its ability to bring back weapons. The E/F will be able to bring back the more advanced smart weapons which tend to be heavier than the majority of weapons in the fleet today. The E/F, the next generation of the Super Hornet, provides future room for future growth and flexibility to accommodate the technological advancements into the next century. One point the GAO has made is that there is a waiver for the C/D's landing restrictions. They say it is a permanent waiver. Well, that is not true. NAVAIR has said the waiver was acceptable in the interim, but it was up to individual air wings to approve or disapprove depending on their own assessments. Let me tell you, from the viewpoint of those who have flown on carriers and flown on and off of carriers at sea, what will have to happen. With the current C/D's to bring back fully loaded the weapons and the fuel, the ship will have to increase its speed to maintain 30 knots or more of wind over the deck, which will increase its fuel costs, whether nuclear or conventional; then the pilots will have to fly a full flap approach. But if the wind goes over 35 [[Page S7229]] knots because of unpredictable winds, then the pilot is required by the Navy safety manual to fly at half lap and would not be able to land with the heavier strike munitions load. It is a small and costly window to achieve. Though in some instances it can be achieved, it is only because of the extreme skill of our carrier crews. It is not an ideal situation to put the pilots or the carrier crews at risk when there is such a limited window of acceptable operations. The new E/F Super Hornet will enable the carrier to cruise at its normal speed and the pilots will be able to fly the normal patterns. They will not have to drop either their weapons or dump their fuel into the ocean to below safe minimums to bring back our most sophisticated and expensive ordnance. Let us remember, however, that the F/A-18C/D models will continue to carry numerous ordnance loads safely and without restrictions covering many missions. It is only for certain strike mission loads that the waiver is required. But we have to plan for the future. For the Navy, that future should and must include the F/A-18E/F. The Super Hornet is desired by the customer, the Navy, which has been consistent and vocal in its support of procuring the aircraft rapidly and efficiently. Further delays in a go-slow approach for this program in its current stage are both inappropriate and costly. We cannot sit around and wait for future paper airplanes magically to appear. We have modified to the limit our older aircraft. For many years aviation, and naval aviation in particular, has been subject to technical, administrative and political forces which have given it the appearance of having no direction. We have been clamoring for such direction. Now we have it. The Navy has said, ``This is what we need. This airplane is meeting our specs. We need it.'' Let us go forward with it. I strongly urge this body not to be in a position of ``go-slowing'' this program to death. Our pilots want the aircraft. They need the aircraft to maintain their critical edge. I urge this body not to pull the wings off. Let us let the Navy get about the job of continuing to defend this Nation now and in the future. The F/A-18E/F program has been a model program, by any measure, and remains on cost, on schedule in meeting all performance requirements. The Navy is developing, at one-half to one-third the cost of a new- start program, a highly capable carrier-based tactical aircraft. The amendment, as written, would divert program management attention away from the execution of the program and, if yet another program review were to be required, could impose as much as an 8-month delay in the program. This delay would affect the 3-year flight test program, the operational evaluation, and IOC of the first squadron. I think that the formal program reviews which are already being conducted are enough. The analytical basis of the program was thoroughly examined at the previous milestone decision, and the program has performed precisely to the plan approved at that time. I believe there are studies going on, and thus this amendment is unnecessary to ensure that we continue to get the kind of additional capability that the Navy, its pilots, and its aircraft crews demand and need. I urge my colleagues, if this amendment is brought up for a vote, to oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I am coming to the end of the debate on this portion. I want to respond to the Senator from Missouri very briefly. Let us be clear what we are attempting. We are in a period here where everyone in the country knows we are trying to find places where we can reduce spending. There are a number of areas that receive very strict scrutiny. There is a sense--it is not held by just one party--that perhaps sometimes the defense spending does not get the same scrutiny that other areas do. Sometimes it leads to defense bashing which may not be justified. It is even possible, if people get an attitude that the Defense Department expenditures are not scrutinized, that there may develop an attitude in this country that would actually threaten national security, that it may become difficult for those advocating defense expenditures to be believed, and that there are those who do not take a warning signal seriously. All that we are suggesting here in this amendment is that a very recent report, yesterday, from the General Accounting Office says--not that this is a bad aircraft, I say to the Senator from Missouri, not that it does not provide perhaps some additional benefits; it may be and probably would turn out that in some areas this is a more capable airplane--but the question is, is the marginal benefit of those improvements sufficient to justify a $17 billion difference in cost, vis-a-vis the C/D planes? That is the issue. We are not stopping the plane here. We are not saying it should never be continued. We are saying that when a report comes out from the GAO entitled, ``F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,'' it is incumbent on us in the U.S. Senate to stop for a bit and find out what it is all about. $17 billion is real money. If there is an opportunity here to ask some questions and find out maybe, just possibly, the Navy, the Defense Department could go with the C/D's, I think that is our obligation. The Senator from Georgia has suggested perhaps a way in which we can allow more of this to go forward while the questions are answered. We are exploring that at this point. I yield the floor. Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there is no question that we need to study carefully all of the views and opinions and the best information available on any program like this. But I suggest that if you take a look at the series of reviews and experiments, tests, and evaluations that have been done on this plane and that will be done, there is no need, unless and until we find from the Navy that the GAO has raised questions which they have not addressed or we can find that responses by the Defense Department are not adequate, there is no reason to raise further the cost of this program and delay it even further. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition completed a review of the F/A-18E/F program on March 25 of this year. As of that time, the program review included program cost, schedule, and technical performance, examination of the formal exit criteria which had been approved at the previous milestone, and results of an early operational assessment conducted by the Navy's commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. This assessment was based on extensive documentation review, modeling and simulation, and analysis flight test data from the first two test aircraft. In May 1996, notification was provided to Congress that the review had been successfully completed and the Navy had authorized contracting for long-lead items for the first low-rate initial production of the aircraft. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is scheduled to conduct another program review in March 1997. At that time, all aspects of the program will again be examined prior to authorizing full funding for the procurement of the first low-rate initial production aircraft. The analytical basis for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the F/A-18E/F program was thoroughly evaluated by both the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense prior to the milestone decision in May of 1992. Numerous studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats, and capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered as part of these analyses. It is not to say that we should not continue to review and analyze, look at the cost and determine the capability. That is an ongoing process. What I am saying, Mr. President, is we could significantly increase the cost of the program, throw production off schedule, and delay the availability of aircraft which the Navy said they have needed by putting a roadblock in the way of the initial low-rate production of the aircraft. This is not the time to throw a monkey wrench into a program which has been on schedule, [[Page S7230]] above performance, and well within cost parameters at this time. I urge my colleagues not to delay the program. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Missouri. I think there has been a good debate on this. I suggest the Senator lay aside his amendment. We can see if we can find a way to see that the report is forthcoming, without disrupting the program. It seems to me that is the way to proceed. If not, I would be joined with the Senator from Missouri in moving to table the amendment. I believe the staff is prepared to work with your staff on this. I have a call in for the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, who has two amendments that will require rollcalls. In the meantime, I suggest we clear these amendments that have all been agreed to or are going to be agreed to by both sides. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the pending amendments have been laid aside. Amendment No. 4387 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering is intended to better facilitate our pledge of material assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by ensuring the lowest fair price of the equipment we provide to their cause. When the President dispatched United States troops to Bosnia last year, he did so with the stipulation that they would be there only a year. The administration has since softened the deadline by indicating that troops may still be there on December 19, but that withdrawal will begin on that date. This latest commitment on withdrawal is not entirely reassuring. It is quite plausible that withdrawal will begin as stated, but our overall presence there may be drawn out indefinitely. A deadline was never an exit strategy. Last year, when then Senate majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, and I led the effort to support the President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief and indirectly to support his dispatch of more than 20,000 American troops to Bosnia, we made clear our reservations about simply imposing a deadline. We also suggested the outline of a true exit strategy. The centerpiece of that strategy, as Senator Dole and I have since repeated on countless occasions, was United States leadership in the effort to adequately equip and train the Bosnian Armed Forces. Only when that nation can defend itself against aggression, which over the course of 3\1/2\ years of war reduced its territory by half, will the peace be safe without us. We tried to address this issue last year by including $100 million in drawdown authority for Bosnia in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The amendment I am offering today simply seeks to ensure that the $100 million in equipment to be transferred to Bosnia is accounted for in a manner similar to the way it is in the case of other American allies. I am not advocating unlimited material support for Bosnia because of the impact on our own military readiness. But in order to get the most of the $100 million, we should see to it that the equipment is valued at the lowest possible fair price. This amendment gives us this assurance. The amendment expresses a sense of the Senate that the pricing of equipment be lowest in order to maximize the amount of equipment provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina under current drawdown authority. I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side. Mr. NUNN. This amendment has been cleared. I urge its adoption. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4387) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4389 (Purpose: To authorize the Air National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Exon, I offer an amendment that would allow the Nebraska National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE. Currently, the Air Guard and local authority share this duty. This amendment would eliminate unnecessary duplication. The air guard would be reimbursed for assuming the entire firefighting mission. I believe this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 4389. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following: SEC. 368. AUTHORITY OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD TO PROVIDE CERTAIN SERVICES AT LINCOLN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA. (a) Authority.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Nebraska Air National Guard may provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, Nebraska, on behalf of the Lincoln Municipal Airport Authority, Lincoln, Nebraska. (b) Agreement.--The Nebraska Air National Guard may not provide services under subsection (a) until the Nebraska Air National Guard and the authority enter into an agreement under which the authority reimburses the Nebraska Air National Guard for the cost of the services provided. (c) Conditions.--These services may only be provided to the extent that the provision of such services does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4389) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4390 (Purpose: To state the sense of Congress regarding the authorization of appropriation and appropriation of funds for military equipment and not identified in a budget request of the Department of Defense and for certain military construction) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment on behalf of Senator Robb. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 4390. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following: SEC. 1014. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION AND APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR CERTAIN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) to the maximum extent practicable, each House of Congress should consider the authorization of appropriation, and appropriation, funds for the procurement of military equipment only if the procurement is included-- (A) in the budget request of the President for the Department of Defense; or (B) in a supplemental request list provided to the congressional defense committees, upon request of such committees, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, by the military departments, by the National Guard Bureau, or by the officials responsible for the administration of the Reserves; (2) the recommendations for procurement in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from the budget request referred to in paragraph (1)(A) should be accompanied in the committee report relating to the bill by a justification of the national security interest addressed by the change; (3) the recommendations for military construction projects in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from such a [[Page S7231]] budget request should be accompanied by a justification in the committee report relating to the bill of the national security interest addressed by the change; and (4) the recommendations for procurement of military equipment, or for military construction projects, in a conference to resolve the differences between the two Houses relating to a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill which recommendations reflect a change from the original recommendation of the applicable committee to either House should be accompanied by a justification in the statement of managers of the conference report of the national security interest addressed by the change. Mr. NUNN. This is not the amendment, I believe, that we have problems with. This amendment would state that it is the sense of the Congress that the defense authorization appropriations bills should rely primarily on the budget request. I am told this is not cleared. I withdraw the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment (No. 4390) was withdrawn. Amendment No. 4391 (Purpose: To require a plan for repairs and stabilization of the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Sarbanes, I offer an amendment to require a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures for the historic district of the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Sarbanes, proposes an amendment numbered 4391. The amendment is as follows: At the end of title XXI, add the following: SEC. 2105. PLAN FOR REPAIRS AND STABILIZATION OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICT AT THE FOREST GLEN ANNEX OF WALTER REED MEDICAL CENTER, MARYLAND. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Maryland, together with funding options for the implementation of the plan. Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer an amendment directing the Secretary of the Army to submit a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures needed throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. This plan would also include funding options for the implementation of such plan. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center Annex at Forest Glen, MD is a 190-acre complex located just north of the Silver Spring business district. It was a former women's seminary known as the National Park Seminary. Acquired by the Army in 1943 by authority of the War Powers Act of 1942, it has served as a rehabilitation center and psychiatric facility for soldiers from World War II through the Vietnam war. The former college campus also contains approximately two dozen historic buildings on approximately 24 acres which comprise what is now referred to as the National Park Seminary Historic District. The site was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972. The site contains a number of historic or unique buildings, including houses shaped like a Dutch windmill, an English castle, a Japanese pagoda, a French chateau, and an Italian villa. Unfortunately, over the many years, many of these buildings have suffered substantial deterioration and neglect. The Army has sought unsuccessfully to excess the property for several years and has continued to plan for its eventual disposal. The National Trust has continued to work with the Army to assist in its assessment of options for the reuse of the property. During this time, even the most basic repairs to the buildings were not undertaken. Reports prepared by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save Our Seminary and other organizations have found that, in general, the property is poorly maintained and insufficiently secure. Routine preventative maintenance, such as cleaning out gutters, is not being performed. Repairs to obvious deficiencies, such as holes in the roof and broken windows, are not being made in a timely way. On site security is lax. Fire alarm and fire suppression systems are not being adequately maintained. The military construction appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990 contained a provision directing the Department of the Army to provide up to $3 million for necessary repairs at the annex and to work with the Montgomery County government and local citizens groups in the planning process for this site. Although we understand that $2 million was allocated by the Army for the repair and maintenance of historic buildings, all of this money was apparently used for architectural planning and design of roof work. However, to date, no funding has been provided for these major repairs and the buildings are deteriorating at a faster rate than ever. The Army developed a master plan for the site which called for the existing historic buildings to be maintained and occupied by the Army as long as it retains ownership to ensure their maintenance and security. The master plan also identified specific maintenance priorities with work on repair and replacement of deteriorated roofs at the top of the list. In addition, a previous commanding officer at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center submitted a letter stating, ``WRAMC will continue to request funding for maintenance of the historic district and make every effort to halt the deterioration of these structures.'' Despite the findings of the master plan and the statements of support by Army officials, no work has been done to repair or maintain these buildings. In 1994 following the burning of the historic Odeon Theatre resulting in its destruction by arson, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save our Seminary jointly filed a lawsuit against the Army claiming that the Army's neglect of the buildings violated the National Historic Preservation Act. The lawsuit is still pending. My amendment directs the Department of the Army to develop and submit a plan with appropriate funding options to implement such a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center within 30 days of the enactment of this act. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. McCain. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4391) was agreed to. Mr. NUNN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. McCain. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4392 (Purpose: To modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Bingaman, I offer an amendment authorizing the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to exchange administrative jurisdiction of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico for purposes of creating easily identifiable and manageable boundaries. I believe the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], Mr. Bingaman, for himself, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 4392. The amendment is as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. . MODIFICATION OF BOUNDARIES OF WHITE SANDS NATIONAL MONUMENT AND WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE. (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to effect an exchange between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army of administrative jurisdiction over the lands described in subsection (c) in order to facilitate administration of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Missile range.--The term ``missile range'' means the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, administered by the Secretary of the Army. [[Page S7232]] (2) Monument.--The term ``monument'' means the White Sands National Monument, New Mexico, established by Proclamation No. 2025 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) and administered by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) Exchange of Jurisdiction.--The lands exchanged under this Act are the lands generally depicted on the map entitled ``White Sands National Monument, Boundary Proposal'', numbered 142/80,061 and dated January 1994, comprising-- (1) approximately 2,524 acres of land within the monument that is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; (2) approximately 5,758 acres of land within the missile range abutting the monument, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; and (3) approximately 4,277 acres of land within the monument abutting the missile range, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Army. (d) Boundary Modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred to the Secretary of the Interior and exclude the land transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c). The boundary of the missile range is modified accordingly. (e) Administration.-- (1) Monument.--The Secretary of the Interior shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by subsection (c) in accordance with laws (including regulations) applicable to the monument. (2) Missile range.--The Secretary of the Army shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (3) Airspace.--The Secretary of the Army shall maintain control of the airspace above the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (f) Public Availability of Map.--The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army shall prepare, and the Secretary of the Interior shall keep on file for public inspection in the headquarters of the monument, a map showing the boundary of the monument as modified by this Act. (g) Waiver of Limitation Under Prior Law.--Notwithstanding section 303(b)(1) of the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3476), land or an interest in land that was deleted from the monument by section 301(19) of the Act (92 Stat. 3475) may be exchanged for land owned by the State of New Mexico within the boundaries of any unit of the National Park System in the State of New Mexico, may be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency without monetary consideration, or may be administered as public land, as the Secretary considers appropriate. SEC. . BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT. (a) Findings and Purpose.-- (1) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (A) under the provisions of a special use permit, sewage lagoons for Bandelier National Monument, established by Proclamation No. 1322 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) (referred to in this section as the ``monument'') are located on land administered by the Secretary of Energy that is adjacent to the monument; and (B) modification of the boundary of the monument to include the land on which the sewage lagoons are situated-- (i) would facilitate administration of both the monument and the adjacent land that would remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy; and (ii) can be accomplished at no cost. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to modify the boundary between the monument and adjacent Department of Energy land to facilitate management of the monument and Department of Energy land. (b) Boundary Modification.-- (1) Transfer of administrative jurisdiction.--There is transferred from the Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of the Interior administrative jurisdiction over the land comprised approximately 4.47 acres depicted on the map entitled ``Boundary Map, Bandelier National Monument'', No. 315/80,051, dated March 1995. (2) Boundary modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred by paragraph (1). (3) Public availability of map.--The map described in paragraph (1) shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Lands Office at the Southwest System Support Office of the National Park Service, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in the Superintendent's Office of Bandelier National Monument. Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today, along with Senator Domenici, I propose an amendment that will allow for better administration, law enforcement, and operational procedures for both the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. The bill will exchange about 10,000 acres along the border of the White Sands Missile Range and the White Sands Monument which abut each other. It also transfers to the monument the administrative jurisdiction over about 2,500 acres which lie within the White Sands National Monument but are currently controlled by the White Sands Missile Range. I ask unanimous consent that a letter and an information paper be printed in the Record. The letter, dated June 27, 1996, is from the National Park Service and is signed by Roger G. Kennedy. It states that the Department does not have a problem with the amendment. The letter further states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this report for consideration before the Senate. The second document is an information paper from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Paul W. Johnson. The paper states that the Department of the Army supports this legislation. It also states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this amendment. Mr. President, the area that I am speaking about is a unique geological formation. This gypsum deposit known as ``White Sands'' is very important to my home State of New Mexico. The sands cover approximately 275 square miles with about 40 percent lying within the monument and the remaining portion of the dunes, to the south and the east, belonging to the White Sands Missile Range. As a brief history, on January 18, 1933, President Hoover designated 142, 987 acres, in the Tularosa Basin, as the National Park. From the very beginning, the park has been a success. Within its first 2 years of operation, the White Sands monument shattered the attendance records of the 23-unit Southwestern National Monuments in the Four Corner States of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, DC, June 27, 1996. Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Bingaman: Thank you for providing the National Park Service the opportunity to comment on the draft amendment to modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(Senate - June 28, 1996)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S7225-S7264] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 The Senate continued with consideration of the bill. Cloture Motion The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Cloture Motion We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 433, S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill: Trent Lott, Don Nickles, Dirk Kempthorne, Rod Grams, Jim Jeffords, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Christopher S. Bond, John Ashcroft, Conrad Burns, Judd Gregg, Larry Pressler, Orrin G. Hatch, Mitch McConnell, Hank Brown, Sheila Frahm. Vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mandatory quorum call has been waived. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] are necessarily absent. Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] are necessarily absent. The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 53, nays 43, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.] YEAS--53 Abraham Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brown Burns Campbell Chafee Coats Cochran Cohen Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Domenici Faircloth Frahm Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchison Jeffords Kassebaum Kempthorne Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pell Pressler Roth Santorum Shelby Simpson Smith Snowe Specter Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner NAYS--43 Akaka Biden Bingaman Boxer Bradley Breaux Bryan Byrd Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Exon Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Harkin Heflin Inouye Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pryor Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Simon Wellstone Wyden NOT VOTING--4 Baucus Bumpers Hatfield Inhofe The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 53, the nays are 43. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not agreed to. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be set aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [[Page S7226]] Amendment No. 4388 (Purpose: To require a cost-benefit analysis of the F/A-18E/F aircraft program) Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk relating to the F/A-18E/F program on behalf of myself and Senator Kohl. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself and Mr. Kohl, proposes an amendment numbered 4388. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following: SEC. 223. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. (a) Report on Program.--Not later than March 30, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the following: (1) A review of the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (2) An analysis and estimate of the production costs of the program for the total number of aircraft realistically expected to be procured at each of three annual production rates as follows: (A) 18 aircraft. (B) 24 aircraft. (C) 36 aircraft. (3) A comparison of the costs and benefits of the program with the costs and benefits of the F/A-18C/D aircraft program taking into account the operational combat effectiveness of the aircraft. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds Pending Transmittal of Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft before the date that is 90 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the report required under subsection (a). Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment would ``fence'' the funds authorized for production of the 12 F/A-18E/F's authorized in this legislation until such time as the Department of Defense [DOD] submits a cost/benefit analysis to Congress and Congress has an opportunity to evaluate whether production of this aircraft should commence, in light of the cost and concerns about the benefit of the F/A-18E/F in contrast to the F/A-18C/D, a far less costly yet extremely capable aircraft. The genesis for this amendment resulted from a General Accounting Office [GAO] draft report made available recently entitled ``Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost''. In this report GAO studied the rationale and need for the F/A-18E/F in order to determine whether continued development of the aircraft is the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. GAO concluded that the marginal improvements of the F/A-18E/F are outweighed by the high cost of the program. Mr. President, in our current fiscal climate, I have serious concerns about authorizing funding for such a costly program which according to GAO will deliver only marginal improvements over the current C/D version of the F/A-18. As GAO noted in its report, at a projected total program cost of $89.15 billion, the F/A-18E/F program is one of the most costly aviation programs in the Department of Defense. The total program cost is comprised of $5.833 billion in development costs and $83.35 billion in procurement costs for 1,000 aircraft. The administration has requested $2.09 billion in fiscal year 1997 for the procurement of 12 F/A-18E/F's. To date, the Navy has already spent $3.75 billion on the research and development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. Before I begin to describe GAO's findings, I would first like to discuss briefly the role of the F/A-18 aircraft in our Nation's overall naval aviation force structure. The Navy performs its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter (air-to-air combat), strike (air-to- ground combat), and strike/fighter (multicombat role) aircraft. Currently, carrier based F-14 fighter aircraft perform air-to-air missions; A6E's perform air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18's perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the latest version of the Navy's carrier-based F/A-18 strike/fighter plane. The Navy has based the need for development and procurement of the F/ A-18E/F on existing or projected operational deficiencies of the F/A- 18C/D in the following key areas: strike range, carrier recovery payload and survivability. In addition, the Navy notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. In its report, GAO concludes that the operational deficiencies in the C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the E/F either have not materialized as projected or such deficiencies can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional upgrades made which would further improve its capabilities. One of the primary reasons the Navy cites in justifying the E/F is the need for increased range and the C/D's inability to perform long- range unrefueled missions against high-value targets. However, GAO concludes that the Navy's F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met by either the F/A-18E/F or F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, it concludes that the increased range of the E/F is achieved at the expense of its aerial combat performance, and that even with increased range, both aircraft will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions. The F/A-18E/F specification requirements call for the aircraft to have a flight range of 390 nautical miles [nm] while performing low- altitude bombing missions. The F/A-18E/F will achieve a strike range of 465 nm while performing low-altitude missions by carrying 2 external 480 gallon fuel tanks. While current C/D's achieve a flight range of 325 nm with 2-330 gallon fuel tanks while performing low-altitude missions--65 nm below the specification requirement of the E/F--when they are equipped with the 2-480 gallon external fuel tanks that are planned to be used on the E/F, the C/D can achieve a strike range of 393 nm on low-altitude missions. Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18E/F is expected to have a 683 nm strike range when flying a more fuel-efficient, survivable, and lethal high-altitude mission profile rather than the specified low-altitude profile. Similarly, although F/A-18E/F range will be greater than the F/A-18C/D, the C/D could achieve strike ranges--566 nm with 3-330 gallon fuel tanks or 600 nm with 2-480 gallon tanks and 1-330 gallon tank--far greater than the target distances stipulated in the E/F's system specifications by flying the same high- altitude missions as the E/F. Additionally, according to GAO, the E/F's increased strike range is achieved at the expense of the aircraft's aerial combat performance as evidenced by its sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and acceleration which impact its ability to maneuver in either offensive or defensive modes. Mr. President, another significant reason the Navy cites in developing the F/A-18E/F is an anticipated deficiency in F/A-18C carrier recovery payload--the amount of fuel, weapons and external equipment that an aircraft can carry when returning from a mission and landing on a carrier. The deficiency in carrier recovery payload which the Navy anticipated of the F/A-18C simply has not materialized. When initially procured, F/A-18C's had a total carrier recovery payload of 6,300 pounds. Because of the Navy's decision to increase the F/A-18C's maximum allowable carrier landing weight and a lower aircraft operating weight resulting from technological improvements, the F/A-18C now has a carrier recovery payload of 7,113 pounds. F/A-18C's operating in support of Bosnian operations are now routinely returning to carriers with operational loads of 7,166 pounds, which exceeds the Navy's stated carrier recovery payload capacity. This recovery payload is substantially greater than the Navy projected it would be and is even greater than when the F/A-18C was first introduced in 1988. In addition, GAO notes that while it is not necessary, upgrading F/A-18C's with stronger landing gear could allow them to recover carrier payloads of more than 10,000 pounds--greater than that sought for the F/A-18E/F--9,000 pounds. While the Navy also cites a need to improve combat survivability in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, it was not developed to counter a particular military threat that could [[Page S7227]] not be met with existing or improved F/A-18C/D's. Additional improvements have subsequently been made or are planned for the F/A- 18C/D to enhance its survivability including improvements to reduce its radar detectability, while survivability improvements of the F/A-18E/F are questionable. For example, because the F/A-18E/F will be carrying weapons and fuel externally, the radar signature reduction improvements derived from the structural design of the aircraft will be diminished and will only help the aircraft penetrate slightly deeper than the F/A- 18C/D into an integrated defensive system before being detected. In addition to noting the operational capability improvements in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, the Navy also notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. The Navy predicted that by the mid-1990's the F/A- 18C/D would not have growth space to accommodate additional new weapons and systems under development. Specifically, the Navy predicted that by fiscal year 1996 C/D's would only have 0.2 cubic feet of space available for future avionics growth; however, 5.3 cubic feet of available space have been identified for future system growth. Furthermore, technological advancements such as miniaturization, modularity, and consolidation may result in additional growth space for future avionics. The Navy also stated that the F/A-18E/F will provide increased payload capacity as a result of two new outboard weapons stations; however, unless current problems concerning weapons release are resolved--airflow problems around the fuselage and weapons stations-- the types and amounts of weapons the E/F can carry will be restricted and the possible payload increase may be negated. Also, while the E/F will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air capability by carrying two extra missiles, it will not increase its ability to carry the heavier, precision-guided, air-to-ground weapons that are capable of hitting fixed and mobile hard targets and the heavier stand-off weapons that will be used to increase aircraft survivability. Understanding that the F/A-18E/F may not deliver as significant operational capability improvements as originally expected, I would now like to focus on the cost of the F/A-18E/F program and possible alternatives to it. As previously mentioned, the total program cost of the F/A-18E/F is projected to be $89.15 billion. These program costs are based on the procurement assumption of 1,000 aircraft--660 by the Navy and 340 by the Marine Corps--at an annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year. As the GAO report points out, these figures are overstated. According to Marine Corps officials and the Marine Corps aviation master plan, the Marine Corps does not intend to buy any F/A- 18E/F's and, therefore, the projected 1,000 aircraft buy is overstated by 340 aircraft. Furthermore, the Congress has stated that an annual production rate of 72 aircraft is probably not feasible due to funding limitations and directed the Navy to calculate costs based on more realistic production rates as 18, 36 and 54 aircraft per year. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service: ``No naval aircraft have been bought in such quantities in recent years, and it is unlikely that such annual buys will be funded in the 1990's, given expected force reductions and lower inventory requirements and the absence of consensus about future military threats.'' Using the Navy's overstated assumptions about the total number of planes procured and an estimated annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year, the Navy calculates the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/ A-18E/F--costs related to the production of the basic aircraft--at $44 million. However, using GAO's more realistic assumptions of the procurement of 660 aircraft by the Navy, at a production rate of 36 aircraft per year, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the E/F balloons to $53 million. This is compared to the $28 million unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/A-18C/D based on a production rate of 36 aircraft per year. Thus, GAO estimates that this cost difference in unit recurring flyaway would result in a savings of almost $17 billion if the Navy were to procure 660 F/A-18C/D's rather than 660 F/A-18E/F's. Mr. President, this is certainly a significant amount of savings. Now I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production of the F/A-18E/F and instead relying on the F/A-18C/D, we will be mortgaging the future of our naval aviation fleet. However, Mr. President, there is a far less costly program already being developed which may yield more significant returns in operational capability. This program is the Joint Advanced Strike Technology or JAST Program. The JAST Program office is currently developing technology for a family of affordable next generation Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The JSF is expected to be a stealthy strike aircraft built on a single production line with a high degree of parts and cost commonality. The driving focus of JAST is affordability achieved by tri-service commonality. The Navy plans to procure 300 JSF's with a projected initial operational capability around 2007. Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies indicate that the JSF will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy tactical aircraft mission areas, especially range and survivability, at far less cost than the F/A-18E/F. The JSF is expected to be a stand alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war survivable aircraft. Overall, the JSF is expected to be more survivable and capable than any existing or planned tactical aircraft in strike and air-to-air missions, with the possible exception of the F-22 in air-to-air missions. The Navy's JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the F/A-18E/F to attack high-value targets without using external tanks or tanking. Unlike the F/A-18E/F which would carry all of its weapons externally, the Navy's JSF will carry at least 4 weapons for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat internally, thereby maximizing its stealthiness and increasing its survivability. Finally, the JSF would not require jamming support from EA-6B aircraft as does the F/A-18E/F in carrying out its mission in the face of integrated air defense systems. While the JSF is expected to have superior operational capabilities, it is expected to be developed and procured at far less expense than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the Navy's JSF is estimated to range from $32 to $40 million depending on which contractor design is chosen for the aircraft, as compared to GAO's $53 million estimate for the F/A-18E/F. Additional cost benefits of the JSF would result from having common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew and maintenance training requirements. Given the enormous cost and marginal improvement in operational capabilities the F/A-18E/F would provide, it seems that the justification for the E/F is not as evident as once thought. Operational deficiencies in the C/D aircraft either have not materialized or can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the plane. As a result, proceeding with the E/F Program may not be the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. In the short term, the Navy can continue to procure the F/A-18C/ D aircraft, while upgrading it to improve further its operational capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can look toward the next generation strike fighter, the JSF, which will provide more operational capability at far less cost than the E/F. Mr. President, succinctly put, the Navy needs an aircraft that will bridge between the current force and the new, superior JSF which will be operational around 2007. The question is whether the F/A-18C/D can serve that function, as it has demonstrated its ability to exceed predicted capacity or whether we should proceed with an expensive, new plane for a marginal level of improvement. The $17 billion difference in projected costs does not appear to provide a significant return on our investment. In times of severe fiscal constraints and a need to look at all areas of the budget to identify more cost-effective approaches, the F/A-18E/F is a project in need of reevaluation. For these reasons, I think it would be prudent to take a go-slow approach toward the F/A-18E/F program and allow the Congress sufficient time to evaluate GAO's findings and obtain a thorough response from DOD to these issues. I ask my colleagues to support [[Page S7228]] my amendment to fence all fiscal year 1997 funds authorizing the production of F/A-18E/F's until certain conditions are met. I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular aircraft program has been thoroughly examined for program costs, schedule, technical performance, and recent test results. The program is on schedule and on cost. This is one of those clear examples of where the GAO and the Department of Defense are at odds on certain data, and I respect fully the very detailed presentation by our distinguished colleague from Wisconsin. But I have to assure Members of the Senate that this is a matter that has been examined by the Armed Services Committee, and we will strongly oppose the amendment. The analytical tests for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the program was thoroughly examined by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense in 1992. A number of studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats and the capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered. To say now it is a better idea to remain with the earlier model of the 18, in our judgment, ignores all of the analyses that went into the decisions to develop the newer model and threatens one of the best run developmental programs and production programs in progress today. Therefore, Mr. President, the amendment would have the effect of delaying the 18 E/F program for up to 8 months at heavy costs to the American taxpayers until we get another study. There will always be more capable programs postulated for the future and there will always be lesser programs as we look over the past. This program has met all the requirements placed on it, is on schedule and at cost. Therefore, I urge the Senate to oppose the amendment. Mr. President, I see the presence on the floor of the Senator from Missouri who has spent a great deal of time in this program. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, briefly to respond to the Senator from Virginia, I appreciate his remarks and his great knowledge in this area, particularly when it comes to the Navy. Let me simply remind my colleagues what this amendment seeks to do. It asks, in light of this recently released GAO report, released yesterday, that we fence the money until such time as the Department of Defense provides us with a response to this, and then there will be just a 90-day period afterward, during which we would have an opportunity to look at it and GAO would look at it. This is a serious report. There may be disagreement. When you are talking about $17 billion between the C/D and Super Hornet, I think it deserves a look. I am not suggesting, nor have I suggested, the E/F is a bad airplane. Clearly, many of the things you indicated about its capabilities are there. The question that was raised by the report was whether or not the current C/D plane can provide these benefits and that perhaps we could move directly from the C/D plane on to the JSF plane as a cheaper and most cost-effective way. All we are suggesting here then is this brief period when we would have a chance to see whether the GAO was on the right track and see what the Department of Defense has to say about it. Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. I have no objection whatsoever to getting the information on the GAO report from the military. I think that is appropriate. I think the Senator is absolutely right to raise these questions once you have a serious GAO report. But I do not think we can hold up the entire funding on this program. I am told it would cost an 8- to 12- month slip in the program, and then assuming you go forward with the program, you end up spending a whole lot more money. So, in an effort to save money, you end up spending a lot more money. So I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. If the Senator would like to have his staff work with our staff to hold up a reasonable amount of money so it does not throw the whole schedule off, to assure the Senator that the report will be forthcoming, I think that could be accommodated. But to hold up the entire funding, I would have to oppose that. I will leave it up to the Senator whether he would like to get a vote on this now or would like to take 10 minutes to see if there is a portion of the funding that would not disrupt the program but would indicate the seriousness with which the information is received. I think that would work. I have not discussed this with the other side of the aisle. It may be they will not want to do that. Maybe we ought to go ahead with a rollcall vote, if that is appropriate, but I certainly defer to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I always appreciate the knowledge and experience of the Senator from Georgia and particularly his reasonableness. I certainly would like to take the opportunity to consult and see if there might be a way to work that out. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside. Mr. BOND. Reserving the right to object, I will not object to setting aside the amendment, but I do want to add some points on the discussion of it. I have no objection to setting it aside, but I do seek the floor to respond to some of the questions raised by the Senator from Wisconsin. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, let me explain why I think this amendment is not appropriate, it is not a good idea. The distinguished Senator from Georgia has already pointed out that an amendment like this, by delaying the production of the aircraft, would inevitably do little more than add cost to the total program and to the total buy. There are ongoing studies. The Navy and the Defense Department have been conducting these studies. They have reviews ongoing, and we will have access to not only their comments on the GAO report but their reviews. Let me say in summary, the GAO is not flying the airplane. The GAO people are not the ones landing fully-weapons-loaded airplanes on pitching aircraft carriers in the ocean. The Navy people are. They are the ones who made a compelling case for this airplane and the need for it. I should point out the F/A-18E/F exceeds the interdiction mission of the current C/D models in range by some 40 to 50 percent, regardless of the mission profile. There is talk about adding additional tanks or larger tanks on the C/ D, but these have been rejected because of restrictive load limitations and the structural operational limitations on the C/D on board the carrier. The Navy has conducted a thorough engineering analysis on the matter of putting larger tanks, for example, on the C/D's and concluded this was not suitable for carrier operations. The real question is the bringback capability. The current model of C/D fleet is at its operational limit in regard to its ability to bring back weapons. The E/F will be able to bring back the more advanced smart weapons which tend to be heavier than the majority of weapons in the fleet today. The E/F, the next generation of the Super Hornet, provides future room for future growth and flexibility to accommodate the technological advancements into the next century. One point the GAO has made is that there is a waiver for the C/D's landing restrictions. They say it is a permanent waiver. Well, that is not true. NAVAIR has said the waiver was acceptable in the interim, but it was up to individual air wings to approve or disapprove depending on their own assessments. Let me tell you, from the viewpoint of those who have flown on carriers and flown on and off of carriers at sea, what will have to happen. With the current C/D's to bring back fully loaded the weapons and the fuel, the ship will have to increase its speed to maintain 30 knots or more of wind over the deck, which will increase its fuel costs, whether nuclear or conventional; then the pilots will have to fly a full flap approach. But if the wind goes over 35 [[Page S7229]] knots because of unpredictable winds, then the pilot is required by the Navy safety manual to fly at half lap and would not be able to land with the heavier strike munitions load. It is a small and costly window to achieve. Though in some instances it can be achieved, it is only because of the extreme skill of our carrier crews. It is not an ideal situation to put the pilots or the carrier crews at risk when there is such a limited window of acceptable operations. The new E/F Super Hornet will enable the carrier to cruise at its normal speed and the pilots will be able to fly the normal patterns. They will not have to drop either their weapons or dump their fuel into the ocean to below safe minimums to bring back our most sophisticated and expensive ordnance. Let us remember, however, that the F/A-18C/D models will continue to carry numerous ordnance loads safely and without restrictions covering many missions. It is only for certain strike mission loads that the waiver is required. But we have to plan for the future. For the Navy, that future should and must include the F/A-18E/F. The Super Hornet is desired by the customer, the Navy, which has been consistent and vocal in its support of procuring the aircraft rapidly and efficiently. Further delays in a go-slow approach for this program in its current stage are both inappropriate and costly. We cannot sit around and wait for future paper airplanes magically to appear. We have modified to the limit our older aircraft. For many years aviation, and naval aviation in particular, has been subject to technical, administrative and political forces which have given it the appearance of having no direction. We have been clamoring for such direction. Now we have it. The Navy has said, ``This is what we need. This airplane is meeting our specs. We need it.'' Let us go forward with it. I strongly urge this body not to be in a position of ``go-slowing'' this program to death. Our pilots want the aircraft. They need the aircraft to maintain their critical edge. I urge this body not to pull the wings off. Let us let the Navy get about the job of continuing to defend this Nation now and in the future. The F/A-18E/F program has been a model program, by any measure, and remains on cost, on schedule in meeting all performance requirements. The Navy is developing, at one-half to one-third the cost of a new- start program, a highly capable carrier-based tactical aircraft. The amendment, as written, would divert program management attention away from the execution of the program and, if yet another program review were to be required, could impose as much as an 8-month delay in the program. This delay would affect the 3-year flight test program, the operational evaluation, and IOC of the first squadron. I think that the formal program reviews which are already being conducted are enough. The analytical basis of the program was thoroughly examined at the previous milestone decision, and the program has performed precisely to the plan approved at that time. I believe there are studies going on, and thus this amendment is unnecessary to ensure that we continue to get the kind of additional capability that the Navy, its pilots, and its aircraft crews demand and need. I urge my colleagues, if this amendment is brought up for a vote, to oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I am coming to the end of the debate on this portion. I want to respond to the Senator from Missouri very briefly. Let us be clear what we are attempting. We are in a period here where everyone in the country knows we are trying to find places where we can reduce spending. There are a number of areas that receive very strict scrutiny. There is a sense--it is not held by just one party--that perhaps sometimes the defense spending does not get the same scrutiny that other areas do. Sometimes it leads to defense bashing which may not be justified. It is even possible, if people get an attitude that the Defense Department expenditures are not scrutinized, that there may develop an attitude in this country that would actually threaten national security, that it may become difficult for those advocating defense expenditures to be believed, and that there are those who do not take a warning signal seriously. All that we are suggesting here in this amendment is that a very recent report, yesterday, from the General Accounting Office says--not that this is a bad aircraft, I say to the Senator from Missouri, not that it does not provide perhaps some additional benefits; it may be and probably would turn out that in some areas this is a more capable airplane--but the question is, is the marginal benefit of those improvements sufficient to justify a $17 billion difference in cost, vis-a-vis the C/D planes? That is the issue. We are not stopping the plane here. We are not saying it should never be continued. We are saying that when a report comes out from the GAO entitled, ``F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,'' it is incumbent on us in the U.S. Senate to stop for a bit and find out what it is all about. $17 billion is real money. If there is an opportunity here to ask some questions and find out maybe, just possibly, the Navy, the Defense Department could go with the C/D's, I think that is our obligation. The Senator from Georgia has suggested perhaps a way in which we can allow more of this to go forward while the questions are answered. We are exploring that at this point. I yield the floor. Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there is no question that we need to study carefully all of the views and opinions and the best information available on any program like this. But I suggest that if you take a look at the series of reviews and experiments, tests, and evaluations that have been done on this plane and that will be done, there is no need, unless and until we find from the Navy that the GAO has raised questions which they have not addressed or we can find that responses by the Defense Department are not adequate, there is no reason to raise further the cost of this program and delay it even further. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition completed a review of the F/A-18E/F program on March 25 of this year. As of that time, the program review included program cost, schedule, and technical performance, examination of the formal exit criteria which had been approved at the previous milestone, and results of an early operational assessment conducted by the Navy's commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. This assessment was based on extensive documentation review, modeling and simulation, and analysis flight test data from the first two test aircraft. In May 1996, notification was provided to Congress that the review had been successfully completed and the Navy had authorized contracting for long-lead items for the first low-rate initial production of the aircraft. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is scheduled to conduct another program review in March 1997. At that time, all aspects of the program will again be examined prior to authorizing full funding for the procurement of the first low-rate initial production aircraft. The analytical basis for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the F/A-18E/F program was thoroughly evaluated by both the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense prior to the milestone decision in May of 1992. Numerous studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats, and capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered as part of these analyses. It is not to say that we should not continue to review and analyze, look at the cost and determine the capability. That is an ongoing process. What I am saying, Mr. President, is we could significantly increase the cost of the program, throw production off schedule, and delay the availability of aircraft which the Navy said they have needed by putting a roadblock in the way of the initial low-rate production of the aircraft. This is not the time to throw a monkey wrench into a program which has been on schedule, [[Page S7230]] above performance, and well within cost parameters at this time. I urge my colleagues not to delay the program. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Missouri. I think there has been a good debate on this. I suggest the Senator lay aside his amendment. We can see if we can find a way to see that the report is forthcoming, without disrupting the program. It seems to me that is the way to proceed. If not, I would be joined with the Senator from Missouri in moving to table the amendment. I believe the staff is prepared to work with your staff on this. I have a call in for the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, who has two amendments that will require rollcalls. In the meantime, I suggest we clear these amendments that have all been agreed to or are going to be agreed to by both sides. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the pending amendments have been laid aside. Amendment No. 4387 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering is intended to better facilitate our pledge of material assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by ensuring the lowest fair price of the equipment we provide to their cause. When the President dispatched United States troops to Bosnia last year, he did so with the stipulation that they would be there only a year. The administration has since softened the deadline by indicating that troops may still be there on December 19, but that withdrawal will begin on that date. This latest commitment on withdrawal is not entirely reassuring. It is quite plausible that withdrawal will begin as stated, but our overall presence there may be drawn out indefinitely. A deadline was never an exit strategy. Last year, when then Senate majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, and I led the effort to support the President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief and indirectly to support his dispatch of more than 20,000 American troops to Bosnia, we made clear our reservations about simply imposing a deadline. We also suggested the outline of a true exit strategy. The centerpiece of that strategy, as Senator Dole and I have since repeated on countless occasions, was United States leadership in the effort to adequately equip and train the Bosnian Armed Forces. Only when that nation can defend itself against aggression, which over the course of 3\1/2\ years of war reduced its territory by half, will the peace be safe without us. We tried to address this issue last year by including $100 million in drawdown authority for Bosnia in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The amendment I am offering today simply seeks to ensure that the $100 million in equipment to be transferred to Bosnia is accounted for in a manner similar to the way it is in the case of other American allies. I am not advocating unlimited material support for Bosnia because of the impact on our own military readiness. But in order to get the most of the $100 million, we should see to it that the equipment is valued at the lowest possible fair price. This amendment gives us this assurance. The amendment expresses a sense of the Senate that the pricing of equipment be lowest in order to maximize the amount of equipment provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina under current drawdown authority. I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side. Mr. NUNN. This amendment has been cleared. I urge its adoption. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4387) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4389 (Purpose: To authorize the Air National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Exon, I offer an amendment that would allow the Nebraska National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE. Currently, the Air Guard and local authority share this duty. This amendment would eliminate unnecessary duplication. The air guard would be reimbursed for assuming the entire firefighting mission. I believe this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 4389. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following: SEC. 368. AUTHORITY OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD TO PROVIDE CERTAIN SERVICES AT LINCOLN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA. (a) Authority.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Nebraska Air National Guard may provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, Nebraska, on behalf of the Lincoln Municipal Airport Authority, Lincoln, Nebraska. (b) Agreement.--The Nebraska Air National Guard may not provide services under subsection (a) until the Nebraska Air National Guard and the authority enter into an agreement under which the authority reimburses the Nebraska Air National Guard for the cost of the services provided. (c) Conditions.--These services may only be provided to the extent that the provision of such services does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4389) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4390 (Purpose: To state the sense of Congress regarding the authorization of appropriation and appropriation of funds for military equipment and not identified in a budget request of the Department of Defense and for certain military construction) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment on behalf of Senator Robb. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 4390. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following: SEC. 1014. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION AND APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR CERTAIN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) to the maximum extent practicable, each House of Congress should consider the authorization of appropriation, and appropriation, funds for the procurement of military equipment only if the procurement is included-- (A) in the budget request of the President for the Department of Defense; or (B) in a supplemental request list provided to the congressional defense committees, upon request of such committees, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, by the military departments, by the National Guard Bureau, or by the officials responsible for the administration of the Reserves; (2) the recommendations for procurement in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from the budget request referred to in paragraph (1)(A) should be accompanied in the committee report relating to the bill by a justification of the national security interest addressed by the change; (3) the recommendations for military construction projects in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from such a [[Page S7231]] budget request should be accompanied by a justification in the committee report relating to the bill of the national security interest addressed by the change; and (4) the recommendations for procurement of military equipment, or for military construction projects, in a conference to resolve the differences between the two Houses relating to a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill which recommendations reflect a change from the original recommendation of the applicable committee to either House should be accompanied by a justification in the statement of managers of the conference report of the national security interest addressed by the change. Mr. NUNN. This is not the amendment, I believe, that we have problems with. This amendment would state that it is the sense of the Congress that the defense authorization appropriations bills should rely primarily on the budget request. I am told this is not cleared. I withdraw the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment (No. 4390) was withdrawn. Amendment No. 4391 (Purpose: To require a plan for repairs and stabilization of the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Sarbanes, I offer an amendment to require a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures for the historic district of the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Sarbanes, proposes an amendment numbered 4391. The amendment is as follows: At the end of title XXI, add the following: SEC. 2105. PLAN FOR REPAIRS AND STABILIZATION OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICT AT THE FOREST GLEN ANNEX OF WALTER REED MEDICAL CENTER, MARYLAND. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Maryland, together with funding options for the implementation of the plan. Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer an amendment directing the Secretary of the Army to submit a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures needed throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. This plan would also include funding options for the implementation of such plan. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center Annex at Forest Glen, MD is a 190-acre complex located just north of the Silver Spring business district. It was a former women's seminary known as the National Park Seminary. Acquired by the Army in 1943 by authority of the War Powers Act of 1942, it has served as a rehabilitation center and psychiatric facility for soldiers from World War II through the Vietnam war. The former college campus also contains approximately two dozen historic buildings on approximately 24 acres which comprise what is now referred to as the National Park Seminary Historic District. The site was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972. The site contains a number of historic or unique buildings, including houses shaped like a Dutch windmill, an English castle, a Japanese pagoda, a French chateau, and an Italian villa. Unfortunately, over the many years, many of these buildings have suffered substantial deterioration and neglect. The Army has sought unsuccessfully to excess the property for several years and has continued to plan for its eventual disposal. The National Trust has continued to work with the Army to assist in its assessment of options for the reuse of the property. During this time, even the most basic repairs to the buildings were not undertaken. Reports prepared by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save Our Seminary and other organizations have found that, in general, the property is poorly maintained and insufficiently secure. Routine preventative maintenance, such as cleaning out gutters, is not being performed. Repairs to obvious deficiencies, such as holes in the roof and broken windows, are not being made in a timely way. On site security is lax. Fire alarm and fire suppression systems are not being adequately maintained. The military construction appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990 contained a provision directing the Department of the Army to provide up to $3 million for necessary repairs at the annex and to work with the Montgomery County government and local citizens groups in the planning process for this site. Although we understand that $2 million was allocated by the Army for the repair and maintenance of historic buildings, all of this money was apparently used for architectural planning and design of roof work. However, to date, no funding has been provided for these major repairs and the buildings are deteriorating at a faster rate than ever. The Army developed a master plan for the site which called for the existing historic buildings to be maintained and occupied by the Army as long as it retains ownership to ensure their maintenance and security. The master plan also identified specific maintenance priorities with work on repair and replacement of deteriorated roofs at the top of the list. In addition, a previous commanding officer at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center submitted a letter stating, ``WRAMC will continue to request funding for maintenance of the historic district and make every effort to halt the deterioration of these structures.'' Despite the findings of the master plan and the statements of support by Army officials, no work has been done to repair or maintain these buildings. In 1994 following the burning of the historic Odeon Theatre resulting in its destruction by arson, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save our Seminary jointly filed a lawsuit against the Army claiming that the Army's neglect of the buildings violated the National Historic Preservation Act. The lawsuit is still pending. My amendment directs the Department of the Army to develop and submit a plan with appropriate funding options to implement such a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center within 30 days of the enactment of this act. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. McCain. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4391) was agreed to. Mr. NUNN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. McCain. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4392 (Purpose: To modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Bingaman, I offer an amendment authorizing the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to exchange administrative jurisdiction of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico for purposes of creating easily identifiable and manageable boundaries. I believe the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], Mr. Bingaman, for himself, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 4392. The amendment is as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. . MODIFICATION OF BOUNDARIES OF WHITE SANDS NATIONAL MONUMENT AND WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE. (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to effect an exchange between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army of administrative jurisdiction over the lands described in subsection (c) in order to facilitate administration of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Missile range.--The term ``missile range'' means the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, administered by the Secretary of the Army. [[Page S7232]] (2) Monument.--The term ``monument'' means the White Sands National Monument, New Mexico, established by Proclamation No. 2025 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) and administered by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) Exchange of Jurisdiction.--The lands exchanged under this Act are the lands generally depicted on the map entitled ``White Sands National Monument, Boundary Proposal'', numbered 142/80,061 and dated January 1994, comprising-- (1) approximately 2,524 acres of land within the monument that is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; (2) approximately 5,758 acres of land within the missile range abutting the monument, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; and (3) approximately 4,277 acres of land within the monument abutting the missile range, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Army. (d) Boundary Modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred to the Secretary of the Interior and exclude the land transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c). The boundary of the missile range is modified accordingly. (e) Administration.-- (1) Monument.--The Secretary of the Interior shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by subsection (c) in accordance with laws (including regulations) applicable to the monument. (2) Missile range.--The Secretary of the Army shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (3) Airspace.--The Secretary of the Army shall maintain control of the airspace above the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (f) Public Availability of Map.--The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army shall prepare, and the Secretary of the Interior shall keep on file for public inspection in the headquarters of the monument, a map showing the boundary of the monument as modified by this Act. (g) Waiver of Limitation Under Prior Law.--Notwithstanding section 303(b)(1) of the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3476), land or an interest in land that was deleted from the monument by section 301(19) of the Act (92 Stat. 3475) may be exchanged for land owned by the State of New Mexico within the boundaries of any unit of the National Park System in the State of New Mexico, may be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency without monetary consideration, or may be administered as public land, as the Secretary considers appropriate. SEC. . BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT. (a) Findings and Purpose.-- (1) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (A) under the provisions of a special use permit, sewage lagoons for Bandelier National Monument, established by Proclamation No. 1322 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) (referred to in this section as the ``monument'') are located on land administered by the Secretary of Energy that is adjacent to the monument; and (B) modification of the boundary of the monument to include the land on which the sewage lagoons are situated-- (i) would facilitate administration of both the monument and the adjacent land that would remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy; and (ii) can be accomplished at no cost. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to modify the boundary between the monument and adjacent Department of Energy land to facilitate management of the monument and Department of Energy land. (b) Boundary Modification.-- (1) Transfer of administrative jurisdiction.--There is transferred from the Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of the Interior administrative jurisdiction over the land comprised approximately 4.47 acres depicted on the map entitled ``Boundary Map, Bandelier National Monument'', No. 315/80,051, dated March 1995. (2) Boundary modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred by paragraph (1). (3) Public availability of map.--The map described in paragraph (1) shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Lands Office at the Southwest System Support Office of the National Park Service, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in the Superintendent's Office of Bandelier National Monument. Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today, along with Senator Domenici, I propose an amendment that will allow for better administration, law enforcement, and operational procedures for both the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. The bill will exchange about 10,000 acres along the border of the White Sands Missile Range and the White Sands Monument which abut each other. It also transfers to the monument the administrative jurisdiction over about 2,500 acres which lie within the White Sands National Monument but are currently controlled by the White Sands Missile Range. I ask unanimous consent that a letter and an information paper be printed in the Record. The letter, dated June 27, 1996, is from the National Park Service and is signed by Roger G. Kennedy. It states that the Department does not have a problem with the amendment. The letter further states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this report for consideration before the Senate. The second document is an information paper from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Paul W. Johnson. The paper states that the Department of the Army supports this legislation. It also states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this amendment. Mr. President, the area that I am speaking about is a unique geological formation. This gypsum deposit known as ``White Sands'' is very important to my home State of New Mexico. The sands cover approximately 275 square miles with about 40 percent lying within the monument and the remaining portion of the dunes, to the south and the east, belonging to the White Sands Missile Range. As a brief history, on January 18, 1933, President Hoover designated 142, 987 acres, in the Tularosa Basin, as the National Park. From the very beginning, the park has been a success. Within its first 2 years of operation, the White Sands monument shattered the attendance records of the 23-unit Southwestern National Monuments in the Four Corner States of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, DC, June 27, 1996. Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Bingaman: Thank you for providing the National Park Service the opportunity to comment on the draft amendment to modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Ba

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
(Senate - June 28, 1996)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S7225-S7264] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 The Senate continued with consideration of the bill. Cloture Motion The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Cloture Motion We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 433, S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill: Trent Lott, Don Nickles, Dirk Kempthorne, Rod Grams, Jim Jeffords, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Christopher S. Bond, John Ashcroft, Conrad Burns, Judd Gregg, Larry Pressler, Orrin G. Hatch, Mitch McConnell, Hank Brown, Sheila Frahm. Vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mandatory quorum call has been waived. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S. 1745, the Department of Defense authorization bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] are necessarily absent. Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] are necessarily absent. The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 53, nays 43, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.] YEAS--53 Abraham Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brown Burns Campbell Chafee Coats Cochran Cohen Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Domenici Faircloth Frahm Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hatch Helms Hollings Hutchison Jeffords Kassebaum Kempthorne Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pell Pressler Roth Santorum Shelby Simpson Smith Snowe Specter Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner NAYS--43 Akaka Biden Bingaman Boxer Bradley Breaux Bryan Byrd Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Exon Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Harkin Heflin Inouye Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pryor Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Simon Wellstone Wyden NOT VOTING--4 Baucus Bumpers Hatfield Inhofe The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 53, the nays are 43. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not agreed to. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be set aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [[Page S7226]] Amendment No. 4388 (Purpose: To require a cost-benefit analysis of the F/A-18E/F aircraft program) Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk relating to the F/A-18E/F program on behalf of myself and Senator Kohl. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself and Mr. Kohl, proposes an amendment numbered 4388. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following: SEC. 223. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. (a) Report on Program.--Not later than March 30, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the following: (1) A review of the F/A/-18E/F aircraft program. (2) An analysis and estimate of the production costs of the program for the total number of aircraft realistically expected to be procured at each of three annual production rates as follows: (A) 18 aircraft. (B) 24 aircraft. (C) 36 aircraft. (3) A comparison of the costs and benefits of the program with the costs and benefits of the F/A-18C/D aircraft program taking into account the operational combat effectiveness of the aircraft. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds Pending Transmittal of Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft before the date that is 90 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the report required under subsection (a). Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment would ``fence'' the funds authorized for production of the 12 F/A-18E/F's authorized in this legislation until such time as the Department of Defense [DOD] submits a cost/benefit analysis to Congress and Congress has an opportunity to evaluate whether production of this aircraft should commence, in light of the cost and concerns about the benefit of the F/A-18E/F in contrast to the F/A-18C/D, a far less costly yet extremely capable aircraft. The genesis for this amendment resulted from a General Accounting Office [GAO] draft report made available recently entitled ``Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost''. In this report GAO studied the rationale and need for the F/A-18E/F in order to determine whether continued development of the aircraft is the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. GAO concluded that the marginal improvements of the F/A-18E/F are outweighed by the high cost of the program. Mr. President, in our current fiscal climate, I have serious concerns about authorizing funding for such a costly program which according to GAO will deliver only marginal improvements over the current C/D version of the F/A-18. As GAO noted in its report, at a projected total program cost of $89.15 billion, the F/A-18E/F program is one of the most costly aviation programs in the Department of Defense. The total program cost is comprised of $5.833 billion in development costs and $83.35 billion in procurement costs for 1,000 aircraft. The administration has requested $2.09 billion in fiscal year 1997 for the procurement of 12 F/A-18E/F's. To date, the Navy has already spent $3.75 billion on the research and development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. Before I begin to describe GAO's findings, I would first like to discuss briefly the role of the F/A-18 aircraft in our Nation's overall naval aviation force structure. The Navy performs its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter (air-to-air combat), strike (air-to- ground combat), and strike/fighter (multicombat role) aircraft. Currently, carrier based F-14 fighter aircraft perform air-to-air missions; A6E's perform air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18's perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the latest version of the Navy's carrier-based F/A-18 strike/fighter plane. The Navy has based the need for development and procurement of the F/ A-18E/F on existing or projected operational deficiencies of the F/A- 18C/D in the following key areas: strike range, carrier recovery payload and survivability. In addition, the Navy notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. In its report, GAO concludes that the operational deficiencies in the C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the E/F either have not materialized as projected or such deficiencies can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional upgrades made which would further improve its capabilities. One of the primary reasons the Navy cites in justifying the E/F is the need for increased range and the C/D's inability to perform long- range unrefueled missions against high-value targets. However, GAO concludes that the Navy's F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met by either the F/A-18E/F or F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, it concludes that the increased range of the E/F is achieved at the expense of its aerial combat performance, and that even with increased range, both aircraft will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions. The F/A-18E/F specification requirements call for the aircraft to have a flight range of 390 nautical miles [nm] while performing low- altitude bombing missions. The F/A-18E/F will achieve a strike range of 465 nm while performing low-altitude missions by carrying 2 external 480 gallon fuel tanks. While current C/D's achieve a flight range of 325 nm with 2-330 gallon fuel tanks while performing low-altitude missions--65 nm below the specification requirement of the E/F--when they are equipped with the 2-480 gallon external fuel tanks that are planned to be used on the E/F, the C/D can achieve a strike range of 393 nm on low-altitude missions. Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18E/F is expected to have a 683 nm strike range when flying a more fuel-efficient, survivable, and lethal high-altitude mission profile rather than the specified low-altitude profile. Similarly, although F/A-18E/F range will be greater than the F/A-18C/D, the C/D could achieve strike ranges--566 nm with 3-330 gallon fuel tanks or 600 nm with 2-480 gallon tanks and 1-330 gallon tank--far greater than the target distances stipulated in the E/F's system specifications by flying the same high- altitude missions as the E/F. Additionally, according to GAO, the E/F's increased strike range is achieved at the expense of the aircraft's aerial combat performance as evidenced by its sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and acceleration which impact its ability to maneuver in either offensive or defensive modes. Mr. President, another significant reason the Navy cites in developing the F/A-18E/F is an anticipated deficiency in F/A-18C carrier recovery payload--the amount of fuel, weapons and external equipment that an aircraft can carry when returning from a mission and landing on a carrier. The deficiency in carrier recovery payload which the Navy anticipated of the F/A-18C simply has not materialized. When initially procured, F/A-18C's had a total carrier recovery payload of 6,300 pounds. Because of the Navy's decision to increase the F/A-18C's maximum allowable carrier landing weight and a lower aircraft operating weight resulting from technological improvements, the F/A-18C now has a carrier recovery payload of 7,113 pounds. F/A-18C's operating in support of Bosnian operations are now routinely returning to carriers with operational loads of 7,166 pounds, which exceeds the Navy's stated carrier recovery payload capacity. This recovery payload is substantially greater than the Navy projected it would be and is even greater than when the F/A-18C was first introduced in 1988. In addition, GAO notes that while it is not necessary, upgrading F/A-18C's with stronger landing gear could allow them to recover carrier payloads of more than 10,000 pounds--greater than that sought for the F/A-18E/F--9,000 pounds. While the Navy also cites a need to improve combat survivability in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, it was not developed to counter a particular military threat that could [[Page S7227]] not be met with existing or improved F/A-18C/D's. Additional improvements have subsequently been made or are planned for the F/A- 18C/D to enhance its survivability including improvements to reduce its radar detectability, while survivability improvements of the F/A-18E/F are questionable. For example, because the F/A-18E/F will be carrying weapons and fuel externally, the radar signature reduction improvements derived from the structural design of the aircraft will be diminished and will only help the aircraft penetrate slightly deeper than the F/A- 18C/D into an integrated defensive system before being detected. In addition to noting the operational capability improvements in justifying the development of the F/A-18E/F, the Navy also notes limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload capacity. The Navy predicted that by the mid-1990's the F/A- 18C/D would not have growth space to accommodate additional new weapons and systems under development. Specifically, the Navy predicted that by fiscal year 1996 C/D's would only have 0.2 cubic feet of space available for future avionics growth; however, 5.3 cubic feet of available space have been identified for future system growth. Furthermore, technological advancements such as miniaturization, modularity, and consolidation may result in additional growth space for future avionics. The Navy also stated that the F/A-18E/F will provide increased payload capacity as a result of two new outboard weapons stations; however, unless current problems concerning weapons release are resolved--airflow problems around the fuselage and weapons stations-- the types and amounts of weapons the E/F can carry will be restricted and the possible payload increase may be negated. Also, while the E/F will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air capability by carrying two extra missiles, it will not increase its ability to carry the heavier, precision-guided, air-to-ground weapons that are capable of hitting fixed and mobile hard targets and the heavier stand-off weapons that will be used to increase aircraft survivability. Understanding that the F/A-18E/F may not deliver as significant operational capability improvements as originally expected, I would now like to focus on the cost of the F/A-18E/F program and possible alternatives to it. As previously mentioned, the total program cost of the F/A-18E/F is projected to be $89.15 billion. These program costs are based on the procurement assumption of 1,000 aircraft--660 by the Navy and 340 by the Marine Corps--at an annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year. As the GAO report points out, these figures are overstated. According to Marine Corps officials and the Marine Corps aviation master plan, the Marine Corps does not intend to buy any F/A- 18E/F's and, therefore, the projected 1,000 aircraft buy is overstated by 340 aircraft. Furthermore, the Congress has stated that an annual production rate of 72 aircraft is probably not feasible due to funding limitations and directed the Navy to calculate costs based on more realistic production rates as 18, 36 and 54 aircraft per year. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service: ``No naval aircraft have been bought in such quantities in recent years, and it is unlikely that such annual buys will be funded in the 1990's, given expected force reductions and lower inventory requirements and the absence of consensus about future military threats.'' Using the Navy's overstated assumptions about the total number of planes procured and an estimated annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year, the Navy calculates the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/ A-18E/F--costs related to the production of the basic aircraft--at $44 million. However, using GAO's more realistic assumptions of the procurement of 660 aircraft by the Navy, at a production rate of 36 aircraft per year, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the E/F balloons to $53 million. This is compared to the $28 million unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/A-18C/D based on a production rate of 36 aircraft per year. Thus, GAO estimates that this cost difference in unit recurring flyaway would result in a savings of almost $17 billion if the Navy were to procure 660 F/A-18C/D's rather than 660 F/A-18E/F's. Mr. President, this is certainly a significant amount of savings. Now I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production of the F/A-18E/F and instead relying on the F/A-18C/D, we will be mortgaging the future of our naval aviation fleet. However, Mr. President, there is a far less costly program already being developed which may yield more significant returns in operational capability. This program is the Joint Advanced Strike Technology or JAST Program. The JAST Program office is currently developing technology for a family of affordable next generation Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The JSF is expected to be a stealthy strike aircraft built on a single production line with a high degree of parts and cost commonality. The driving focus of JAST is affordability achieved by tri-service commonality. The Navy plans to procure 300 JSF's with a projected initial operational capability around 2007. Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies indicate that the JSF will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy tactical aircraft mission areas, especially range and survivability, at far less cost than the F/A-18E/F. The JSF is expected to be a stand alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war survivable aircraft. Overall, the JSF is expected to be more survivable and capable than any existing or planned tactical aircraft in strike and air-to-air missions, with the possible exception of the F-22 in air-to-air missions. The Navy's JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the F/A-18E/F to attack high-value targets without using external tanks or tanking. Unlike the F/A-18E/F which would carry all of its weapons externally, the Navy's JSF will carry at least 4 weapons for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat internally, thereby maximizing its stealthiness and increasing its survivability. Finally, the JSF would not require jamming support from EA-6B aircraft as does the F/A-18E/F in carrying out its mission in the face of integrated air defense systems. While the JSF is expected to have superior operational capabilities, it is expected to be developed and procured at far less expense than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the Navy's JSF is estimated to range from $32 to $40 million depending on which contractor design is chosen for the aircraft, as compared to GAO's $53 million estimate for the F/A-18E/F. Additional cost benefits of the JSF would result from having common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew and maintenance training requirements. Given the enormous cost and marginal improvement in operational capabilities the F/A-18E/F would provide, it seems that the justification for the E/F is not as evident as once thought. Operational deficiencies in the C/D aircraft either have not materialized or can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the plane. As a result, proceeding with the E/F Program may not be the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft fleet. In the short term, the Navy can continue to procure the F/A-18C/ D aircraft, while upgrading it to improve further its operational capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can look toward the next generation strike fighter, the JSF, which will provide more operational capability at far less cost than the E/F. Mr. President, succinctly put, the Navy needs an aircraft that will bridge between the current force and the new, superior JSF which will be operational around 2007. The question is whether the F/A-18C/D can serve that function, as it has demonstrated its ability to exceed predicted capacity or whether we should proceed with an expensive, new plane for a marginal level of improvement. The $17 billion difference in projected costs does not appear to provide a significant return on our investment. In times of severe fiscal constraints and a need to look at all areas of the budget to identify more cost-effective approaches, the F/A-18E/F is a project in need of reevaluation. For these reasons, I think it would be prudent to take a go-slow approach toward the F/A-18E/F program and allow the Congress sufficient time to evaluate GAO's findings and obtain a thorough response from DOD to these issues. I ask my colleagues to support [[Page S7228]] my amendment to fence all fiscal year 1997 funds authorizing the production of F/A-18E/F's until certain conditions are met. I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular aircraft program has been thoroughly examined for program costs, schedule, technical performance, and recent test results. The program is on schedule and on cost. This is one of those clear examples of where the GAO and the Department of Defense are at odds on certain data, and I respect fully the very detailed presentation by our distinguished colleague from Wisconsin. But I have to assure Members of the Senate that this is a matter that has been examined by the Armed Services Committee, and we will strongly oppose the amendment. The analytical tests for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the program was thoroughly examined by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense in 1992. A number of studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats and the capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered. To say now it is a better idea to remain with the earlier model of the 18, in our judgment, ignores all of the analyses that went into the decisions to develop the newer model and threatens one of the best run developmental programs and production programs in progress today. Therefore, Mr. President, the amendment would have the effect of delaying the 18 E/F program for up to 8 months at heavy costs to the American taxpayers until we get another study. There will always be more capable programs postulated for the future and there will always be lesser programs as we look over the past. This program has met all the requirements placed on it, is on schedule and at cost. Therefore, I urge the Senate to oppose the amendment. Mr. President, I see the presence on the floor of the Senator from Missouri who has spent a great deal of time in this program. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, briefly to respond to the Senator from Virginia, I appreciate his remarks and his great knowledge in this area, particularly when it comes to the Navy. Let me simply remind my colleagues what this amendment seeks to do. It asks, in light of this recently released GAO report, released yesterday, that we fence the money until such time as the Department of Defense provides us with a response to this, and then there will be just a 90-day period afterward, during which we would have an opportunity to look at it and GAO would look at it. This is a serious report. There may be disagreement. When you are talking about $17 billion between the C/D and Super Hornet, I think it deserves a look. I am not suggesting, nor have I suggested, the E/F is a bad airplane. Clearly, many of the things you indicated about its capabilities are there. The question that was raised by the report was whether or not the current C/D plane can provide these benefits and that perhaps we could move directly from the C/D plane on to the JSF plane as a cheaper and most cost-effective way. All we are suggesting here then is this brief period when we would have a chance to see whether the GAO was on the right track and see what the Department of Defense has to say about it. Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. I have no objection whatsoever to getting the information on the GAO report from the military. I think that is appropriate. I think the Senator is absolutely right to raise these questions once you have a serious GAO report. But I do not think we can hold up the entire funding on this program. I am told it would cost an 8- to 12- month slip in the program, and then assuming you go forward with the program, you end up spending a whole lot more money. So, in an effort to save money, you end up spending a lot more money. So I have to oppose the amendment as it is now worded. If the Senator would like to have his staff work with our staff to hold up a reasonable amount of money so it does not throw the whole schedule off, to assure the Senator that the report will be forthcoming, I think that could be accommodated. But to hold up the entire funding, I would have to oppose that. I will leave it up to the Senator whether he would like to get a vote on this now or would like to take 10 minutes to see if there is a portion of the funding that would not disrupt the program but would indicate the seriousness with which the information is received. I think that would work. I have not discussed this with the other side of the aisle. It may be they will not want to do that. Maybe we ought to go ahead with a rollcall vote, if that is appropriate, but I certainly defer to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I always appreciate the knowledge and experience of the Senator from Georgia and particularly his reasonableness. I certainly would like to take the opportunity to consult and see if there might be a way to work that out. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside. Mr. BOND. Reserving the right to object, I will not object to setting aside the amendment, but I do want to add some points on the discussion of it. I have no objection to setting it aside, but I do seek the floor to respond to some of the questions raised by the Senator from Wisconsin. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, let me explain why I think this amendment is not appropriate, it is not a good idea. The distinguished Senator from Georgia has already pointed out that an amendment like this, by delaying the production of the aircraft, would inevitably do little more than add cost to the total program and to the total buy. There are ongoing studies. The Navy and the Defense Department have been conducting these studies. They have reviews ongoing, and we will have access to not only their comments on the GAO report but their reviews. Let me say in summary, the GAO is not flying the airplane. The GAO people are not the ones landing fully-weapons-loaded airplanes on pitching aircraft carriers in the ocean. The Navy people are. They are the ones who made a compelling case for this airplane and the need for it. I should point out the F/A-18E/F exceeds the interdiction mission of the current C/D models in range by some 40 to 50 percent, regardless of the mission profile. There is talk about adding additional tanks or larger tanks on the C/ D, but these have been rejected because of restrictive load limitations and the structural operational limitations on the C/D on board the carrier. The Navy has conducted a thorough engineering analysis on the matter of putting larger tanks, for example, on the C/D's and concluded this was not suitable for carrier operations. The real question is the bringback capability. The current model of C/D fleet is at its operational limit in regard to its ability to bring back weapons. The E/F will be able to bring back the more advanced smart weapons which tend to be heavier than the majority of weapons in the fleet today. The E/F, the next generation of the Super Hornet, provides future room for future growth and flexibility to accommodate the technological advancements into the next century. One point the GAO has made is that there is a waiver for the C/D's landing restrictions. They say it is a permanent waiver. Well, that is not true. NAVAIR has said the waiver was acceptable in the interim, but it was up to individual air wings to approve or disapprove depending on their own assessments. Let me tell you, from the viewpoint of those who have flown on carriers and flown on and off of carriers at sea, what will have to happen. With the current C/D's to bring back fully loaded the weapons and the fuel, the ship will have to increase its speed to maintain 30 knots or more of wind over the deck, which will increase its fuel costs, whether nuclear or conventional; then the pilots will have to fly a full flap approach. But if the wind goes over 35 [[Page S7229]] knots because of unpredictable winds, then the pilot is required by the Navy safety manual to fly at half lap and would not be able to land with the heavier strike munitions load. It is a small and costly window to achieve. Though in some instances it can be achieved, it is only because of the extreme skill of our carrier crews. It is not an ideal situation to put the pilots or the carrier crews at risk when there is such a limited window of acceptable operations. The new E/F Super Hornet will enable the carrier to cruise at its normal speed and the pilots will be able to fly the normal patterns. They will not have to drop either their weapons or dump their fuel into the ocean to below safe minimums to bring back our most sophisticated and expensive ordnance. Let us remember, however, that the F/A-18C/D models will continue to carry numerous ordnance loads safely and without restrictions covering many missions. It is only for certain strike mission loads that the waiver is required. But we have to plan for the future. For the Navy, that future should and must include the F/A-18E/F. The Super Hornet is desired by the customer, the Navy, which has been consistent and vocal in its support of procuring the aircraft rapidly and efficiently. Further delays in a go-slow approach for this program in its current stage are both inappropriate and costly. We cannot sit around and wait for future paper airplanes magically to appear. We have modified to the limit our older aircraft. For many years aviation, and naval aviation in particular, has been subject to technical, administrative and political forces which have given it the appearance of having no direction. We have been clamoring for such direction. Now we have it. The Navy has said, ``This is what we need. This airplane is meeting our specs. We need it.'' Let us go forward with it. I strongly urge this body not to be in a position of ``go-slowing'' this program to death. Our pilots want the aircraft. They need the aircraft to maintain their critical edge. I urge this body not to pull the wings off. Let us let the Navy get about the job of continuing to defend this Nation now and in the future. The F/A-18E/F program has been a model program, by any measure, and remains on cost, on schedule in meeting all performance requirements. The Navy is developing, at one-half to one-third the cost of a new- start program, a highly capable carrier-based tactical aircraft. The amendment, as written, would divert program management attention away from the execution of the program and, if yet another program review were to be required, could impose as much as an 8-month delay in the program. This delay would affect the 3-year flight test program, the operational evaluation, and IOC of the first squadron. I think that the formal program reviews which are already being conducted are enough. The analytical basis of the program was thoroughly examined at the previous milestone decision, and the program has performed precisely to the plan approved at that time. I believe there are studies going on, and thus this amendment is unnecessary to ensure that we continue to get the kind of additional capability that the Navy, its pilots, and its aircraft crews demand and need. I urge my colleagues, if this amendment is brought up for a vote, to oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I am coming to the end of the debate on this portion. I want to respond to the Senator from Missouri very briefly. Let us be clear what we are attempting. We are in a period here where everyone in the country knows we are trying to find places where we can reduce spending. There are a number of areas that receive very strict scrutiny. There is a sense--it is not held by just one party--that perhaps sometimes the defense spending does not get the same scrutiny that other areas do. Sometimes it leads to defense bashing which may not be justified. It is even possible, if people get an attitude that the Defense Department expenditures are not scrutinized, that there may develop an attitude in this country that would actually threaten national security, that it may become difficult for those advocating defense expenditures to be believed, and that there are those who do not take a warning signal seriously. All that we are suggesting here in this amendment is that a very recent report, yesterday, from the General Accounting Office says--not that this is a bad aircraft, I say to the Senator from Missouri, not that it does not provide perhaps some additional benefits; it may be and probably would turn out that in some areas this is a more capable airplane--but the question is, is the marginal benefit of those improvements sufficient to justify a $17 billion difference in cost, vis-a-vis the C/D planes? That is the issue. We are not stopping the plane here. We are not saying it should never be continued. We are saying that when a report comes out from the GAO entitled, ``F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,'' it is incumbent on us in the U.S. Senate to stop for a bit and find out what it is all about. $17 billion is real money. If there is an opportunity here to ask some questions and find out maybe, just possibly, the Navy, the Defense Department could go with the C/D's, I think that is our obligation. The Senator from Georgia has suggested perhaps a way in which we can allow more of this to go forward while the questions are answered. We are exploring that at this point. I yield the floor. Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there is no question that we need to study carefully all of the views and opinions and the best information available on any program like this. But I suggest that if you take a look at the series of reviews and experiments, tests, and evaluations that have been done on this plane and that will be done, there is no need, unless and until we find from the Navy that the GAO has raised questions which they have not addressed or we can find that responses by the Defense Department are not adequate, there is no reason to raise further the cost of this program and delay it even further. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition completed a review of the F/A-18E/F program on March 25 of this year. As of that time, the program review included program cost, schedule, and technical performance, examination of the formal exit criteria which had been approved at the previous milestone, and results of an early operational assessment conducted by the Navy's commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. This assessment was based on extensive documentation review, modeling and simulation, and analysis flight test data from the first two test aircraft. In May 1996, notification was provided to Congress that the review had been successfully completed and the Navy had authorized contracting for long-lead items for the first low-rate initial production of the aircraft. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is scheduled to conduct another program review in March 1997. At that time, all aspects of the program will again be examined prior to authorizing full funding for the procurement of the first low-rate initial production aircraft. The analytical basis for the decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development of the F/A-18E/F program was thoroughly evaluated by both the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense prior to the milestone decision in May of 1992. Numerous studies which looked at the future of naval aviation, projected threats, and capabilities required to defeat those threats were considered as part of these analyses. It is not to say that we should not continue to review and analyze, look at the cost and determine the capability. That is an ongoing process. What I am saying, Mr. President, is we could significantly increase the cost of the program, throw production off schedule, and delay the availability of aircraft which the Navy said they have needed by putting a roadblock in the way of the initial low-rate production of the aircraft. This is not the time to throw a monkey wrench into a program which has been on schedule, [[Page S7230]] above performance, and well within cost parameters at this time. I urge my colleagues not to delay the program. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Missouri. I think there has been a good debate on this. I suggest the Senator lay aside his amendment. We can see if we can find a way to see that the report is forthcoming, without disrupting the program. It seems to me that is the way to proceed. If not, I would be joined with the Senator from Missouri in moving to table the amendment. I believe the staff is prepared to work with your staff on this. I have a call in for the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, who has two amendments that will require rollcalls. In the meantime, I suggest we clear these amendments that have all been agreed to or are going to be agreed to by both sides. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the pending amendments have been laid aside. Amendment No. 4387 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering is intended to better facilitate our pledge of material assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by ensuring the lowest fair price of the equipment we provide to their cause. When the President dispatched United States troops to Bosnia last year, he did so with the stipulation that they would be there only a year. The administration has since softened the deadline by indicating that troops may still be there on December 19, but that withdrawal will begin on that date. This latest commitment on withdrawal is not entirely reassuring. It is quite plausible that withdrawal will begin as stated, but our overall presence there may be drawn out indefinitely. A deadline was never an exit strategy. Last year, when then Senate majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, and I led the effort to support the President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief and indirectly to support his dispatch of more than 20,000 American troops to Bosnia, we made clear our reservations about simply imposing a deadline. We also suggested the outline of a true exit strategy. The centerpiece of that strategy, as Senator Dole and I have since repeated on countless occasions, was United States leadership in the effort to adequately equip and train the Bosnian Armed Forces. Only when that nation can defend itself against aggression, which over the course of 3\1/2\ years of war reduced its territory by half, will the peace be safe without us. We tried to address this issue last year by including $100 million in drawdown authority for Bosnia in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The amendment I am offering today simply seeks to ensure that the $100 million in equipment to be transferred to Bosnia is accounted for in a manner similar to the way it is in the case of other American allies. I am not advocating unlimited material support for Bosnia because of the impact on our own military readiness. But in order to get the most of the $100 million, we should see to it that the equipment is valued at the lowest possible fair price. This amendment gives us this assurance. The amendment expresses a sense of the Senate that the pricing of equipment be lowest in order to maximize the amount of equipment provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina under current drawdown authority. I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side. Mr. NUNN. This amendment has been cleared. I urge its adoption. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4387) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4389 (Purpose: To authorize the Air National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Exon, I offer an amendment that would allow the Nebraska National Guard to provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, NE. Currently, the Air Guard and local authority share this duty. This amendment would eliminate unnecessary duplication. The air guard would be reimbursed for assuming the entire firefighting mission. I believe this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 4389. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following: SEC. 368. AUTHORITY OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD TO PROVIDE CERTAIN SERVICES AT LINCOLN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA. (a) Authority.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Nebraska Air National Guard may provide fire protection services and rescue services relating to aircraft at Lincoln Municipal Airport, Lincoln, Nebraska, on behalf of the Lincoln Municipal Airport Authority, Lincoln, Nebraska. (b) Agreement.--The Nebraska Air National Guard may not provide services under subsection (a) until the Nebraska Air National Guard and the authority enter into an agreement under which the authority reimburses the Nebraska Air National Guard for the cost of the services provided. (c) Conditions.--These services may only be provided to the extent that the provision of such services does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4389) was agreed to. Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. NUNN. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4390 (Purpose: To state the sense of Congress regarding the authorization of appropriation and appropriation of funds for military equipment and not identified in a budget request of the Department of Defense and for certain military construction) Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment on behalf of Senator Robb. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 4390. The amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following: SEC. 1014. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION AND APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR CERTAIN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) to the maximum extent practicable, each House of Congress should consider the authorization of appropriation, and appropriation, funds for the procurement of military equipment only if the procurement is included-- (A) in the budget request of the President for the Department of Defense; or (B) in a supplemental request list provided to the congressional defense committees, upon request of such committees, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, by the military departments, by the National Guard Bureau, or by the officials responsible for the administration of the Reserves; (2) the recommendations for procurement in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from the budget request referred to in paragraph (1)(A) should be accompanied in the committee report relating to the bill by a justification of the national security interest addressed by the change; (3) the recommendations for military construction projects in a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives which reflect a change from such a [[Page S7231]] budget request should be accompanied by a justification in the committee report relating to the bill of the national security interest addressed by the change; and (4) the recommendations for procurement of military equipment, or for military construction projects, in a conference to resolve the differences between the two Houses relating to a defense authorization bill or a defense appropriations bill which recommendations reflect a change from the original recommendation of the applicable committee to either House should be accompanied by a justification in the statement of managers of the conference report of the national security interest addressed by the change. Mr. NUNN. This is not the amendment, I believe, that we have problems with. This amendment would state that it is the sense of the Congress that the defense authorization appropriations bills should rely primarily on the budget request. I am told this is not cleared. I withdraw the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment (No. 4390) was withdrawn. Amendment No. 4391 (Purpose: To require a plan for repairs and stabilization of the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Sarbanes, I offer an amendment to require a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures for the historic district of the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Sarbanes, proposes an amendment numbered 4391. The amendment is as follows: At the end of title XXI, add the following: SEC. 2105. PLAN FOR REPAIRS AND STABILIZATION OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICT AT THE FOREST GLEN ANNEX OF WALTER REED MEDICAL CENTER, MARYLAND. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Maryland, together with funding options for the implementation of the plan. Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer an amendment directing the Secretary of the Army to submit a comprehensive plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures needed throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MD. This plan would also include funding options for the implementation of such plan. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center Annex at Forest Glen, MD is a 190-acre complex located just north of the Silver Spring business district. It was a former women's seminary known as the National Park Seminary. Acquired by the Army in 1943 by authority of the War Powers Act of 1942, it has served as a rehabilitation center and psychiatric facility for soldiers from World War II through the Vietnam war. The former college campus also contains approximately two dozen historic buildings on approximately 24 acres which comprise what is now referred to as the National Park Seminary Historic District. The site was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972. The site contains a number of historic or unique buildings, including houses shaped like a Dutch windmill, an English castle, a Japanese pagoda, a French chateau, and an Italian villa. Unfortunately, over the many years, many of these buildings have suffered substantial deterioration and neglect. The Army has sought unsuccessfully to excess the property for several years and has continued to plan for its eventual disposal. The National Trust has continued to work with the Army to assist in its assessment of options for the reuse of the property. During this time, even the most basic repairs to the buildings were not undertaken. Reports prepared by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save Our Seminary and other organizations have found that, in general, the property is poorly maintained and insufficiently secure. Routine preventative maintenance, such as cleaning out gutters, is not being performed. Repairs to obvious deficiencies, such as holes in the roof and broken windows, are not being made in a timely way. On site security is lax. Fire alarm and fire suppression systems are not being adequately maintained. The military construction appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990 contained a provision directing the Department of the Army to provide up to $3 million for necessary repairs at the annex and to work with the Montgomery County government and local citizens groups in the planning process for this site. Although we understand that $2 million was allocated by the Army for the repair and maintenance of historic buildings, all of this money was apparently used for architectural planning and design of roof work. However, to date, no funding has been provided for these major repairs and the buildings are deteriorating at a faster rate than ever. The Army developed a master plan for the site which called for the existing historic buildings to be maintained and occupied by the Army as long as it retains ownership to ensure their maintenance and security. The master plan also identified specific maintenance priorities with work on repair and replacement of deteriorated roofs at the top of the list. In addition, a previous commanding officer at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center submitted a letter stating, ``WRAMC will continue to request funding for maintenance of the historic district and make every effort to halt the deterioration of these structures.'' Despite the findings of the master plan and the statements of support by Army officials, no work has been done to repair or maintain these buildings. In 1994 following the burning of the historic Odeon Theatre resulting in its destruction by arson, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Save our Seminary jointly filed a lawsuit against the Army claiming that the Army's neglect of the buildings violated the National Historic Preservation Act. The lawsuit is still pending. My amendment directs the Department of the Army to develop and submit a plan with appropriate funding options to implement such a plan for basic repairs and stabilization measures throughout the historic district at the Forest Glen Annex of Walter Reed Army Medical Center within 30 days of the enactment of this act. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. McCain. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment (No. 4391) was agreed to. Mr. NUNN. I move to reconsider the vote. Mr. McCain. I move to table the motion. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4392 (Purpose: To modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of the Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico) Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Bingaman, I offer an amendment authorizing the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to exchange administrative jurisdiction of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico for purposes of creating easily identifiable and manageable boundaries. I believe the amendment has been cleared. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], Mr. Bingaman, for himself, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 4392. The amendment is as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. . MODIFICATION OF BOUNDARIES OF WHITE SANDS NATIONAL MONUMENT AND WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE. (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to effect an exchange between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army of administrative jurisdiction over the lands described in subsection (c) in order to facilitate administration of the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Missile range.--The term ``missile range'' means the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, administered by the Secretary of the Army. [[Page S7232]] (2) Monument.--The term ``monument'' means the White Sands National Monument, New Mexico, established by Proclamation No. 2025 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) and administered by the Secretary of the Interior. (c) Exchange of Jurisdiction.--The lands exchanged under this Act are the lands generally depicted on the map entitled ``White Sands National Monument, Boundary Proposal'', numbered 142/80,061 and dated January 1994, comprising-- (1) approximately 2,524 acres of land within the monument that is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; (2) approximately 5,758 acres of land within the missile range abutting the monument, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior; and (3) approximately 4,277 acres of land within the monument abutting the missile range, which are transferred to the Secretary of the Army. (d) Boundary Modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred to the Secretary of the Interior and exclude the land transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c). The boundary of the missile range is modified accordingly. (e) Administration.-- (1) Monument.--The Secretary of the Interior shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by subsection (c) in accordance with laws (including regulations) applicable to the monument. (2) Missile range.--The Secretary of the Army shall administer the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (3) Airspace.--The Secretary of the Army shall maintain control of the airspace above the lands transferred to the Secretary of the Army by subsection (c) as part of the missile range. (f) Public Availability of Map.--The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army shall prepare, and the Secretary of the Interior shall keep on file for public inspection in the headquarters of the monument, a map showing the boundary of the monument as modified by this Act. (g) Waiver of Limitation Under Prior Law.--Notwithstanding section 303(b)(1) of the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3476), land or an interest in land that was deleted from the monument by section 301(19) of the Act (92 Stat. 3475) may be exchanged for land owned by the State of New Mexico within the boundaries of any unit of the National Park System in the State of New Mexico, may be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency without monetary consideration, or may be administered as public land, as the Secretary considers appropriate. SEC. . BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT. (a) Findings and Purpose.-- (1) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (A) under the provisions of a special use permit, sewage lagoons for Bandelier National Monument, established by Proclamation No. 1322 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) (referred to in this section as the ``monument'') are located on land administered by the Secretary of Energy that is adjacent to the monument; and (B) modification of the boundary of the monument to include the land on which the sewage lagoons are situated-- (i) would facilitate administration of both the monument and the adjacent land that would remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy; and (ii) can be accomplished at no cost. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to modify the boundary between the monument and adjacent Department of Energy land to facilitate management of the monument and Department of Energy land. (b) Boundary Modification.-- (1) Transfer of administrative jurisdiction.--There is transferred from the Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of the Interior administrative jurisdiction over the land comprised approximately 4.47 acres depicted on the map entitled ``Boundary Map, Bandelier National Monument'', No. 315/80,051, dated March 1995. (2) Boundary modification.--The boundary of the monument is modified to include the land transferred by paragraph (1). (3) Public availability of map.--The map described in paragraph (1) shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Lands Office at the Southwest System Support Office of the National Park Service, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in the Superintendent's Office of Bandelier National Monument. Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today, along with Senator Domenici, I propose an amendment that will allow for better administration, law enforcement, and operational procedures for both the White Sands National Monument and the White Sands Missile Range. The bill will exchange about 10,000 acres along the border of the White Sands Missile Range and the White Sands Monument which abut each other. It also transfers to the monument the administrative jurisdiction over about 2,500 acres which lie within the White Sands National Monument but are currently controlled by the White Sands Missile Range. I ask unanimous consent that a letter and an information paper be printed in the Record. The letter, dated June 27, 1996, is from the National Park Service and is signed by Roger G. Kennedy. It states that the Department does not have a problem with the amendment. The letter further states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this report for consideration before the Senate. The second document is an information paper from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Paul W. Johnson. The paper states that the Department of the Army supports this legislation. It also states that the Office of Management and Budget has no objection to the presentation of this amendment. Mr. President, the area that I am speaking about is a unique geological formation. This gypsum deposit known as ``White Sands'' is very important to my home State of New Mexico. The sands cover approximately 275 square miles with about 40 percent lying within the monument and the remaining portion of the dunes, to the south and the east, belonging to the White Sands Missile Range. As a brief history, on January 18, 1933, President Hoover designated 142, 987 acres, in the Tularosa Basin, as the National Park. From the very beginning, the park has been a success. Within its first 2 years of operation, the White Sands monument shattered the attendance records of the 23-unit Southwestern National Monuments in the Four Corner States of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, DC, June 27, 1996. Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Bingaman: Thank you for providing the National Park Service the opportunity to comment on the draft amendment to modify the boundaries of the White Sands National Monument New Mexico, and to modify the boundary of