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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996
(Senate - September 21, 1995)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S13995-S14079] FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 1868, which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 1868) making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996. The Senate resumed consideration of the bill. Pending: Helms (for Dole/Helms) amendment No. 2707 (to committee amendment on page 2, line 25), to provide for the streamlining and consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States. Brown amendment No. 2708 (to committee amendment beginning on page 15, line 17 through page 16, line 24), to clarify restrictions on assistance to Pakistan. (By 37 yeas to 61 nays (Vote No. 452), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.) Murkowski amendment No. 2712, to set forth requirements for implementation of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea Act relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Amendment No. 2708 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 1 hour of debate on the Brown amendment No. 2708, equally divided. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. So ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this amendment is about simple fairness. We have taken their money. We have obtained a contract to deliver equipment, and we do not want to deliver that equipment. I understand the feelings of those Members who have that position. But, Mr. President, it is wrong to take somebody's money and not deliver the equipment and not give them their money back. If this were Sears, Roebuck in the United States, we would lock them up. The consumer protection laws do not apply to the U.S. Government, but, Mr. President, simple fairness does. The American people understand this issue because they understand what it is like when someone who is selling something takes their money and does not deliver either the product or the money. That is what this amendment is all about. It is about fairness, and it is about saying either give them their money back or give them the equipment they contracted for. Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Under the quorum call that just took place, how is the time charged to each side? [[Page S 13996]] The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator that suggested it. Mr. GLENN. Would the Chair repeat? The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator who suggested it. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, my sense is that fairness would require that it be charged to both sides equally. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. I suggest the absence of a quorum and request the time be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I cannot disagree more with my distinguished colleague from Colorado when he says this is just a matter of fairness about giving money back as though we ordered something from Sears, Roebuck and did not get it so we ought to get our money back. That is such a simplistic view that it mocks what we have been trying to do with our nonproliferation policy, our nuclear nonproliferation policy for the last 30 years. We have tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around this world. That is what this issue is all about. It is a nonproliferation issue. The question: Are we serious about a U.S. leadership role in nonproliferation policy or are we not? I share the concern that Pakistan should get its money back, but not at the expense of dumping our nuclear policy and making our efforts around the world to further nuclear nonproliferation be mocked by the 178 nations that signed up under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is what this is all about. Pakistan has been the most egregious violator. They refused to join the NPT and refused to cooperate and repeatedly told us untruth after untruth after untruth after untruth, lie after lie after lie, about their intentions on nuclear weapons. They deliberately misled us--misled me personally. I was over there a couple times. Once I met with President Zia; with Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister; Mir Khan, from their atomic energy commission. They told me they had no program at all. They said that our intelligence was just flat wrong. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto repeatedly has made statements that they have no nuclear weapons objectives. And yet we know that is not true. So what this is about is not just about fairness of giving the money back as though a purchase had been made at Sears; this is a matter of nonproliferation and are we serious about it or not? We all love to get up and make our press conference statements about how much we are against nuclear proliferation and we do not want to see nuclear weapons spread to more nations around the world. We, in fact, right now are getting control of our nuclear weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union, now the Russians, and we are scaling those down. At the same time we asked other nations, ``Please do not go ahead with nuclear weapons programs. We will cooperate with you if you do not.'' We cooperated with Pakistan when they were threatened and mutual interest indicated we should send weapons to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. It was in Pakistan's interest we do that, also. It was not just a gratuitous favor to the United States. Through the years over and over we were assured Pakistan had no nuclear weapons program by their officials when we knew they did. During this time period we were successful in turning off a Taiwanese effort to start a nuclear weapons program. We were successful in turning off a South Korean effort to start a nuclear weapons program. South Africa, they finally gave up on their efforts after having a nuclear weapon or being close to it. Argentina and Brazil ceased their efforts. And 178 nations signed up under NPT. This is a great success story. Do we mean it when we say we have a nonproliferation policy or not? I am very critical of this administration. I sent a long letter to the President with my position on this back in April. I included it in the Record last night. I think this is sort of a test case here. Do we mean it or not? If we let Pakistan go ahead and say we reward them then with all sorts of help, with economic aid, with all the things that are going on with the weapons program, with the spare parts, with things like that, with new missiles, and we reward them for these efforts, it makes a mockery--makes a mockery--out of our nonproliferation efforts when other nations say they may want to do the same thing that Pakistan has already done. The international nuclear trade has been going up, I am sorry to say. We should be trying to cut it back. We passed legislation--we passed the Glenn-Symington amendment to deal with this way back. We passed the Pressler amendment later on that was Pakistan-specific, and should have been. It is the way it should be. But the Congress was unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan, and stipulated in our waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if it received or exploded a nuclear device. ``Received''--in other words, gained that capability. Congress stipulated that an annual report would be provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm that the United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb program, as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration officers. Waiver after waiver after waiver, which I went through in detail last night, waiver after waiver after waiver for Pakistan. And every time one was granted, it was granted on the basis that we need to be their friends so they will not continue along this route. And we have that whole trail of broken promises, one after another after another. The result of all of this, all the untruths that were told to us, all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the program was progressing, resulted in the Pressler amendment. Well, the CIA, to their credit, was skeptical that any of these things would work back at that time. And they were right. So now we have the effort to give the money back. And it is supposedly that they would like to have you think that the proposal from the other side was that they just paid all this money out there, and then we jerked the rug out from under them. The fact is that out of the $858 million, $50 million was paid before Pressler; the rest of it was all paid after the Pressler amendment was adopted, and Pakistan knew full well what they were doing. They knew exactly what they were doing, and they continued and paid the rest of that money after the Pressler amendment was adopted, hoping that we would back down, that we were not serious about our nuclear nonproliferation policy, and they were right. We backed down. The United States of America is still backing down on nuclear nonproliferation. It is not easy for the Pakis, because they are entitled to some sympathy in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars with a much larger adversary, India, who was also pursuing a nuclear weapons program and had exploded a device in 1984, and mainly built their program because of China's nuclear efforts. I do have sympathy for them in that regard, but I do not have much sympathy when they have deliberately misled us, lied to us all through the years. Mr. President, one after the other, officials in Pakistan have not told us the truth. I said before my own personal experience in meeting with President Zia, the foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, and from the atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, was that they all assured us they had no program when we knew that they did. Let me read a few quotes. Back in 1988, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, shortly before coming Prime Minister: We don't want any controversy [with the U.S.] on the nuclear issue . . . We want it clear beyond doubt that we're interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons. Again, interview with Time magazine, November 1988: We believe in a peaceful [nuclear] program for energy purposes and nothing else. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview in Calcutta Telegraph, December 1988: [[Page S 13997]] I can tell you with confidence that there is no bomb programme in Pakistan . . . There is no bomb programme . . . there is no bomb programme. December, 1988: We're committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't have any [nuclear] weapons policy . . . Pakistan doesn't have any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon. Another one in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an address before a joint meeting of Congress, right down the hall, a joint meeting of Congress, and made this statement to all of us. I was in attendance at that meeting: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy. New York Times, 1989 interview with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting together or making, a bomb, or taking it to the point where you can put it together. So much for the word of Pakistan. So when we say, Mr. President, that this is an issue of just giving the money back, as though we have made a deal at Sears someplace, that is extremely misleading, and I disagree with that characterization of what this is about. What this is about is whether the United States has a nuclear nonproliferation policy and whether we are truly willing to stick to it or are we not. Do we have the guts to make the tough decisions in the interest of seeing nuclear weapons not spread further around the world, just at the same time we are trying to get our own nuclear weapons stockpiles and those of the former Soviet Union under control and doing a good job in that area. Mr. President, that is what this vote is all about. I know from the vote yesterday what the vote is likely to be today. I think it is a wrong vote because it sends all the wrong signals to the 178 nonproliferation members around the world who are doing what we wanted them to do, what we tried to lead them to do and which they have continued to do, and that is try and stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. That is what this vote is all about. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there are several important points raised by the distinguished Senator from Ohio that I would like to address. One is the suggestion that we have somehow backed down on our nonproliferation objective or let Pakistan off the hook if this amendment is adopted. I sincerely believe that is an inaccurate statement, and I want to draw the attention of the Members to the facts. The reality is, if this amendment is adopted that our restriction against military assistance stays in place and it stays in place even though Pakistan has significant national security problems, our restriction against military sales stays in place, and it does so even though they have a great need and want to buy equipment from the United States. For a country that is in need of assistance and in need of weapons, those are significant and major restrictions, and to throw them away or ignore them, I think, ignores the facts. The fact is, they are strong sanctions that are in place and continue in place if the amendment is adopted. We should not forget the fact as well that Pakistan signed a contract for these some 9 years ago, for other parts 8 years ago, and for other parts 7 years ago. They paid for those, and whether they paid all up front or paid in installments, as most people do, I think misses the point. The fact is, they paid for these, they contracted for these. These items they have contracted for have sat around. Does anybody think military equipment that was due for delivery 5 years ago is as valuable today as when it came up? Of course, not. So to suggest there have not been and do not continue to be enormously significant sanctions in place against Pakistan is to simply ignore the facts. It is misleading, I think, to say that there are not major penalties that we have demanded that the Pakistanis pay and will continue to pay in the future. Mr. President, a great deal has been made about disingenuous statements by the Pakistanis with regard to their nuclear program. I, for one, think it is regrettable that that has happened. But, we should not be holier than thou when we talk about misleading statements regarding national security. Are our memories so short around here, particularly with regard to Pakistan? Does not anyone recall that Francis Gary Powers' flight took off from Pakistan, an area we asked the Pakistanis to make available to us, at a base we asked them to let us fly out of, to fly over and spy on the Soviet Union? Has everyone forgotten how important that was to national security? Incidentally, does anyone remember what President Eisenhower said when he was asked about it? No one has mentioned that today. But if you want to talk about disingenuous statements, what about President Eisenhower? Are we so holy we have forgotten it? This emanated from Pakistan. President Eisenhower denied the flights. Was it an incorrect statement? Of course it was. Why did he do it? To protect our national security. Does anybody remember what President Kennedy said with regard to the Bay of Pigs? We do not dwell on it, but before we get so holy, before we get too holy, remember, Americans have felt a need to protect their national security, too, and it is strange that people would talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to Pakistan and not be willing to talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to India. My own view of this is that we want to be friends with both India and Pakistan. We want to stand beside them. We want to work with both of them. Perhaps it was not widely noticed, but I was the prime critic of the administration when it was slow to name an Ambassador to India. It seemed to me that was an important function to do, with a country that should be our friend and we want to work with. I spoke out against the bashing of India over the question of Kashmir. I believe what we want is a balanced policy, but, Mr. President, we should not look at the questions regarding Pakistan's national security in a vacuum. To assume that we are going to have a policy that denies Pakistan nuclear weapons and not comment about India's nuclear weapons is a mistake. To assume we are going to bash Pakistan for trying to find missiles and not say anything about India's missile program is a mistake. What we ought to have is a balanced policy in that part of the world, not a one-sided policy. I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to compliment the Senator from Colorado on his diligence and his effort to bring some rationality and reason to this debate, to try to get us to focus on fairness and equity in dealing with this part of the world. I certainly would not want any of my comments that I made last night in the debate, or any I might make now, to be construed to indicate in any way that I have it in for India. That is not it at all. But I do believe that the history of our relations with Pakistan are such that we have to start dealing in a more evenhanded fashion in that part of the world. Last night in my remarks, I went over the long history of Pakistani- United States friendly relations. I do not mean to belabor that again and go over that, other than to just say that going clear back to when Pakistan got its independence, Pakistan has always been oriented toward the United States. They supported us in the Korean war. As the Senator from Colorado pointed out, the flights of the U-2 over the Soviet Union came from Pakistan. After the U-2 was shot down, Nikita Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with nuclear weapons. Pakistan stuck with the United States. In the gulf war, Pakistan helped us out; they were on our side. In Somalia--and even in Haiti, Pakistan has sent troops to help restore democracy to Haiti. So in almost everything that we have done, Pakistan has been our strong friend and ally. Yet, I believe we have not treated them evenhandedly. All this really is is a question of fairness. Last night, I quoted--and I want to repeat that--the statement by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in [[Page S 13998]] a letter dated September 20 to Senator Daschle. He said: We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counter- terrorist programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including nonproliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. That is what the Brown amendment does. Again, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter, dated September 20, from Secretary of State Christopher, be printed in its entirety in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of State, Washington, September 20, 1995. Hon. Thomas A. Daschle, Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate. Dear Senator Daschle: As the Senate begins consideration of the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, I would like to address several issues in the version of the bill as reported by the full Appropriations Committee. At the outset I would like to thank Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy for their willingness to work with us and to include priority initiatives such as a long-term extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) and a drawdown authority for Jordan in the subcommittee mark. We would oppose any amendments that would alter the carefully negotiated language for either of these initiatives. Also, we appreciate the Subcommittee's removal of objectional conditions adopted by the House on population assistance and aid to Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. We hope to continue in this cooperative fashion to produce a Foreign Operations bill that can be presented to the President with bipartisan support. Despite the favorable aspects of the legislation, there are several items that are of great concern to the Department of State. The funding levels throughout the bill are well below the President's request level. The Foreign Operations cuts, coupled with the cuts being proposed to international programs in the Senate's Commerce, Justice, State Department Appropriations bill, represent a serious threat to America's leadership in international affairs. The bill also contains numerous earmarks and substantially restructures our foreign aid accounts. We expect international agencies to do their share in the effort to balance the budget as the President's budget plan makes clear. However, we, the Administration, should have the flexibility to apply funds to the programs that provide the best results. Earmarks in our programs for the New Independent States, International Counternarcotics, and economic assistance would prevent us from being able to respond to the crisis and unexpected requirements of the post-Cold War world. Further, the proportionality requirement in the new Economic Assistance account restricts our ability to change the distribution of these funds from year to year. We oppose these restrictions. The bill also contains a number of objectionable policy provisions. Restrictions on our ability to contribute to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would, in effect, prevent U.S. funding of KEDO and greatly hinder, if not destroy, the international effort to implement the Agreed Framework. We oppose linking KEDO funding to substantial progress on North Korean/South Korean dialogue. Imposing an artificial and unrealistic deadline on North/South talks, which have taken years to progress, will hold hostage the very funding that will facilitate the progress we all so desire. We remain convinced that the North/South dialogue will move forward substantially as a result of the Agreed Framework and the creation of KEDO. Our failure to contribute to KEDO will threaten its ability to meet its obligations under the Framework and, consequently, invite North Korean non-compliance. The Agreed Framework is working. North Korea has frozen its nuclear weapons program. We need Congressional support for KEDO to keep the freeze in place. Regarding assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) and Russia, we have reached a critical moment in the reform process. Continued funding is essential. It can make a major difference in whether reformers in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and other states will be able to maintain momentum, or the opponents of reform will halt the development of democratic market societies. We need to stay the course for this transitional period, while normal trading and investment relationships develop in the former Soviet states. We very much appreciate the continued support we have received from the Congress, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in particular, for this critical effort, as reflected in this bill. At the same time, however, we oppose new conditions on assistance to the NIS. It is of course tempting to withdraw our assistance as punishment when we do not agree with Russian actions or policies. But this would be a mistake. This assistance is in our national interest. Cutting or restricting aid would hurt reformers, the very people who have protested the war in Chechnya, criticized Russia's proposed nuclear sale to Iran, or insisted that Russia end cooperation with Cuba. We urge you to remove such conditions from this bill. Let me assure you that we share your concerns about Russia's policies in these areas; that is why we continue to work on other fronts to stop the Russian nuclear reactor sale to Iran and to prevent completion of the Cuban reactor project. We also urge you to restore the national security waiver for the certification requirement on violations of territorial integrity, which has been removed from the Senate version of this bill. It is important that the President retain the ability to determine whether the national security of the United States justifies a waiver of this requirement. Moreover, removal of the waiver provision could have unintended consequences, such as prohibiting humanitarian assistance to the victims of regional conflicts in countries such as Armenia. The language regarding restrictions on the termination of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also reflects objectionable House language carried over in the Senate bill. The recent combination of NATO's resolve and energetic United States leadership on the diplomatic front has led to some encouraging opportunities for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. To prematurely close off any avenues that may lead to a diplomatic settlement, including adjustments to the sanctions regime against Serbia, would complicate our efforts. We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counterterrorism programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including non- proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. There remain other problematic issues in the bill, but we are encouraged by the willingness of the bill's managers to work with us, and we hope that these other issues can be resolved on the Senate floor or in conference. Sincerely, Warren Christopher. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, there is also a letter from Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense, who said: This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. We do not hear much talk about that around here. The nuclear programs and the missile programs of India ought to be a big concern of ours also. Secretary Perry concluded: If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Perry, dated August 2, also be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, August 2, 1995. Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Nunn: For the past six months, the Administration has wrestled with the difficult problem of trying to build a stronger, more flexible relationship with Pakistan--an important moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region which has been a long-time friend and has become a major partner in peacekeeping operations--while promoting the very important nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. Based on a detailed review within the Administration and consultations with Congress, the President has decided to address this matter on three fronts: First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance and limited military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including assistance in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counternarcotics as well as IMET). Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as provided by an amendment to be proposed by Senator Brown, that would release approximately $370 million worth of embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions. This authority would specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the items that would be released are three P-3C [[Page S 13999]] Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s and Cobra helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items will not disturb the conventional arms balance in South Asia which overwhelmingly favors India. Finally, the President has decided that, rather than releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he will seek to sell them to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in the Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale permits, Pakistan's investment in these aircraft. While we recognize that this is not a perfect solution, it is, we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a difficult problem with a country which has long been a friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. The second aspect of this three-part effort--embodied in Senator Brown's pending amendment to provide authority to release the embargoed Pakistan equipment other than the F- 16s--may be coming to a vote very shortly. I urge you to support our efforts to resolve this problem by supporting Senator Brown's amendment when it is offered. Sincerely, William J. Perry. ____ Putting The Release Of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian Navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five Il-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with the AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-air missiles, the release of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It should be noted that during the nearly five years that these howitzers were embargoed, India acquired over 250 equivalent artillery pieces from Czechoslovakia and Russia/USSR. In regard to MK-46 torpedoes, Pakistan will receive parts that constitute less than one operational MK-46. As for the 2.75" rockets, these constitute a resupply of ammunition for one of the weapons systems on the Pakistani Cobra helicopters--they do not give Pakistan any new capability. ____ Brown Amendment Text Add the following subparagraph to section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: ( ) Applicability.--(a) The restrictions of section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. (b) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 620E(e), military equipment, technology or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts of cases entered into before October 1, 1990. Impact of the Brown Amendment The proposed legislation would authorize the release of approximately $368 million worth of military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions (1 October 1995) but not delivered to Pakistan due to Pressler sanctions. Specifically prohibited from release to Pakistan under this legislation are the 28 Pakistani F-16s. Items to be released include: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stored Item Stored value Funding quantity (millions) source ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Army: C-NITE modification kits........ 18 $24.1 FMF M198 Howitzers.................. 24 18.7 FMF/Cash TPQ-36 radars................... 4 10.5 FMF M-Series rebuild parts.......... NA 6.8 FMF TOW launchers................... 135 6.1 FMF 2.75 inch rockets............... 16,720 9.4 FMF Miscellaneous Army items........ NA 1.7 FMF/Cash ------------ Army subtotal................. ........ 77.4 ============ Navy: P-3C aircraft................... 3 138.1 FMF Harpoon missiles................ 28 30.8 FMF/Cash AIM-9L missile components....... 360 19.7 FMF/Cash MK-46/Mod 2 torpedo components.. NA .1 Cash Miscellaneous Navy items........ NA 2.1 FMF/Cash ------------ Navy subtotal................. ........ 191.8 ============ Air Force: Peace Gate II support equipment, 220E engine kits............... 30,968 28.5 FMF/Cash Depot engine spares program..... 4,746 8.0 FMF ILC kits: Spares for ILC, ALQ- 131, F-100, ALR-69, support.... 2,035 7.9 FMF/Cash Peace Gate III support package: Peculiar support equipment.. 37 .9 FMF Engine spares............... 511 9.1 FMF Spares...................... 154 1.6 FMF Standard support equipment.. 67 .4 FMF Peace Gate IV support package: Engine components........... 14 .1 Cash Developmental support equipment.................. 144 8.0 Cash Standard support equipment.. 386 1.2 Cash Non-standard support equipment.................. 9 .5 Cash Standard spares............. 204 1.3 Cash Test equipment.............. NA .1 Cash ALQ-131 pods and spares..... 20 21.7 Cash Class A explosives.......... 245,046 1.5 Cash Other Air Force items........... NA 8.2 FMF/Cash ------------ Air Force subtotal............ ........ 98.8 ============ Grand total................... ........ 368 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Initiative to Strengthen Relations with Pakistan After extensive review and consultations with Congress, President Clinton has decided to support legislation to permit a stronger and more flexible relationship with Pakistan, while maintaining the nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. The President's decision builds on provisions already in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bills, which would permit the United States to resume economic assistance and limited forms of military assistance (including IMET, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and peacekeeping assistance) to Pakistan. The President has decided to seek authority, as provided for in legislation proposed by Senator Brown, to release to Pakistan approximately $370 million in military equipment, exclusive of F-16s, contracted for by Pakistan prior to the imposition of Pressler sanctions in October, 1990. This equipment includes air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, radars, howitzers, three P-3C Orion Aircraft, and support kits for the F-16s already in Pakistan's inventory. This non- strategic equipment does not have the symbolism that the F- 16s have come to acquire in the region. Release of this equipment would be a one-time exemption to the Pressler Amendment. We do not seek repeal of the Amendment or a resumed military supply relationship with Pakistan. The President also decided not to seek release of the 28 F- 16s in the pipeline. Instead, he will seek to sell the aircraft and return the proceeds of any sale to Pakistan, to reimburse as much as possible of the $684 million that Pakistan has expended on these aircraft. Putting these issues behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad, without which real progress on nonproliferation and other issues of importance to the United States will remain difficult. Finally, in making his decision, the President stressed the importance of there being no substantial change in the status quo in Pakistan with regard to nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States. In particular, we expect that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the nuclear and missile areas. Mr. HARKIN. On July 28, to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Christopher responds to a question. [[Page S 14000]] This gets to the heart of the arguments made by the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Michigan about the so-called evidence that justifies the impositions of sanctions. Here was the question: Will the Clinton administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record, also. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club, Washington, DC, July 28, 1995 Question. Will the Clinton Administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law in this regard. Mr. HARKIN. Again, I want to point out that under the missile technology Control Regime, which has been talked about by the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Ohio, even under that, even if MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all of the items in the Brown amendment could still go to Pakistan, because MTCR violations only prohibited new licenses to Pakistan and China. These items were already licensed in the 1980's. Again, Mr. President, there is a lot of talk about Pakistan not admitting certain things. I think the Senator from Colorado answered that quite adequately. Again I would just ask a question: Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? We know that they detonated one in 1974. Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? If not, are they lying to us, also? I think that is enough of that. Mr. President, I want to close my remarks by pointing out that Pakistan has always gone the extra mile to try to get a reasonable solution and compromise in that part of the world with India. Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. We have India, a large nation with 981 million people, confronting Pakistan, a small country with only about 125 million people. We have to kind of keep that in context. I want to review for my colleagues some of the proposals that Pakistan has put forward, going back over 20 years. First of all, Pakistan proposed to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in south Asia in 1974. In 1978, they proposed to issue a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacturing of nuclear weapons. In 1979, they proposed to have mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities. Also in 1979, they proposed simultaneous adherence to the Non- Proliferation Treaty by India and Pakistan. Again in 1979, they proposed to endorse a simultaneous acceptance of full-scope international atomic energy safeguards and to have the IAEA do inspections. They proposed, also in 1987, an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty. In 1991, Pakistan proposed to commence a multilateral conference on the question of nuclear proliferation in south Asia. A couple years ago, they proposed to create a missile-free zone in all of south Asia. Pakistan has proposed all this. What is the stumbling block? India will not accept any of these. They are the ones that have said ``no'' to all of these proposals. Yet, we are the ones that are sticking it to Pakistan. I do not understand this at all. It seems to me that this is the kind of regime that we want in south Asia. We ought to be behind these proposals, and we ought to be using our influence with India and other countries in that area to agree with Pakistan, to sit down and negotiate these proposals, which were made in good faith by Pakistan. Last, Mr. President, two quotes, first by President Clinton, April 11, 1995: I don't think what happened was fair to Pakistan in terms of the money . . . I don't think it is right for us to keep the money and the equipment. That is not right. And I am going to try to find a resolution to it. I don't like this. President Clinton, April 11, 1995. That is exactly what the Brown amendment does. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Iowa 2 additional minutes. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the President is supporting the Brown amendment because it reflects exactly what President Clinton said April 11. On the same date, Prime Minister Bhutto said: The Pressler amendment has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation issue. April 11, 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, it is time to put this behind us. It is time for fairness and equity. It is time to recognize that if we want to support the democratic forces in Pakistan, if we want to give Prime Minister Bhutto the support she needs to consolidate the prodemocracy forces in Pakistan, then we have to put this behind us. This will do more to help promote a regional solution to these problems than anything else we can do. It is simply a question of fairness and equity. I hope that the vote will be overwhelming, overwhelming in favor of the Brown amendment. Let Pakistan know we will not turn our backs on Pakistan after all of these years of friendship and support that Pakistan has given to us. I yield back whatever time is remaining. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his leadership on this. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Simon. Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I will vote against the Brown amendment, though I agree with much of what my colleague from Iowa has to say. I will vote against any weapons in any amendment that go to Pakistan or India or China until we get this nuclear thing worked out. Many of the things that Senator Harkin says are correct; for example, Pakistan and India, Pakistan suggesting that they have mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and so forth. The difficulty is India also fears China. There has to be a tripartite agreement. I think that necessarily means United States leadership working together with Russia to bring that about. There is no question Pakistan has some legitimate grievances. We ought to get those worked out. I think the Feinstein amendment that is going to be coming along shortly will help to move in that direction. We want to maintain friendship with Pakistan. Pakistan has moved from a dictatorship to a functioning democracy. Like all functioning democracies, it has problems. We ought to be working with Pakistan more closely. However, I do not think we ought to be sending weapons to any one of the three parties, who now have the greatest nuclear threat, I think, anywhere in the world. I think it would be a mistake to approve the Brown amendment. Mr. GLENN. How much time is remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from Ohio that his side has 15 minutes. Mr. GLENN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Levin. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and my friend from Ohio. Mr. President, the Brown amendment moves us in the opposite direction of trying to restrain missile proliferation. We have a law on our books and it says that where there is a determination that a transfer of a missile with a certain range and payload has been made that we will then impose sanctions. There is a large body of evidence. It is up on the fourth floor. We have had three briefings. The briefers left the [[Page S 14001]] material for us to look at. It is right there, a couple floors above us, for any of us to look at, to see whether or not each of us are satisfied that, in fact, a missile of a certain range and payload in excess of the missile technology control regime has been transferred from China to Pakistan. Under American law, if that occurs, sanctions are supposed to be imposed. Now, what the Brown amendment does is take us in the opposite direction. It would have us amend Pressler, to then allow for the transfer of significant military equipment to Pakistan. Instead of looking at this evidence and deciding whether or not it proves incontrovertible that there has been a transfer of missiles in excess of the range and payload that is provided for in the missile technology control regime which we have incorporated in our law, the amendment before the Senate would say that still could apply, but we will move in exactly the opposite direction. This amendment makes a mockery--if it passes this Senate--will make a mockery of our efforts to restrain the proliferation of missiles. That is the issue before the Senate. It is American law. American law says if there is a transfer of a missile or missiles that meet certain tests, sanctions will be imposed. I do not think we can in good conscience say that we are fighting the proliferation of missiles if we ignore that evidence two floors above us, if we do not take the time to at least look at that evidence two floors above us, and instead of acting on it, whatever our conclusions are, under American law, we move in exactly the opposite direction, amend Pressler, allow for the transfer of military equipment which otherwise could not be transferred. That is the issue before this Senate. I hope we will adopt the Feinstein amendment, which will provide that any appropriate funds that are owed to Pakistan that they have given to us, whatever is equitable, be returned to Pakistan, without trashing the missile technology control regime. I thank the Chair. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I want to deal with an aspect of this that I think is a fundamental problem because we have not addressed it, and maybe we have not addressed it for a good reason. This amendment is about fairness and about the inequity of keeping both their money and their arms. I think Americans will respond strongly to that. They understand it, and would be outraged at any retailer who did the same thing or anyone who signed contracts to sell as well. Other Members have brought up significant issues and concerns about arms in Southeast Asia. That is appropriate, and they should, and it ought to be a concern. It is why I made sure with the adoption of this amendment that very strong sanctions stay in place that send a clear message that Pakistan is paying a price for having developed weapons. Mr. President, the aspect of this that needs Members' attention is this: We have sanctions that will sanction Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, but we do not have sanctions that will sanction India for developing nuclear weapons. They are two nations, side by side. The fact is, Pakistan's program literally came about in part because India was Pakistan's adversary and India developed nuclear weapons. We cannot ignore that when you think about trying to solve this problem. There has been a lot of concern raised about missiles. That is a valid concern. I think we need to do more in that area. Mr. President, you cannot talk about it in a vacuum. The fact is, Pakistan developed their program after India developed weapons, and there are strong indications that the potential of Pakistan's missiles, if they have them and if they uncrate them, is somewhat similar to what the potential of the Indian missiles are. If anything, India has stronger missiles. You cannot talk about this in a vacuum. If you do talk about it in a vacuum and you think about it in a vacuum, you are doomed to failure. We want a nonproliferation program that works, that is effective. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Iowa. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to respond, perhaps, to my colleague from Illinois who talked about the weapons going to Pakistan. I have looked over the list of the items that are going. I thought I might, just for the Record, point out what some people have said about these items. All of the experts agree, it will not in any way upset the regional balance. Steve Cohen is the director of program in arms control, disarmament and international security at the University of Illinois. He said, In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think that the release of this military equipment . . . will have . . . significant impact on the balance one way or the other. George Tanham, who was a vice president of the Rand Corp., says, ``I agree.'' He said: In fact, there is no balance now. India dominates so strongly. They have twice as large an army as Pakistan, twice as large an Air Force, twice as large a Navy, twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. * * * India has overwhelming strength. So this small amount of equipment will not upset any balance. All of the experts basically agree that this amount of items that we are sending over there would not in any way upset that regional balance. James Clad, professor at Georgetown University said: They offer for Pakistan ``exactly as Dr. Tanham pointed out, an equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry capability and geographical reality.'' So, again, I have gone over this list. I do not know if anyone has ever put it in the Record. But of the military equipment, adding to about $368 million, the biggest items are three P-C3 aircraft, four- engine turboprop aircraft. They are very slow aircraft. They do not have the capability in any way to threaten India, and I would be glad to get into a discussion with anyone if they would like to discuss that. I want to make sure this is in the Record. I ask unanimous consent a list of the items be printed in the Record and also a description of these items be printed in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Putting the Release of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five II-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with an AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-missiles, the release [[Page S 14002]] of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It would be noted that during the nea

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996
(Senate - September 21, 1995)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S13995-S14079] FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 1868, which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 1868) making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996. The Senate resumed consideration of the bill. Pending: Helms (for Dole/Helms) amendment No. 2707 (to committee amendment on page 2, line 25), to provide for the streamlining and consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States. Brown amendment No. 2708 (to committee amendment beginning on page 15, line 17 through page 16, line 24), to clarify restrictions on assistance to Pakistan. (By 37 yeas to 61 nays (Vote No. 452), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.) Murkowski amendment No. 2712, to set forth requirements for implementation of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea Act relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Amendment No. 2708 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 1 hour of debate on the Brown amendment No. 2708, equally divided. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. So ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this amendment is about simple fairness. We have taken their money. We have obtained a contract to deliver equipment, and we do not want to deliver that equipment. I understand the feelings of those Members who have that position. But, Mr. President, it is wrong to take somebody's money and not deliver the equipment and not give them their money back. If this were Sears, Roebuck in the United States, we would lock them up. The consumer protection laws do not apply to the U.S. Government, but, Mr. President, simple fairness does. The American people understand this issue because they understand what it is like when someone who is selling something takes their money and does not deliver either the product or the money. That is what this amendment is all about. It is about fairness, and it is about saying either give them their money back or give them the equipment they contracted for. Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Under the quorum call that just took place, how is the time charged to each side? [[Page S 13996]] The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator that suggested it. Mr. GLENN. Would the Chair repeat? The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator who suggested it. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, my sense is that fairness would require that it be charged to both sides equally. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. I suggest the absence of a quorum and request the time be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I cannot disagree more with my distinguished colleague from Colorado when he says this is just a matter of fairness about giving money back as though we ordered something from Sears, Roebuck and did not get it so we ought to get our money back. That is such a simplistic view that it mocks what we have been trying to do with our nonproliferation policy, our nuclear nonproliferation policy for the last 30 years. We have tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around this world. That is what this issue is all about. It is a nonproliferation issue. The question: Are we serious about a U.S. leadership role in nonproliferation policy or are we not? I share the concern that Pakistan should get its money back, but not at the expense of dumping our nuclear policy and making our efforts around the world to further nuclear nonproliferation be mocked by the 178 nations that signed up under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is what this is all about. Pakistan has been the most egregious violator. They refused to join the NPT and refused to cooperate and repeatedly told us untruth after untruth after untruth after untruth, lie after lie after lie, about their intentions on nuclear weapons. They deliberately misled us--misled me personally. I was over there a couple times. Once I met with President Zia; with Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister; Mir Khan, from their atomic energy commission. They told me they had no program at all. They said that our intelligence was just flat wrong. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto repeatedly has made statements that they have no nuclear weapons objectives. And yet we know that is not true. So what this is about is not just about fairness of giving the money back as though a purchase had been made at Sears; this is a matter of nonproliferation and are we serious about it or not? We all love to get up and make our press conference statements about how much we are against nuclear proliferation and we do not want to see nuclear weapons spread to more nations around the world. We, in fact, right now are getting control of our nuclear weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union, now the Russians, and we are scaling those down. At the same time we asked other nations, ``Please do not go ahead with nuclear weapons programs. We will cooperate with you if you do not.'' We cooperated with Pakistan when they were threatened and mutual interest indicated we should send weapons to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. It was in Pakistan's interest we do that, also. It was not just a gratuitous favor to the United States. Through the years over and over we were assured Pakistan had no nuclear weapons program by their officials when we knew they did. During this time period we were successful in turning off a Taiwanese effort to start a nuclear weapons program. We were successful in turning off a South Korean effort to start a nuclear weapons program. South Africa, they finally gave up on their efforts after having a nuclear weapon or being close to it. Argentina and Brazil ceased their efforts. And 178 nations signed up under NPT. This is a great success story. Do we mean it when we say we have a nonproliferation policy or not? I am very critical of this administration. I sent a long letter to the President with my position on this back in April. I included it in the Record last night. I think this is sort of a test case here. Do we mean it or not? If we let Pakistan go ahead and say we reward them then with all sorts of help, with economic aid, with all the things that are going on with the weapons program, with the spare parts, with things like that, with new missiles, and we reward them for these efforts, it makes a mockery--makes a mockery--out of our nonproliferation efforts when other nations say they may want to do the same thing that Pakistan has already done. The international nuclear trade has been going up, I am sorry to say. We should be trying to cut it back. We passed legislation--we passed the Glenn-Symington amendment to deal with this way back. We passed the Pressler amendment later on that was Pakistan-specific, and should have been. It is the way it should be. But the Congress was unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan, and stipulated in our waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if it received or exploded a nuclear device. ``Received''--in other words, gained that capability. Congress stipulated that an annual report would be provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm that the United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb program, as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration officers. Waiver after waiver after waiver, which I went through in detail last night, waiver after waiver after waiver for Pakistan. And every time one was granted, it was granted on the basis that we need to be their friends so they will not continue along this route. And we have that whole trail of broken promises, one after another after another. The result of all of this, all the untruths that were told to us, all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the program was progressing, resulted in the Pressler amendment. Well, the CIA, to their credit, was skeptical that any of these things would work back at that time. And they were right. So now we have the effort to give the money back. And it is supposedly that they would like to have you think that the proposal from the other side was that they just paid all this money out there, and then we jerked the rug out from under them. The fact is that out of the $858 million, $50 million was paid before Pressler; the rest of it was all paid after the Pressler amendment was adopted, and Pakistan knew full well what they were doing. They knew exactly what they were doing, and they continued and paid the rest of that money after the Pressler amendment was adopted, hoping that we would back down, that we were not serious about our nuclear nonproliferation policy, and they were right. We backed down. The United States of America is still backing down on nuclear nonproliferation. It is not easy for the Pakis, because they are entitled to some sympathy in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars with a much larger adversary, India, who was also pursuing a nuclear weapons program and had exploded a device in 1984, and mainly built their program because of China's nuclear efforts. I do have sympathy for them in that regard, but I do not have much sympathy when they have deliberately misled us, lied to us all through the years. Mr. President, one after the other, officials in Pakistan have not told us the truth. I said before my own personal experience in meeting with President Zia, the foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, and from the atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, was that they all assured us they had no program when we knew that they did. Let me read a few quotes. Back in 1988, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, shortly before coming Prime Minister: We don't want any controversy [with the U.S.] on the nuclear issue . . . We want it clear beyond doubt that we're interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons. Again, interview with Time magazine, November 1988: We believe in a peaceful [nuclear] program for energy purposes and nothing else. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview in Calcutta Telegraph, December 1988: [[Page S 13997]] I can tell you with confidence that there is no bomb programme in Pakistan . . . There is no bomb programme . . . there is no bomb programme. December, 1988: We're committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't have any [nuclear] weapons policy . . . Pakistan doesn't have any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon. Another one in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an address before a joint meeting of Congress, right down the hall, a joint meeting of Congress, and made this statement to all of us. I was in attendance at that meeting: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy. New York Times, 1989 interview with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting together or making, a bomb, or taking it to the point where you can put it together. So much for the word of Pakistan. So when we say, Mr. President, that this is an issue of just giving the money back, as though we have made a deal at Sears someplace, that is extremely misleading, and I disagree with that characterization of what this is about. What this is about is whether the United States has a nuclear nonproliferation policy and whether we are truly willing to stick to it or are we not. Do we have the guts to make the tough decisions in the interest of seeing nuclear weapons not spread further around the world, just at the same time we are trying to get our own nuclear weapons stockpiles and those of the former Soviet Union under control and doing a good job in that area. Mr. President, that is what this vote is all about. I know from the vote yesterday what the vote is likely to be today. I think it is a wrong vote because it sends all the wrong signals to the 178 nonproliferation members around the world who are doing what we wanted them to do, what we tried to lead them to do and which they have continued to do, and that is try and stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. That is what this vote is all about. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there are several important points raised by the distinguished Senator from Ohio that I would like to address. One is the suggestion that we have somehow backed down on our nonproliferation objective or let Pakistan off the hook if this amendment is adopted. I sincerely believe that is an inaccurate statement, and I want to draw the attention of the Members to the facts. The reality is, if this amendment is adopted that our restriction against military assistance stays in place and it stays in place even though Pakistan has significant national security problems, our restriction against military sales stays in place, and it does so even though they have a great need and want to buy equipment from the United States. For a country that is in need of assistance and in need of weapons, those are significant and major restrictions, and to throw them away or ignore them, I think, ignores the facts. The fact is, they are strong sanctions that are in place and continue in place if the amendment is adopted. We should not forget the fact as well that Pakistan signed a contract for these some 9 years ago, for other parts 8 years ago, and for other parts 7 years ago. They paid for those, and whether they paid all up front or paid in installments, as most people do, I think misses the point. The fact is, they paid for these, they contracted for these. These items they have contracted for have sat around. Does anybody think military equipment that was due for delivery 5 years ago is as valuable today as when it came up? Of course, not. So to suggest there have not been and do not continue to be enormously significant sanctions in place against Pakistan is to simply ignore the facts. It is misleading, I think, to say that there are not major penalties that we have demanded that the Pakistanis pay and will continue to pay in the future. Mr. President, a great deal has been made about disingenuous statements by the Pakistanis with regard to their nuclear program. I, for one, think it is regrettable that that has happened. But, we should not be holier than thou when we talk about misleading statements regarding national security. Are our memories so short around here, particularly with regard to Pakistan? Does not anyone recall that Francis Gary Powers' flight took off from Pakistan, an area we asked the Pakistanis to make available to us, at a base we asked them to let us fly out of, to fly over and spy on the Soviet Union? Has everyone forgotten how important that was to national security? Incidentally, does anyone remember what President Eisenhower said when he was asked about it? No one has mentioned that today. But if you want to talk about disingenuous statements, what about President Eisenhower? Are we so holy we have forgotten it? This emanated from Pakistan. President Eisenhower denied the flights. Was it an incorrect statement? Of course it was. Why did he do it? To protect our national security. Does anybody remember what President Kennedy said with regard to the Bay of Pigs? We do not dwell on it, but before we get so holy, before we get too holy, remember, Americans have felt a need to protect their national security, too, and it is strange that people would talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to Pakistan and not be willing to talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to India. My own view of this is that we want to be friends with both India and Pakistan. We want to stand beside them. We want to work with both of them. Perhaps it was not widely noticed, but I was the prime critic of the administration when it was slow to name an Ambassador to India. It seemed to me that was an important function to do, with a country that should be our friend and we want to work with. I spoke out against the bashing of India over the question of Kashmir. I believe what we want is a balanced policy, but, Mr. President, we should not look at the questions regarding Pakistan's national security in a vacuum. To assume that we are going to have a policy that denies Pakistan nuclear weapons and not comment about India's nuclear weapons is a mistake. To assume we are going to bash Pakistan for trying to find missiles and not say anything about India's missile program is a mistake. What we ought to have is a balanced policy in that part of the world, not a one-sided policy. I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to compliment the Senator from Colorado on his diligence and his effort to bring some rationality and reason to this debate, to try to get us to focus on fairness and equity in dealing with this part of the world. I certainly would not want any of my comments that I made last night in the debate, or any I might make now, to be construed to indicate in any way that I have it in for India. That is not it at all. But I do believe that the history of our relations with Pakistan are such that we have to start dealing in a more evenhanded fashion in that part of the world. Last night in my remarks, I went over the long history of Pakistani- United States friendly relations. I do not mean to belabor that again and go over that, other than to just say that going clear back to when Pakistan got its independence, Pakistan has always been oriented toward the United States. They supported us in the Korean war. As the Senator from Colorado pointed out, the flights of the U-2 over the Soviet Union came from Pakistan. After the U-2 was shot down, Nikita Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with nuclear weapons. Pakistan stuck with the United States. In the gulf war, Pakistan helped us out; they were on our side. In Somalia--and even in Haiti, Pakistan has sent troops to help restore democracy to Haiti. So in almost everything that we have done, Pakistan has been our strong friend and ally. Yet, I believe we have not treated them evenhandedly. All this really is is a question of fairness. Last night, I quoted--and I want to repeat that--the statement by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in [[Page S 13998]] a letter dated September 20 to Senator Daschle. He said: We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counter- terrorist programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including nonproliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. That is what the Brown amendment does. Again, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter, dated September 20, from Secretary of State Christopher, be printed in its entirety in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of State, Washington, September 20, 1995. Hon. Thomas A. Daschle, Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate. Dear Senator Daschle: As the Senate begins consideration of the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, I would like to address several issues in the version of the bill as reported by the full Appropriations Committee. At the outset I would like to thank Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy for their willingness to work with us and to include priority initiatives such as a long-term extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) and a drawdown authority for Jordan in the subcommittee mark. We would oppose any amendments that would alter the carefully negotiated language for either of these initiatives. Also, we appreciate the Subcommittee's removal of objectional conditions adopted by the House on population assistance and aid to Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. We hope to continue in this cooperative fashion to produce a Foreign Operations bill that can be presented to the President with bipartisan support. Despite the favorable aspects of the legislation, there are several items that are of great concern to the Department of State. The funding levels throughout the bill are well below the President's request level. The Foreign Operations cuts, coupled with the cuts being proposed to international programs in the Senate's Commerce, Justice, State Department Appropriations bill, represent a serious threat to America's leadership in international affairs. The bill also contains numerous earmarks and substantially restructures our foreign aid accounts. We expect international agencies to do their share in the effort to balance the budget as the President's budget plan makes clear. However, we, the Administration, should have the flexibility to apply funds to the programs that provide the best results. Earmarks in our programs for the New Independent States, International Counternarcotics, and economic assistance would prevent us from being able to respond to the crisis and unexpected requirements of the post-Cold War world. Further, the proportionality requirement in the new Economic Assistance account restricts our ability to change the distribution of these funds from year to year. We oppose these restrictions. The bill also contains a number of objectionable policy provisions. Restrictions on our ability to contribute to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would, in effect, prevent U.S. funding of KEDO and greatly hinder, if not destroy, the international effort to implement the Agreed Framework. We oppose linking KEDO funding to substantial progress on North Korean/South Korean dialogue. Imposing an artificial and unrealistic deadline on North/South talks, which have taken years to progress, will hold hostage the very funding that will facilitate the progress we all so desire. We remain convinced that the North/South dialogue will move forward substantially as a result of the Agreed Framework and the creation of KEDO. Our failure to contribute to KEDO will threaten its ability to meet its obligations under the Framework and, consequently, invite North Korean non-compliance. The Agreed Framework is working. North Korea has frozen its nuclear weapons program. We need Congressional support for KEDO to keep the freeze in place. Regarding assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) and Russia, we have reached a critical moment in the reform process. Continued funding is essential. It can make a major difference in whether reformers in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and other states will be able to maintain momentum, or the opponents of reform will halt the development of democratic market societies. We need to stay the course for this transitional period, while normal trading and investment relationships develop in the former Soviet states. We very much appreciate the continued support we have received from the Congress, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in particular, for this critical effort, as reflected in this bill. At the same time, however, we oppose new conditions on assistance to the NIS. It is of course tempting to withdraw our assistance as punishment when we do not agree with Russian actions or policies. But this would be a mistake. This assistance is in our national interest. Cutting or restricting aid would hurt reformers, the very people who have protested the war in Chechnya, criticized Russia's proposed nuclear sale to Iran, or insisted that Russia end cooperation with Cuba. We urge you to remove such conditions from this bill. Let me assure you that we share your concerns about Russia's policies in these areas; that is why we continue to work on other fronts to stop the Russian nuclear reactor sale to Iran and to prevent completion of the Cuban reactor project. We also urge you to restore the national security waiver for the certification requirement on violations of territorial integrity, which has been removed from the Senate version of this bill. It is important that the President retain the ability to determine whether the national security of the United States justifies a waiver of this requirement. Moreover, removal of the waiver provision could have unintended consequences, such as prohibiting humanitarian assistance to the victims of regional conflicts in countries such as Armenia. The language regarding restrictions on the termination of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also reflects objectionable House language carried over in the Senate bill. The recent combination of NATO's resolve and energetic United States leadership on the diplomatic front has led to some encouraging opportunities for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. To prematurely close off any avenues that may lead to a diplomatic settlement, including adjustments to the sanctions regime against Serbia, would complicate our efforts. We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counterterrorism programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including non- proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. There remain other problematic issues in the bill, but we are encouraged by the willingness of the bill's managers to work with us, and we hope that these other issues can be resolved on the Senate floor or in conference. Sincerely, Warren Christopher. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, there is also a letter from Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense, who said: This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. We do not hear much talk about that around here. The nuclear programs and the missile programs of India ought to be a big concern of ours also. Secretary Perry concluded: If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Perry, dated August 2, also be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, August 2, 1995. Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Nunn: For the past six months, the Administration has wrestled with the difficult problem of trying to build a stronger, more flexible relationship with Pakistan--an important moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region which has been a long-time friend and has become a major partner in peacekeeping operations--while promoting the very important nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. Based on a detailed review within the Administration and consultations with Congress, the President has decided to address this matter on three fronts: First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance and limited military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including assistance in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counternarcotics as well as IMET). Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as provided by an amendment to be proposed by Senator Brown, that would release approximately $370 million worth of embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions. This authority would specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the items that would be released are three P-3C [[Page S 13999]] Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s and Cobra helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items will not disturb the conventional arms balance in South Asia which overwhelmingly favors India. Finally, the President has decided that, rather than releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he will seek to sell them to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in the Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale permits, Pakistan's investment in these aircraft. While we recognize that this is not a perfect solution, it is, we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a difficult problem with a country which has long been a friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. The second aspect of this three-part effort--embodied in Senator Brown's pending amendment to provide authority to release the embargoed Pakistan equipment other than the F- 16s--may be coming to a vote very shortly. I urge you to support our efforts to resolve this problem by supporting Senator Brown's amendment when it is offered. Sincerely, William J. Perry. ____ Putting The Release Of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian Navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five Il-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with the AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-air missiles, the release of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It should be noted that during the nearly five years that these howitzers were embargoed, India acquired over 250 equivalent artillery pieces from Czechoslovakia and Russia/USSR. In regard to MK-46 torpedoes, Pakistan will receive parts that constitute less than one operational MK-46. As for the 2.75" rockets, these constitute a resupply of ammunition for one of the weapons systems on the Pakistani Cobra helicopters--they do not give Pakistan any new capability. ____ Brown Amendment Text Add the following subparagraph to section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: ( ) Applicability.--(a) The restrictions of section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. (b) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 620E(e), military equipment, technology or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts of cases entered into before October 1, 1990. Impact of the Brown Amendment The proposed legislation would authorize the release of approximately $368 million worth of military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions (1 October 1995) but not delivered to Pakistan due to Pressler sanctions. Specifically prohibited from release to Pakistan under this legislation are the 28 Pakistani F-16s. Items to be released include: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stored Item Stored value Funding quantity (millions) source ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Army: C-NITE modification kits........ 18 $24.1 FMF M198 Howitzers.................. 24 18.7 FMF/Cash TPQ-36 radars................... 4 10.5 FMF M-Series rebuild parts.......... NA 6.8 FMF TOW launchers................... 135 6.1 FMF 2.75 inch rockets............... 16,720 9.4 FMF Miscellaneous Army items........ NA 1.7 FMF/Cash ------------ Army subtotal................. ........ 77.4 ============ Navy: P-3C aircraft................... 3 138.1 FMF Harpoon missiles................ 28 30.8 FMF/Cash AIM-9L missile components....... 360 19.7 FMF/Cash MK-46/Mod 2 torpedo components.. NA .1 Cash Miscellaneous Navy items........ NA 2.1 FMF/Cash ------------ Navy subtotal................. ........ 191.8 ============ Air Force: Peace Gate II support equipment, 220E engine kits............... 30,968 28.5 FMF/Cash Depot engine spares program..... 4,746 8.0 FMF ILC kits: Spares for ILC, ALQ- 131, F-100, ALR-69, support.... 2,035 7.9 FMF/Cash Peace Gate III support package: Peculiar support equipment.. 37 .9 FMF Engine spares............... 511 9.1 FMF Spares...................... 154 1.6 FMF Standard support equipment.. 67 .4 FMF Peace Gate IV support package: Engine components........... 14 .1 Cash Developmental support equipment.................. 144 8.0 Cash Standard support equipment.. 386 1.2 Cash Non-standard support equipment.................. 9 .5 Cash Standard spares............. 204 1.3 Cash Test equipment.............. NA .1 Cash ALQ-131 pods and spares..... 20 21.7 Cash Class A explosives.......... 245,046 1.5 Cash Other Air Force items........... NA 8.2 FMF/Cash ------------ Air Force subtotal............ ........ 98.8 ============ Grand total................... ........ 368 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Initiative to Strengthen Relations with Pakistan After extensive review and consultations with Congress, President Clinton has decided to support legislation to permit a stronger and more flexible relationship with Pakistan, while maintaining the nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. The President's decision builds on provisions already in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bills, which would permit the United States to resume economic assistance and limited forms of military assistance (including IMET, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and peacekeeping assistance) to Pakistan. The President has decided to seek authority, as provided for in legislation proposed by Senator Brown, to release to Pakistan approximately $370 million in military equipment, exclusive of F-16s, contracted for by Pakistan prior to the imposition of Pressler sanctions in October, 1990. This equipment includes air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, radars, howitzers, three P-3C Orion Aircraft, and support kits for the F-16s already in Pakistan's inventory. This non- strategic equipment does not have the symbolism that the F- 16s have come to acquire in the region. Release of this equipment would be a one-time exemption to the Pressler Amendment. We do not seek repeal of the Amendment or a resumed military supply relationship with Pakistan. The President also decided not to seek release of the 28 F- 16s in the pipeline. Instead, he will seek to sell the aircraft and return the proceeds of any sale to Pakistan, to reimburse as much as possible of the $684 million that Pakistan has expended on these aircraft. Putting these issues behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad, without which real progress on nonproliferation and other issues of importance to the United States will remain difficult. Finally, in making his decision, the President stressed the importance of there being no substantial change in the status quo in Pakistan with regard to nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States. In particular, we expect that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the nuclear and missile areas. Mr. HARKIN. On July 28, to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Christopher responds to a question. [[Page S 14000]] This gets to the heart of the arguments made by the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Michigan about the so-called evidence that justifies the impositions of sanctions. Here was the question: Will the Clinton administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record, also. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club, Washington, DC, July 28, 1995 Question. Will the Clinton Administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law in this regard. Mr. HARKIN. Again, I want to point out that under the missile technology Control Regime, which has been talked about by the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Ohio, even under that, even if MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all of the items in the Brown amendment could still go to Pakistan, because MTCR violations only prohibited new licenses to Pakistan and China. These items were already licensed in the 1980's. Again, Mr. President, there is a lot of talk about Pakistan not admitting certain things. I think the Senator from Colorado answered that quite adequately. Again I would just ask a question: Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? We know that they detonated one in 1974. Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? If not, are they lying to us, also? I think that is enough of that. Mr. President, I want to close my remarks by pointing out that Pakistan has always gone the extra mile to try to get a reasonable solution and compromise in that part of the world with India. Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. We have India, a large nation with 981 million people, confronting Pakistan, a small country with only about 125 million people. We have to kind of keep that in context. I want to review for my colleagues some of the proposals that Pakistan has put forward, going back over 20 years. First of all, Pakistan proposed to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in south Asia in 1974. In 1978, they proposed to issue a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacturing of nuclear weapons. In 1979, they proposed to have mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities. Also in 1979, they proposed simultaneous adherence to the Non- Proliferation Treaty by India and Pakistan. Again in 1979, they proposed to endorse a simultaneous acceptance of full-scope international atomic energy safeguards and to have the IAEA do inspections. They proposed, also in 1987, an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty. In 1991, Pakistan proposed to commence a multilateral conference on the question of nuclear proliferation in south Asia. A couple years ago, they proposed to create a missile-free zone in all of south Asia. Pakistan has proposed all this. What is the stumbling block? India will not accept any of these. They are the ones that have said ``no'' to all of these proposals. Yet, we are the ones that are sticking it to Pakistan. I do not understand this at all. It seems to me that this is the kind of regime that we want in south Asia. We ought to be behind these proposals, and we ought to be using our influence with India and other countries in that area to agree with Pakistan, to sit down and negotiate these proposals, which were made in good faith by Pakistan. Last, Mr. President, two quotes, first by President Clinton, April 11, 1995: I don't think what happened was fair to Pakistan in terms of the money . . . I don't think it is right for us to keep the money and the equipment. That is not right. And I am going to try to find a resolution to it. I don't like this. President Clinton, April 11, 1995. That is exactly what the Brown amendment does. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Iowa 2 additional minutes. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the President is supporting the Brown amendment because it reflects exactly what President Clinton said April 11. On the same date, Prime Minister Bhutto said: The Pressler amendment has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation issue. April 11, 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, it is time to put this behind us. It is time for fairness and equity. It is time to recognize that if we want to support the democratic forces in Pakistan, if we want to give Prime Minister Bhutto the support she needs to consolidate the prodemocracy forces in Pakistan, then we have to put this behind us. This will do more to help promote a regional solution to these problems than anything else we can do. It is simply a question of fairness and equity. I hope that the vote will be overwhelming, overwhelming in favor of the Brown amendment. Let Pakistan know we will not turn our backs on Pakistan after all of these years of friendship and support that Pakistan has given to us. I yield back whatever time is remaining. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his leadership on this. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Simon. Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I will vote against the Brown amendment, though I agree with much of what my colleague from Iowa has to say. I will vote against any weapons in any amendment that go to Pakistan or India or China until we get this nuclear thing worked out. Many of the things that Senator Harkin says are correct; for example, Pakistan and India, Pakistan suggesting that they have mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and so forth. The difficulty is India also fears China. There has to be a tripartite agreement. I think that necessarily means United States leadership working together with Russia to bring that about. There is no question Pakistan has some legitimate grievances. We ought to get those worked out. I think the Feinstein amendment that is going to be coming along shortly will help to move in that direction. We want to maintain friendship with Pakistan. Pakistan has moved from a dictatorship to a functioning democracy. Like all functioning democracies, it has problems. We ought to be working with Pakistan more closely. However, I do not think we ought to be sending weapons to any one of the three parties, who now have the greatest nuclear threat, I think, anywhere in the world. I think it would be a mistake to approve the Brown amendment. Mr. GLENN. How much time is remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from Ohio that his side has 15 minutes. Mr. GLENN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Levin. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and my friend from Ohio. Mr. President, the Brown amendment moves us in the opposite direction of trying to restrain missile proliferation. We have a law on our books and it says that where there is a determination that a transfer of a missile with a certain range and payload has been made that we will then impose sanctions. There is a large body of evidence. It is up on the fourth floor. We have had three briefings. The briefers left the [[Page S 14001]] material for us to look at. It is right there, a couple floors above us, for any of us to look at, to see whether or not each of us are satisfied that, in fact, a missile of a certain range and payload in excess of the missile technology control regime has been transferred from China to Pakistan. Under American law, if that occurs, sanctions are supposed to be imposed. Now, what the Brown amendment does is take us in the opposite direction. It would have us amend Pressler, to then allow for the transfer of significant military equipment to Pakistan. Instead of looking at this evidence and deciding whether or not it proves incontrovertible that there has been a transfer of missiles in excess of the range and payload that is provided for in the missile technology control regime which we have incorporated in our law, the amendment before the Senate would say that still could apply, but we will move in exactly the opposite direction. This amendment makes a mockery--if it passes this Senate--will make a mockery of our efforts to restrain the proliferation of missiles. That is the issue before the Senate. It is American law. American law says if there is a transfer of a missile or missiles that meet certain tests, sanctions will be imposed. I do not think we can in good conscience say that we are fighting the proliferation of missiles if we ignore that evidence two floors above us, if we do not take the time to at least look at that evidence two floors above us, and instead of acting on it, whatever our conclusions are, under American law, we move in exactly the opposite direction, amend Pressler, allow for the transfer of military equipment which otherwise could not be transferred. That is the issue before this Senate. I hope we will adopt the Feinstein amendment, which will provide that any appropriate funds that are owed to Pakistan that they have given to us, whatever is equitable, be returned to Pakistan, without trashing the missile technology control regime. I thank the Chair. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I want to deal with an aspect of this that I think is a fundamental problem because we have not addressed it, and maybe we have not addressed it for a good reason. This amendment is about fairness and about the inequity of keeping both their money and their arms. I think Americans will respond strongly to that. They understand it, and would be outraged at any retailer who did the same thing or anyone who signed contracts to sell as well. Other Members have brought up significant issues and concerns about arms in Southeast Asia. That is appropriate, and they should, and it ought to be a concern. It is why I made sure with the adoption of this amendment that very strong sanctions stay in place that send a clear message that Pakistan is paying a price for having developed weapons. Mr. President, the aspect of this that needs Members' attention is this: We have sanctions that will sanction Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, but we do not have sanctions that will sanction India for developing nuclear weapons. They are two nations, side by side. The fact is, Pakistan's program literally came about in part because India was Pakistan's adversary and India developed nuclear weapons. We cannot ignore that when you think about trying to solve this problem. There has been a lot of concern raised about missiles. That is a valid concern. I think we need to do more in that area. Mr. President, you cannot talk about it in a vacuum. The fact is, Pakistan developed their program after India developed weapons, and there are strong indications that the potential of Pakistan's missiles, if they have them and if they uncrate them, is somewhat similar to what the potential of the Indian missiles are. If anything, India has stronger missiles. You cannot talk about this in a vacuum. If you do talk about it in a vacuum and you think about it in a vacuum, you are doomed to failure. We want a nonproliferation program that works, that is effective. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Iowa. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to respond, perhaps, to my colleague from Illinois who talked about the weapons going to Pakistan. I have looked over the list of the items that are going. I thought I might, just for the Record, point out what some people have said about these items. All of the experts agree, it will not in any way upset the regional balance. Steve Cohen is the director of program in arms control, disarmament and international security at the University of Illinois. He said, In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think that the release of this military equipment . . . will have . . . significant impact on the balance one way or the other. George Tanham, who was a vice president of the Rand Corp., says, ``I agree.'' He said: In fact, there is no balance now. India dominates so strongly. They have twice as large an army as Pakistan, twice as large an Air Force, twice as large a Navy, twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. * * * India has overwhelming strength. So this small amount of equipment will not upset any balance. All of the experts basically agree that this amount of items that we are sending over there would not in any way upset that regional balance. James Clad, professor at Georgetown University said: They offer for Pakistan ``exactly as Dr. Tanham pointed out, an equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry capability and geographical reality.'' So, again, I have gone over this list. I do not know if anyone has ever put it in the Record. But of the military equipment, adding to about $368 million, the biggest items are three P-C3 aircraft, four- engine turboprop aircraft. They are very slow aircraft. They do not have the capability in any way to threaten India, and I would be glad to get into a discussion with anyone if they would like to discuss that. I want to make sure this is in the Record. I ask unanimous consent a list of the items be printed in the Record and also a description of these items be printed in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Putting the Release of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five II-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with an AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-missiles, the release [[Page S 14002]] of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It would be noted that during the

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996
(Senate - September 21, 1995)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S13995-S14079] FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 1868, which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 1868) making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996. The Senate resumed consideration of the bill. Pending: Helms (for Dole/Helms) amendment No. 2707 (to committee amendment on page 2, line 25), to provide for the streamlining and consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States. Brown amendment No. 2708 (to committee amendment beginning on page 15, line 17 through page 16, line 24), to clarify restrictions on assistance to Pakistan. (By 37 yeas to 61 nays (Vote No. 452), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.) Murkowski amendment No. 2712, to set forth requirements for implementation of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea Act relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Amendment No. 2708 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 1 hour of debate on the Brown amendment No. 2708, equally divided. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. So ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this amendment is about simple fairness. We have taken their money. We have obtained a contract to deliver equipment, and we do not want to deliver that equipment. I understand the feelings of those Members who have that position. But, Mr. President, it is wrong to take somebody's money and not deliver the equipment and not give them their money back. If this were Sears, Roebuck in the United States, we would lock them up. The consumer protection laws do not apply to the U.S. Government, but, Mr. President, simple fairness does. The American people understand this issue because they understand what it is like when someone who is selling something takes their money and does not deliver either the product or the money. That is what this amendment is all about. It is about fairness, and it is about saying either give them their money back or give them the equipment they contracted for. Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Under the quorum call that just took place, how is the time charged to each side? [[Page S 13996]] The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator that suggested it. Mr. GLENN. Would the Chair repeat? The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator who suggested it. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, my sense is that fairness would require that it be charged to both sides equally. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. I suggest the absence of a quorum and request the time be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I cannot disagree more with my distinguished colleague from Colorado when he says this is just a matter of fairness about giving money back as though we ordered something from Sears, Roebuck and did not get it so we ought to get our money back. That is such a simplistic view that it mocks what we have been trying to do with our nonproliferation policy, our nuclear nonproliferation policy for the last 30 years. We have tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around this world. That is what this issue is all about. It is a nonproliferation issue. The question: Are we serious about a U.S. leadership role in nonproliferation policy or are we not? I share the concern that Pakistan should get its money back, but not at the expense of dumping our nuclear policy and making our efforts around the world to further nuclear nonproliferation be mocked by the 178 nations that signed up under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is what this is all about. Pakistan has been the most egregious violator. They refused to join the NPT and refused to cooperate and repeatedly told us untruth after untruth after untruth after untruth, lie after lie after lie, about their intentions on nuclear weapons. They deliberately misled us--misled me personally. I was over there a couple times. Once I met with President Zia; with Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister; Mir Khan, from their atomic energy commission. They told me they had no program at all. They said that our intelligence was just flat wrong. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto repeatedly has made statements that they have no nuclear weapons objectives. And yet we know that is not true. So what this is about is not just about fairness of giving the money back as though a purchase had been made at Sears; this is a matter of nonproliferation and are we serious about it or not? We all love to get up and make our press conference statements about how much we are against nuclear proliferation and we do not want to see nuclear weapons spread to more nations around the world. We, in fact, right now are getting control of our nuclear weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union, now the Russians, and we are scaling those down. At the same time we asked other nations, ``Please do not go ahead with nuclear weapons programs. We will cooperate with you if you do not.'' We cooperated with Pakistan when they were threatened and mutual interest indicated we should send weapons to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. It was in Pakistan's interest we do that, also. It was not just a gratuitous favor to the United States. Through the years over and over we were assured Pakistan had no nuclear weapons program by their officials when we knew they did. During this time period we were successful in turning off a Taiwanese effort to start a nuclear weapons program. We were successful in turning off a South Korean effort to start a nuclear weapons program. South Africa, they finally gave up on their efforts after having a nuclear weapon or being close to it. Argentina and Brazil ceased their efforts. And 178 nations signed up under NPT. This is a great success story. Do we mean it when we say we have a nonproliferation policy or not? I am very critical of this administration. I sent a long letter to the President with my position on this back in April. I included it in the Record last night. I think this is sort of a test case here. Do we mean it or not? If we let Pakistan go ahead and say we reward them then with all sorts of help, with economic aid, with all the things that are going on with the weapons program, with the spare parts, with things like that, with new missiles, and we reward them for these efforts, it makes a mockery--makes a mockery--out of our nonproliferation efforts when other nations say they may want to do the same thing that Pakistan has already done. The international nuclear trade has been going up, I am sorry to say. We should be trying to cut it back. We passed legislation--we passed the Glenn-Symington amendment to deal with this way back. We passed the Pressler amendment later on that was Pakistan-specific, and should have been. It is the way it should be. But the Congress was unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan, and stipulated in our waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if it received or exploded a nuclear device. ``Received''--in other words, gained that capability. Congress stipulated that an annual report would be provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm that the United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb program, as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration officers. Waiver after waiver after waiver, which I went through in detail last night, waiver after waiver after waiver for Pakistan. And every time one was granted, it was granted on the basis that we need to be their friends so they will not continue along this route. And we have that whole trail of broken promises, one after another after another. The result of all of this, all the untruths that were told to us, all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the program was progressing, resulted in the Pressler amendment. Well, the CIA, to their credit, was skeptical that any of these things would work back at that time. And they were right. So now we have the effort to give the money back. And it is supposedly that they would like to have you think that the proposal from the other side was that they just paid all this money out there, and then we jerked the rug out from under them. The fact is that out of the $858 million, $50 million was paid before Pressler; the rest of it was all paid after the Pressler amendment was adopted, and Pakistan knew full well what they were doing. They knew exactly what they were doing, and they continued and paid the rest of that money after the Pressler amendment was adopted, hoping that we would back down, that we were not serious about our nuclear nonproliferation policy, and they were right. We backed down. The United States of America is still backing down on nuclear nonproliferation. It is not easy for the Pakis, because they are entitled to some sympathy in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars with a much larger adversary, India, who was also pursuing a nuclear weapons program and had exploded a device in 1984, and mainly built their program because of China's nuclear efforts. I do have sympathy for them in that regard, but I do not have much sympathy when they have deliberately misled us, lied to us all through the years. Mr. President, one after the other, officials in Pakistan have not told us the truth. I said before my own personal experience in meeting with President Zia, the foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, and from the atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, was that they all assured us they had no program when we knew that they did. Let me read a few quotes. Back in 1988, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, shortly before coming Prime Minister: We don't want any controversy [with the U.S.] on the nuclear issue . . . We want it clear beyond doubt that we're interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons. Again, interview with Time magazine, November 1988: We believe in a peaceful [nuclear] program for energy purposes and nothing else. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview in Calcutta Telegraph, December 1988: [[Page S 13997]] I can tell you with confidence that there is no bomb programme in Pakistan . . . There is no bomb programme . . . there is no bomb programme. December, 1988: We're committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't have any [nuclear] weapons policy . . . Pakistan doesn't have any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon. Another one in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an address before a joint meeting of Congress, right down the hall, a joint meeting of Congress, and made this statement to all of us. I was in attendance at that meeting: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy. New York Times, 1989 interview with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting together or making, a bomb, or taking it to the point where you can put it together. So much for the word of Pakistan. So when we say, Mr. President, that this is an issue of just giving the money back, as though we have made a deal at Sears someplace, that is extremely misleading, and I disagree with that characterization of what this is about. What this is about is whether the United States has a nuclear nonproliferation policy and whether we are truly willing to stick to it or are we not. Do we have the guts to make the tough decisions in the interest of seeing nuclear weapons not spread further around the world, just at the same time we are trying to get our own nuclear weapons stockpiles and those of the former Soviet Union under control and doing a good job in that area. Mr. President, that is what this vote is all about. I know from the vote yesterday what the vote is likely to be today. I think it is a wrong vote because it sends all the wrong signals to the 178 nonproliferation members around the world who are doing what we wanted them to do, what we tried to lead them to do and which they have continued to do, and that is try and stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. That is what this vote is all about. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there are several important points raised by the distinguished Senator from Ohio that I would like to address. One is the suggestion that we have somehow backed down on our nonproliferation objective or let Pakistan off the hook if this amendment is adopted. I sincerely believe that is an inaccurate statement, and I want to draw the attention of the Members to the facts. The reality is, if this amendment is adopted that our restriction against military assistance stays in place and it stays in place even though Pakistan has significant national security problems, our restriction against military sales stays in place, and it does so even though they have a great need and want to buy equipment from the United States. For a country that is in need of assistance and in need of weapons, those are significant and major restrictions, and to throw them away or ignore them, I think, ignores the facts. The fact is, they are strong sanctions that are in place and continue in place if the amendment is adopted. We should not forget the fact as well that Pakistan signed a contract for these some 9 years ago, for other parts 8 years ago, and for other parts 7 years ago. They paid for those, and whether they paid all up front or paid in installments, as most people do, I think misses the point. The fact is, they paid for these, they contracted for these. These items they have contracted for have sat around. Does anybody think military equipment that was due for delivery 5 years ago is as valuable today as when it came up? Of course, not. So to suggest there have not been and do not continue to be enormously significant sanctions in place against Pakistan is to simply ignore the facts. It is misleading, I think, to say that there are not major penalties that we have demanded that the Pakistanis pay and will continue to pay in the future. Mr. President, a great deal has been made about disingenuous statements by the Pakistanis with regard to their nuclear program. I, for one, think it is regrettable that that has happened. But, we should not be holier than thou when we talk about misleading statements regarding national security. Are our memories so short around here, particularly with regard to Pakistan? Does not anyone recall that Francis Gary Powers' flight took off from Pakistan, an area we asked the Pakistanis to make available to us, at a base we asked them to let us fly out of, to fly over and spy on the Soviet Union? Has everyone forgotten how important that was to national security? Incidentally, does anyone remember what President Eisenhower said when he was asked about it? No one has mentioned that today. But if you want to talk about disingenuous statements, what about President Eisenhower? Are we so holy we have forgotten it? This emanated from Pakistan. President Eisenhower denied the flights. Was it an incorrect statement? Of course it was. Why did he do it? To protect our national security. Does anybody remember what President Kennedy said with regard to the Bay of Pigs? We do not dwell on it, but before we get so holy, before we get too holy, remember, Americans have felt a need to protect their national security, too, and it is strange that people would talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to Pakistan and not be willing to talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to India. My own view of this is that we want to be friends with both India and Pakistan. We want to stand beside them. We want to work with both of them. Perhaps it was not widely noticed, but I was the prime critic of the administration when it was slow to name an Ambassador to India. It seemed to me that was an important function to do, with a country that should be our friend and we want to work with. I spoke out against the bashing of India over the question of Kashmir. I believe what we want is a balanced policy, but, Mr. President, we should not look at the questions regarding Pakistan's national security in a vacuum. To assume that we are going to have a policy that denies Pakistan nuclear weapons and not comment about India's nuclear weapons is a mistake. To assume we are going to bash Pakistan for trying to find missiles and not say anything about India's missile program is a mistake. What we ought to have is a balanced policy in that part of the world, not a one-sided policy. I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to compliment the Senator from Colorado on his diligence and his effort to bring some rationality and reason to this debate, to try to get us to focus on fairness and equity in dealing with this part of the world. I certainly would not want any of my comments that I made last night in the debate, or any I might make now, to be construed to indicate in any way that I have it in for India. That is not it at all. But I do believe that the history of our relations with Pakistan are such that we have to start dealing in a more evenhanded fashion in that part of the world. Last night in my remarks, I went over the long history of Pakistani- United States friendly relations. I do not mean to belabor that again and go over that, other than to just say that going clear back to when Pakistan got its independence, Pakistan has always been oriented toward the United States. They supported us in the Korean war. As the Senator from Colorado pointed out, the flights of the U-2 over the Soviet Union came from Pakistan. After the U-2 was shot down, Nikita Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with nuclear weapons. Pakistan stuck with the United States. In the gulf war, Pakistan helped us out; they were on our side. In Somalia--and even in Haiti, Pakistan has sent troops to help restore democracy to Haiti. So in almost everything that we have done, Pakistan has been our strong friend and ally. Yet, I believe we have not treated them evenhandedly. All this really is is a question of fairness. Last night, I quoted--and I want to repeat that--the statement by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in [[Page S 13998]] a letter dated September 20 to Senator Daschle. He said: We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counter- terrorist programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including nonproliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. That is what the Brown amendment does. Again, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter, dated September 20, from Secretary of State Christopher, be printed in its entirety in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of State, Washington, September 20, 1995. Hon. Thomas A. Daschle, Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate. Dear Senator Daschle: As the Senate begins consideration of the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, I would like to address several issues in the version of the bill as reported by the full Appropriations Committee. At the outset I would like to thank Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy for their willingness to work with us and to include priority initiatives such as a long-term extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) and a drawdown authority for Jordan in the subcommittee mark. We would oppose any amendments that would alter the carefully negotiated language for either of these initiatives. Also, we appreciate the Subcommittee's removal of objectional conditions adopted by the House on population assistance and aid to Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. We hope to continue in this cooperative fashion to produce a Foreign Operations bill that can be presented to the President with bipartisan support. Despite the favorable aspects of the legislation, there are several items that are of great concern to the Department of State. The funding levels throughout the bill are well below the President's request level. The Foreign Operations cuts, coupled with the cuts being proposed to international programs in the Senate's Commerce, Justice, State Department Appropriations bill, represent a serious threat to America's leadership in international affairs. The bill also contains numerous earmarks and substantially restructures our foreign aid accounts. We expect international agencies to do their share in the effort to balance the budget as the President's budget plan makes clear. However, we, the Administration, should have the flexibility to apply funds to the programs that provide the best results. Earmarks in our programs for the New Independent States, International Counternarcotics, and economic assistance would prevent us from being able to respond to the crisis and unexpected requirements of the post-Cold War world. Further, the proportionality requirement in the new Economic Assistance account restricts our ability to change the distribution of these funds from year to year. We oppose these restrictions. The bill also contains a number of objectionable policy provisions. Restrictions on our ability to contribute to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would, in effect, prevent U.S. funding of KEDO and greatly hinder, if not destroy, the international effort to implement the Agreed Framework. We oppose linking KEDO funding to substantial progress on North Korean/South Korean dialogue. Imposing an artificial and unrealistic deadline on North/South talks, which have taken years to progress, will hold hostage the very funding that will facilitate the progress we all so desire. We remain convinced that the North/South dialogue will move forward substantially as a result of the Agreed Framework and the creation of KEDO. Our failure to contribute to KEDO will threaten its ability to meet its obligations under the Framework and, consequently, invite North Korean non-compliance. The Agreed Framework is working. North Korea has frozen its nuclear weapons program. We need Congressional support for KEDO to keep the freeze in place. Regarding assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) and Russia, we have reached a critical moment in the reform process. Continued funding is essential. It can make a major difference in whether reformers in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and other states will be able to maintain momentum, or the opponents of reform will halt the development of democratic market societies. We need to stay the course for this transitional period, while normal trading and investment relationships develop in the former Soviet states. We very much appreciate the continued support we have received from the Congress, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in particular, for this critical effort, as reflected in this bill. At the same time, however, we oppose new conditions on assistance to the NIS. It is of course tempting to withdraw our assistance as punishment when we do not agree with Russian actions or policies. But this would be a mistake. This assistance is in our national interest. Cutting or restricting aid would hurt reformers, the very people who have protested the war in Chechnya, criticized Russia's proposed nuclear sale to Iran, or insisted that Russia end cooperation with Cuba. We urge you to remove such conditions from this bill. Let me assure you that we share your concerns about Russia's policies in these areas; that is why we continue to work on other fronts to stop the Russian nuclear reactor sale to Iran and to prevent completion of the Cuban reactor project. We also urge you to restore the national security waiver for the certification requirement on violations of territorial integrity, which has been removed from the Senate version of this bill. It is important that the President retain the ability to determine whether the national security of the United States justifies a waiver of this requirement. Moreover, removal of the waiver provision could have unintended consequences, such as prohibiting humanitarian assistance to the victims of regional conflicts in countries such as Armenia. The language regarding restrictions on the termination of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also reflects objectionable House language carried over in the Senate bill. The recent combination of NATO's resolve and energetic United States leadership on the diplomatic front has led to some encouraging opportunities for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. To prematurely close off any avenues that may lead to a diplomatic settlement, including adjustments to the sanctions regime against Serbia, would complicate our efforts. We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counterterrorism programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including non- proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. There remain other problematic issues in the bill, but we are encouraged by the willingness of the bill's managers to work with us, and we hope that these other issues can be resolved on the Senate floor or in conference. Sincerely, Warren Christopher. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, there is also a letter from Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense, who said: This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. We do not hear much talk about that around here. The nuclear programs and the missile programs of India ought to be a big concern of ours also. Secretary Perry concluded: If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Perry, dated August 2, also be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, August 2, 1995. Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Nunn: For the past six months, the Administration has wrestled with the difficult problem of trying to build a stronger, more flexible relationship with Pakistan--an important moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region which has been a long-time friend and has become a major partner in peacekeeping operations--while promoting the very important nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. Based on a detailed review within the Administration and consultations with Congress, the President has decided to address this matter on three fronts: First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance and limited military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including assistance in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counternarcotics as well as IMET). Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as provided by an amendment to be proposed by Senator Brown, that would release approximately $370 million worth of embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions. This authority would specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the items that would be released are three P-3C [[Page S 13999]] Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s and Cobra helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items will not disturb the conventional arms balance in South Asia which overwhelmingly favors India. Finally, the President has decided that, rather than releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he will seek to sell them to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in the Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale permits, Pakistan's investment in these aircraft. While we recognize that this is not a perfect solution, it is, we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a difficult problem with a country which has long been a friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. The second aspect of this three-part effort--embodied in Senator Brown's pending amendment to provide authority to release the embargoed Pakistan equipment other than the F- 16s--may be coming to a vote very shortly. I urge you to support our efforts to resolve this problem by supporting Senator Brown's amendment when it is offered. Sincerely, William J. Perry. ____ Putting The Release Of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian Navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five Il-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with the AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-air missiles, the release of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It should be noted that during the nearly five years that these howitzers were embargoed, India acquired over 250 equivalent artillery pieces from Czechoslovakia and Russia/USSR. In regard to MK-46 torpedoes, Pakistan will receive parts that constitute less than one operational MK-46. As for the 2.75" rockets, these constitute a resupply of ammunition for one of the weapons systems on the Pakistani Cobra helicopters--they do not give Pakistan any new capability. ____ Brown Amendment Text Add the following subparagraph to section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: ( ) Applicability.--(a) The restrictions of section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. (b) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 620E(e), military equipment, technology or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts of cases entered into before October 1, 1990. Impact of the Brown Amendment The proposed legislation would authorize the release of approximately $368 million worth of military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions (1 October 1995) but not delivered to Pakistan due to Pressler sanctions. Specifically prohibited from release to Pakistan under this legislation are the 28 Pakistani F-16s. Items to be released include: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stored Item Stored value Funding quantity (millions) source ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Army: C-NITE modification kits........ 18 $24.1 FMF M198 Howitzers.................. 24 18.7 FMF/Cash TPQ-36 radars................... 4 10.5 FMF M-Series rebuild parts.......... NA 6.8 FMF TOW launchers................... 135 6.1 FMF 2.75 inch rockets............... 16,720 9.4 FMF Miscellaneous Army items........ NA 1.7 FMF/Cash ------------ Army subtotal................. ........ 77.4 ============ Navy: P-3C aircraft................... 3 138.1 FMF Harpoon missiles................ 28 30.8 FMF/Cash AIM-9L missile components....... 360 19.7 FMF/Cash MK-46/Mod 2 torpedo components.. NA .1 Cash Miscellaneous Navy items........ NA 2.1 FMF/Cash ------------ Navy subtotal................. ........ 191.8 ============ Air Force: Peace Gate II support equipment, 220E engine kits............... 30,968 28.5 FMF/Cash Depot engine spares program..... 4,746 8.0 FMF ILC kits: Spares for ILC, ALQ- 131, F-100, ALR-69, support.... 2,035 7.9 FMF/Cash Peace Gate III support package: Peculiar support equipment.. 37 .9 FMF Engine spares............... 511 9.1 FMF Spares...................... 154 1.6 FMF Standard support equipment.. 67 .4 FMF Peace Gate IV support package: Engine components........... 14 .1 Cash Developmental support equipment.................. 144 8.0 Cash Standard support equipment.. 386 1.2 Cash Non-standard support equipment.................. 9 .5 Cash Standard spares............. 204 1.3 Cash Test equipment.............. NA .1 Cash ALQ-131 pods and spares..... 20 21.7 Cash Class A explosives.......... 245,046 1.5 Cash Other Air Force items........... NA 8.2 FMF/Cash ------------ Air Force subtotal............ ........ 98.8 ============ Grand total................... ........ 368 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Initiative to Strengthen Relations with Pakistan After extensive review and consultations with Congress, President Clinton has decided to support legislation to permit a stronger and more flexible relationship with Pakistan, while maintaining the nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. The President's decision builds on provisions already in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bills, which would permit the United States to resume economic assistance and limited forms of military assistance (including IMET, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and peacekeeping assistance) to Pakistan. The President has decided to seek authority, as provided for in legislation proposed by Senator Brown, to release to Pakistan approximately $370 million in military equipment, exclusive of F-16s, contracted for by Pakistan prior to the imposition of Pressler sanctions in October, 1990. This equipment includes air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, radars, howitzers, three P-3C Orion Aircraft, and support kits for the F-16s already in Pakistan's inventory. This non- strategic equipment does not have the symbolism that the F- 16s have come to acquire in the region. Release of this equipment would be a one-time exemption to the Pressler Amendment. We do not seek repeal of the Amendment or a resumed military supply relationship with Pakistan. The President also decided not to seek release of the 28 F- 16s in the pipeline. Instead, he will seek to sell the aircraft and return the proceeds of any sale to Pakistan, to reimburse as much as possible of the $684 million that Pakistan has expended on these aircraft. Putting these issues behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad, without which real progress on nonproliferation and other issues of importance to the United States will remain difficult. Finally, in making his decision, the President stressed the importance of there being no substantial change in the status quo in Pakistan with regard to nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States. In particular, we expect that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the nuclear and missile areas. Mr. HARKIN. On July 28, to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Christopher responds to a question. [[Page S 14000]] This gets to the heart of the arguments made by the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Michigan about the so-called evidence that justifies the impositions of sanctions. Here was the question: Will the Clinton administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record, also. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club, Washington, DC, July 28, 1995 Question. Will the Clinton Administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law in this regard. Mr. HARKIN. Again, I want to point out that under the missile technology Control Regime, which has been talked about by the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Ohio, even under that, even if MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all of the items in the Brown amendment could still go to Pakistan, because MTCR violations only prohibited new licenses to Pakistan and China. These items were already licensed in the 1980's. Again, Mr. President, there is a lot of talk about Pakistan not admitting certain things. I think the Senator from Colorado answered that quite adequately. Again I would just ask a question: Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? We know that they detonated one in 1974. Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? If not, are they lying to us, also? I think that is enough of that. Mr. President, I want to close my remarks by pointing out that Pakistan has always gone the extra mile to try to get a reasonable solution and compromise in that part of the world with India. Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. We have India, a large nation with 981 million people, confronting Pakistan, a small country with only about 125 million people. We have to kind of keep that in context. I want to review for my colleagues some of the proposals that Pakistan has put forward, going back over 20 years. First of all, Pakistan proposed to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in south Asia in 1974. In 1978, they proposed to issue a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacturing of nuclear weapons. In 1979, they proposed to have mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities. Also in 1979, they proposed simultaneous adherence to the Non- Proliferation Treaty by India and Pakistan. Again in 1979, they proposed to endorse a simultaneous acceptance of full-scope international atomic energy safeguards and to have the IAEA do inspections. They proposed, also in 1987, an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty. In 1991, Pakistan proposed to commence a multilateral conference on the question of nuclear proliferation in south Asia. A couple years ago, they proposed to create a missile-free zone in all of south Asia. Pakistan has proposed all this. What is the stumbling block? India will not accept any of these. They are the ones that have said ``no'' to all of these proposals. Yet, we are the ones that are sticking it to Pakistan. I do not understand this at all. It seems to me that this is the kind of regime that we want in south Asia. We ought to be behind these proposals, and we ought to be using our influence with India and other countries in that area to agree with Pakistan, to sit down and negotiate these proposals, which were made in good faith by Pakistan. Last, Mr. President, two quotes, first by President Clinton, April 11, 1995: I don't think what happened was fair to Pakistan in terms of the money . . . I don't think it is right for us to keep the money and the equipment. That is not right. And I am going to try to find a resolution to it. I don't like this. President Clinton, April 11, 1995. That is exactly what the Brown amendment does. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Iowa 2 additional minutes. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the President is supporting the Brown amendment because it reflects exactly what President Clinton said April 11. On the same date, Prime Minister Bhutto said: The Pressler amendment has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation issue. April 11, 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, it is time to put this behind us. It is time for fairness and equity. It is time to recognize that if we want to support the democratic forces in Pakistan, if we want to give Prime Minister Bhutto the support she needs to consolidate the prodemocracy forces in Pakistan, then we have to put this behind us. This will do more to help promote a regional solution to these problems than anything else we can do. It is simply a question of fairness and equity. I hope that the vote will be overwhelming, overwhelming in favor of the Brown amendment. Let Pakistan know we will not turn our backs on Pakistan after all of these years of friendship and support that Pakistan has given to us. I yield back whatever time is remaining. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his leadership on this. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Simon. Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I will vote against the Brown amendment, though I agree with much of what my colleague from Iowa has to say. I will vote against any weapons in any amendment that go to Pakistan or India or China until we get this nuclear thing worked out. Many of the things that Senator Harkin says are correct; for example, Pakistan and India, Pakistan suggesting that they have mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and so forth. The difficulty is India also fears China. There has to be a tripartite agreement. I think that necessarily means United States leadership working together with Russia to bring that about. There is no question Pakistan has some legitimate grievances. We ought to get those worked out. I think the Feinstein amendment that is going to be coming along shortly will help to move in that direction. We want to maintain friendship with Pakistan. Pakistan has moved from a dictatorship to a functioning democracy. Like all functioning democracies, it has problems. We ought to be working with Pakistan more closely. However, I do not think we ought to be sending weapons to any one of the three parties, who now have the greatest nuclear threat, I think, anywhere in the world. I think it would be a mistake to approve the Brown amendment. Mr. GLENN. How much time is remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from Ohio that his side has 15 minutes. Mr. GLENN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Levin. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and my friend from Ohio. Mr. President, the Brown amendment moves us in the opposite direction of trying to restrain missile proliferation. We have a law on our books and it says that where there is a determination that a transfer of a missile with a certain range and payload has been made that we will then impose sanctions. There is a large body of evidence. It is up on the fourth floor. We have had three briefings. The briefers left the [[Page S 14001]] material for us to look at. It is right there, a couple floors above us, for any of us to look at, to see whether or not each of us are satisfied that, in fact, a missile of a certain range and payload in excess of the missile technology control regime has been transferred from China to Pakistan. Under American law, if that occurs, sanctions are supposed to be imposed. Now, what the Brown amendment does is take us in the opposite direction. It would have us amend Pressler, to then allow for the transfer of significant military equipment to Pakistan. Instead of looking at this evidence and deciding whether or not it proves incontrovertible that there has been a transfer of missiles in excess of the range and payload that is provided for in the missile technology control regime which we have incorporated in our law, the amendment before the Senate would say that still could apply, but we will move in exactly the opposite direction. This amendment makes a mockery--if it passes this Senate--will make a mockery of our efforts to restrain the proliferation of missiles. That is the issue before the Senate. It is American law. American law says if there is a transfer of a missile or missiles that meet certain tests, sanctions will be imposed. I do not think we can in good conscience say that we are fighting the proliferation of missiles if we ignore that evidence two floors above us, if we do not take the time to at least look at that evidence two floors above us, and instead of acting on it, whatever our conclusions are, under American law, we move in exactly the opposite direction, amend Pressler, allow for the transfer of military equipment which otherwise could not be transferred. That is the issue before this Senate. I hope we will adopt the Feinstein amendment, which will provide that any appropriate funds that are owed to Pakistan that they have given to us, whatever is equitable, be returned to Pakistan, without trashing the missile technology control regime. I thank the Chair. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I want to deal with an aspect of this that I think is a fundamental problem because we have not addressed it, and maybe we have not addressed it for a good reason. This amendment is about fairness and about the inequity of keeping both their money and their arms. I think Americans will respond strongly to that. They understand it, and would be outraged at any retailer who did the same thing or anyone who signed contracts to sell as well. Other Members have brought up significant issues and concerns about arms in Southeast Asia. That is appropriate, and they should, and it ought to be a concern. It is why I made sure with the adoption of this amendment that very strong sanctions stay in place that send a clear message that Pakistan is paying a price for having developed weapons. Mr. President, the aspect of this that needs Members' attention is this: We have sanctions that will sanction Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, but we do not have sanctions that will sanction India for developing nuclear weapons. They are two nations, side by side. The fact is, Pakistan's program literally came about in part because India was Pakistan's adversary and India developed nuclear weapons. We cannot ignore that when you think about trying to solve this problem. There has been a lot of concern raised about missiles. That is a valid concern. I think we need to do more in that area. Mr. President, you cannot talk about it in a vacuum. The fact is, Pakistan developed their program after India developed weapons, and there are strong indications that the potential of Pakistan's missiles, if they have them and if they uncrate them, is somewhat similar to what the potential of the Indian missiles are. If anything, India has stronger missiles. You cannot talk about this in a vacuum. If you do talk about it in a vacuum and you think about it in a vacuum, you are doomed to failure. We want a nonproliferation program that works, that is effective. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Iowa. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to respond, perhaps, to my colleague from Illinois who talked about the weapons going to Pakistan. I have looked over the list of the items that are going. I thought I might, just for the Record, point out what some people have said about these items. All of the experts agree, it will not in any way upset the regional balance. Steve Cohen is the director of program in arms control, disarmament and international security at the University of Illinois. He said, In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think that the release of this military equipment . . . will have . . . significant impact on the balance one way or the other. George Tanham, who was a vice president of the Rand Corp., says, ``I agree.'' He said: In fact, there is no balance now. India dominates so strongly. They have twice as large an army as Pakistan, twice as large an Air Force, twice as large a Navy, twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. * * * India has overwhelming strength. So this small amount of equipment will not upset any balance. All of the experts basically agree that this amount of items that we are sending over there would not in any way upset that regional balance. James Clad, professor at Georgetown University said: They offer for Pakistan ``exactly as Dr. Tanham pointed out, an equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry capability and geographical reality.'' So, again, I have gone over this list. I do not know if anyone has ever put it in the Record. But of the military equipment, adding to about $368 million, the biggest items are three P-C3 aircraft, four- engine turboprop aircraft. They are very slow aircraft. They do not have the capability in any way to threaten India, and I would be glad to get into a discussion with anyone if they would like to discuss that. I want to make sure this is in the Record. I ask unanimous consent a list of the items be printed in the Record and also a description of these items be printed in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Putting the Release of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five II-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with an AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-missiles, the release [[Page S 14002]] of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It would be noted that during the nea

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FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996
(Senate - September 21, 1995)

Text of this article available as: TXT PDF [Pages S13995-S14079] FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 1868, which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 1868) making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996. The Senate resumed consideration of the bill. Pending: Helms (for Dole/Helms) amendment No. 2707 (to committee amendment on page 2, line 25), to provide for the streamlining and consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States. Brown amendment No. 2708 (to committee amendment beginning on page 15, line 17 through page 16, line 24), to clarify restrictions on assistance to Pakistan. (By 37 yeas to 61 nays (Vote No. 452), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.) Murkowski amendment No. 2712, to set forth requirements for implementation of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea Act relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Amendment No. 2708 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 1 hour of debate on the Brown amendment No. 2708, equally divided. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. So ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this amendment is about simple fairness. We have taken their money. We have obtained a contract to deliver equipment, and we do not want to deliver that equipment. I understand the feelings of those Members who have that position. But, Mr. President, it is wrong to take somebody's money and not deliver the equipment and not give them their money back. If this were Sears, Roebuck in the United States, we would lock them up. The consumer protection laws do not apply to the U.S. Government, but, Mr. President, simple fairness does. The American people understand this issue because they understand what it is like when someone who is selling something takes their money and does not deliver either the product or the money. That is what this amendment is all about. It is about fairness, and it is about saying either give them their money back or give them the equipment they contracted for. Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Under the quorum call that just took place, how is the time charged to each side? [[Page S 13996]] The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator that suggested it. Mr. GLENN. Would the Chair repeat? The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was charged to the Senator who suggested it. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, my sense is that fairness would require that it be charged to both sides equally. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROWN. I suggest the absence of a quorum and request the time be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I cannot disagree more with my distinguished colleague from Colorado when he says this is just a matter of fairness about giving money back as though we ordered something from Sears, Roebuck and did not get it so we ought to get our money back. That is such a simplistic view that it mocks what we have been trying to do with our nonproliferation policy, our nuclear nonproliferation policy for the last 30 years. We have tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around this world. That is what this issue is all about. It is a nonproliferation issue. The question: Are we serious about a U.S. leadership role in nonproliferation policy or are we not? I share the concern that Pakistan should get its money back, but not at the expense of dumping our nuclear policy and making our efforts around the world to further nuclear nonproliferation be mocked by the 178 nations that signed up under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is what this is all about. Pakistan has been the most egregious violator. They refused to join the NPT and refused to cooperate and repeatedly told us untruth after untruth after untruth after untruth, lie after lie after lie, about their intentions on nuclear weapons. They deliberately misled us--misled me personally. I was over there a couple times. Once I met with President Zia; with Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister; Mir Khan, from their atomic energy commission. They told me they had no program at all. They said that our intelligence was just flat wrong. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto repeatedly has made statements that they have no nuclear weapons objectives. And yet we know that is not true. So what this is about is not just about fairness of giving the money back as though a purchase had been made at Sears; this is a matter of nonproliferation and are we serious about it or not? We all love to get up and make our press conference statements about how much we are against nuclear proliferation and we do not want to see nuclear weapons spread to more nations around the world. We, in fact, right now are getting control of our nuclear weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union, now the Russians, and we are scaling those down. At the same time we asked other nations, ``Please do not go ahead with nuclear weapons programs. We will cooperate with you if you do not.'' We cooperated with Pakistan when they were threatened and mutual interest indicated we should send weapons to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. It was in Pakistan's interest we do that, also. It was not just a gratuitous favor to the United States. Through the years over and over we were assured Pakistan had no nuclear weapons program by their officials when we knew they did. During this time period we were successful in turning off a Taiwanese effort to start a nuclear weapons program. We were successful in turning off a South Korean effort to start a nuclear weapons program. South Africa, they finally gave up on their efforts after having a nuclear weapon or being close to it. Argentina and Brazil ceased their efforts. And 178 nations signed up under NPT. This is a great success story. Do we mean it when we say we have a nonproliferation policy or not? I am very critical of this administration. I sent a long letter to the President with my position on this back in April. I included it in the Record last night. I think this is sort of a test case here. Do we mean it or not? If we let Pakistan go ahead and say we reward them then with all sorts of help, with economic aid, with all the things that are going on with the weapons program, with the spare parts, with things like that, with new missiles, and we reward them for these efforts, it makes a mockery--makes a mockery--out of our nonproliferation efforts when other nations say they may want to do the same thing that Pakistan has already done. The international nuclear trade has been going up, I am sorry to say. We should be trying to cut it back. We passed legislation--we passed the Glenn-Symington amendment to deal with this way back. We passed the Pressler amendment later on that was Pakistan-specific, and should have been. It is the way it should be. But the Congress was unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan, and stipulated in our waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if it received or exploded a nuclear device. ``Received''--in other words, gained that capability. Congress stipulated that an annual report would be provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm that the United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb program, as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration officers. Waiver after waiver after waiver, which I went through in detail last night, waiver after waiver after waiver for Pakistan. And every time one was granted, it was granted on the basis that we need to be their friends so they will not continue along this route. And we have that whole trail of broken promises, one after another after another. The result of all of this, all the untruths that were told to us, all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the program was progressing, resulted in the Pressler amendment. Well, the CIA, to their credit, was skeptical that any of these things would work back at that time. And they were right. So now we have the effort to give the money back. And it is supposedly that they would like to have you think that the proposal from the other side was that they just paid all this money out there, and then we jerked the rug out from under them. The fact is that out of the $858 million, $50 million was paid before Pressler; the rest of it was all paid after the Pressler amendment was adopted, and Pakistan knew full well what they were doing. They knew exactly what they were doing, and they continued and paid the rest of that money after the Pressler amendment was adopted, hoping that we would back down, that we were not serious about our nuclear nonproliferation policy, and they were right. We backed down. The United States of America is still backing down on nuclear nonproliferation. It is not easy for the Pakis, because they are entitled to some sympathy in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars with a much larger adversary, India, who was also pursuing a nuclear weapons program and had exploded a device in 1984, and mainly built their program because of China's nuclear efforts. I do have sympathy for them in that regard, but I do not have much sympathy when they have deliberately misled us, lied to us all through the years. Mr. President, one after the other, officials in Pakistan have not told us the truth. I said before my own personal experience in meeting with President Zia, the foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, and from the atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, was that they all assured us they had no program when we knew that they did. Let me read a few quotes. Back in 1988, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, shortly before coming Prime Minister: We don't want any controversy [with the U.S.] on the nuclear issue . . . We want it clear beyond doubt that we're interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons. Again, interview with Time magazine, November 1988: We believe in a peaceful [nuclear] program for energy purposes and nothing else. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview in Calcutta Telegraph, December 1988: [[Page S 13997]] I can tell you with confidence that there is no bomb programme in Pakistan . . . There is no bomb programme . . . there is no bomb programme. December, 1988: We're committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't have any [nuclear] weapons policy . . . Pakistan doesn't have any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon. Another one in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an address before a joint meeting of Congress, right down the hall, a joint meeting of Congress, and made this statement to all of us. I was in attendance at that meeting: Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy. New York Times, 1989 interview with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting together or making, a bomb, or taking it to the point where you can put it together. So much for the word of Pakistan. So when we say, Mr. President, that this is an issue of just giving the money back, as though we have made a deal at Sears someplace, that is extremely misleading, and I disagree with that characterization of what this is about. What this is about is whether the United States has a nuclear nonproliferation policy and whether we are truly willing to stick to it or are we not. Do we have the guts to make the tough decisions in the interest of seeing nuclear weapons not spread further around the world, just at the same time we are trying to get our own nuclear weapons stockpiles and those of the former Soviet Union under control and doing a good job in that area. Mr. President, that is what this vote is all about. I know from the vote yesterday what the vote is likely to be today. I think it is a wrong vote because it sends all the wrong signals to the 178 nonproliferation members around the world who are doing what we wanted them to do, what we tried to lead them to do and which they have continued to do, and that is try and stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. That is what this vote is all about. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado. Mr. BROWN. I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there are several important points raised by the distinguished Senator from Ohio that I would like to address. One is the suggestion that we have somehow backed down on our nonproliferation objective or let Pakistan off the hook if this amendment is adopted. I sincerely believe that is an inaccurate statement, and I want to draw the attention of the Members to the facts. The reality is, if this amendment is adopted that our restriction against military assistance stays in place and it stays in place even though Pakistan has significant national security problems, our restriction against military sales stays in place, and it does so even though they have a great need and want to buy equipment from the United States. For a country that is in need of assistance and in need of weapons, those are significant and major restrictions, and to throw them away or ignore them, I think, ignores the facts. The fact is, they are strong sanctions that are in place and continue in place if the amendment is adopted. We should not forget the fact as well that Pakistan signed a contract for these some 9 years ago, for other parts 8 years ago, and for other parts 7 years ago. They paid for those, and whether they paid all up front or paid in installments, as most people do, I think misses the point. The fact is, they paid for these, they contracted for these. These items they have contracted for have sat around. Does anybody think military equipment that was due for delivery 5 years ago is as valuable today as when it came up? Of course, not. So to suggest there have not been and do not continue to be enormously significant sanctions in place against Pakistan is to simply ignore the facts. It is misleading, I think, to say that there are not major penalties that we have demanded that the Pakistanis pay and will continue to pay in the future. Mr. President, a great deal has been made about disingenuous statements by the Pakistanis with regard to their nuclear program. I, for one, think it is regrettable that that has happened. But, we should not be holier than thou when we talk about misleading statements regarding national security. Are our memories so short around here, particularly with regard to Pakistan? Does not anyone recall that Francis Gary Powers' flight took off from Pakistan, an area we asked the Pakistanis to make available to us, at a base we asked them to let us fly out of, to fly over and spy on the Soviet Union? Has everyone forgotten how important that was to national security? Incidentally, does anyone remember what President Eisenhower said when he was asked about it? No one has mentioned that today. But if you want to talk about disingenuous statements, what about President Eisenhower? Are we so holy we have forgotten it? This emanated from Pakistan. President Eisenhower denied the flights. Was it an incorrect statement? Of course it was. Why did he do it? To protect our national security. Does anybody remember what President Kennedy said with regard to the Bay of Pigs? We do not dwell on it, but before we get so holy, before we get too holy, remember, Americans have felt a need to protect their national security, too, and it is strange that people would talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to Pakistan and not be willing to talk about the phenomenon of nuclear weapons with regard to India. My own view of this is that we want to be friends with both India and Pakistan. We want to stand beside them. We want to work with both of them. Perhaps it was not widely noticed, but I was the prime critic of the administration when it was slow to name an Ambassador to India. It seemed to me that was an important function to do, with a country that should be our friend and we want to work with. I spoke out against the bashing of India over the question of Kashmir. I believe what we want is a balanced policy, but, Mr. President, we should not look at the questions regarding Pakistan's national security in a vacuum. To assume that we are going to have a policy that denies Pakistan nuclear weapons and not comment about India's nuclear weapons is a mistake. To assume we are going to bash Pakistan for trying to find missiles and not say anything about India's missile program is a mistake. What we ought to have is a balanced policy in that part of the world, not a one-sided policy. I retain the remainder of my time. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to compliment the Senator from Colorado on his diligence and his effort to bring some rationality and reason to this debate, to try to get us to focus on fairness and equity in dealing with this part of the world. I certainly would not want any of my comments that I made last night in the debate, or any I might make now, to be construed to indicate in any way that I have it in for India. That is not it at all. But I do believe that the history of our relations with Pakistan are such that we have to start dealing in a more evenhanded fashion in that part of the world. Last night in my remarks, I went over the long history of Pakistani- United States friendly relations. I do not mean to belabor that again and go over that, other than to just say that going clear back to when Pakistan got its independence, Pakistan has always been oriented toward the United States. They supported us in the Korean war. As the Senator from Colorado pointed out, the flights of the U-2 over the Soviet Union came from Pakistan. After the U-2 was shot down, Nikita Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with nuclear weapons. Pakistan stuck with the United States. In the gulf war, Pakistan helped us out; they were on our side. In Somalia--and even in Haiti, Pakistan has sent troops to help restore democracy to Haiti. So in almost everything that we have done, Pakistan has been our strong friend and ally. Yet, I believe we have not treated them evenhandedly. All this really is is a question of fairness. Last night, I quoted--and I want to repeat that--the statement by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in [[Page S 13998]] a letter dated September 20 to Senator Daschle. He said: We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counter- terrorist programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including nonproliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. That is what the Brown amendment does. Again, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter, dated September 20, from Secretary of State Christopher, be printed in its entirety in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of State, Washington, September 20, 1995. Hon. Thomas A. Daschle, Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate. Dear Senator Daschle: As the Senate begins consideration of the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, I would like to address several issues in the version of the bill as reported by the full Appropriations Committee. At the outset I would like to thank Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy for their willingness to work with us and to include priority initiatives such as a long-term extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) and a drawdown authority for Jordan in the subcommittee mark. We would oppose any amendments that would alter the carefully negotiated language for either of these initiatives. Also, we appreciate the Subcommittee's removal of objectional conditions adopted by the House on population assistance and aid to Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. We hope to continue in this cooperative fashion to produce a Foreign Operations bill that can be presented to the President with bipartisan support. Despite the favorable aspects of the legislation, there are several items that are of great concern to the Department of State. The funding levels throughout the bill are well below the President's request level. The Foreign Operations cuts, coupled with the cuts being proposed to international programs in the Senate's Commerce, Justice, State Department Appropriations bill, represent a serious threat to America's leadership in international affairs. The bill also contains numerous earmarks and substantially restructures our foreign aid accounts. We expect international agencies to do their share in the effort to balance the budget as the President's budget plan makes clear. However, we, the Administration, should have the flexibility to apply funds to the programs that provide the best results. Earmarks in our programs for the New Independent States, International Counternarcotics, and economic assistance would prevent us from being able to respond to the crisis and unexpected requirements of the post-Cold War world. Further, the proportionality requirement in the new Economic Assistance account restricts our ability to change the distribution of these funds from year to year. We oppose these restrictions. The bill also contains a number of objectionable policy provisions. Restrictions on our ability to contribute to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would, in effect, prevent U.S. funding of KEDO and greatly hinder, if not destroy, the international effort to implement the Agreed Framework. We oppose linking KEDO funding to substantial progress on North Korean/South Korean dialogue. Imposing an artificial and unrealistic deadline on North/South talks, which have taken years to progress, will hold hostage the very funding that will facilitate the progress we all so desire. We remain convinced that the North/South dialogue will move forward substantially as a result of the Agreed Framework and the creation of KEDO. Our failure to contribute to KEDO will threaten its ability to meet its obligations under the Framework and, consequently, invite North Korean non-compliance. The Agreed Framework is working. North Korea has frozen its nuclear weapons program. We need Congressional support for KEDO to keep the freeze in place. Regarding assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) and Russia, we have reached a critical moment in the reform process. Continued funding is essential. It can make a major difference in whether reformers in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and other states will be able to maintain momentum, or the opponents of reform will halt the development of democratic market societies. We need to stay the course for this transitional period, while normal trading and investment relationships develop in the former Soviet states. We very much appreciate the continued support we have received from the Congress, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in particular, for this critical effort, as reflected in this bill. At the same time, however, we oppose new conditions on assistance to the NIS. It is of course tempting to withdraw our assistance as punishment when we do not agree with Russian actions or policies. But this would be a mistake. This assistance is in our national interest. Cutting or restricting aid would hurt reformers, the very people who have protested the war in Chechnya, criticized Russia's proposed nuclear sale to Iran, or insisted that Russia end cooperation with Cuba. We urge you to remove such conditions from this bill. Let me assure you that we share your concerns about Russia's policies in these areas; that is why we continue to work on other fronts to stop the Russian nuclear reactor sale to Iran and to prevent completion of the Cuban reactor project. We also urge you to restore the national security waiver for the certification requirement on violations of territorial integrity, which has been removed from the Senate version of this bill. It is important that the President retain the ability to determine whether the national security of the United States justifies a waiver of this requirement. Moreover, removal of the waiver provision could have unintended consequences, such as prohibiting humanitarian assistance to the victims of regional conflicts in countries such as Armenia. The language regarding restrictions on the termination of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also reflects objectionable House language carried over in the Senate bill. The recent combination of NATO's resolve and energetic United States leadership on the diplomatic front has led to some encouraging opportunities for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. To prematurely close off any avenues that may lead to a diplomatic settlement, including adjustments to the sanctions regime against Serbia, would complicate our efforts. We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counterterrorism programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including non- proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation. There remain other problematic issues in the bill, but we are encouraged by the willingness of the bill's managers to work with us, and we hope that these other issues can be resolved on the Senate floor or in conference. Sincerely, Warren Christopher. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, there is also a letter from Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense, who said: This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. We do not hear much talk about that around here. The nuclear programs and the missile programs of India ought to be a big concern of ours also. Secretary Perry concluded: If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Perry, dated August 2, also be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, August 2, 1995. Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Nunn: For the past six months, the Administration has wrestled with the difficult problem of trying to build a stronger, more flexible relationship with Pakistan--an important moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region which has been a long-time friend and has become a major partner in peacekeeping operations--while promoting the very important nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. Based on a detailed review within the Administration and consultations with Congress, the President has decided to address this matter on three fronts: First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance and limited military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including assistance in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counternarcotics as well as IMET). Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as provided by an amendment to be proposed by Senator Brown, that would release approximately $370 million worth of embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions. This authority would specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the items that would be released are three P-3C [[Page S 13999]] Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s and Cobra helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items will not disturb the conventional arms balance in South Asia which overwhelmingly favors India. Finally, the President has decided that, rather than releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he will seek to sell them to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in the Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale permits, Pakistan's investment in these aircraft. While we recognize that this is not a perfect solution, it is, we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a difficult problem with a country which has long been a friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation. The second aspect of this three-part effort--embodied in Senator Brown's pending amendment to provide authority to release the embargoed Pakistan equipment other than the F- 16s--may be coming to a vote very shortly. I urge you to support our efforts to resolve this problem by supporting Senator Brown's amendment when it is offered. Sincerely, William J. Perry. ____ Putting The Release Of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian Navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five Il-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with the AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-air missiles, the release of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It should be noted that during the nearly five years that these howitzers were embargoed, India acquired over 250 equivalent artillery pieces from Czechoslovakia and Russia/USSR. In regard to MK-46 torpedoes, Pakistan will receive parts that constitute less than one operational MK-46. As for the 2.75" rockets, these constitute a resupply of ammunition for one of the weapons systems on the Pakistani Cobra helicopters--they do not give Pakistan any new capability. ____ Brown Amendment Text Add the following subparagraph to section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: ( ) Applicability.--(a) The restrictions of section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. (b) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 620E(e), military equipment, technology or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts of cases entered into before October 1, 1990. Impact of the Brown Amendment The proposed legislation would authorize the release of approximately $368 million worth of military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler sanctions (1 October 1995) but not delivered to Pakistan due to Pressler sanctions. Specifically prohibited from release to Pakistan under this legislation are the 28 Pakistani F-16s. Items to be released include: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stored Item Stored value Funding quantity (millions) source ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Army: C-NITE modification kits........ 18 $24.1 FMF M198 Howitzers.................. 24 18.7 FMF/Cash TPQ-36 radars................... 4 10.5 FMF M-Series rebuild parts.......... NA 6.8 FMF TOW launchers................... 135 6.1 FMF 2.75 inch rockets............... 16,720 9.4 FMF Miscellaneous Army items........ NA 1.7 FMF/Cash ------------ Army subtotal................. ........ 77.4 ============ Navy: P-3C aircraft................... 3 138.1 FMF Harpoon missiles................ 28 30.8 FMF/Cash AIM-9L missile components....... 360 19.7 FMF/Cash MK-46/Mod 2 torpedo components.. NA .1 Cash Miscellaneous Navy items........ NA 2.1 FMF/Cash ------------ Navy subtotal................. ........ 191.8 ============ Air Force: Peace Gate II support equipment, 220E engine kits............... 30,968 28.5 FMF/Cash Depot engine spares program..... 4,746 8.0 FMF ILC kits: Spares for ILC, ALQ- 131, F-100, ALR-69, support.... 2,035 7.9 FMF/Cash Peace Gate III support package: Peculiar support equipment.. 37 .9 FMF Engine spares............... 511 9.1 FMF Spares...................... 154 1.6 FMF Standard support equipment.. 67 .4 FMF Peace Gate IV support package: Engine components........... 14 .1 Cash Developmental support equipment.................. 144 8.0 Cash Standard support equipment.. 386 1.2 Cash Non-standard support equipment.................. 9 .5 Cash Standard spares............. 204 1.3 Cash Test equipment.............. NA .1 Cash ALQ-131 pods and spares..... 20 21.7 Cash Class A explosives.......... 245,046 1.5 Cash Other Air Force items........... NA 8.2 FMF/Cash ------------ Air Force subtotal............ ........ 98.8 ============ Grand total................... ........ 368 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Initiative to Strengthen Relations with Pakistan After extensive review and consultations with Congress, President Clinton has decided to support legislation to permit a stronger and more flexible relationship with Pakistan, while maintaining the nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment. The President's decision builds on provisions already in the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid Authorization bills, which would permit the United States to resume economic assistance and limited forms of military assistance (including IMET, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and peacekeeping assistance) to Pakistan. The President has decided to seek authority, as provided for in legislation proposed by Senator Brown, to release to Pakistan approximately $370 million in military equipment, exclusive of F-16s, contracted for by Pakistan prior to the imposition of Pressler sanctions in October, 1990. This equipment includes air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, radars, howitzers, three P-3C Orion Aircraft, and support kits for the F-16s already in Pakistan's inventory. This non- strategic equipment does not have the symbolism that the F- 16s have come to acquire in the region. Release of this equipment would be a one-time exemption to the Pressler Amendment. We do not seek repeal of the Amendment or a resumed military supply relationship with Pakistan. The President also decided not to seek release of the 28 F- 16s in the pipeline. Instead, he will seek to sell the aircraft and return the proceeds of any sale to Pakistan, to reimburse as much as possible of the $684 million that Pakistan has expended on these aircraft. Putting these issues behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad, without which real progress on nonproliferation and other issues of importance to the United States will remain difficult. Finally, in making his decision, the President stressed the importance of there being no substantial change in the status quo in Pakistan with regard to nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States. In particular, we expect that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the nuclear and missile areas. Mr. HARKIN. On July 28, to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Christopher responds to a question. [[Page S 14000]] This gets to the heart of the arguments made by the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Michigan about the so-called evidence that justifies the impositions of sanctions. Here was the question: Will the Clinton administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record, also. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club, Washington, DC, July 28, 1995 Question. Will the Clinton Administration order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan and Iran? Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and very closely. At the present time, although there is a fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law in this regard. Mr. HARKIN. Again, I want to point out that under the missile technology Control Regime, which has been talked about by the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Ohio, even under that, even if MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all of the items in the Brown amendment could still go to Pakistan, because MTCR violations only prohibited new licenses to Pakistan and China. These items were already licensed in the 1980's. Again, Mr. President, there is a lot of talk about Pakistan not admitting certain things. I think the Senator from Colorado answered that quite adequately. Again I would just ask a question: Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? We know that they detonated one in 1974. Has India ever admitted that they have a nuclear weapon? If not, are they lying to us, also? I think that is enough of that. Mr. President, I want to close my remarks by pointing out that Pakistan has always gone the extra mile to try to get a reasonable solution and compromise in that part of the world with India. Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. We have India, a large nation with 981 million people, confronting Pakistan, a small country with only about 125 million people. We have to kind of keep that in context. I want to review for my colleagues some of the proposals that Pakistan has put forward, going back over 20 years. First of all, Pakistan proposed to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in south Asia in 1974. In 1978, they proposed to issue a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacturing of nuclear weapons. In 1979, they proposed to have mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities. Also in 1979, they proposed simultaneous adherence to the Non- Proliferation Treaty by India and Pakistan. Again in 1979, they proposed to endorse a simultaneous acceptance of full-scope international atomic energy safeguards and to have the IAEA do inspections. They proposed, also in 1987, an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty. In 1991, Pakistan proposed to commence a multilateral conference on the question of nuclear proliferation in south Asia. A couple years ago, they proposed to create a missile-free zone in all of south Asia. Pakistan has proposed all this. What is the stumbling block? India will not accept any of these. They are the ones that have said ``no'' to all of these proposals. Yet, we are the ones that are sticking it to Pakistan. I do not understand this at all. It seems to me that this is the kind of regime that we want in south Asia. We ought to be behind these proposals, and we ought to be using our influence with India and other countries in that area to agree with Pakistan, to sit down and negotiate these proposals, which were made in good faith by Pakistan. Last, Mr. President, two quotes, first by President Clinton, April 11, 1995: I don't think what happened was fair to Pakistan in terms of the money . . . I don't think it is right for us to keep the money and the equipment. That is not right. And I am going to try to find a resolution to it. I don't like this. President Clinton, April 11, 1995. That is exactly what the Brown amendment does. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Iowa 2 additional minutes. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the President is supporting the Brown amendment because it reflects exactly what President Clinton said April 11. On the same date, Prime Minister Bhutto said: The Pressler amendment has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation issue. April 11, 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, it is time to put this behind us. It is time for fairness and equity. It is time to recognize that if we want to support the democratic forces in Pakistan, if we want to give Prime Minister Bhutto the support she needs to consolidate the prodemocracy forces in Pakistan, then we have to put this behind us. This will do more to help promote a regional solution to these problems than anything else we can do. It is simply a question of fairness and equity. I hope that the vote will be overwhelming, overwhelming in favor of the Brown amendment. Let Pakistan know we will not turn our backs on Pakistan after all of these years of friendship and support that Pakistan has given to us. I yield back whatever time is remaining. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his leadership on this. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Simon. Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I will vote against the Brown amendment, though I agree with much of what my colleague from Iowa has to say. I will vote against any weapons in any amendment that go to Pakistan or India or China until we get this nuclear thing worked out. Many of the things that Senator Harkin says are correct; for example, Pakistan and India, Pakistan suggesting that they have mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and so forth. The difficulty is India also fears China. There has to be a tripartite agreement. I think that necessarily means United States leadership working together with Russia to bring that about. There is no question Pakistan has some legitimate grievances. We ought to get those worked out. I think the Feinstein amendment that is going to be coming along shortly will help to move in that direction. We want to maintain friendship with Pakistan. Pakistan has moved from a dictatorship to a functioning democracy. Like all functioning democracies, it has problems. We ought to be working with Pakistan more closely. However, I do not think we ought to be sending weapons to any one of the three parties, who now have the greatest nuclear threat, I think, anywhere in the world. I think it would be a mistake to approve the Brown amendment. Mr. GLENN. How much time is remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from Ohio that his side has 15 minutes. Mr. GLENN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Levin. Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and my friend from Ohio. Mr. President, the Brown amendment moves us in the opposite direction of trying to restrain missile proliferation. We have a law on our books and it says that where there is a determination that a transfer of a missile with a certain range and payload has been made that we will then impose sanctions. There is a large body of evidence. It is up on the fourth floor. We have had three briefings. The briefers left the [[Page S 14001]] material for us to look at. It is right there, a couple floors above us, for any of us to look at, to see whether or not each of us are satisfied that, in fact, a missile of a certain range and payload in excess of the missile technology control regime has been transferred from China to Pakistan. Under American law, if that occurs, sanctions are supposed to be imposed. Now, what the Brown amendment does is take us in the opposite direction. It would have us amend Pressler, to then allow for the transfer of significant military equipment to Pakistan. Instead of looking at this evidence and deciding whether or not it proves incontrovertible that there has been a transfer of missiles in excess of the range and payload that is provided for in the missile technology control regime which we have incorporated in our law, the amendment before the Senate would say that still could apply, but we will move in exactly the opposite direction. This amendment makes a mockery--if it passes this Senate--will make a mockery of our efforts to restrain the proliferation of missiles. That is the issue before the Senate. It is American law. American law says if there is a transfer of a missile or missiles that meet certain tests, sanctions will be imposed. I do not think we can in good conscience say that we are fighting the proliferation of missiles if we ignore that evidence two floors above us, if we do not take the time to at least look at that evidence two floors above us, and instead of acting on it, whatever our conclusions are, under American law, we move in exactly the opposite direction, amend Pressler, allow for the transfer of military equipment which otherwise could not be transferred. That is the issue before this Senate. I hope we will adopt the Feinstein amendment, which will provide that any appropriate funds that are owed to Pakistan that they have given to us, whatever is equitable, be returned to Pakistan, without trashing the missile technology control regime. I thank the Chair. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I want to deal with an aspect of this that I think is a fundamental problem because we have not addressed it, and maybe we have not addressed it for a good reason. This amendment is about fairness and about the inequity of keeping both their money and their arms. I think Americans will respond strongly to that. They understand it, and would be outraged at any retailer who did the same thing or anyone who signed contracts to sell as well. Other Members have brought up significant issues and concerns about arms in Southeast Asia. That is appropriate, and they should, and it ought to be a concern. It is why I made sure with the adoption of this amendment that very strong sanctions stay in place that send a clear message that Pakistan is paying a price for having developed weapons. Mr. President, the aspect of this that needs Members' attention is this: We have sanctions that will sanction Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, but we do not have sanctions that will sanction India for developing nuclear weapons. They are two nations, side by side. The fact is, Pakistan's program literally came about in part because India was Pakistan's adversary and India developed nuclear weapons. We cannot ignore that when you think about trying to solve this problem. There has been a lot of concern raised about missiles. That is a valid concern. I think we need to do more in that area. Mr. President, you cannot talk about it in a vacuum. The fact is, Pakistan developed their program after India developed weapons, and there are strong indications that the potential of Pakistan's missiles, if they have them and if they uncrate them, is somewhat similar to what the potential of the Indian missiles are. If anything, India has stronger missiles. You cannot talk about this in a vacuum. If you do talk about it in a vacuum and you think about it in a vacuum, you are doomed to failure. We want a nonproliferation program that works, that is effective. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Iowa. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I want to respond, perhaps, to my colleague from Illinois who talked about the weapons going to Pakistan. I have looked over the list of the items that are going. I thought I might, just for the Record, point out what some people have said about these items. All of the experts agree, it will not in any way upset the regional balance. Steve Cohen is the director of program in arms control, disarmament and international security at the University of Illinois. He said, In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think that the release of this military equipment . . . will have . . . significant impact on the balance one way or the other. George Tanham, who was a vice president of the Rand Corp., says, ``I agree.'' He said: In fact, there is no balance now. India dominates so strongly. They have twice as large an army as Pakistan, twice as large an Air Force, twice as large a Navy, twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. * * * India has overwhelming strength. So this small amount of equipment will not upset any balance. All of the experts basically agree that this amount of items that we are sending over there would not in any way upset that regional balance. James Clad, professor at Georgetown University said: They offer for Pakistan ``exactly as Dr. Tanham pointed out, an equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry capability and geographical reality.'' So, again, I have gone over this list. I do not know if anyone has ever put it in the Record. But of the military equipment, adding to about $368 million, the biggest items are three P-C3 aircraft, four- engine turboprop aircraft. They are very slow aircraft. They do not have the capability in any way to threaten India, and I would be glad to get into a discussion with anyone if they would like to discuss that. I want to make sure this is in the Record. I ask unanimous consent a list of the items be printed in the Record and also a description of these items be printed in the Record at this point. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Putting the Release of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment Into Perspective The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 million as has been reported. Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems: It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft. It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new weapons system for the region as the Indian navy already has two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that include five II-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes. The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that provided by three P-3s. C-NITE would enable Pak Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan. The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with an AN/ALR-69 radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits that would be released would enhance the reliability of these systems rather than provide any new military capability. Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air- to-missiles, the release [[Page S 14002]] of 360 more will not provide any new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000). The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a significant difference. It would be noted that during the